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SWEDISH SUMMARY 
Parkhouse, Anna (2013). Does speed matter? The impact of the EU 
membership incentive on rule adoption in minority language rights protection. 
(Spelar hastigheten någon roll? Effekten av EU-medlemskapet som 
incitament för minoritetsspråkslagstiftning). Skriven på engelska med en 
sammanfattning på svenska. 
Denna avhandling tar sin utgångspunkt i ett ifrågasättande av 
effektiviteten i EU:s konditionalitetspolitik avseende minoritetsrättig- 
heter. Baserat på den rationalistiska teoretiska modellen, External 
Incentives Model of Governance, syftar denna hypotesprövande avhandling 
till att förklara om tidsavståndet på det potentiella EU medlemskapet 
påverkar lagstiftningsnivån hos stater som omsluts av EU:s 
konditionalitetspolitik avseende minoritetsspråksrättigheter. Mätningen 
av nivån på lagstiftningen avseende minoritetsspråksrättigheter 
begränsas till att omfatta icke-diskriminering, användning av 
minoritetsspråk i officiella sammanhang samt minoriteters språkliga 
rättigheter i utbildningen. Metodologiskt används ett jämförande 
angreppssätt både avseende tidsramen för studien, som sträcker sig 
mellan 2003 och 2010, men även avseende urvalet av stater. På basis av 
det ”mest lika systemet” kategoriseras staterna i tre grupper efter deras 
olika tidsavstånd från det potentiella EU medlemskapet. Hypotesen som 
prövas är följande: ju kortare tidsavstånd till det potentiella EU 
medlemskapet desto större sannolikhet att staternas lagstiftningsnivå 
inom de tre områden som studeras har utvecklats till en hög nivå.  
 
Studien visar att hypotesen endast bekräftas delvis. Resultaten avseende 
icke-diskriminering visar att sambandet mellan tidsavståndet och nivån 
på lagstiftningen har ökat markant under den undersökta tidsperioden. 
Detta samband har endast stärkts mellan kategorin av stater som ligger 
tidsmässigt längst bort ett potentiellt EU medlemskap och de två 
kategorier som ligger närmare respektive närmast ett potentiellt EU 
medlemskap. Resultaten avseende användning av minoritetsspråk i 
officiella sammanhang och minoriteters språkliga rättigheter i 
utbildningen visar inget respektive nästan inget samband mellan 
tidsavståndet och utvecklingen på lagstiftningen mellan 2003 och 2010. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
“Language is culture. And language 
 is power.”1 
Framing the problem 
Norms have become the buzz-word in IR-studies as well as in European 
Union studies. One explanation for the avalanche of studies on how 
norms impact or influence political outcome is linked to the end of the 
Cold War, which paves the way for a new dimension of morality in 
international relations. I argue that this dimension of morality is two-fold. 
On the one hand, there is an emphasis upon common liberal norms to 
guide how international relations ought to be conducted between states. 
On the other hand, there are emerging supranational norms on how 
states should behave towards their populations, within the domestic 
jurisdiction of states. This has consequently entailed that international 
norms and ideational phenomena are argued to have an increasing 
impact on state behaviour and political outcome. 
 
As a consequence of the incapacity of the international community to 
stop, let alone prevent, the violent interethnic conflicts in the Western 
Balkans and the genocide in Rwanda, the prescriptive norm of the 
Responsibility to Protect2 (R2P) was launched in the beginning of the 
2000s. The promotion of the R2P was made in an attempt to bridge the 
contradicting norms of the protection of universal human rights with the 
traditional conception of sovereignty, based on non-interference. Thus, by 
                                                          
1“Opening Statement by Mr Jonas Gahr Störe, Foreign Minister of Norway” in “Linguistic 
Rights of National Minorities ten years after the Oslo Recommendations and beyond. 
Safeguarding Linguistic Rights: Identity and Participation in Multilingual Societies”, 
Conference Report, Organised by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(HCNM) and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), University of Oslo 18-19 
June 2008, Annex 1, p. 28. 
2 The Responsibility to Protect-norm was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005; 
cf. GA Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, October 24, 2005, paragraphs 138-
139. The R2P norm has also been endorsed by quite a number of regional security 
organisations.  
18 
adding a conditionality criterion to state sovereignty, linked to the notion 
of responsibility, this would legitimise intervention from the international 
community should the state in question fail to guarantee the protection of 
its population. (ICISS 2001: 7-8) Apart from difficulties as to 
implementation the problem of the R2P norm is that it is exclusively 
based on the protection of universal human rights tout court and fails to 
address the issue of minority rights protection. This shortcoming raises 
several challenges as to the prevention of future violent conflicts seeing as 
how “conflicts over the handling of ethno-cultural diversity are no doubt 
the main threat to regional security in the Western Balkans” (Tsilevich in 
Kymlicka & Opalski 2001: 169). 
 
Already in the beginning of the 1990’s European organisations had, 
however, responded to the new security threats not only in the Balkans 
but also in the Caucasus by elevating minority rights protection to “a 
matter of legitimate international concern…” as articulated by the OSCE 
Copenhagen Declaration of 1990 (Kymlicka 2007: 173). Thus, minority 
rights protection would no longer constitute an exclusively internal affair 
of the respective States but was increasingly becoming part of a 
responsibility of the international community. A few years later both 
NATO and the EU made membership in their respective organisations 
conditional upon minority rights protection in the candidate states3. The 
norm of minority rights protection, not part of the EU acquis, however, 
imposed as a political condition in the Copenhagen convergence criteria 
of 1993, has often been “singled out as a prime example of the EU’s 
positive impact on democracy in Central and Eastern Europe” (Sasse 
2008: 842). This has resulted in a situation where there seems to be almost 
a consensual understanding that the EU exerts strong and multifaceted 
influence on states on track of EU-accession. (Keukelaire & MacNaughtan 
2008: 228) 
 
Most research on EU political conditionality have been based on the 
perspective of conditionality as a bargaining process and have primarily 
been focused on explaining conditionality-compliance from territorial 
                                                          
3 Minority rights protection was included in the Copenhagen criteria, adopted in 1993, 
and was made conditional upon the acceding states for becoming EU members. Cf. 
European Council, “Conclusions of the Presidency”, DOC SN 180/1/93 REV, Copenhagen, 
21-22 June 1993, p. 13, http://ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/documents/abc/72921_en.pdf, 2011-02-
21. 
19 
and functional perspectives. Consequently, variations in norm comp-
liance and policy change have largely been explained by national 
preferences, domestic costs (Moravcsik 1998; Schimmelfennig et al. 2002; 
Schimmefennig & Sedelmeier 2002; Schimmelfennig 2003; 
Schimmelfennig & Schwellnus 2006) but also by the nature of the policy 
areas as well as the size and speed of rewards. (Schimmelfennig; Kelley 
2004; Grabbe in Featherstone & Radaelli 2003) In the External Incentives 
Model of Governance, which is based on the strategy of reinforcement by 
reward, the size and speed of reward dimension has proven successful in 
explaining norm compliance. (Schimmelfennig et al. 2002; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2002; Schimmelfennig 2003; 
Schimmelfennig & Schwellnus 2006; Kelley 2004) However, since the 
results are largely limited to research pertaining to the candidate states of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEEs), which were at least initially assumed 
to acquire EU membership at the same time, the explanatory power of the 
speed dimension has never been properly investigated since it has always 
been overshadowed by the size of reward dimension. Furthermore, in the 
former candidate states of the Eastern enlargements, the explicit promise 
of EU membership and its subsequent benefits can be argued to have 
been a forceful incentive for norm compliance and policy change. In 
addition, even though the deadline for accession was not stated until late 
in the accession negotiations, it has been argued that the timetables set by 
the EU Commission or the “instruments of temporality played a key role 
in driving institutional action and political decisions in the process of 
expansion of the EU” (Avery 2009: 256). 
 
However, one can only speculate on its effectiveness since no systematic 
analysis has been carried out as to how the “instruments of temporality” 
of the membership incentive in fact impacts on norm compliance in the 
area of minority rights protection in states “on track” of EU accession but 
with neither explicit promise of EU membership nor any specified 
temporal location associated with it. Furthermore, since there can be 
noted considerable reluctance on the part of some EU states4 to accept 
                                                          
4 Reluctance towards future enlargement, “at least additional expansion eastwards” has 
for instance been recurrent statements in both France and Italy although there seems to 
have been a reorientation at least in the French policy towards a more positive stance 
since 2008. (Berglund et al. 2009: 94) However, at the same time France along with Austria 
have both stated that future EU-enlargements might become cause for national referenda, 
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further enlargements in the near future, one could assume that the 
membership incentive is a less forceful instrument to make states comply 
with EU political conditionality. In fact, it has been convincingly argued 
that for norm compliance to be effective “target states need to be certain 
that they are rewarded with significant steps toward accession (soon) 
after complying with the EU’s political conditions” (Schimmelfennig 
2008: 920). Furthermore, in some of the current states on track of EU 
accession, state-minority relations are more securitised than was the case 
in the candidate states of the Central and Eastern European enlargements 
of 2004 and 2007. This in turn would suggest that norm compliance and 
domestic change most likely would entail higher adaptation costs to the 
recipient states thus rendering norm compliance and policy change more 
costly than was the case in the former candidate states of Central and 
Eastern Europe. However, since there has been no systematic analysis 
carried out as to how the temporal dimension of the membership 
incentive in fact impacts on the current recipient states’ propensity to 
comply with EU minority rights conditionality we can still only make 
assumptions about this. 
Research objective 
My doctoral dissertation is anchored in the nexus between International 
Relations and International Law with the purpose to investigate how 
effective the EU membership incentive is on recipient states’ propensity 
to comply with EU minority rights conditionality. More specifically this 
will be done by examining to what extent the speed of the prospective EU 
membership reward impacts on norm compliance in the area of EU 
minority language rights conditionality in states on track of EU accession. 
Minority language rights are investigated pertaining to three categories, 
the non-discrimination norm, the use of minority languages in official 
contexts and minority language rights in education. Based on the External 
Incentives Model of Governance, the study departs from a rationalist 
account of international relations which posits that actors are rational and 
driven by a motivation to act to maximise their power and welfare. In the 
states constituting our empirical base, enlargement preferences are 
assumed to be strong which consequently means that the prospect of the 
EU membership reward is argued to be a strong incentive for compliance 
                                                                                                                                                
however these statements have more been related to discussions on future Turkish EU 
membership.  
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with EU norms and rules in the area under investigation. However, since 
the states under investigation have a much more cumbersome and 
uncertain trajectory of becoming EU-members than was the case in the 
former candidate states of the CEEs, however, differing as regards to their 
temporal distance to the prospective EU membership reward, the 
efficiency of the EU membership incentive is argued to be heavily 
influenced by how speedily the prospective reward is distributed. Based 
on the rationalist perspective, the speed of the prospective EU 
membership reward is understood as a constraint and an opportunity 
and is argued to constitute the main driving force of adaptation pressure 
in the conditionality-compliance process. On the basis thereof, it is 
claimed that the nearer recipient states are to the prospective EU 
membership reward, the higher the adaptation pressure and the more 
likely recipient states will comply with EU norms and rules. Vice versa, 
the further away from EU accession, the lower the adaptation pressure 
and the more likely norm compliance will be low. 
 
Another central claim in this study is that there has been an increasing 
legalisation of international norms and rules, which are argued to 
constitute an important mechanism to make recipient states comply with 
diffused norms and rules. Legalisation is to be understood as a particular 
type of institutionalisation, imposing international legal constraints on 
recipient states thereby facilitating and constraining states into 
compliance. Norm compliance is solely equated with legislation adopted, 
which consequently means that the impact of the speed of the prospective 
EU membership reward is measured against the level of rule adoption in 
the area of minority language rights in the recipient states forming the 
empirical base. This furthermore entails that the level of rule adoption is 
assumed to vary according to how speedily the prospective EU 
membership reward is distributed. 
 
On the basis of these claims it is argued that the nearer the recipient states 
are to the prospective EU-membership reward the higher the adaptation 
pressure and consequently the more likely the level of rule adoption 
would be high. Vice versa, the further away from the prospective EU 
membership reward, the lower the adaptation pressure thus the more 
likely the level of rule adoption would be low (speed of reward 
hypothesis). 
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Fig. 1.1. Speed of reward hypothesis and level of rule adoption 
 
Temporal distance        level of adaptation      level of rule  
to EU membership pressure  adoption   
reward     
    
Close to EU mem-             high level of                  high level of              
bership reward adaptation pressure  rule adoption
      
Distant to EU mem-  low level of  low level of  
bership reward adaptation pressure rule adoption 
 
 
Methodologically, the research question presupposes a comparative 
approach, both in terms of the temporal distance to the prospective EU 
membership reward, but also in terms of the time-frame of the analysis. 
By using the most similar systems design, the selection of states has been 
made according to a set of similar criteria, considered crucial for the 
investigation, where the only divergence is the recipient states’ temporal 
distance to the prospective EU membership reward. Croatia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Serbia, Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are all aspiring 
towards EU membership but are temporally situated at very different 
stages in the EU conditionality process. In order to measure the 
explanatory power of the speed dimension’s impact on the level of rule 
adoption, a comparative approach in terms of the time-frame of the 
analysis has also been required. This consequently entails that, on the 
basis of the recipient states’ temporal location from the prospective EU 
membership reward, the impact of the speed dimension is measured 
against the progress made in the level of rule adoption in the recipient 
states during the time-frame of the analysis which has been confined to 
2003 – 2010. It is thus hypothesised that the nearer the recipient states are 
to the prospective EU membership reward the more likely they are to 
have progressed to a high level of rule adoption. Vice versa, the further 
away the recipient states are to the prospective EU membership reward, 
the more likely their progression in the level of rule adoption will be 
lower. 
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Fig. 1.2. Speed of reward hypothesis and progression in the level of rule adoption 
 
Close to EU mem-         high level of adaptation           progressed to a high 
bership reward pressure level of rule  
   adoption 
 
Distant to EU mem-  low level of adaptation   progressed to a low 
bership reward pressure level of rule 
  adoption 
 
 
Although this investigation focuses exclusively on the impact of the 
speed of the prospective EU membership reward on variations in the 
level of rule adoption, it needs to be stressed that the author does in no 
way adhere to mono-causality as an explanation of political outcome. 
Pertaining to the investigation at hand, there is no doubt that several 
other factors most probably have a bearing on the level of rule adoption. 
For instance, Grabbe has accounted for dimensions of uncertainty from 
the perspective of recipient states as regards the nature of the policy 
areas, which is assumed to undermine the effectiveness of norm 
compliance. (Grabbe in Featherstone & Radaelli 2003: 318-323) The 
uncertainties surrounding the policy agenda recipient states should 
undertake is particularly blatant as regards to the softer forms of norms, 
like minority rights protection, where the international legal framework is 
limited and furthermore displays inconsistencies in comparison with the 
more encompassing human rights framework. Subsequently, this could 
entail unclear formulations, on the part of the international organisations, 
both in terms of standards to be adopted as well as thresholds to be 
attained which could ultimately have a hampering effect on norm 
compliance simply because recipient states are uncertain which measures 
need to be adopted. 
 
Uncertainties surrounding the policy agenda could also relate to 
situations of contested policy advice where an international organisation 
could advance conflicting norms as to conditions to be adopted or where 
conditions advanced have not fully been adopted by the member states 
themselves. Grigorescu for one has shown that the EU has experienced 
difficulties in promoting norms that existing member states had not fully 
adopted themselves. (Grigorescu 2002: 482) Domestically, the size of 
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adoption costs could vary in relation to what impact rule adoption would 
have on welfare costs and power costs and how these are distributed 
between domestic actors, both public as well as private. Furthermore, 
since rule adoption is carried out by the government in place, variations 
in government preferences as well as preferences of “veto-players” are 
likely to have an impact on as to what extent legislation is adopted. 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 675) Thus, having in mind that other 
factors, both domestic as well as international, are likely to have an 
impact on rule adoption, the research at hand however is only focused 
upon investigating the impact of the speed of the prospective EU 
membership on the level of rule adoption in the selected states, on track 
of EU accession. 
A note on the theoretical framework 
Questions on what makes actors comply with rules and norms have 
occupied IR researchers and EU scholars alike and whether you adhere to 
sociological institutionalism or rationalist institutionalism, the underlying 
rationale is based on questions of social control, however differing on 
what types of mechanisms make states comply with external 
requirements. Thus, a great number of contemporary studies on 
compliance can be categorised as either being based on the rational choice 
model or on the sociological model. Compliance according to the 
sociological model works through the mechanisms of persuasion and 
socialisation which entails that in order for compliance to succeed the 
recipient actor needs to have internalised the norm thereby creating a 
change in the belief system. (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Checkel 2000, 
2001, 2005) Compliance is then equated with when a norm “will become 
legitimate to a specific individual, and therefore become behaviourally 
significant, when the individual internalizes its content and re-conceives 
his or her interests according to the rule” (Hurd 1999: 388). 
 
On the other side of the spectrum, the rationalist perspective has not been 
concerned with the legitimacy of norms per se since compliance is looked 
upon solely from the perspective of states as being rational actors that, 
based on cost-benefit calculations, either choose to comply out of self-
interest or out of coercion. The rationalist perspective then pays no 
interest to whether there has been any belief change or not but equates 
compliance with behavioural change. More and more there have been 
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efforts to bridge the sociological-rationalist divide by cross-fertilising the 
two perspectives in order to better be able to explain what makes states 
comply with rules and norms imposed from the outside. Based on the 
argument of increasing complexity of international relations, this would 
in turn necessitate that researchers employ both paradigms since each 
“generates a different set of variables for analyzing the breach and 
compliance with international norms” (Hirsch cited in Pulkowski 2006: 
515). On the basis of my research aim and as much research on EU 
conditionality show, however, the perspective taken here is that 
incentive-based methods are more effective than methods based on 
persuasion in motivating state governments to comply with the 
conditions set. (Schimmelfennig 2002; 2003; 2006; Kelley 2004) As shown 
by Kelley for instance, the sociological model has only limited 
explanatory power to account for why states comply with external 
requirements and make policy changes (se figure below). 
 
Fig. 1.3. Receptivity of policymakers to external requirements (Kelley 2004: 432) 
 
  Institutional preference 
  
 
Cannot be Can be Can be  Do not need to   
enticed enticed persuaded be persuaded 
 Policy  
 Persuasion  preferences 
 Works 
    
  Political conditionality works 
   
 
 
However, even though this investigation is actor-oriented and premised 
on the assumption that states are rationally-driven actors, motivated by 
self-interested goals, normative values are considered embedded in the 
self-interested calculations that states make. The example of minority 
rights is particularly interesting because of the controversial nature of 
these norms. Indeed, minority rights have been perceived, and acted out 
on, as highly securitised and as a matter of the highest national security 
interest in the states under investigation, having resulted in violent ethnic 
26 
conflicts. Thus, minority rights demands have been perceived of as 
challenging the very survival of states and consequently have been an 
inhibiting factor as to why recipient state governments have been 
adamantly opposed to granting specific collective rights to national 
minorities inhabiting the state territory. So if the minority rights norms 
are not considered legitimate it would not be in the interest of the 
recipient state government to abide by the external requirements set by 
an international actor. In that case, neither persuasion, nor external 
incentives will produce norm compliance because the recipient state 
cannot be enticed by the conditions set or by the institutional preference 
diffused by the international actor (EU). Cost-benefit calculations would 
then result in a lack of norm-compliance and result in no policy changes 
because no matter what the stakes, the costs to comply would be 
calculated as too high. At the same time, it could be argued that however 
illegitimate the recipient state government would perceive the granting of 
collective rights to minority groups, norm compliance and policy change 
could take place if the prospective benefits to be reaped were calculated 
as higher than the costs to be paid because then it would be in the interest 
of the state to comply. A central claim of this study is that the 
enlargement preferences of the states under investigation are strong 
foreign policy determinants, making the prospective EU membership 
reward an effective mechanism to induce non-member states to comply 
with EU norms and rules. 
 
Norms, rules and policies are usually understood as institutions which 
are social phenomena “that can create stable patterns of collective and 
individual behaviour” (Mörth cited in Featherstone & Radaelli 2003: 161). 
At the same time, international rules and norms are seldom clear and 
incontestable which subsequently creates room for interpretation both 
from the point of view of the recipient states but also from the perspective 
of the international actor that sets the conditions. This in turn makes 
norms and rules not only as constraining and facilitating actors’ 
behaviour but “they can also form actors’ preferences and interests” 
(Mörth cited in Featherstone & Radaelli 2003: 161). The assumption of this 
study is that norms are held collectively and that state action is rule 
governed, on the basis of norms laid down in treaties, conventions and 
declarations. That state action is rule governed means that norms and 
rules are understood as action-guiding devices. The controversial nature 
of the norms of minority rights has led to that these norms have been 
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both inconsistent and incoherent and have displayed weaknesses in both 
clarity as well as legality making it at times unclear to the  recipient states 
what kind of changes are deemed necessary to adjust to EU norms and 
rules. (Mörth in Featherstone & Radaelli 2003: 160) 
 
Schimmelfennig et al. have argued that compliance with norms is 
facilitated by how determinate the norms set as conditions are. 
Determinacy of norms would refer to both the clarity and legality which 
would entail that “the clearer the behavioural implications of a rule, and 
the more ’legalized’ its status, the higher its determinacy” 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 672). Whether legalised norms 
create a specific compliance pull of their own, different to the softer forms 
of norms is an issue of controversy and can only be established by 
empirical investigation. However, I argue that the increasing legalisation 
of international norms has meant that both legally as well as non-legally 
binding norms have an impact on states’ behaviour. Subsequently this 
would entail that the distinction between “vertical” (EU directives) and 
“horizontal” (suggestion of best practice) (Harcourt in Featherstone & 
Radaelli 2003: 181) institutionalisation or hard law as opposed to soft law 
might not be theoretically relevant any longer.  
 
I argue that it is theoretically more relevant to categorise norms and rules 
according to a legal continuum where international norms display 
varying degrees of legalisation. Taken in this study, legalisation is 
understood as “a particular form of institutionalization characterized by 
three components: obligation, precision and delegation” (Abbott et al. 
2000: 401). Therefore, international norms can be defined as being harder 
or softer according to the various dimensions such as degrees of 
precision, obligation and delegation where each end of the legal 
continuum should be understood as ideal types. Inspired by Abbott et al., 
the concept of legalisation in this study is understood as encompassing “a 
multidimensional continuum, ranging from the “ideal type” of 
legalization, where all three properties are maximized; to “hard” 
legalization, where all three (or at least obligation and delegation) are 
high; through multiple forms of partial or “soft” legalization involving 
different combinations of attributes; and finally to the complete absence 
of legalization, another ideal type” (Abbott et al. 2000: 401-402).  
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Legal obligation refers to when states or other actors are “legally bound by 
a rule or commitment in the sense that their behaviour there under is 
subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of 
international law, and often of domestic law as well” (Abbott et al. 2000: 
401). The dimension of precision refers to the status of the norm, in terms 
of how unambiguous and coherent the norm is; precision would then 
refer to rules which “unambiguously define the conduct they require, 
authorize, or proscribe” (Abbott et al. 2000: 401). Delegation finally, refers 
to when “third parties have been granted authority to implement, 
interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make 
further rules” (Abbott et al. 2000: 401). 
 
Fig. 1.4. Dimensions of legalisation (Abbott et al. 2000: 404) 
 
Obligation Expressly  Binding rule (jus cogens) 
(o) non legal norm  (O) 
 
Precision Vague         Precise, highly 
elaborated 
(p) principle  rule (P) 
 
Delegation Diplomacy                 International court,  
(d)    organisation; domestic 
    application (D) 
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2 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The External Incentives Model of Governance: 
theoretical assumptions and expectations 
The terminology surrounding conditionality can come in many disguises; 
researchers use terms, sometimes interchangeably, like political 
conditionality, democratic conditionality, membership conditionality and 
conditionality tout court to describe an asymmetrical bargaining situation 
in which a donor actor sets conditions upon which the recipient states 
either comply and get the conditional rewards or fail to comply and don’t 
get the rewards. Whereas conditionality usually refers to a “strategy 
whereby a reward is granted or withheld depending on the fulfilment of 
an attached condition” (Tocci 2007: 10), political conditionality is 
specifically narrowed down to mean “the linking, by a state or 
international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state, to the 
fulfilment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the 
advancement of democratic principles” (Smith cited in Tocci 2007: 10).  
 
The External Incentives Model of Governance is based on the strategy of 
reinforcement by reward and the material bargaining mechanism where 
recipient states are offered material benefits or other “tangible political 
rewards in return for compliance” (Schimmelfennig 2003: 497). 
Reinforcement is then a form of “social control by which pro-social 
behaviour is rewarded and anti-social behaviour is punished” 
(Schimmelfennig et al. 2002: 2). Reinforcement as a means of social 
control then enables the EU to choose different reinforcement strategies 
should the recipient state not comply with the conditions set. In the 
empirical investigations on conditionality-compliance in the candidate 
states of the Eastern enlargements of 2004 and 2007, Schimmelfennig’s 
analytical framework is based on a unidirectional relationship where the 
EU sets conditions upon which the recipient states either comply and get 
rewarded or don’t comply thus causing the EU to withhold the rewards 
(reactive reinforcement). (Schimmelfennig et al. 2002: 3)  
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The asymmetry in the conditionality-compliance process was evident in 
the negotiations leading up to the Eastern enlargements of 2004 and 2007 
since the EU had all the benefits to offer, in the form of trade and aid but 
primarily the explicit promise of EU-membership, and the recipient states 
had little to bargain with. According to Grabbe, this “asymmetry of 
interdependence allows the European Union to set the rules of the game 
in the accession conditionality” (Grabbe in Featherstone & Radaelli 
2003:318). The asymmetrical bargaining situation is possibly even more 
pertinent as regards the states under investigation and places the EU in a 
powerful bargaining situation since the current states on track of EU-
accession have even less, at least economically, to bargain with. However, 
as regards primarily the states of the Western Balkans, it is at the same 
time argued that the EU also has an interest in that these states can 
integrate into the EU. EU interests are primarily security-related in nature 
since concerns over regional instability, especially the unfolding of the 
Kosovo conflict, are to be understood as the main driving forces behind 
the EU decision to offer these states the prospect of EU membership. 
(Friis & Murphy 2000: 767) Thus, although the bargaining situation is 
based on the logic of asymmetrical interdependence5, the instability of the 
applicant states, primarily grounded in challenging minority-majority 
relations, is argued to have an impact on the bargaining process.  
 
Hence, EU strategy is presumed to be more proactive in nature which can 
be seen in that conflict resolution mechanisms have accompanied EU 
political conditionality. Proactive reinforcement, according to 
Schimmelfennig, can be both coercive and supportive. Coercive 
reinforcement is defined as when an international organisation “not only 
withholds the rewards but inflicts extra punishment on the non-
compliant state in order to increase the costs of non-compliance beyond 
the costs of compliance” and if the punishment is effective the state will 
comply. (Schimmelfennig et al. 2002: 3) Supportive reinforcement is also 
proactive however distinguished from coercive reinforcement in that it is 
used to give “extra support to the non-compliant state in order to 
decrease the costs of compliance or to enable S (state) to fulfil the 
conditions” (Schimmelfennig et al. 2002: 3). If the support outweighs the 
costs of compliance, the state will comply.  
                                                          
5 The term was first introduced in IR literature by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye; 
cf. Keohane, R., O. & Nye, J., S. (1977) Power and Interdependence. Boston: Little, Brown.  
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The distinction between supportive, i.e. the carrot and coercive 
reinforcement, i.e. the stick, is however not clear-cut, neither is the 
distinction between reactive and proactive reinforcement. In fact, they are 
all based on the two mechanisms of social control, coercion and self-
interest. Indeed, according to my line of reasoning the two mechanisms of 
coercion and self-interest are interrelated in that they are both forms of 
utilitarianism in which recipient states are presented with some sort of 
sanction, be it threat or reward. Hurd, for example has stated that “when 
an actor is presented with a situation of choice that involves threats and 
reprisals or where the available choices have been manipulated by others, 
the self-interest and coercion model will follow the same logic and predict 
the same outcome” (Hurd 1999: 385). However, since the bargaining 
situation between the EU and the recipient states is presumed to entail 
higher stakes both for the recipient states as well as for the EU, than was 
the case in the negotiations leading up to the Eastern enlargements of 
2004 and 2007, the EU reinforcement strategy is however assumed to be 
more proactive, entailing a more dynamic bargaining situation, however 
asymmetrical this bargaining process may be. 
 
Fig. 2.1. Strategies of conditionality (Schimmelfennig et al. 2002: 3) 
 
EU Recipient state EU 
Sets conditions  Compliance with Rewards 
 conditions   
  Withholds rewards 
  (reactive reinforcement) 
 
Sets conditions  Non-compliance  Inflicts punishment 
 with conditions        (coercive reinforcement)  
  
 Gives support 
 (supportive reinforcement)
   
 
The most general proposition of the external incentives model of 
governance based on the strategy of reinforcement by reward is that 
based on the reward incentive recipient states’ choose to comply with EU 
rules and norms set as conditions if the benefits to be had are calculated 
as exceeding the domestic costs to be paid. Thus, the bigger the 
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prospective rewards the more likely recipient states are to comply with 
EU conditionality. In the EU strategy of reinforcement by reward, sources 
of variation pertain to the determinacy of conditions, the credibility of 
conditions, the size of adoption costs in the recipient states as well as the 
size and speed of rewards. To reiterate, this dissertation only concerns 
itself with investigating the explanatory power of the speed of the 
prospective EU membership reward and consequently leaves out the 
other sources of variation. 
The size of EU rewards as an incentive of norm compliance 
Even though rewards can be both social (pertaining to the normative 
power of the EU) as well as material and political (financial assistance, 
trade relations and institutional ties), the investigation at hand only 
concerns itself with the latter. Thus, although the author does recognise 
that the symbolic value of the EU, i.e. being part of the European club and 
adhering to European values and norms, might have an effect on states’ 
willingness to comply with EU norms and rules, this value-based 
incentive is assumed to be of little significance. It is therefore claimed that 
the promise or the prospect of political and material rewards is more 
effective in making external states abide by the rules and norms set by the 
EU.  
 
Material and political rewards can come as two kinds of benefits, namely 
assistance and institutional ties. Assistance can be both technical and 
financial in nature and mostly come as EU-funding of different projects 
and establishment of EU trade relations with the recipient states. These 
are furthermore normally established as a way of facilitating recipient 
states’ compliance with EU political conditionality. Institutional ties come 
in the form of different trade and cooperation agreements which later are 
followed by association agreements. The next stage of the association 
agreements is accession agreements which are automatically expected to 
lead to full EU-membership which is the ultimate and strongest 
institutional tie. Primarily due to divergent interests of the EU member 
states on finding common strategies as to how to deal with the security 
challenges of the Western Balkan states, since unanimity in the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar6, the Stability Pact for South 
                                                          
6 The three pillar construct was established by the Maastricht Treaty, ratified in 1993, but 
was formally made obsolete in December 2009 by the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.   
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Eastern Europe (SPSEE) and the Stabilisation and Association Process 
(SAP), launched in 2000, was developed outside of the framework of a 
common strategy. (Keukelaire & MacNaughtan 2008: 156)  
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2004 as an 
incentive of associating both the neighbouring Mediterranean states as 
well as the Eastern European states into a contractual relationship with 
the aim of tying the signatory states, both politically as well as 
economically, to the EU. It is evident that one of the primary rationales 
behind linking particularly the Eastern European states but also the states 
of the Western Balkans into this type of conditionality-compliance 
process is the increased possibility to exert pressure on these recipient 
states in order to prevent future violent conflicts on the doorstep to the 
EU. Furthermore, although the Eastern European states “are not likely to 
be EU candidates in the foreseeable future” (...) several of the eastern 
neighbours have EU membership as an explicit aim” (Berglund et al. 
2009: 92).  
 
On the basis of Alderson’s categorisation of four different socialisation 
mechanisms international organisations have to exert influence on 
external states, Bauhr & Nasiritousi have constructed a theoretical 
framework with the aim of analysing the effectiveness and the 
shortcomings inherent in each of the four mechanisms. The four 
mechanisms are: Inter-state competitive pressures; Conditions on 
economic assistance; Interaction with transnational actors and finally, 
Enlargement of international communities. (Bauhr & Nasiritousi 2009: 16-
17)  
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Table 2.1. How International Organisations promote norm diffusion (revised 
chart on the basis of the theoretical framework provided by Bauhr & Nasiritousi 
2009: 16-17) 
 
Mechanisms Means of norm 
diffusion 
Intended Effects 
A:Interstate 
competitive 
pressures 
A: Governance 
rankings 
 
B: Competition for 
foreign direct 
investment 
A: Governments 
enact reforms to 
improve state image 
B: Governments 
enact reforms to 
attract investment 
B: Conditions on 
economic assistance 
Structural adjustment 
and aid conditionality 
Governments enact 
reforms to receive 
aid or loans 
C: Interaction with 
International 
organisations 
IO-led workshops, 
capacity-building, 
knowledge-sharing, 
meetings, etc. 
Socialisation 
D: Enlargement of 
international 
communities 
Membership process of 
certain IOs 
Prospective 
members enact 
governmental 
reforms in order to 
increase their 
chances of 
membership 
 
 
The categorisation of the four mechanisms made by Bauhr and 
Nasiritousi is interesting and one could quite easily identify that the 
mechanism used by the EU as regards the Stabilisation and Association 
Process (SAp) of the Western Balkans pertains to the enlargement of 
international communities whereas the European Neighbourhood Policy 
would rather pertain to conditions on economic assistance. However and 
as rightly noted by the authors, in practice the different mechanisms are 
not easily separable since economic assistance usually is linked to 
institutional ties and vice versa. The interaction of the different 
mechanisms was clear in the previous enlargement rounds of 2004 and 
2007 and is also blatant as concerns the Western Balkan states. In effect, in 
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order to facilitate the road to the prospective EU membership SAp-
conditionality is not only based on the stabilisation and association 
agreements through which the EU sets conditions on a bilateral basis for 
each recipient state. The framework is also based on trade concessions 
and different aid programmes, especially the Community Assistance for 
Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation programme (CARDS), 
established with the aim of furthering peace and stability in the region. 
The interdependence of the mechanisms is also blatant regarding the 
European Neighbourhood Policy where economic assistance and aid 
conditionality are closely tied to political conditionality. 
 
Since enlargement preferences are assumed to be strong determinants in 
the recipient states’ foreign policy goals, the EU membership reward is 
argued to be the ultimate benefit and therefore it is assumed that the 
nearer recipient states are to the prospective EU membership, the more 
likely it is that recipient states comply with EU requirements. 
Accordingly, “the promise of enlargement should be more powerful than 
the promise of association or assistance, and the impact of the EU on 
candidates for membership should be stronger than on outside states not 
considered potential EU members” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 
673). According to the same logic it is thus argued that the level of rule 
adoption is closely associated with how speedily the prospective EU 
membership reward is likely to be distributed. 
The speed of EU rewards as an incentive of norm compliance 
The temporal dimension in research on European governance has been 
almost non-existent up until recently. Apart from research by Ekengren, 
who investigated the social construction of temporality in European 
governance (Ekengren 2009), little has been done in research pertaining to 
EU political conditionality and what impact the temporal dimension has 
on norm compliance. Even though Schimmelfennig et al. do integrate 
speed of rewards as one source of variation under the strategy of 
reinforcement by reward, this dimension is little explored and 
“overshadowed” by the size of the reward incentive7. The little focus on 
the temporal dimension is however remarkable seeing as how the entire 
                                                          
7 In Schimmelfennig’s analysis on the previous enlargements, the little focus on the speed 
incentive is easily explained by the fact that all states under investigation were in fact 
candidate states and apart from Romania and Bulgaria had the same time horizon as to 
deadlines and accession dates.  
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EU project is a constantly moving colossus, sometimes moving in an ad 
hoc unpredictable fashion, both in terms of an evolving integration 
process but also in terms of the gradual process of enlargement. 
According to Ekengren, the reference to the EU as a project is mainly 
explained by the “significant lack of actual experience that characterises 
the European governance language”, which entails that the project is 
constantly referred to as being based on the present. (Ekengren 2009: 49) 
At the same time, the “temporalisation process prevails owing to the fact 
that the pure forms of European political processes and decision-making 
are expected to develop at an accelerating tempo. The ‘project’ is in 
European governance made an empty vehicle for political movement” 
(Ekengren 2009: 49). This “vehicle for political movement” can be seen 
both in the evolving integration process but is particularly blatant in the 
enlargement process which can be conceived as a gradual process on the 
basis of which the dynamic process of conditionality-compliance is 
closely anchored.  
 
Already in 1998, Schmitter and Santiso (Schmitter & Santiso 1998) 
introduced the study of political time as an important dimension in the 
study of democratisation. In their pioneering work, the authors 
convincingly argued that “When something happens, as well as in what 
order and with what rhythm, can be even more important in determining 
the outcome than whether something happens or what happens” 
(Schmitter & Santiso 1998: 69). On the basis of the work by Santiso and 
Schmitter, Goetz et al. dedicate an entire issue of Journal of European Public 
Policy 16 (2) in 2009 to political time, claiming that this ignored dimension 
in the study of European governance is in fact crucial in understanding 
not only how something happened by also why it happened. Goetz and 
Meyer-Sahling treat time as an institution, and, on the basis of the three 
dimensions developed by Schmitter and Santiso, they argue that the 
policy cycle is made up of four different temporal categories: the 
temporal location (when something happens); the sequence (in what 
order things happen); speed (how quickly things happen); and duration 
(how long things take) (Goetz & Meyer-Sahling 2009: 180-182).  
 
Timing is also raised by Grabbe as constituting one dimension of 
uncertainty in the conditionality process, having an impact on the cost-
benefit calculations as regards adoption costs of compliance in relation to 
future benefits. Since the “ultimate reward of accession is far removed 
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from the moment at which adaptation costs are incurred, so 
conditionality is a blunt instrument when it comes to persuading 
countries to change particular practices” (Grabbe in Featherstone & 
Radaelli 2003: 320). Hence, even though it is assumed, that the nearer 
recipient states are to prospective benefits “temporal devices”, especially 
timetables, with fixed dates and sequences, have been argued to be 
effective instruments of compliance. Although temporal devices are 
presumably more important in cases where “there is a long time gap 
between action and likely effects”, which Goetz labels “transtemporal 
policy problems” (Goetz 2009: 208), they are argued to be important 
devices also as regards creating “temporal consistency” in states which 
have a shorter trajectory to prospective benefits. On the contrary, Avery 
has argued that timetables and the setting of dates can have negative 
effects on compliance and policy change, since this could cause “an 
applicant country to relax, while uncertainty would cause it to try harder 
to meet the EU requirements” (Avery 2009: 262). However, at the same 
time, in the negotiations leading up to the accessions in 2004 and 2007, 
candidate states argued that in the absence of timetables and firm 
deadlines the EU could not expect domestic ministers and ministries to 
implement “difficult and costly parts of the acquis” (Avery 2009: 262).  
 
Although it has been asserted that the future of the Western Balkan states 
lies in Europe, thus giving some kind of assertion that, not only candidate 
states but also potential candidate states will eventually gain EU 
membership, conditional upon compliance with EU rules and norms, the 
temporal distance to the prospective EU membership reward is argued to 
be a strong incentive as to what degree recipient states are willing to 
comply with EU norms and rules. Based on the rationalist perspective, 
political time is here conceived of as “temporal institutions (that) act as 
opportunities and constraints on actors’ strategies, affecting both when 
and how to act” (Goetz 2009: 193). According to the rationalist 
perspective, “the more Europeanization provides new opportunities and 
constraints (high adaptational pressure), the more likely a redistribution 
of resources is, which may alter the domestic balance of power and which 
may empower domestic actors to effectively mobilize for policy change” 
(Börzel & Risse in Featherstone & Radaelli 2003: 70). Taken in this study, 
the speed of the prospective EU membership reward is understood as a 
constraint and an opportunity and is argued to constitute the main 
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driving force of adaptation pressure in the conditionality-compliance 
process.  
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3 
NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
EU Minority rights conditionality 
The reluctance to internationally provide for collective rights to sub-state 
groups became blatant in the international legal system that ensued after 
World War II. Due to the destabilising effects international protection of 
minorities had had on international security prior to World War II8, there 
was consensus amongst the architects of the UN Charter that minority 
rights were to be substituted by universal human rights. Substitution, 
however, did not mean that minority rights were becoming invalid but 
rather that these were henceforth considered as being protected within 
the larger human rights framework.9  
 
Thus, when minority rights protection became part of EU conditionality 
in 1993 there was almost no international legal framework to fall back 
upon. In fact, up until the Lisbon Treaty of 200910, minority rights 
protection was not part of EU Treaty law and did neither provide for any 
clear standards nor any clear benchmarks on what minority rights to 
protect and, subsequently, what minority rights to monitor. Hence, 
                                                          
8 The treaties regulating the rights of minorities of the interwar period were seen as 
potentially destabilising. In fact, one devastating example of this could be seen in the 
justifications made by Germany when invading Poland and Czechoslovakia since these 
had been given “on the grounds that these countries were violating the treaty rights of 
ethnic Germans on their soil” (Kymlicka 2007: 29). 
9 One single provision in international law texts during the Cold War period can be said to 
have asserted minority rights protection. The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights of 1966 stated that “In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community 
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language”. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Article 27, UNGA, Res. 2200A (XXI), December 16, 1966.  
10 The Lisbon Treaty, sometimes referred to as the Reform Treaty, was ratified in 
December 2009. For the first time in the history of the EU, minority rights protection is 
integrated into the legal framework, making them internal policies. Cf. “Consolidated 
Versions of the Treaty of European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union” in Official Journal of the European Union, 2010/C/83/01, Vol. 53, 
http://europa.eu/documentation/official-docs/index_en.htm, 2011-02-03. 
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minority rights conditionality was established more as a political 
construct, premised on conflict prevention, which left the EU with the 
task of both setting the conditions as well as monitoring compliance with 
the conditions in the candidate states. Integrated as a political condition 
in the Copenhagen criteria, minority rights protection became an integral 
part of the pre-accession requirements conditional upon EU membership. 
However, since the “guidelines” for minority protection in fact were 
limited to vague formulations, stating that applicant states should have 
systems, providing for “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities”11, other standard-setting documents were also integrated as 
benchmarks of EU minority rights conditionality.   
 
On the one hand, a contextualised security-based minority rights track, 
conceived of and established as a conflict preventive instrument, was 
developed within the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). Thus, concomitantly to the introduction of minority 
rights protection as conditional upon EU accession, the OSCE 
institutionalised the High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(HCNM), established and mandated as a conflict prevention mechanism. 
The HCNM became pivotal not only to its own organisation but was also 
linked to EU minority rights conditionality since the EU repeatedly has 
declared that “countries seeking accession to the EU are expected to 
follow the HCNM’s advice” (Kymlicka & Opalski 2001: 375). The merit of 
the contextualised security-based approach is apparent since it is based 
on the country-specific context which, consequently, allows for 
formulations of different standards of minority rights protection.  
 
On the other hand, there was the development of a universal justice-
based minority rights track, exemplified by the development of the 
Framework Convention of National Minorities (FCNM), adopted by the 
Council of Europe in 1995 and ratified in 1998. The FCNM is 
                                                          
11 The Copenhagen criteria were adopted in June 1993 and consist of four criteria which 
are conditional upon accession to the EU. The minority rights criteria is part of the 
political criterion, the other criteria refers to economic criteria and the functioning of a 
market economy as well as the transposition of the whole EU acquis as well as the 
obligatory adherence to the aims of the political, economic and monetary union. Cf. 
European Council, “Conclusions of the Presidency”, DOC SN 180/1/93 REV, Copenhagen, 
21-22 June 1993, p. 13. 
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groundbreaking in that it is the first legally binding, to the States parties, 
multilateral instrument which is aimed at the protection of national 
minorities. However, since the vagueness of many of the articles in this 
universal justice-based system allows for competing interpretations, 
depending upon context, it can in fact be argued that the difference 
between the context-based recommendations of the HCNM and the 
“universal-based” articles of the FCNM in fact is minor. However, in 
terms of linkage to EU conditionality, although the recommendations of 
the HCNM are important, the impact of the FCNM is even greater. 
Indeed, ratification of the Framework Convention constitutes “the main 
indicator of meeting the Copenhagen criteria in relation to minority 
rights” (Bokulic et al. 2006: 68).  
 
Minority rights provisions within the EU would, however, develop from 
the late 1990s. When accession negotiations were to start with the Eastern 
and Central European states, the legally enshrined non-discrimination 
norm, part of the EU acquis, was extended to the minority relevant area 
by the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnic 
origin. Thus, whereas the reluctance of granting legal collective rights to 
national minorities would persist, EU law would henceforth provide the 
protection of individual rights irrespective of ethnic origin. Indeed, in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights12, it is stated that the Charter prohibits 
“any discrimination based on any ground such as (…) ethnic or social 
origin (…) language, religion or belief (…) membership of a national 
minority” (Art. 21.1)13. Although the Lisbon Treaty also integrates 
“collective provisions”14 into Treaty law, it does not give any clear 
guidance as to what specific minority rights the Union is referring to.  
                                                          
12 The Charter is binding to all signatories. Poland and the United Kingdom have not 
signed the Charter thus it is not binding upon them. 
13 European Council (2010) “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union” in 
Official Journal of the European Union, 2010/C/83/02, Vol. 53, Brussels, 30 March 2010, 
http://europa.eu/documentation/official-docs/index_en.htm, 2011-02-03. 
14 In fact, these collective provisions are more based on the individual rights approach 
since the Treaty refers to the “respect for human rights including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities” and that “these values are common to the Member States in a 
society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men prevail” (Art. 2). Cf. European Council (2010) “Consolidated 
Versions of the Treaty of European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union” in Official Journal of the European Union, 2010/C/83/01, Vol. 53, Brussels, 
30 March 2010. Second, it is stated that the EU “shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic 
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The reluctance of granting collective rights to national minorities, 
anchored in the intractable relationship between state-minority relations, 
can also be seen in the fact that most international organisations have 
refrained from giving a definition of what a national minority is. 
Consequently, even though the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe 
declare that national minorities have rights that need protecting, none of 
these organisations actually defines what a national minority is. In the 
OSCE, the first organisation on the European continent to make an official 
declaration on the necessity to protect national minorities15, the 
organisation has absented from giving a definition of a national minority. 
In fact, the first High Commissioner of National Minorities (HCNM), van 
der Stoel, stated that “The existence of a minority is a question of fact and 
not of definition.”16 This statement may seem odd, but in relation to the 
HCNM’s mandate, which is to “provide ‘early warning’ and as 
appropriate, ‘early action’ at the earliest possible stage ‘in regard to 
tensions involving national minority issues”17, it has not been considered 
important to define which groups need protecting, but rather what 
minority rights situations are endangering to peace. The Council of 
Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM) follows suit and “contains no definition of national 
minorities, none having received the consent of all Council of Europe 
member states” (Capotorti 1996: 147). Although minority rights 
protection would become even more emphasised in the conditionality 
process of the Western Balkan states in the 2000s, the EU has persisted in 
refraining from providing a definition of the groups whose rights need 
protection and promotion.  
 
                                                                                                                                                
diversity” (Art. 22). Cf. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in Official 
Journal of the European Union, 2010/C/83/02, Vol. 53, Brussels, 30 March 2010.  
15 The Copenhagen Document of 1990 and the Geneva Document of 1991 were the first 
documents after the end of the Cold War to recognise the importance of the issue of 
national minorities in terms of conflict resolution on the Eurasian continent. Cf. (Ghébali 
1996: 451-453, 509-514). 
16 The High Commissioner on National Minorities, van der Stoel, in his keynote address at 
the opening of the OSCE Minorities Seminar in Warsaw in 1994, 
http://www.osce.org/hcnm, 2010-12-14. 
17 Cf. http://www.osce.org/hcnm, 2010-12-14. 
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Conditionality in the Western Balkans and in the states 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
Whereas the guaranteeing of political stability was the primary 
foundation of minority rights conditionality prior to the large Eastern 
enlargement of 2004, it would become even more emphasised in light of 
the prospective EU membership for the states of the Western Balkans. The 
success of conditionality as an effective tool of domestic change, both in 
terms of securing internal stability, as well as a guarantor of functioning 
market economies, would contribute to both its broadening as well as its 
deepening. The broadening would entail that conditionality was to 
develop into a tool of providing guarantees of stability, not only to the 
candidate states of the EU, but also to the states not directly linked to 
enlargement. Indeed, with the introduction of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, the strategy of conditionality was 
introduced to the Eastern European neighbours as well as to the 
adjoining states of the Union’s Southern periphery. The deepening of 
conditionality, and the greater emphasis put on minority rights 
protection, would become introduced with the conditionality linked with 
the prospect of integrating the Western Balkan states into the structures 
of the Union. In fact, “ever since the Copenhagen criteria and the ‘SAp 
conditionality’18 were adopted, the EU has emphasised the role of 
minority protection in its political accession criteria, directly linking 
minority protection with EU membership, albeit to varying degrees” 
(Bokulic et al. 2006: 67). In fact, one of the lessons drawn by the 
Commission from the pre-accession conditionality of the Eastern 
enlargement was to retain “the principle of differentiation”, both in terms 
of the conditions set, as well as in terms of the rewards granted. (Kelley 
2006: 49) This became particularly manifest in the SAp-conditionality 
encompassing the Western Balkan states.  
 
The framework of SAp-conditionality was established by the European 
Council in 199719, complementing the Copenhagen criteria with 
                                                          
18 The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAp) was launched in 2000 establishing a 
contractual relationship between the EU and the states of the Western Balkans. Distinctive 
of the SAp is that the EU recognised the special status and the different prerequisites of 
these states “which had experienced war and conflict” (Bokulic et al. 2006: 50).   
19 European Commission (1997) “Council Conclusions on the Application of 
Conditionality with a view to developing a Coherent EU Strategy for the Relations with 
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additional minority rights protection conditions. Although more 
emphasis is put on minority rights protection, applicable on a general 
level, these conditions continue to be held very generally, requiring the 
states’ “credible commitment to democratic reforms and progress in 
compliance with the generally recognised standards of human and 
minority rights” (Bokulic et al. 2006: 66-67). However, since SAp-
conditionality also encompasses the peace treaties, signed with the 
individual states of the Western Balkans, which in turn form the basis of 
each state’s obligations towards minority protection, the contextualised 
approach is blatant also in the field of minority rights protection. 
(Anastasakis & Bechev 2003: 7-8) Thus, even though the Copenhagen 
criteria apply to all states, SAp-conditionality is based on a country-
specific approach, which is “geared towards reconciliation, reconstruction 
and reform” (Anastasakis & Bechev 2003: 7-8).  
 
Although SAp-conditionality, initially, was not automatically linked to 
the explicit promise of enlargement, it is at the same time true that the 
launching of SAp-conditionality in 2000, would ultimately commit the EU 
in 2005 to reiterate its support for the Western Balkan states, re-
emphasising “that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the European 
Union”20. Indeed, the European Partnerships set up in 2004, “with all the 
countries of the Western Balkans, focus on their preparation for EU 
membership” (Bokulic et al. 2006: 51). The prospect of membership is 
furthermore furthered by the pre-accession agreements concluded by the 
signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), which 
on the basis of the country-specific approach, further define the 
conditions set for each state as well as define EU support to help meet the 
requirements of the Copenhagen criteria.21  
 
                                                                                                                                                
the Countries in the Region” in Bulletin EU, 4, Brussels, 29 April 1997, 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/bulletin/en/bullset.htm, 2011-02-15. 
20 European Council (2005) “Presidency Conclusions”, 10255/1/05 REV 1, Brussels, 15 July 
2005, p. 12, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/85349.pdf, 2012-
07-20.  
21 The SAAs ”include the asymmetric liberalisation of trade between the signatory and the 
EU, with the EU market opening more rapidly, a number of obligations by the state, EU 
support towards fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria, and specific post-conflict measures” 
(Bokulic et al. 2006: 54).  
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However, the graduated approach of SAp-conditionality, based on the 
diversification of the individual states and their respective capacities to 
comply with the conditions set, has entailed that the states have been 
categorised into two groups of prospective future EU member states. The 
categorisation into candidate states (with a higher level of compliance) 
and potential candidate states (with a lower level of compliance) became 
blatant in 2004 and 2005, when Croatia and Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, respectively, acquired status as candidate states. The group 
composed of the potential candidate states, considered to have a more 
cumbersome road to prospective EU membership, encompasses Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia. The distinction made 
between the two categories is relevant, not only as concerns their distance 
to prospective EU membership, but is also dependent upon the level of 
EU financial aid granted to the states. Indeed, compared with the Europe 
Agreements of the CEEs, the SAAs provide for little financial aid which is 
very much restricted to applicant states having reached the last phase of 
the conditionality process, thus limited to states having acquired status as 
candidate states.   
 
ENP-conditionality, at least as regards the Eastern European neighbours, 
is based on the same legal and political underpinnings as SAp-
conditionality, and ultimately pre-accession conditionality. (Kochenov 
2008: 15) Just like SAp-conditionality, ENP-conditionality is based on the 
principle of differentiation, and the country-specific approach, both in 
terms of the conditions set, as well as in terms of the rewards linked to 
compliance. However, the graduated approach of SAp-conditionality has 
not been applied to ENP-conditionality which consequently means that 
no categorisation, based on the level of compliance in relation to 
prospective EU membership, has been made. Thus, the Eastern European 
signatories of the ENP, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
and Ukraine, are all, formally at least, equally as far away from the 
prospective EU membership. Indeed, even though SAp-conditionality, at 
least initially, was not explicitly linked to enlargement, the finalités 
géographiques of ENP states’ compliance are even more left in the vague. 
Indeed, although premised on the strategies of conditionality, the 
Commission has stated that the goal of the ENP framework is to provide 
for, “the development of a new relationship which would not, in the 
medium-term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the 
Union’s institutions” (Kochenov 2008: 15). However, although 
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enlargement is not envisioned in the medium-term perspective, since 
ENP-conditionality is not directly linked to the incentive of accession, 
“the path dependency of the ENP is strong. Its raison d’être is 
enlargement” (Kelley 2006: 31). 
 
Just like SAp-conditionality, on a general level, ENP-conditionality is 
based on “a shared commitment to ‘common values’, and aim to support 
structural change or consolidation in the direction of democracy, rule of 
law, good governance, respect for human rights and market economy 
principles” (Keukelaire & MacNaughtan 2008: 271). Furthermore, even 
though ENP-conditionality is not as tightly geared towards minority 
rights as SAp-conditionality, conditions related to respect of 
“fundamental freedoms, including freedom of media and expression, 
rights of minorities” are also integrated within the ENP-framework. 
(Kelley 2006: 42). The general norms are promoted concomitantly to the 
country-based specific conditions in the Action Plans, which form the 
“pre-accession” agreements of ENP-conditionality. In the same vein as 
the SAp, financial aid and support are linked to compliance with the 
conditions set. 
 
Even though the Copenhagen criteria and the acquis-related 
conditionality is not part of ENP-conditionality per se, parts of the EU 
acquis are integrated within ENP-conditionality as well. Indeed, since all 
ENP states have signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention, 
where obligations to meet the requirements of non-discrimination as well 
as the principles regulating minority language rights are formulated, 
these rights are part of ENP-conditionality as well. Indeed, and based on 
the philosophical underpinnings of both the EU and the Council of 
Europe, which is that minority communities need to be protected both 
from exclusion and assimilation, these two approaches require that 
minority rights protection, in fact, be based both on non-discrimination 
(protection from exclusion), as well as the promotion of collective 
minority rights (protection from assimilation).  
Setting the conditions for minority language rights 
protection 
Minority language rights constitute one of the three types of minority 
rights, deemed crucial in the prevention of violent ethnic conflict. Indeed, 
47 
“rights pertaining to the protection of identity”, of which language 
protection is a part; “rights guaranteeing economic and social well-
being”, as well as “rights linked to participation”, in which national 
minorities should be allowed to participate in “all issues of public 
interest”22, are all part of the minority rights template. Identity pertains to 
the cultural markers of minority groups, which means that the culture, 
language, and religion can be practiced without discrimination, and 
should furthermore be “recognized and supported by the authorities” 
(Baldwin et al. 2007: 5). Even though all aspects of the cultural identity of 
a person of ethnic origin are important, “two that are often at stake in 
situations of violent conflict, are language and religion” (Baldwin et al. 
2007: 8). Furthermore, although language rights are normally referred to 
as being an integral part of a person’s cultural identity, it is at the same 
time, a vital component of both “rights guaranteeing economic and social 
well-being”, as well as “rights linked to participation”. Indeed, the 
consequences of direct and indirect discrimination of minority languages 
and their users, will not only have negative effects upon a person’s 
cultural identity, the social and political consequences of language 
discrimination will further accentuate alienation of minority groups from 
decisions that affect them, both politically as well as socially, thus 
excluding them from the society in which they live. Extinction of minority 
languages, as the most radical form of discrimination and subordination, 
is thus, not only, related to linguistic loss, and a loss of a person’s cultural 
identity, it is also, a loss of power and social mobility. As May contends, 
“language loss is not only, perhaps not even primarily, a linguistic issue – 
it has much more to do with power, prejudice, (unequal) competition 
and, in many cases, overt discrimination and subordination” (May 2000: 
368). 
 
The importance given to the protection of minority languages is blatant 
both in the OSCE recommendations on the treatment of minority issues in 
the OSCE area23, but also and primarily, as stipulated by the legally 
                                                          
22 United Nations Institute for Training and Research (2007) “Preventing Genocide” in 
UNITAR Peace and Security Series, New York, 2-3 April 2007, p. 3, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Summary_Report_with_contacts.pdf, 2010-
10-15. 
23 Cf. The Hague Recommendations on Education Rights of National Minorities (1996); the 
Oslo Recommendations on Linguistic Rights of National Minorities (1998); The Lund 
Recommendations on Effective Participation Rights of National Minorities (1999), 
www.osce.org/hcnm, 2011-11-17.  
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binding articles of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention. The 
importance of guaranteeing minority language rights protection is, 
furthermore, emphasised by the establishment of the Council of Europe’s 
special instrument, the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages (ECRML), adopted in 1992.24 Even though the ECRML 
stipulates, that the protection and promotion of minority languages, 
should not be considered to “be an act of discrimination against the users 
of more widely used languages” (Art. 7, para. 2), minority language 
rights protection is by no means uncontroversial. Indeed, minority 
language rights protection is oftentimes perceived of as a challenge, not 
only to the state language, but also to the national cohesion of the state.  
 
The ECRML does not distinguish between a regional and a minority 
language, but uses the two terms interchangeably. According to the 
Charter, “regional or minority languages” are languages that are: “(i) 
traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that 
State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s 
population; and (ii) different from the official language(s) of that State” 
(Art. 1a). Furthermore, this would entail that this “does not include either 
dialects of the official language(s) of the State or the language of 
migrants” (Art. 1a). The nationality requirement of this definition is, 
however, problematic since it would then exclude the Roma minority 
who oftentimes lacks nationality. Furthermore, since the exclusion of the 
Roma, especially pertinent in the states of the Western Balkans, has been 
one of the EU’s prioritised issues in minority rights protection, the 
nationality requirement would consequently leave them out. Hence, on 
the basis of the definition provided for by the Fundamental Rights 
Agency (FRA), in this study linguistic minorities are peoples “whose first 
language is not the language of the majority of people in the country in 
which they live”25. The majority is defined as the group of people which 
is not only the numerically strongest but also holds the tools of the state’s 
                                                          
24 Council of Europe (1992) “European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages” in 
European Treaty Series. No. 148, Strasbourg, 5 November 1992, 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Local_and_regional_Democracy/Regional_or_Mino
rity_languages, 2011-11-25. 
25 Fundamental Rights Agency (2010) The impact of the Racial Equality Directive – Views of 
trade unions and employers in the European Union. Strengthening the fundamental rights 
architecture in the EU IV. Luxembourg: Publications office of the European Union, 
http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Racial-equality-directive_conf-
ed_en.pdf, 2011-03-04.  
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nation-building, thereby being in control of the state, its institutions, and 
its language policies. (Kymlicka 2001: 49) This consequently entails, that a 
minority language in the context of this investigation pertains to: 
 
A language traditionally used within a given territory of a State by 
minority groups, numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s 
population, and perceived by the minority groups themselves, as 
different both from the official language, as well as from the dialects of 
the official language of that State. 
 
The sensitivity of the language issue, or the dilemma between national 
cohesion concerns (integration) and protection of minority languages 
(accommodation), is blatant in the articles of the Framework Convention. 
In fact, just like minority rights provisions, in general, are still highly 
challenging, not only to the states that have to adopt them, but also to the 
international organisations that set the conditions for their compliance, so 
are minority language rights provisions. Indeed, and based on the 
philosophical underpinnings of not only the Council of Europe but also 
the EU, minority communities need to be protected both from exclusion 
and assimilation. This, in turn, entails that minority language rights 
protection, in fact, is based on two approaches: non-discrimination 
(protection from exclusion), as well as the promotion of collective 
minority rights (protection from assimilation). Subsequently, minority 
language rights’ conditionality forms part of both the acquis-related 
conditionality (based on non-discrimination), as well as on collective 
language rights granted to minority groups. 
 
The distinction between the two approaches has been further developed 
by Dunbar who has divided minority language rights into two broad 
categories. On the one hand, linguistic rights can be based on a regime of 
linguistic tolerance, which includes “measures which aim to protect 
speakers of minority languages from discrimination and procedural 
unfairness” (Dunbar 2001: 91). The principle of non-discrimination refers 
to clauses in the general human rights framework, stipulating that every 
person has the right not to be discriminated against, on the basis of the 
equality principle. In the category of linguistic tolerance, Dunbar also 
integrates the principle of protection and non-assimilation, as well as 
basic civil and political rights. The principle of protection and non-
assimilation refers to that every person, regardless of ethnic belonging, 
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has a right to her own language and culture. Rights pertaining to basic 
civil and political rights entail that every person, regardless of ethnic 
belonging, has the right to a fair trial, freedom of expression and freedom 
of assembly and association. (Dunbar 2001: 100-107)  
 
On the other hand, linguistic rights can be based on a regime of linguistic 
promotion, which includes “measures which create certain ‘positive’ 
rights to key public services, such as, education and public media 
through the medium of minority languages” (Dunbar 2001: 91). In the 
category of linguistic promotion, these positive rights include educational 
rights, i.e. that national minorities have the right both to learn their 
mother tongue, as well as to be instructed in the minority language. 
Educational rights are, however, not limited to linguistic rights proper, 
but also pertain to the fact that States have a responsibility to take 
measures to “promote knowledge of the history, traditions, language and 
culture of minorities among the general population” (Art. 34 of the OSCE 
Copenhagen Declaration cited in Dunbar 2001: 109). Integrated in the 
regime of linguistic promotion are provisions related to rights of 
linguistic minorities to use their minority languages in official contexts, as 
well as the right to use the minority language in personal and place 
names. Limitations as to how far these positive minority language rights 
can be promoted refer to national sovereignty considerations, and the fact 
that minority language rights protection, should in no way, compromise 
the territorial integrity of the state. (Dunbar 2001: 109-115)  
 
This would consequently entail, that linguistic rights of tolerance, based 
on non-discrimination, are premised on negative rights, i.e. that minority 
groups, or rather individuals of ethnic belonging, have a right not to be 
treated in a discriminatory way. Linguistic rights of promotion, on the 
other hand, are based on promotion of certain collective rights, more 
premised on positive rights, where specific positive measures to promote 
linguistic rights, are created for linguistic minorities of a State. (Dunbar 
2001: 91-92) The distinction of the two linguistic regimes is also highly 
relevant in the realm of the codification of minority language rights 
conditionality. Indeed, whereas EU codification of minority language 
rights is limited to the regime of linguistic tolerance, based on the non-
discrimination acquis, the articles of the FCNM encompass both the norm 
of non-discrimination, as well as provisions based on linguistic 
promotion. Indeed, in the FCNM, positive rights, and the promotion of 
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collective language rights provisions, are also enshrined in articles, 
pertaining to the area of the use of minority languages in official contexts, 
as well as in the area of minority language rights in education.   
Non-discrimination  
Non-discrimination is a key principle in EU legislation, and as part of the 
acquis communautaire, legally binding upon member states, but also upon 
applicant states to the EU. By the end of the 1990s, when accession 
negotiations were to start with the Central and Eastern European states, 
the non-discrimination norm was extended to the minority relevant area, 
with the addition of Article 13 TEC, regarding the fight against racism 
and xenophobia, and the adoption of the Racial Equality Directive 
(RED)26 in 2000, implementing the prohibition of discrimination on the 
grounds of race and ethnic origin. Concomitantly, the Employment 
Equality Directive (EED)27 was adopted that same year, prohibiting 
discrimination on the grounds of “religion or belief, age, disability, sexual 
orientation” (Bokulic et al. 2006: 80). Even though both Directives form 
part of the Race Directives, and contain definitions of discrimination that 
necessitate transposition into the national legislations, of both member 
states as well as applicant states, the Racial and Equality Directive is 
specifically applied to the prohibition of discrimination, based on ethnic 
belonging, at the same time as it is the most encompassing. Indeed, the 
Racial and Equality Directive sets out to prohibit discrimination in the 
areas of employment, education, social protection and housing, and sets 
minimum standards of how the Directive should be transposed into 
Member states’ as well as applicant states’ national legislations. Part of 
the minimum standards is the transposition of the definitions of direct 
discrimination, indirect discrimination as well as harassment contained 
by the Directive.  
 
Direct discrimination is defined as occurring when, “one person is treated 
less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a 
comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin” (Art. 2(2)(a), 
Race Directive). Indirect discrimination is defined as occurring when, “an 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a 
racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other 
                                                          
26 Council Directive 2000/43/EC, Official Journal L180, Vol. 43, 19 July 2000. 
27 Council Directive 2000/78/EC, Official Journal L303, Vol. 43, 2 December 2000.  
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persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified 
by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim is appropriate 
and necessary” (Art. 2(2)(b), Race Directive). Harassment finally is 
deemed to be discriminatory, “when an unwanted conduct related to 
racial or ethnic origin takes place with the purpose or effect of violating 
the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, 
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment” (Art. 2(3), Race 
Directive). Apart from the obligatory transposition of the established 
definitions into the national legislations, pertaining to the specified areas, 
part of the minimum sets of standards obliges member states, as well as 
applicant states, to set up Equality Bodies whose primary mandate is to 
provide “independent support to victims” (Bokulic et al. 2006: 80-81). 
 
Although the non-discrimination norm, as part of the EU acquis, displays 
a high degree of legality, especially in terms of both obligation as well as 
delegation, since in the case of legal dispute judicial interpretation would 
be ruled by the European Court of Justice, in terms of the level of 
precision, it is more problematic. Indeed, there have been cases where 
some member states have implemented incorrect definitions of both 
discrimination as well as harassment in their respective national 
legislations.28 Furthermore, the level of precision, as regards the agents of 
protection of the norm itself, i.e. persons of ethnic belonging, remains 
problematic since the EU has persisted in abstaining from giving a 
definition of what a person of ethnic origin actually means. In addition, 
since “discrimination on the basis of nationality/citizenship is excluded 
from the Directive”, this consequently means that individuals of ethnic 
belonging, who lack citizenship, are excluded from protection against 
discrimination. (Bokulic et al. 2006: 83) This is particularly problematic in 
cases involving the Roma minority, who often lack citizenship, but also as 
concerns groups of national minorities, who, as a consequence of the 
violent ethnic conflicts, have become refugees. In fact, the relevance of the 
individualistic approach of the non-discrimination norm in minority 
rights protection has been seriously questioned, as “its emphasis on 
individual action seriously limits the ability to respond effectively to, and 
redress, deeply-rooted exclusion and inequalities, suffered by various 
groups” (Bokulic et al. 2006: 83). The limitations of the individualistic 
                                                          
28 Cf. http://www.eubusiness.com/topics/employment/race-equality, 2011-03-04. 
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approach have, in fact, been acknowledged also by the EU Commission, 
which has stated that, “there is a need to go beyond anti-discrimination 
policies designed to prevent unequal treatment of individuals” (Bokulic 
et al. 2006: 84). 
 
The non-discrimination norm is also part of the Council of Europe’s 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCNM), and although not as specific and encompassing as the minimum 
criteria, stipulated by the EU, the content and purpose of Article 4 of the 
FCNM is, “to ensure the applicability of the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination for persons belonging to national minorities” (FCNM 
1995b: 16). However, whereas the EU Racial and Equality Directive is 
more based on negative rights, i.e. to protect individuals of ethnic 
belonging from discrimination, the article pertaining to non-
discrimination within the FCNM is more based on positive rights, i.e. to 
promote equality. Article 4 of the FCNM stipulates that the States parties 
have an obligation to “guarantee to persons belonging to national 
minorities the right of equality before the law and of equal protection of 
the law. In this respect, any discrimination based on belonging to a 
national minority shall be prohibited” (Art. 4(1), FCNM). The promotion 
of equality is further stressed in the consecutive paragraph which 
underlines that, “where necessary, adequate measures in order to 
promote, in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full 
and effective equality between persons belonging to a national minority, 
and those belonging to the majority“, should be taken by the State 
authorities. (Art. 4(2), FCNM, emphasis added) It is further accentuated, 
that these “positive” measures, “adopted in accordance with paragraph 2, 
shall not be considered to be an act of discrimination” (Art. 4(3), FCNM). 
 
The level of legality of Article 4 is quite low, even though formally 
displaying a high level of both obligation, as well as delegation. Indeed, 
the level of precision of Article 4 seriously inhibits the level of legality. 
Not only does the low level of precision pertain to the scope of 
application of the norm, where the Council of Europe, in the same vein as 
the EU, has refrained from giving a definition of the agents, whose 
effective equality rights should be promoted. Furthermore, and more 
serious, is the fact that, even though the State parties, are “obliged” to 
promote “effective equality between persons belonging to a national 
minority, and those belonging to the majority”, the wording “where 
54 
necessary”, must be considered as seriously harming, not only to the level 
of precision of the norm, but consequently also, to the level of obligation, 
and logically following from this, the level of delegation. Indeed, the 
diffuseness of certain wordings gives great flexibility of interpretation as 
to the duties that befall the State authorities. The vagueness of certain 
formulations are, in effect, consistently employed in the articles 
regulating minorities’ language rights, and viewed the flexibility of 
interpretation given to the State authorities, consequently heavily curtail 
the rights that are promoted.   
Minority language use in official contexts 
The Articles regulating minorities’ rights to use minority languages in 
official contexts are quite general in character, both as concerns the 
content of the norm, as well as the duties that befall the State authorities, 
signatories of the FCNM. Articles 10 and 11 of the FCNM set the 
conditions for the use of minority language rights in official contexts. The 
paragraphs of Article 10 both enshrine the universal justice-based right, 
that national minorities have an inherent right to freely use their minority 
languages, both in private and in public, but also set conditions that are 
context-based, dependent upon more specific criteria, however left vague 
since undefined. Indeed, paragraph 1 stipulates that “every person 
belonging to a national minority has the right to use freely and without 
interference his or her minority language, in private and in public, orally 
and in writing” (Art. 10(1), FCNM). Whereas paragraph 1 is relatively 
uncontroversial, the infringement on the State authorities is more 
important in paragraph 2, which regulates the rights of national 
minorities to communicate in their minority languages with the public 
institutions. This is also blatant in the conditions set up for this right, 
which are defined according to rather vague formulations. In fact, 
paragraph 2 stipulates that “in areas inhabited by persons belonging to 
national minorities, traditionally or in substantial numbers, if those persons 
so request, and where such a request corresponds to a real need, the 
Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, the conditions which 
would make it possible to use the minority language in relations between 
those persons and the administrative authorities” (Art. 10(2), FCNM, 
emphasis added).  
 
Whereas the criterion of “traditionally” is never specified, it is even more 
aggravating that the condition of “substantial numbers”, is left in the 
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vague. Indeed, the lack of providing for a numerical threshold, in fact, 
makes the very vague formulations of “real need”, and “as far as 
possible”, problematic, since interpretation of these formulations are left 
to the discretion of the State authorities. Whereas paragraph 2 is left 
highly imprecise, which in turn makes enforcement a difficult task, 
paragraph 3 is more precise. Indeed, pertaining to the protection of civil 
rights, the rights enshrined in this paragraph are of universal application. 
Hence, it is stipulated that the State authorities are obliged to “guarantee 
the right of every person belonging to a national minority to be informed 
promptly, in a language which he or she understands, of the reasons for 
his or her arrest, and of the nature and cause of any accusation against 
him or her, and to defend himself or herself in this language, if necessary 
with the free assistance of an interpreter” (Art. 10(3), FCNM). 
 
Article 11 pertains to the right of minorities to use their personal names, 
as well as signs, and other topographical indications in their own 
minority languages. Whereas the two first paragraphs contain rights, 
which are granted on a universal basis, the third paragraph is more 
contextualised, depending upon the numerical size of the minority 
communities, which once again is not specified, thus curtailing the 
possibilities of enforcement. Paragraph 1 enshrines the right of minorities 
to “use his or her surname (patronym) and first names in the minority 
language, and the right to official recognition of them, according to 
modalities provided for in their legal system” (Art. 11(1), FCNM). 
Paragraph 2 stipulates that minorities have a right “to display in his or 
her minority language signs, inscriptions and other information of a 
private nature, visible to the public” (Art. 11(2), FCNM). Paragraph 3, 
finally, enshrines rights of minorities to “display traditional local names, 
street names and other topographical indications, intended for the public 
also in the minority language, where there is a sufficient demand for such 
indications” (Art. 11(3), FCNM, emphasis added). However, not only is 
this right conditional upon “sufficient demand”, which is left unspecified, 
it is also conditional upon the criteria of “traditionally”, “substantial 
numbers”, but also on the framework of the State parties “legal system, 
including, where appropriate, agreements with other States, and taking 
into account their specific conditions”  (Art. 11(3), FCNM). Hence, the 
many conditions integrated in paragraph 3 make the legal validity of this 
paragraph problematic since the possibilities of enforcement are highly 
reduced. 
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Minority language rights in education 
Whereas the right to use the minority language in contacts with official 
authorities is important, not only as a guarantor of preserving the cultural 
identity, but also as a guarantor of protecting the civil and political rights 
of linguistic minority communities, the right to learn to speak one’s own 
minority language constitutes the very essence of preserving one’s own 
cultural identity. Indeed, as stipulated by Article 14 of the FCNM, “the 
obligation to recognise the right of every person belonging to a national 
minority to learn his or her minority language concerns one of the 
principal means by which such individuals can assert and preserve their 
identity. There can be no exceptions to this” (FCNM 1995b: 21-22). 
However, at the same time, it should be underlined that diffuse wordings 
are present in the articles pertaining to minority education as well, and 
the dilemma between accommodation (promotion of minority language 
rights in education), and integration (the importance that minorities learn 
the State language in relation to concerns of national cohesion), is blatant. 
Indeed, since the learning of the state language is seen as paramount to 
the preservation of the national cohesion of states, minority language 
rights in education, “shall be implemented without prejudice to the 
learning of the official language or the teaching in this language” (Art. 
14(6), FCNM). Furthermore, another condition that regulates minority 
language rights in education, which is underlined by the FCNM, is that 
“in particular, there must be “sufficient demand” from persons belonging 
to the relevant national minorities” (FCNM 1995b: 21-22).  
 
The principles regulating the right to learn one’s own minority language 
as well as the right to be instructed in the minority language are included 
in Articles 12, 13 and 14 of the FCNM. Article 12 does not pertain to 
minorities’ right to be instructed in, or of their minority languages, per se, 
but is more focused on promotion of measures facilitating inter-cultural 
education. Thus, paragraph 1 stipulates that State parties should, “where 
appropriate, take measures in the fields of education and research, to foster 
knowledge of the culture, history, language, and religion of their national 
minorities and of the majority” (Art. 12(1), FCNM, emphasis added). Just 
like other vague formulations, “appropriate”, is not defined and leaves 
much room for interpretation. Following from paragraph 1, should there 
be appropriateness of inter-cultural education, States parties are also 
obligated to “provide adequate opportunities for teacher training and 
access to textbooks, and facilitate contacts among students and teachers of 
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different communities” (Art. 12(2), FCNM). Paragraph 3, finally, obliges 
State parties to, “undertake to promote equal opportunities for access to 
education, at all levels, for persons belonging to national minorities” (Art. 
12(3), FCNM). 
 
As regards minority language rights in education proper, Article 13 
enshrines the right for minorities to, “set up and to manage their own 
private educational and training establishments” (Art. 13(1), FCNM). 
However, this right should be recognised by the State parties, “within the 
framework of their education system”, and “the exercise of this right shall 
not entail any financial obligation for the Parties” (Art. 13(1, 2), FCNM). 
Article 14, finally, regulates minorities’ rights both to be taught the 
minority language, but also to have the right to be instructed in the 
minority language. Indeed, as stipulated by paragraph 1, “the Parties 
undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national minority 
has the right to learn his or her minority language” (Art. 14(1), FCNM). 
Whereas paragraph 1 institutes an inherent right of universal 
applicability, the rights enshrined in paragraph 2 are context-based, and 
in the same vein as the previous context-based articles, these conditions 
are left unspecified, consequently, making enforcement more difficult. 
Indeed, paragraph 2 stipulates that, “in areas inhabited by persons 
belonging to national minorities, traditionally or in substantial numbers, if 
there is sufficient demand, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as 
possible, and within the framework of their education systems, that 
persons belonging to these minorities have adequate opportunities for being 
taught the minority language, or for receiving instruction in this 
language” (Art. 14(2), FCNM, emphasis added). However, apart from the 
conditions already stipulated in paragraph 2, the above rights do not take 
away the importance of learning the state language, “or the teaching in 
this language” (Art. 14(3), FCNM).  
 
The dilemmas between, not only integration (necessity of learning the 
State language for national cohesion concerns) and accommodation 
(provisions enshrined for minority education), but also between the goals 
(political), and the means (capacity), are blatant. Indeed, even though 
minority language rights in education are generously provided for, since 
the FCNM does declare that minorities have the right to set up and to run 
their own educational establishments, at the same time, it is added that 
the State in question has no responsibility in funding such establishments 
58 
(Art. 13). Furthermore, even though minorities are granted rights to learn 
their mother tongue, as well as rights to be instructed in their minority 
languages, provisions as to “the learning of the official language, or the 
teaching in this language”, are made concomitantly (Art. 14(3)).   
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4 
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The comparative design 
Methodologically, the research question presupposes a comparative 
approach, both in terms of the temporal distance to the prospective EU 
membership reward of the recipient states, constituting the empirical 
base, but also in terms of the time-frame of the analysis. By using the 
most similar systems design, the selection of states, that constitutes the 
empirical base, has been made according to a set of similar criteria, 
considered crucial for the investigation, where the only divergence is the 
recipient states’ temporal distance to the prospective EU membership 
reward. First, enlargement preferences in each state under investigation 
are assumed to be strong. Second, the selected states are all European, 
which means that, in principle, they all qualify for EU-membership. To 
claim that all states under investigation are European is controversial, 
since the term European is elastic and pertains not only to geographical 
delimitations, but also to cultural borders. In fact, whereas it would be 
unproblematic to label states like Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus as being 
European, the “European merits of Caucasian states like Georgia, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan are more questionable” (Berglund et al. 2009: 
70). However, since all states under investigation are part of the EU 
political conditionality, and at least as concerns the Eastern European 
states of ENP-conditionality, could be argued not to be excluded from the 
European hemisphere, the merits of the Caucasian states in the 
investigation at hand are argued to qualify as European.   
 
Third, all states are post-communist states, having constituted parts of 
two larger federal political systems, whose societies are multi-ethnic in 
character, thus, composed of significant segments of national minorities. 
Fourth, all states have been involved, to a greater or lesser extent, in 
violent ethno-political conflicts since the end of the Cold War, and the 
demise of communism, which means that all states can be described as 
states with powerful “minority nationalisms” (Kymlicka 2007: 194). This 
means that the selection of states has been based on the criterion that 
there has to be significant conflict, or policy misfit, between the EU 
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minority language rights conditions, and the domestic policies in the 
respective recipient states, prior to becoming part of EU conditionality. 
Thus, in the states under investigation, it is assumed that minority rights 
provisions are generally viewed upon as illegitimate, and that state 
governments at the receiving end, would not go about changing minority 
rights policies, if there would not be any EU external incentives. This 
criterion is deemed crucial for methodological reasons, since it is argued 
that difficult cases will call for stronger and more visible reactions from 
the EU. This, in turn, is argued to facilitate the measurement of how the 
speed of the prospective EU membership reward, in fact, impacts on the 
progress made in the level of rule adoption, pertaining to the area of 
minority language rights in the recipient states. The states under scrutiny, 
however, differ in one important aspect: how close or distant they are to 
EU membership. Since the level of rule adoption is assumed to vary in 
relation to the speed of the prospective EU membership reward, we can 
categorise the states accordingly.  
 
The first category includes Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, states that acquired status as candidate states, in 2004 and 
2005, respectively. Turkey, Iceland, and Montenegro are also candidate 
states, but for different reasons, have not been included in this study. 
Turkey, a candidate state since 1999, is perhaps the most difficult case in 
terms of having been excluded; the most obvious reason being the issue 
of the strong Kurdish minority nationalism, and the conflictive nature of 
relations with the Turkish government. In fact, the Turkish government’s 
lack of protecting rights of national minorities, and especially the Kurdish 
one, was one of the reasons29 not to accept continued negotiations on the 
Turkish EU membership application. However, even though the nature of 
the ethno-political conflict, at times, has been violent, Turkey does not 
qualify in terms of the fact that it is not a post-communist state. The 
                                                          
29 Even though Turkey did not comply with the political criteria, the controversy over the 
Turkish candidature is not only limited to Turkey not having successfully complied with 
human rights and the protection of national minorities. The question of Turkish EU-
membership, which splits the European Council into those who are in favour and those 
who are against, has much more to do with questions related to power struggles where 
the very size of Turkey would decrease the political influence of especially the big three: 
France, Germany and the UK. In the vivid debates within the Council there is also the 
controversy of religion; since Turkey is an Islamic state with one part in Europe and the 
bigger part in Asia, the issue concerns whether Turkey could actually be considered 
European at all, or rather whether Turkey could be qualified as a state of European values. 
61 
omission of Iceland is in no way controversial, since it only qualifies as 
against the criterion of being a European state, and having strong 
enlargement preferences. Montenegro, on the other hand, does qualify in 
all respects, except for the fact, that the temporal dimension of the 
candidature of Montenegro places limits on whether the newly 
independent state should, in fact, be integrated in the study. Since the 
material collected for the analysis is confined to the period 2003 – 2010, 
and Montenegro acquired status as a candidate state as late as in 2010, for 
natural purposes there are no annual progress reports available as 
concerns Montenegro. Since the research question presupposes the 
measuring of the progress made in the level of rule adoption, 
consequently, Montenegro has also been omitted from the study.  
 
The second category includes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo30, and 
Serbia, which all acquired status as potential candidate states in 2003, 
when signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA). The 
SAAs were established with the specific aim of integrating the Western 
Balkan States into the European framework, with possible EU-
membership, conditional upon the EU acquis and the Copenhagen 
criteria. Whereas Serbia can be considered an independent state, 
according to the Westphalian model of sovereignty, as defined by the 
exclusion of external actors from exercising authority or effective control 
within the borders of a given state (Krasner in Krieger 2006: 71), both 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo can be considered semi-
protectorates (Noutcheva 2006: 1-4). This is particularly blatant in the 
sense that international organisations, still to a considerable extent, exert 
authority over both the civil administration and the military, since there 
is still international deployment of both civil and military staff for the 
maintenance of peace and security. In the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, this means that, even though the state does enjoy 
                                                          
30 The Kosovo status as defined in UNSC resolution 1244. Cf. UN, S/RES/1244 (1999), New 
York, 10 June 1999, http://www.un.org/DOCS/scres/1999/sc99.htm, 2010-12-12.  
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international legal sovereignty31, both Westphalian as well as domestic 
sovereignty32 is undermined by the presence of international bodies.  
 
The Kosovo status is even more problematic, and even though Kosovo 
has its own Constitution since 2008, following the unilateral proclamation 
of independence, not even half of the states in the international society 
recognise the independence of Kosovo, which means that Kosovo does 
not even enjoy international legal sovereignty to its fullest. However, just 
like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo is part of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAP) and under review from the monitoring of the 
EU annual Progress Reports since 2005, which subsequently means that 
progress can be measured on the basis of the same monitoring procedure 
as the other states under scrutiny. Albania is also a potential candidate 
state, since it is part of the SAA; however, Albania is not integrated in the 
study on the grounds that it has not experienced violent ethnic conflict 
since the demise of communism, and does not characterise as a state with 
strong minority nationalism.  
 
The last category includes Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, states 
which neither are candidate states nor potential candidate states, but 
where a closer cooperation, based on political conditionality, was 
established with the signing of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) in 2004 (Moldova), and 2006 (Azerbaijan and Georgia). However, 
in the states forming this third category, there have been no statements 
from the EU as to whether these states would possibly ever qualify for 
EU-membership. States that have signed the ENP conditionality package 
are bordering states to the EU, both in the Southern hemisphere, with the 
Northern African states, as well as the states bordering the EU on the 
Eurasian continent. Since the investigation presupposes that the states, 
forming the empirical base, are part of the European hemisphere, the 
states of Northern Africa have been excluded. Apart from Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Moldova, three other Eastern European states have signed 
                                                          
31 Krasner categorises sovereignty according to four different types: Westphalian 
sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty and international legal 
sovereignty. The latter refers to the “mutual recognition of states or other entities” 
(Krasner in Krieger 2006: 77-90). 
32 According to the typology provided by Krasner, domestic sovereignty refers to “the 
organization of public authority within a state and to the level of effective control 
exercised by those holding authority” (Krasner in Krieger 2006: 77). 
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the ENP conditionality, namely Belarus, Ukraine, and Armenia. Belarus 
does not qualify, since the state has not experienced violent ethnic conflict 
since the end of the Cold War, and cannot be characterised as a state with 
strong minority nationalism. The exclusion of Ukraine is more 
controversial, since the state did experience a dispute over Crimea. 
However, since that dispute did not develop into a violent ethno-political 
conflict, but was resolved in a rather peaceful manner, Ukraine has been 
considered not to qualify as against the criteria set. Furthermore, even 
though the state has conflictive divisions, between the western and the 
eastern parts, the state does not qualify against the criterion set for strong 
minority nationalisms. Armenia has been omitted from the study on the 
grounds that it is a highly mono-ethnic state. Thus, even though Armenia 
would qualify in accordance with the other criteria set for this study, the 
development of Armenia into a highly mono-ethnic society disqualifies 
the state, in terms of the investigation at hand. The last category is thus 
distinct from the first two since there is little prospect of EU membership, 
at least in the foreseeable future.  
 
On the basis of our empirical base, and according to our categorisation, it 
is thus expected that by 2010, the level of rule adoption would have 
progressed to be the highest in Croatia and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (category 1: candidate states), to have acquired an 
intermediate level in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia (category 2: potential 
candidate states) and to have progressed the least in Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
and Moldova (category 3: ENP states).  
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Fig. 4.1. Speed of reward hypothesis and categorisation of the empirical base 
 
Close to EU mem-  high level of adaptation  progressed to a 
bership reward  pressure high level of rule  
(category 1)   adoption 
 
Intermediate dis-  intermediate level of  progressed to an  
tance to EU mem- adaptation pressure intermediate level 
bership reward    of rule adoption 
(category 2)  
 
Distant to EU mem-  low level of adaptation   progressed to a 
bership reward pressure low level of rule 
(category 3) adoption 
   
 
The pitfall of the categorisation lies in the enlargement process itself, 
namely that the process is constantly moving, which means that it is a 
challenge to construct static categories. Thus, the dynamics of the 
enlargement process could, in turn, entail that one recipient state which 
is, at the time of writing, categorised as a candidate state could become a 
member state during the process of investigation. In fact, Croatia, a 
candidate state since 2004, has made strong progress in the accession 
negotiations and has already entered the final phase33, which 
subsequently means that Croatia has the potential of becoming a member 
state in the not too distant future.34 The dynamics of the enlargement 
process could also potentially mean that Serbia, as having advanced35 in 
the category “potential candidate states”, could very well migrate into the 
category of the candidate states. The possible fluctuation of recipient 
states from one category to another, could become a methodological 
problem, however, if we limit the temporal dimension of the study to 
2010, then the current categorisation would still be valid. In the following, 
                                                          
33 European Commission (2010) Croatia 2010 Progress Report, SEC (2010) 1326, Brussels, 9 
November 2010. 
34 The rapid development of the negotiations on accession coincides with the Croatian 
government’s revised position on the ICTY and its acceptance since 2010 to release the 
Croatian war criminals to be put on trial in the Hague Tribunal. 
35 On 22 December 2009, Serbia handed over the application for EU membership, cf. 
European Commission (2010) Serbia 2010 Progress Report, SEC (2010) 1330, Brussels, 9 
November 2010. 
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the investigation is limited both in time and in space. The time frame of 
the study is limited to the period 2003 (when Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo acquired status as potential candidate states), 
and 2010, which would then safeguard against any possible fluctuations 
during consecutive years. Rule adoption in minority language rights 
legislation have been limited to the areas of non-discrimination, minority 
language use in official contexts, and minority language rights in 
education. 
Measuring progress in minority language rights 
legislation 
Measuring the progress in the level of rule adoption in the area of 
minority language rights is a complex endeavour, since rights pertaining 
to minority rights protection have been lacking in EU internal 
consistency, displaying weaknesses in both clarity, and legality and, 
therefore, lacking in clear benchmarks. Furthermore, a second weakness 
emanates from the difficulty in isolating the EU impact from domestic 
incentives as concerns the legal changes, made in connection to the EU set 
objectives. However, as stated previously, given the securitised minority-
majority relations left by the legacies of war, in the states forming our 
empirical base, it is assumed that recipient states’ governments would not 
go about changing legislation in the area of minority language rights 
protection, would there not be any EU external incentives. In view of 
these challenges, and as underlined by Sasse, the way forward seems to 
be to measure compliance, “against the domestic follow-up on the actual 
complaints and recommendations, including legal changes, made by the 
EU” (Sasse 2008: 843).  
 
Norm compliance in this study is equated solely with rule adoption, i.e. 
legislative behaviour of recipient states’ governments. The argument why 
I have chosen to equate norm compliance with rule adoption of 
legislation is, primarily, due to the fact that legislative behaviour and 
legislative change are easier to measure. Furthermore, since the 
measurement of the progress made in the level of rule adoption will be 
based on the monitoring reports of both the EU, and the Council of 
Europe (CoE), which are both based on measuring legislative behaviour, 
since “this approach ensures equal treatment for all countries and permits 
an objective assessment of each country in terms of its concrete progress 
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in preparing for accession” (EU 2005 Progress Report on Croatia: 4), 
legislative behaviour is argued to facilitate comparison. It is important to 
stress, however, that rule adoption of legislation does in no way equate 
implementation thereof. This means that the study is not concerned with 
analysing whether the legislation adopted, in fact, is implemented in 
practice or not.  
 
On the basis of both Dunbar’s categorisation, as well as Schwellnus 
operationalisation of rule adoption in five issue areas of minority rights 
protection (Schwellnus et al. 2009: 6-7), minority language rights will be 
investigated pertaining to three categories, namely: non-discrimination; 
minority language use in official contexts, and minority language rights 
in education. Since the investigation hypothesises that the progress made 
in the level of rule adoption, is assumed to vary according to the temporal 
distance of the recipient states, which have been categorised accordingly, 
the progress made in the level of rule adoption will be measured on the 
basis of the progress reports of both the EU, as well as on the basis of the 
Opinions of the CoE’s Advisory Committee. Thus, the closer the recipient 
states are to becoming EU members, the more likely the progress in the 
level of rule adoption is assumed to be high. Following from this, it is 
argued that the candidate states are likely to have progressed to a higher 
level of rule adoption than the potential candidate states, which are 
temporally more distant to the prospective EU membership reward. In 
the category the furthest away from the prospective EU membership, 
progress in the level of rule adoption is assumed to be the least rapid.  
 
Each category is based on a continuum, varying from the least tolerant to 
the most promoted. Hence, on the basis of each category and the two 
ideal-types, three ordinal scales can be established, enabling the 
measurement of progress, on the basis of the values given to each 
indicator. The progress will be measured individually, on the basis of 
each category, which will determine values for each recipient state for 
each category. Measurement will also be carried out by putting together 
all three categories, giving each recipient state a total value, based on the 
progress made.  
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Fig. 4.2. Ordinal scale: Non-discrimination 
 
   Tolerance                                                                                       Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
(0): Absence of any non-discrimination norm; 
(1): General provisions such as an equality clause in the Constitution; 
(2): Non-discrimination laws are inserted in specific laws (language 
laws for instance) which entails a partial transposition of the EU 
Directives; 
(3): Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation which then means 
that there has been a complete transposition of the EU anti-
discrimination acquis; 
(4): Non-discrimination laws exceed the minimum requirements of 
the Directive.  
 
 
Fig. 4.3. Ordinal scale: Minority language use in official contexts 
 
   Tolerance                                           Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
(0): No recognition of minority languages; 
(1): The right to use the minority language in official contexts (before 
judicial and administrative authorities; i.e. the right to a translator); 
(2): The minority language can be used in Personal and Place Names 
(public signs); 
(3): The minority language can be used in official documents; 
(4): Minority language having status as official language. 
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Fig. 4.4. Ordinal scale: Minority language rights in education 
 
   Tolerance                                                                                      Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
 (0): No education of or in minority language; 
(1): Children belonging to minorities have the right to learn their 
mother tongue in school; 
(2): At least parts of the curriculum (e.g. history or religion) are taught 
in the minority language; 
(3): Minorities have the right to educate their children completely in 
the mother tongue, either in state schools with a complete syllabus 
taught in the minority language or in specific minority schools; 
(4): Minorities have their own universities. 
 
 
The research question has presupposed a methodological design, where 
the categorisation of the recipient states, is based on their temporal 
distance to the prospective EU membership reward. Therefore, in order to 
be able to analyse the progress made, the status of each recipient state 
upon gaining status as candidate state, potential candidate state, and ENP 
state respectively, will be determined on the basis of the assessments of 
both the EU Commission, and also the Advisory Committee of the 
Council of Europe. Thus, on the basis of the values each recipient state 
will be given upon accession to the different statuses, this will, 
consequently, permit an analysis of the subsequent progress made, 
enabling us to determine the explanatory power of the speed dimension’s 
impact upon the progress made in the level of rule adoption. 
The material 
The material used to analyse how the speed dimension impacts on the 
progress in rule adoption, pertaining to the three categories of minority 
language rights in the eight cases under investigation, ranges from official 
reports and documents of the EU, primarily through the Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAp), the Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
(SAA), and the respective bilateral negotiations, which are formalised in 
the European Partnerships for each state, and which all set the objectives 
and the conditions for the candidate states, as well as the potential 
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candidate states, under investigation. Furthermore, the bilateral Action 
Plans, which define the objectives for the states in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), will be analysed. Other non-EU 
documents, that constitute the basis of the material, is the Council of 
Europe’s Framework Convention (FCNM), which will be evaluated first, 
on the basis of whether the states under investigation have signed and 
ratified the legally binding document, but also on the basis of the reports 
provided for by the CoE Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the Committee 
of Ministers, which will inform of how the states have progressed in 
relation to the articles pertaining to the minority language rights 
provisions under investigation. 
 
For the sake of objectivity and comparability, the primary source for 
analysing the impact of the speed dimension on progress in rule adoption 
in the respective states under investigation, is mainly based on the EU 
Commission’s annual progress reports as well as the opinion reports 
prepared by the Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe. Even 
though the EU Progress Reports are written by the Commission, 
coordinated by the Directorate General of Enlargement, the reports are 
based on material gained from various sources. Thus, information is 
provided by the annual State Reports from the recipient state 
governments, from EU members, from International organisations like 
the CoE, OSCE, UNHCR, ICTY etc. The Progress Reports are also based 
on information gained from NGOs. Apart from the official documents 
and reports, case study literature from the disciplines of both political 
science as well international law will be used, as well as reports from 
minority rights NGO’s36. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 Especially Minority Rights Group International is an NGO that publishes up-to-date 
analyses on the current minority rights situations in the states under investigation. 
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5 
THE YUGOSLAV TRAGEDY 
From construction to deconstruction 
The history of the Balkans, in general, and the former Yugoslavia in 
particular, is one of the complex patterns of national groupings that, early 
on, constituted the battleground for imperial expansionism and conquest. 
After centuries of competition between the Byzanthine Empire and the 
Roman Empire, the ensuing long-lasting conflict in the Balkans was to be 
the one between the Eastern Ottoman Empire and the Western European 
powers and more specifically the Habsburg Empire. Whereas Croatia and 
Slovenia were never completely colonised by the Ottomans and thus 
remained part of the Christian western hemisphere, the present-day 
territories of Serbia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia37, 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo were subjugated to 
Ottoman rule for centuries. At the Congress of Berlin both Serbia38 and 
Montenegro became independent and as a consequence of the Serbian 
victory in the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 both Kosovo and Macedonia 
“were annexed to the Kingdom of Serbia” (Briza 2000: 7). The Balkan 
wars had constituted the final blow to the Ottoman Empire and a few 
years later with the end of World War I the demise of the Austro-
Hungarian, German and Russian Empires was inevitable.  
 
The idea about the necessity of constructing a state assembling all South 
Slavs39 already emerged in the nineteenth century especially among Croat 
and Serbian intellectuals since “the economic and cultural advancement 
made South Slavs increasingly aware of their ethnical and linguistic 
kinship” (Bilandzic 1972: 13). However, the new state in the making 
remained an idea in an embryonic form until the outbreak of World War I 
                                                          
37 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will hereinafter be labelled Macedonia. 
38 The principality of Serbia had had de facto independence since the Serbian uprising in 
1804 and the subsequent conquest of Belgrade in 1806. Cf. (Lukic in Ramet 2010: 45).  
39 The people that constituted the South Slavs were apart from the Croats, Serbs and 
Slovenes also the Bulgarians. Whereas the Slovenian national identity developed as late as 
the 19th century, the collective memories of nationhood and statehood of the Serbs, Croats 
and Bulgarians reach back to Medieval times and that’s why they belong to the old South 
Slavs. Cf. (Banac 1988: 23).  
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where exogenous factors (the fall of Empires) along with particularly 
Serbian but also Croatian interests made possible the promotion of a 
union between the South Slavs. Hence, in December 1914, the Serbian 
Prime Minister, Nikola Pasic, “obtained parliamentary approval of a 
statement that declared Serbia’s principal war aim to be the liberation and 
unification of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” (Dragnich 1983: 5). After 1918, 
when the peoples of the former Empire were granted the freedom to 
decide their own fate, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes chose to stay 
together and form a common state.  
 
Based on the Treaty of Corfu40, the first Yugoslav state was proclaimed in 
December 1918 as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
comprising also of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. 
As a consequence of the new Yugoslav state, the two Kingdoms of Serbia 
and Montenegro ceased to exist. On the basis of the Corfu Declaration, 
the Constitution was enacted on June 28 in 1921, establishing the new 
state as a constitutional parliamentary democracy, providing for “a 
democratically elected unicameral parliament (Skupstina), with ministers 
responsible to it and to the king” (Dragnich 1983: 25). The Corfu 
Declaration, furthermore, stated that the monarchy was going to be 
headed by the Serbian ruling house, Karadjordjevic. (Dragnich 1983: 7) 
Even though the first Yugoslav state was established on the principle of 
the legal equality of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Constitution 
“adopted the concept of the single “Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian” nation 
which then acted as justification for establishing a nation-state based on 
the principle of one nation – one state. Not only was the artificial 
construction of the one nation-state a futile endeavour, it was seen as an 
outright blasphemy especially of the Croatian nation and only aggravated 
an already sensitive inter-nationality problem, especially as concerned the 
Croat animosity towards the Serbs.41 Since the quintessence of the state 
                                                          
40 The Corfu Declaration consisted of fourteen points and declared that the Yugoslav state 
“was to be a constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary monarchy headed by the 
Serbian ruling house, Karadjordjevic. It was to be a unitary state, and the constitution for 
the new union was to be framed by a constituent assembly and adopted by a numerically 
qualified majority” (Dragnich 1983: 7). Serbia having been invaded during World War I, 
the Serbian government was in exile on the Greek island of Corfu. 
41 Already in 1915 a leading Croatian member of the Yugoslavia Committee, in the 
deliberations on the new Kingdom, had raised concerns as to the nature of the new State 
in that “the Croats wanted a common state with the Serbs, he said, but at the same time 
they desired to preserve their individuality in that state” (Dragnich 1983: 8).   
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was the unity of both state and nation, the division of the Yugoslav state 
into 33 regions was therefore not based on any ethnic criteria but was 
pursued according to the “natural, social and economic conditions” of the 
regions. (Bilandzic 1972: 27)  
 
Even though the nationality problem overshadowed existing social and 
economic divisions, it is nevertheless true that the gaps between the 
industrialised42 North and the agrarian South became particularly acute 
with the interwar recession. (Dragnich 1983: 72) Ethnic strife had 
culminated in 1928, with the assassinations in parliament which led to an 
enduring political crisis that the fragile democratic institutions were 
incapable of handling. As a consequence thereof, King Alexander 
assumed personal rule on the 6th of January in 1929. Although the 
dictatorial regime was softened in 1931, the ethnic tensions between 
primarily Croats and Serbs only augmented. The culmination of the 
tensions reached its peak in 1934, when on the instigation of Croat 
nationalists a Macedonian nationalist assassinated the Serbian King. 
(Briza 2000: 7) The political instability and the interethnic tensions of the 
first Yugoslavia facilitated the invasion of the Axis powers which finally 
brought an end to the regime in 1941. In 1941, Germany, Bulgaria, and 
Italy invaded Yugoslavia which disintegrated into its constituent parts 
and came under the tutelage of the Axis powers during WW II. In 1941, 
Croatia established the Independent State of Croatia43 on the territory of 
both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, a fascist state within the 
sphere of influence of the Axis powers which adopted the genocidal 
policy of the Nazi regime. This resulted in extermination campaigns, not 
only against the Jews and the Roma, but also and primarily against the 
Serbs44, in order to “purge Croatia of foreign elements” (Lattimer 2003: 7). 
During the fascist regime, the Partisan insurgency, in majority composed 
                                                          
42 Even though there was a division between the richer, more industrialised North and the 
poorer, agrarian South, the industrial sector was little developed in the 1920s. Cf. 
(Dragnich 1983: 72). 
43 The Independent state of Croatia is also called Ustashi which refers to the fascist nature 
of the Croatian regime. Cf. (Briza 2000: 7).  
44 During 1941-1945 and the Croatian genocidal campaigns, some 500 000 Serbs are 
believed to have been killed; some 250 000 expelled and another 200 000 who were made 
to convert into Roman Catholicism. Cf. (Lattimer 2003: 7). Not only Serbs were the targets 
during the Ustashi regime; the purge was also directed at Croatian insurgents and it has 
been estimated that approximately 192 000 Croats were killed along with 103 000 
Moslems. Cf. (Ramet 2006: 161). 
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of Croats and Montenegrins, was led by Tito, the Croat who was to 
become the strong man of the second Yugoslavia.   
 
The Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed on the 20th 
of November 1945. Being fully aware that the root cause of the failure of 
the first Yugoslavia had been the nationality question, the second socialist 
state was based on a federative structure where the equality of all six 
constituent republics would be guaranteed. Thus, on the basis of the 
Federal Constitution, each of the six republics enacted their own 
“autonomous” Constitutions. Even though the autonomy of the People’s 
Republics was from the beginning heavily restrained by the centralistic 
policies of the Federation, the individuality of each nation, displaying 
characteristics of individual statehood, was reflected in the fact that each 
Republic “had their own national flag and coat of arms, which expressed 
their national individuality and historical traditions” (Bilandzic 1972: 60). 
At the outset, although it was clear that the communists did constitute an 
important unifying factor45, the “integrative force” of socialism never 
succeeded in erasing the nationality problem in the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.  
 
Already from the beginning of the 1960s, the nationality problem came to 
the fore, indicating that the coexistence between the two foundational 
components46 of the communist platform in fact cohabited uneasily. 
Indeed, the centralistic foundation of the Communist Party was contrary 
to the autonomy concerns, based on the equality of the constituent 
nations, of the Republics. The paradoxical effect was that, however 
opposed to the policy of unitarism that had been “characteristic of pre-
war bourgeois Yugoslavia”, Tito, and the chief ideologists of the 
Communist Party, in fact, attempted to preserve the same ideology of 
unitarism. (Bilandzic 1972: 92) This, consequently, led to the ever present 
problem of the separation of powers, both legally as well as politically. 
Thus, from the 1960s and onwards, “the conflict between the centrifugal 
                                                          
45 The unifying factor of the Communist Party in the first decade of the Federal Republic’s 
existence is primarily explained by the role the Communists played in liberating 
Yugoslavia from both the external invaders but also from the internal perpetrators in the 
form of the Croat Ustashis and the Serb Chetniks. Cf. (Sekulic et al. 1994: 86). 
46 Apart from the revolutionary component and the establishment of a new political 
system, the platform of the Yugoslav Communist Party was also based on the nationality 
component and the establishment of the equality of all constituent nations. Cf. (Bilandzic 
1972: 47). 
74 
and the centripetal forces” was at the core of the numerous Constitutional 
amendments and revisions the Socialist Republic underwent. (Dragnich 
1983: 86)   
 
Legally, the balance between the centrifugal and the centripetal forces can 
be connected to several federal stages during the existence of the SFRY. 
Characteristic of all stages is, however, the imbalance in the separation of 
powers between the federal and the republican level. From the beginning, 
the heavy imbalance in favour of the centripetal forces would constantly 
evolve towards a heavy imbalance in favour of the centrifugal forces. By 
the end of the 1980s, this had led to a situation where the Republics had 
gained the status of sovereign states, which entailed that the political 
system of the SFRY was legally more of a confederation than a federation. 
Politically, however, due to the centralistic policies of the Communist 
Party, the imbalance had partly remained in favour of the centripetal 
forces. Consequently, when the crumbling of the communist system 
began in the late 1980s, the Republics had the legal right to both national 
self-determination as well as the right to secession. Despite the fall of 
communism, the legal right soon became a political problem, both 
internally, as well as externally.   
The demographic dimension 
The historical legacies of the Balkans had entailed a myriad of nations 
inhabiting the states and nations which were to form the first Yugoslav 
state in 1918. Although there were similarities between the Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes, mainly ascribed to the fact that they largely spoke the same 
language, the divisions were greater. The internal divisions were a direct 
consequence of the long-lasting imperial conquests of the Ottomans and 
the Habsburgs respectively, which had left their traces on the societal 
constructions of the different nations to varying degrees. The differences 
were mainly religious, although other societal differences prevailed as 
well. While most Serbs adhered to the Orthodox Church47, Croats and 
Slovenes had early on converted to Roman Catholicism. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the impact of the imperial conquests was the most blatant. 
                                                          
47 The impact of the Ottomans and the Islamic faith had had little impact on the Serbs 
whose religious affiliation early on was consolidated in the Orthodox Church; the latter 
becoming an important driving force in the development of Serbian nationalism especially 
in the 19th and 20th centuries. Cf. (Lukic in Ramet 2010: 44-45; Briza 2000: 8).  
75 
Its territorial setting, in between Serbia (under Ottoman tutelage between 
the 14th and 19th century), and Croatia (under Hungarian and Habsburg 
rule between 12th and 20th century), had entailed important migratory 
movements of especially Serbs and Croats, as well as an enduring impact 
of Islam that many Bosnians converted to early on. Furthermore, the early 
settlements of Albanians in the Serbian region of Kosovo-Metohija had 
entailed that the majority of the population of Kosovo adhered to the 
Islamic faith. In consequence, the future six constituent republics of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were heavily multi-ethnic in 
character48.  
 
The nationality problem, as it was to develop in the two Yugoslavias, 
does pertain to the North-West – South-East cleavage and particularly 
centres around the conflict between the two most numerically important 
South Slav nations, the Serbs and the Croats. However conflictive the 
relationship developed in the first Yugoslavia, relations had started out 
rather peacefully to counter a common enemy, the infidels from the 
Ottoman Empire. In fact, in the 16th century, and due to the advancing 
Turks, who had made territorial conquests as far as Dalmatia in present-
day Croatia, the Habsburg rulers had “invited the Serbs to escape their 
own subjugation under Turkish rule and join them in Croatia, where, in 
return for land, they could help guard the border - Krajina49 - between 
Christendom and the infidel” (Swain & Swain 2003: 258). Concomitantly, 
however, the Serb mercenaries were also used to hold down any 
nationalistic strife from the Croat and the Hungarian feudal peasants. 
Apart from land, the Serb minority also acquired other privileges and 
national rights50, which meant that, “as border guards, Serbs enjoyed the 
                                                          
48 Except for Slovenia that remained highly mono-ethnic in character. This furthermore 
explains why the secession of Slovenia from the Federation in 1991 never constituted a 
real problem since there were no national minorities to complicate the situation. Cf. 
(Swain & Swain 2003: 258). 
49 In the 16th century, Croatia virtually became the centre of the battlefield between 
Christendom and the advancement of the Infidels of the Ottoman Empire. When the 
Turks had advanced as far as Dalmatia in the Krajina region of the southern parts of 
Croatia, the Krajina region became an important military outpost to protect the further 
advancement of the Ottomans into the heartland of the Habsburg Empire. Cf. (Lattimer 
2003: 6). 
50 The Serb community in Croatia acquired national self-government including 
educational autonomy from the Austrian Habsburg Emperors between late 17th to mid-
18th century. Cf. (Lattimer 2003: 6). 
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status as free farmers excluded from Croatian parliamentary rule” 
(Lattimer 2003: 6). This meant that Croatia came to have a historically 
settled and numerically51 important Serb minority, with extended 
autonomy, in the southern parts of present-day Croatia, bordering on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
The nation-building processes of the Serbs and Croats, respectively, bore 
similarities in that they both had experienced early and strong nation-
building processes, where both nations “maintained a collective memory 
of their medieval statehood, and this memory survived in various forms” 
(Banac 1988: 23). The importance of the historic autonomy of Croat 
statehood52, and its individuality, would become a constitutive identity 
marker, especially pertinent from the late 18th century in the Croat 
national revival and onwards. The collective memory of the Serbs was 
fertilised by a glorious past of the Serbian Empire, which had peaked 
during the 14th century, before the expansionist policies of the Serbian 
Empire were momentarily stopped by the Ottomans on the battlefield at 
Kosovo Polje in 1389.53  
 
The successful Serbian opposition to the Ottomans subsequently led to 
the early forming of the Serb nation-state, de facto since 1806 during the 
Belgrade uprisings54, and de jure since 1878. The Croats, however, never 
constituted a nation-state, but were living under semi-independent 
                                                          
51 Before the Yugoslav war of Succession in the beginning of the 1990s the Serb minority in 
Croatia amounted to approximately 12%. Cf. (Ramet 2010: 266). 
52 The Croatian Kingdom was formed already in 925 and even though the Kingdom early 
on became intermingled with, or subjugated to, the Hungarian Kingdom (1102-1527) and 
the Habsburg Empire (1527-1918), at least the collective memory of Croat statehood 
remained. There is controversy over whether Croatian statehood was preserved under the 
union of the Kingdoms of Hungary and Croatia (1102 – 1527) where some claim that the 
union was more of a Hungarian conquest than a union based on unanimity of mutual 
interests. Furthermore, even though the Habsburg Empire gave extensive autonomy to 
Croatia during 1527 – 1868, it is still debatable whether Croatian statehood can be labelled 
as independent, at least in the Westphalian sense of the term. For a discussion on the 
controversy over Croatian statehood, cf. (Bellamy 2003: 36). 
 53 The symbolic legacy of the Kosovo territory as the cradle of the Serb nationhood 
became an important tool in the Serbian aggressive nationalist policies in the 1980s and 
1990s. Cf. (Trix in Ramet 2010: 359). 
54 Serbia had in fact been a de facto independent state since the Serbian revolt against the 
Ottoman tutelage in 1804 and the conquest of Belgrade in 1806 which “mark the 
beginning of the construction of the Serbian nation-state” (Lukic in Ramet 2010: 45). 
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circumstances in multinational polities. This, in turn, constituted the 
breeding ground for two opposing nationalisms. Whereas Croatian 
nationalism was based on self-determination and separatism, the Serbian 
nationalism, on the other hand, favoured centralism and hegemony, 
formulated in “the concept of Greater Serbia”, which was to become 
particularly articulate in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
century. (Bilandzic 1972: 161) Furthermore, religious affiliation became an 
important identity marker in the national development of both Croats, 
and particularly the Serbs. Thus, where Croat nationalism, early on, was 
consolidated in the Roman Catholic Church, the conversion of the Serbs 
to the Orthodox Church55, was to become a constitutive characteristic of 
Serb nationalism. Indeed, “the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox 
churches were driving forces in the national development of the Croatian 
and Serb nation” (Baltic 2007: 8).  
 
The domineering size of both Croats but particularly the Serbs in the two 
Yugoslavias indicates a problematic demographic situation, considering 
the incompatibility of the two nations, especially as concerned their 
opposing visions of Yugoslav statehood. Furthermore, with neither 
nation ever approaching a majority status, in parallel to the fact that Serbs 
and Croats, in particular, were heavily territorially dispersed, the multi-
ethnic character of the Republics and Provinces rendered the inter-
republican territorial divisions complicated. Indeed, apart from Serbia 
proper56, the Serbs were living in four of the other Republics57, as well as 
in the two Autonomous Provinces. The dispersion of the Croats was also 
important and encompassed three Republics58 and the Serbian province 
of Voijvodina. This, in turn, meant that five of the six Republics contained 
pockets of national minorities which were territorially concentrated in the 
                                                          
55 The Orthodox Church played an important part in the violent nationalistic policies 
during the Serbian leadership of Milosevic during the 1980s and the 1990s. Cf. (Briza 2000: 
10). 
56 Serbia proper refers to the Serbian mainland territory exempting the Serbian 
Autonomous provinces, Voijvodina and Kosovo-Metohija.  
57 The Serbs accounted for 31.2% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 12.2% in Croatia, 9.4% in 
Montenegro and 2.1% in Macedonia. Cf. (Baltic 2007: 36-41) 
58 Apart from Croatia, Croats were territorially settled in Bosnia and Herzegovina (17.4%), 
in Serbia they were primarily settled in the Autonomous Province of Voijvodina (7.1%) 
and also in Slovenia (2.8%). Cf. (Dragnich 1983: 3).   
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various regions of the Republics.59 From 1918 to 1991, there was a sharp 
increase in the size of the population from 12 to 20 million. The changes 
in the national structure within the two Yugoslavias during the 20th 
century are primarily explained from migratory movements, as well as 
from varying fertility rates between the various nations.    
 
Table 5.1. The development of the size of nations and nationalities in the SHS 
and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia according to the censuses in 
percentages from 1918 to 1991 (data retrieved from Banac 1988: 58 and Baltic 
2007: 25) 
 
Nationality 1918 
in % 
1948 
in % 
1961 
in % 
1971 in 
% 
1981 
in % 
1991 
in % 
Serbs 38.8 41.5 42.1 39.6 36.3 36.2 
Croats 23.8 24.0 23.1 22.0 19.7 19.7 
Slovenes 8.5 9.0 8.6 8.2 7.8 7.5 
Muslims 6.1 5.1 5.2 8.4 8.9 10.0 
Macedonians 4.960 5.1 5.6 5.8 6.0 5.8 
Albanians 3.7 4.8 4.9 6.4 7.7 9.3 
Montenegrins -61 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.3 
Bulgarians - 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 - 
Czechs -62 0.2 0.2 0.1 - - 
Others 14.2 7.2 7.2 6.7 10.8 9.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Furthermore, apart from the constitutive nations of the SFRY, the two 
recognised nationalities of the Hungarians and the Albanians also 
constituted ethnically concentrated minorities in the Republics. The 
Hungarian minority was historically settled in Croatia and in the Serbian 
Autonomous Province of Voijvodina, and the Albanian minority came to 
constitute an overwhelming majority in Kosovo, but also a significant 
portion of the population in Macedonia. Therefore, when the internal 
                                                          
59 Except for Bosnia and Herzegovina where no internal borders partitioned the Croats, 
Serbs and Bosniaks. Cf. (Swain & Swain 2003: 258-259). 
60 In the 1918 census the Macedonians and the Bulgarians were categorised as one. Cf. 
(Banac 1988: 58).  
61 Montenegrins were not categorised in the 1918 census. Cf. (Banac 1988: 58).  
62 Czechs were not categorised separately in the 1918 census. Cf. (Banac 1988: 58).  
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territorial demarcations were drawn between both the Republics, as well 
as the Provinces, the assumption was that these divisions would be 
“intra-national, administrative divisions to help run a multinational state 
in an area where history had laughed at the notion of a nation state 
(Swain & Swain 2003: 258). With the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 
1990s, these divisions, both intra-Republic as well as inter-Republic, were 
one of the main factors why the ensuing violent interethnic conflicts 
became particularly bloody. 
Minority language rights protection in the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
Language is one of the most fundamental identity markers in the 
building-blocks of creating a common identity, which was apparent 
throughout the nation-building processes of the 18th and 19th centuries in 
Europe. When the South Slavs were coming together in the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, it was the linguistic kinship that became the 
determinant around which the three nations, at the outset, attempted to 
create the fundament of the new state. However, the linguistic kinship 
was a fragile bond since there wasn’t one South Slav language but in fact 
a myriad of languages or rather dialects. In fact, during the Croatian 
national revival in the 18th century, the linguistic issue was to become the 
battleground on which Croats63 and Serbs were defining their respective 
linguistic specificities, at the same time as there were efforts to determine 
which one of the dialects would constitute the common language of the 
South Slavs. (Banac 1988: 75-84)  
 
The Stokavian dialect was used by an overwhelming majority of Serbs 
and also a majority of Croats. The Slovenes, however, used an idiom 
which was very similar to the second biggest Croatian dialect, the 
Kajkavian. The major conflict, however, was not the one between 
Stokavian and Kajkavian, it was the cleavage between the Orthodox Slavs 
                                                          
63 There were also divisions within the Croat camp as concerned which linguistic branch 
was to become the Croat national language. In fact, Croats spoke three different dialects 
which were fairly divergent and belonged to three specific language zones. In the 
Northwest around Zagreb, the Kajkavian dialect was in use, very similar to the Slovene 
language. Whereas in Istria, forming parts of littoral Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands, 
Croats spoke Cakavian (in decline and in little use) and finally in the rest of Croatia, 
Croats spoke the Stokavian dialect which is also the spoken language of an overwhelming 
majority of Serbs. Cf. (Banac 1988: 77). 
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(predominantly Serb), adhering to the Cyrillic alphabet, and the Roman 
Catholic Slavs (predominantly Croat and Slovene), using the Latin 
alphabet. Hence, the division between the Serbo-Croat (Cyrillic) and the 
Croat-Serbian (Latin) “languages” was to remain a conflict line. In the 
first Yugoslavia, Serb hegemony violently discriminated against any 
linguistic diversity and in the second Socialist Yugoslavia, although 
recognising all constituent nations’ languages as being “in official use at 
the federal level” (Baltic 2007: 34), nationalist strife based on linguistic 
issues was prevalent.  
 
National rights and minority rights64 were legally protected through the 
general non-discrimination norm where individuals were protected from 
discrimination, as stipulated in articles 13 and 21 of the 1946 Federal 
Constitution. Article 21, section III stated that, “acts privileging or 
restraining persons based on nationality, race or confession of faith were 
unconstitutional and punishable” (Baltic 2007: 31). Furthermore, the non-
discrimination norm was also confirmed in the “Law on the Prohibition 
of Provocation of National, Racial or Religious Hatred and Disruption” 
(Baltic 2007: 31). Based on the “liberation of nationalities’ component”, 
Yugoslavia under communist rule did not have one official state 
language, but seven languages had an equal legal status as being official 
languages. These languages were, respectively, the Serbo-Croat (Cyrillic), 
the Croatian literary language (Latin), Serbo-Croat or Croat-Serbian 
(Cyrillic and Latin), Macedonian (Cyrillic), Slovene (Latin), as well as two 
languages of the nationalities, namely Albanian and Hungarian. (Baltic 
2007: 34) This, in turn, implied that language rights were naturally 
extensive and provided for in different administrative regulations. In the 
Code of Procedure of the Federal Assembly, provisions were made so 
that each deputy had the right to use his mother tongue in his daily work. 
Also, the use of language in Public Courts, gave the right to “any party 
that did not have mastery of the procedural language, to use its own 
mother tongue, as well as to access to the procedural material provided 
by an interpreter, if necessary” (Baltic 2007: 31-32). 
                                                          
64 In fact, the term minority was hardly in use during the SFRY regime since it was 
considered pejorative. Instead, the term nationality, referring to “the members (of) the 
people that (were) organized into a nation, with (their) own written language and other 
features and which had a “native nation” outside the borders of Yugoslavia” was used. 
Cf. (Baltic 2007: 25).  
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Minority language rights were also extensively provided for in the 
Federal Constitution, as article 43 codified the rights of minorities to the 
free use of the language, as well as guaranteed the right of minorities to 
be instructed in the minority languages in education. Minority languages 
were specified as being either the mother tongue or the second language. 
Hence, and depending on the size of minorities at the local level, schools 
could be bilingual where minority languages “could be the language of 
instruction or the subject of instruction” (Baltic 2007: 36).   
 
Even though much of the rights and regulations concerning minority 
rights had increasingly been transferred to the Republican level, the basic 
principles were regulated on the Federal level and had to be adopted by 
the respective Republics. In accordance with the federal level, the 
Republican constitutions were henceforth regulating minority rights 
provisions and their implementation locally. (Baltic 2007: 33) On the 
Republican level, national rights and minority rights were increasingly65 
provided for, especially in the Republics and Autonomous Provinces 
with concentrated sizeable minority groups. In the Federal Constitution 
of 1963, the strengthening of language rights was confirmed in article 41 
and the guaranteeing of “the free use of language to all citizens”66 (Baltic 
2007: 32). Also, the 1963 Constitution, article 42, stressed the equality of 
the languages, including the equality of the alphabets, of “the nations of 
Yugoslavia” (Baltic 2007: 32).  
 
Linguistic rights in Education were guaranteed by the Constitution, both 
on the Federal, as well as on the Republican level. Implementation of the 
laws regulating education and the guaranteed right of education in 
minority languages were carried out on the local level which, in turn, 
meant that “the school models in nationally mixed regions throughout 
Yugoslavia differed from one to another” (Baltic 2007: 36). Therefore and 
paradoxically, where education generally is a forceful instrument of 
creating a common identity, the effect became the reverse in the SFRY 
regime since the education systems were based on “republic-level control 
                                                          
65 Since the 1963 Constitution meant a federalisation of Yugoslavia this is also visible 
pertaining to minority rights which were extensively provided for in the cultural and 
educational fields. Cf. (Baltic 2007: 32). 
66 The equality of the languages of nations and nationalities consequently meant that in 
the highly multi-ethnic Vojvodina “there were municipalities where proceedings were 
conducted in up to five or six different languages” (Baltic 2007: 35).  
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of curriculum content and the teaching of separate national histories in 
each republic” (Seculic et al. 1994: 94). This, in turn, meant that national 
specificities were enhanced to the detriment of creating a common history 
and, what is more, a common language. Consequently, the different 
educational systems became a breeding-ground for nationalistic 
sentiment, since all could develop their own understanding of history, as 
well as develop their own national specificity.  
The deconstruction of the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia 
In the second Yugoslavia, the nationality problem was anticipated to 
naturally die out due to the “integrating force” of socialism. After 35 
years of communist rule, however, interethnic strife had slowly, but 
surely, been allowed to develop in the country, which consequently 
meant that when the communist system started to disintegrate in the late 
1980s, it was to become replaced by nationalism. The economic 
breakdown of the Yugoslav economy which had nurtured ethnic rivalry 
and tensions, subsequently leading to the unilateral secessions of both 
Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, followed by the Bosnian and Macedonian 
proclamations of independence in 1992, all rapidly endorsed by the EU, 
propelled Yugoslavia into civil war. Even though the War of Succession, 
fought between 1991 and 1995, did not include Kosovo, the Kosovo issue 
dominated the nationalistic agenda of the Serbian political leadership in 
the late 1980s. 
 
Tensions in the Serbian Autonomous Province of Kosovo had been 
building up ever since the death of Tito in 1980. The tensions were based 
on the Kosovo Albanian claims for further autonomy, on the one hand, 
and on the other, resentments from Serbia and the continuous exodus of 
the Kosovo Serb minority.67 In 1981, riots broke out in Kosovo which 
exacerbated Serb nationalistic sentiment, of which the famous 
Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art, a document 
                                                          
67 Even though human rights violations against the Serb minority in Kosovo have been 
attested by observers, the primary reason of the exodus is however argued to be due to 
economic reasons. Over 30 000 Serbs and Montenegrins are believed to have left Kosovo 
during 1971 – 1981. Cf. (Briza 2000: 12).  
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produced by former nationalist dissidents, opposed to Titoism68, 
expressed the quintessence of the Serbian nationalistic project. The 
Memorandum declared that the constitutional order from 197469 denied 
the Serbs their right to their own state and that, not only Kosovo, but “the 
western Yugoslav republics, were exploiting Serbia economically, and 
that the regime was acquiescing in the Albanian “genocide” of Serbs in 
Kosovo, as well as in Croatia’s assimilation of its Serb population” (Hoare 
in Ramet 2010: 115). When Slobodan Milosevic came to power in 1987, he 
endorsed the conclusion of the Memorandum, which stated that the 
status of Kosovo was primordial to the very survival of the Serb nation. 
Thus, logically following from this, the autonomy of Kosovo was 
suppressed in 1989, later manifest in the Serb Constitution of 1990, which 
lowered the Province of Kosovo to the rank of District and renamed it 
Kosovo-Metohija. 
 
Later that same year, ethnic tensions propagated to other Republics, 
heavily spurred by the disastrous economic situation, and in 1990, the 
tensions had taken on “a clear Croat-Serbian dimension” (Swain & Swain 
2003: 225). Even though the Yugoslav war of Succession included all the 
Yugoslav Republics, except Macedonia, it was primarily a war which was 
fought between Serbs and Croats in Slovenia, Croatia and later in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The on-going Kosovo issue in the beginning of the 
1990s, characterised by the pacifist resistance of the Kosovo-Albanians to 
the violent discriminatory policies of the Serbs, was to explode into a full 
blown war in between the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army 
(JNA) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) between 1996 and 1999. 
Finally, the early successes of the conflict preventive missions of the UN 
and the OSCE in Macedonia would prove insufficient, as the 
repercussions of the Albanian issue in the Kosovo war were to spill over 
to Macedonian territory in 2001.  
 
The run-up to the war of Yugoslav Succession, apart from its structural 
conflict dimension, was activated by the Croatian elections, held on 22 
                                                          
68 Serbian opposition to Titoism and the constitutional order implemented by the 1974 
Constitution accelerated after Tito’s death. Cf. (Hoare in Ramet 2010: 115).  
69 In the 1974 Constitution Kosovo was upgraded to the status of federal unit equivalent to 
that of Vojvodina. This in turn led to that both Autonomous Provinces, since constituting 
federal units were almost on the same legal footing as the Republics which considerably 
increased their independence vis-à-vis Belgrade. Cf. (Ramet 1984: 158-159). 
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April and 6-7 May 1990. On a highly nationalistic programme, Franjo 
Tudjman70 won the elections and on the 30th of May, “was elected 
president of the Croatian presidency” (Swain & Swain 2003: 227). The 
following year, the culmination of three specific events, taking place in 
the time-span of 11 days in 1991, catapulted the region into civil war and 
bloodshed. The first event took place on the 8th of May, when Slovenia 
declared its intention to secede from the SFRY, subsequently proclaiming 
independence on the 25th of June. Second, on the 12th of May, the self-
proclaimed Serb ‘Autonomous Region of Krajina’ in the Croatian 
Republic71 voted in a regional referendum to remain part of Yugoslavia. 
Third, in a referendum on the 19th of May, 90% of the population in 
Croatia voted for secession and on the same day as Slovenia, 25th of June 
1991, unilaterally withdrew from the FRY. (Swain & Swain 2003: 227)  
 
Whereas the war in Slovenia was almost over before it had begun (the 
war lasted 10 days), the war in Croatia lasted for 4 years, in between 1991 
– 1995. The war in Slovenia was short because, in reality, the 
independence of Slovenia was posing few problems to the Serbs since the 
republic was almost exclusively constituted by ethnic Slovenes with 
almost no national minorities to complicate the situation. The situation in 
Croatia was the reverse. With a numerically important, and a highly 
concentrated Serb minority, especially in the Krajina region, the self-
proclaimed secession of Croatia was violently reacted on by the large 
Serb community. In fact, even before the unilateral secession of Croatia 
was proclaimed, fighting between the Krajina Serb insurgents and Croats 
had started out in Eastern Slavonia. The fighting between Serb insurgents 
in Croatia72, who wanted to stay part of the SFRY, and Croats, thus 
started at the border between Serbia and Croatia which, in turn, meant 
that “the issues of Croatian independence and the rights of the Serb 
minority within Croatia became intertwined” (Swain & Swain 2003: 260). 
                                                          
70 Franjo Tudjman had played an important part in the autonomy strives of Croatia during 
the Tito regime. In fact, having heavily criticised the centralistic policies of the Communist 
Party he was sentenced to prison on the charge of being a menace to the Yugoslav state. 
Cf. (Baltic 2007: 16).  
71 The build-up of ethnic tensions between Croats and Serbs played out in the Serb towns 
of Knin and Benkovac where the Serb minority had set up blockades against Croatian 
police in October 1990, subsequently declaring an independent Serb enclave. Cf. (Swain & 
Swain 2003: 227).  
72 The Croatian Serbs were in fact one of the ethnic groups “the most loyal to the 
communist regime in the entire federation” (Swain & Swain 2003: 460).  
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Although concentrated from the start to the North-East, where Serb 
insurgents, with the help of the Yugoslav National Army, took rapid 
control of approximately 30% of Croatian territory, the war between 
Croats and Serbs soon developed into all of Croatia. By the end of 1991, 
the successes of the Serb contingents, having killed and expelled Croats 
from their homes, had created a pseudo-state consisting of Serbs in 
Croatia which had been de facto annexed to Serbia between 1991 and 1995. 
(Lukic in Ramet 2010: 51-52)  
 
When Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence in 1992, much of 
the Serb-Croat conflict moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina, beginning as 
an open war between the two primary antagonists, Croats and Serbs, and 
continued as a proxy war before it was ended by the international 
community 3 ½ years later. (Swain & Swain 2003: 259) Thus, just like in 
the war in Croatia, the Serbian political leadership was using community 
leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina to stir up resistance. (Lukic in Ramet 
2010: 51-52) However, since Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted of three 
constituent nations which were highly dispersed, the Bosnian war 
became particularly violent and was to constitute one of the worst 
battlegrounds of ethnic cleansing on European soil since World War II. 
The Yugoslav War of Succession lasted for 4 years and was terminated by 
the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. One year later, in 1996, when the 
peaceful resistance of the Kosovars did not show any sign of success73, the 
Kosovo conflict developed into a proper war in 1998, subsequently ended 
by the NATO intervention in 1999. 
 
I think it is fair to say that the Kosovo conflict has been the most 
symbolically value-laden conflict of all the ethnic conflicts played out in 
the region. The division between Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians, although 
separated by the two most important identity markers, language and 
religion74, is primarily rooted in a conflict over a common territory over 
which both peoples claim exclusive authority. The international law 
                                                          
73 The resistance of the Kosovars had not succeeded in ameliorating their situation but 
rather the contrary, worsening the discriminatory situation that became untenable. Cf. 
(Trix in Ramet 2010: 362-363). 
74 Where the religious affiliation was not central to the Albanian national identity, the 
linguistic marker is. Cf. (Roux 1992: 205). For the Serbs however, the religious identity was 
the very core of the Serb national identity thus Serb aversion towards the Albanians is 
explained by a classical religious antagonism which dates back to the Islamic infidels of 
the Ottoman Empire. Cf. (Radic in de Nebojsa 1998: 137-138). 
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dimension of the Kosovo conflict became acute when the Kosovo 
Albanians started to declare their right to national self-determination, 
responded to by the Serbs who advocated the principle of territorial 
integrity. Thus, on the one hand the Albanians referred to the UN 
Charter, and the principle on the basis of which every nation living under 
colonial domination or other types of guardianship, i.e. foreign 
occupation or racial discrimination, have a legitimate right to exercise 
their right to self-determination. The Serbs, however, refused to recognise 
the existence of any type of colonial domination in Kosovo, thus 
promulgating the counter-argument that international law does not allow 
the right to secede, neither to national minorities, nor to nations. 
 
The right to secession was, however, not a problem in the Macedonian 
case, since its withdrawal from the SFRY in 1992, went practically 
unnoticed. In fact, Macedonia became the only former Yugoslav Republic 
to have succeeded in seceding from the SFRY without bloodshed as a 
consequence. However, due to the numerically important Albanian 
minority in Macedonia, and primarily due to the possible spill-over of the 
Kosovo “issue” into Macedonia, the former Macedonian President 
Gligorov invited the OSCE and the UN75, to deploy conflict preventive 
missions on Macedonian territory in the first years of Macedonian 
independence.  
 
Even though the conflict preventive missions were largely successful76, 
the Kosovo war, and its effects, started to have repercussions on the 
hostilities between the numerically large Albanian minority and the 
ethnic Macedonians. Thus, the escalation of the Kosovo war, in 1998-1999, 
eventually resulted in the spill-over of the conflict and the outbreak of 
increasing conflict between ethnic Macedonians and the Albanian 
                                                          
75 The UN Mission was the first mission of preventive diplomacy with a fairly large 
military contingent. By UN resolution 983 of 31 March 1995, the Security Council made 
the preventive detachment, UNPROFOR, an operation of maintenance of peace in its own 
right as the UN Preventive Deployment Force. Cf. United Nations, S/RES/983 (1995), New 
York, 31 March 1995, http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1995/scres95.htm, 2011-09-12. 
76 Success is however a controversial term to use in relation to conflict preventive actions 
since there is an inherent limit in the validity of measurement of conflict preventive action 
since one never knows whether the hostilities that are prevented would ever have 
escalated into a violent conflict had there not been preventive action. Cf. Pioppi, D. (2001) 
“Conflict Prevention: Measuring the Unmeasurable?” in The International Spectator, Vol. 
36, No. 2, April-June 2001.  
87 
minority in Macedonia. Even though the demilitarisation of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army and the establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps 
were a direct consequence of the NATO-intervention in Kosovo, and the 
subsequent UN resolution 1244, of June 10th 1999, the KLA had remained 
active. After 6 months of conflict between the Macedonian security forces 
and the Macedonian Albanian rebels, the conflict ended with the Ohrid 
Peace Agreement, brokered in August 2001 by EU and US envoys.   
 
Thus, the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia had produced new states, 
with varying records of democracy-building and interethnic hostilities, 
consequently entailing various degrees of intervention and supervision 
from the international community (EU, NATO and UN). What is common 
to them, however, is that all successor states under investigation, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo are on track of 
EU-membership and that all, therefore, have to comply with EU 
conditionality and the criteria set up for minority language rights 
protection.  
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6 
CROATIA AND MINORITY LANGUAGE 
RIGHTS PROTECTION 
Croatian independence 
Croatian political history is a history of a nation which has been living in 
different multinational settings77 with varying degrees of autonomy but 
always being reminiscent of the sovereign Croatian Kingdom (925 – 
1102). Croatian political history is also one of constant fluidity of both 
territorial borders as well as the malleability of borders between political 
communities. Subsequently, cohabitation with different nations and 
nationalities throughout the centuries became a constant. Whereas the 
development of interethnic relations went rather smoothly with the 
Muslims, Slovenes, Hungarians and the Italians, the relationship with the 
large Serb community on Croatian soil was to develop according to 
increasing hostility, exploding in genocidal policies both during the 
Ustashi regime (1941-1945), and eventually in the wars of Yugoslav 
dissolution in the 1990s. During the SFRY regime, the cohabitation 
between Serbs and Croats was however managed since it was tightly 
controlled by communist rule. Indeed, although Croat animosity towards 
Serb hegemony was manifest in the cultural, political and economic 
domains and demands for increased autonomy were continuously voiced 
from the 1960s, the legal standing of the Serbs in the multinational 
Socialist Republic of Croatia was prominent. The Croatian Constitution 
defined Croatia as “the national state of Croats, Serbs in Croatia and other 
nationalities” (Lattimer 2003: 7-8).78 
                                                          
77 The multinational context in which Croats found themselves started already in 1102 
when the Hungarian conquest led to a forced union, under Hungarian royalty, of the two 
Kingdoms. From 1527 the Croats acquired a semi-autonomous status under the Habsburg 
rule and in 1868 acquired autonomy from Budapest with the signing of the 
“Compromise” by Hungary and the Triune Kingdom, composed of Croatia, Slavonia and 
Dalmatia which “created a new sort of political community” (Lukic in Ramet 2010: 43).  
78 The particular legal status of the Serb nation was due both to its considerable numerical 
size (12.2% according to the 1991 census) and also due to the protected status of the 
Krajina Serbs which had gained extensive autonomy under the Habsburgs in the 17th and 
18th centuries. Cf. (Lattimer 2003: 38).  
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 With the crumbling of the communist order and the subsequent 
proclamation of Croatian independence, the latent interethnic hostilities 
between Croats and Serbs exploded into outright war. The threat towards 
the newly independent state came both from within the newly 
established international borders (from the unilaterally proclaimed 
Croatian Serbs Krajina Republic), as well as from the Socialist Republic of 
Serbia. The Constitution of 1990, adopted on the 22 December 1990, 
established Croatia as a unitary state with a semi-presidential system and 
a parliamentary form of government. (Art. 1 of the Constitution) Hence, 
the executive power was divided between the Prime Minister and his 
government and the President, with the legislative power invested in the 
bicameral Parliament (Sabor), the directly elected House of 
Representatives and the indirectly elected House of Counties. The 
elections of April and May 1990 were held in a climate of nationalistic 
euphoria, which paved the way for the newly established party, the 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) which, on a highly nationalistic party 
programme gained the majority of the votes. Franjo Tudjman, the 
founder of the HDZ, as well as the symbolic figure of the Croatian Spring 
movement79, “was elected president of the Croatian presidency” (Swain & 
Swain 2003: 227).  
 
The following year, in a popular referendum on the 19th of May 1991, 90% 
of the population in Croatia voted in favour of independence, which 
subsequently led to the unilateral withdrawal of Croatia from the SFRY 
on the 25th of June 1991. The Tudjman rule, which lasted from 1990 to 
199980, was naturally coinciding with Croatia’s homeland war, which only 
exacerbated, as well as legitimated, Tudjman’s rule and popularity. The 
extensive powers which the Constitution granted to the presidential 
office were effectively used by Tudjman, which, in turn, meant that 
political power during this period was more or less monopolised in the 
hands of a charismatic leader. Mate Granic, a close associate and Foreign 
minister of the Tudjman government (1993 – 2000), described the 
                                                          
79 Initially the “Croatian Spring” movement was an organised resistance against the 
dominance of the Serbian language and an attempt to restore the independence of the 
Croatian language. What started as a movement for linguistic independence was however 
to become a movement for more generalised autonomy demands. Cf. (Baltic 2007: 16). 
80 Tudjman died in office but rumours had it that Tudjman had been planning to make 
changes to the Constitution in order for him to have the right to be re-elected for a third 
time. Cf. (Ramet 2010: 268)   
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omnipotence of Tudjman in his memoirs, noting that “Tudjman had 
complete control over the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, and 
police, as well as over the information services, and for a while he also 
controlled the Ministry of Finance” (Granic cited in Ramet 2010: 259). 
 
Tudjman was then well placed to capitalise on the strong nationalistic 
currents and had, more or less, “carte blanche” to implement his 
nationalistic agenda. The core of Tudjman’s successful strategy was to 
convince the electorate that the survival of the Croatian nation was 
threatened and this necessarily meant the restoration of Croatia as a state 
of the Croatian nation. The strategy had three components: “(1) identify 
and stigmatize a national enemy; (2) unite the nation against this threat; 
and (3) call for resistance” (Duffy & Lindstrom 2002: 78). In parallel to 
stigmatising the other (the Serbs), which also meant massive 
redundancies of Serbs from official positions (especially from the 
judiciary), as well as the prohibition of using the Cyrillic alphabet, the 
government also “initiated a campaign of Croatian symbolism, renaming 
the streets named after notable Serbs or anti-Fascists, or Serbian towns” 
(Vladisavljevic 2004: 7).  
 
As a precondition81 for gaining international recognition of Croatian 
independence, the Croatian Parliament had adopted the Constitutional 
Law on Human Rights and Freedoms of National and Ethnic 
Communities in December 1991. (Lattimer 2003: 19) However, the lack of 
commitment to implement the law, as well as the HDZ’s stronghold of 
Parliament, meant that the political rights of particularly the Serbs could 
cleverly be juggled with. In fact, each of the parliamentary elections of 
1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, 2000 and 2003, were effectively carried out 
according to different electoral laws, and the electoral law, passed prior to 
the 1995 elections, “annulled certain rights granted to Croatia’s Serb 
minority under the 1990 constitution and, accordingly, reduced the 
number of parliamentary seats reserved for them to three” (Ramet 2010: 
269).   
 
                                                          
81 The preconditions were formulated by the Badinter Commission and included amongst 
other things “the inviolability of borders and guarantees for the rights of ethnic groups 
and minorities” (Hoffmann in Ullman 1996: 99). Diplomatic recognition of Croatian 
independence was made by the EU member states on the 15th of January 1992. Cf. 
(Lattimer 2003: 9). 
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Even though the cult of Tudjman persevered after his death in 1999, there 
was a reorientation in Croatian politics from 2000, when the country 
entered a new transitional stage towards democratisation and the start 
towards EU integration. In fact, in the elections of the 3rd of January 2000, 
the HDZ was voted out of government and during 2000 – 200382, a 
coalition of six parties83, headed by the Social Democratic Party (SDP), 
reoriented the country on a path towards democratic reform. In order to 
come to terms with the extended powers of the Presidency, the 
amendments to the Constitution, passed in 2000 and 2001, downgraded 
the powers of the presidency and made the Office of Prime minister “the 
most powerful political office in Croatia” (Ramet 2010: 269). Thus, the 
semi-presidential system was abandoned and replaced by a 
parliamentary system, where the governmental powers were 
strengthened to the detriment of the presidential ones. The bicameral 
parliament was reformed into a single chamber by a constitutional 
amendment in 2001. (Art. 146) Furthermore, in order to strengthen local 
self-government and come to terms with prior restrictions on the 
competencies of the local units (towns, municipalities and counties)84, the 
Law on Local and Regional Self-Government was adopted by the 
Croatian Parliament in 2001. (Lattimer 2003: 19) 
 
However, even though there was a reorientation of Croatian politics with 
a path towards democratisation, taking place in parallel with the road 
towards European integration with Croatia’s application for EU 
membership in February 200385, this reorientation has not been without 
its problems. In fact, the legacies of the wars and the undemocratic 
regime under the Tudjman rule had left marks on Croatian politics even 
                                                          
82 However, a reformed, less nationalistic HDZ, regained power in the 2003 elections 
“capturing 66 seats in the Sabor, against 34 for the SDP” (Ramet 2010: 270). The same result 
was confirmed by the 2007 parliamentary elections whereby Sanader formed a coalition 
government with the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) and the Croatian Social Liberal Party 
(HSLS). (Ramet 2010: 272)  
83 Apart from the Social Democratic Party, the other political parties in government were: 
The Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), the Croatian People’s Party (HNS), the Croatian 
Peasant Party (HSS), the Liberal Party (LS) and the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS). 
The IDS, formed in 1990 to “defend the interests of the people of Istria” later left the 
coalition government. Cf. (Ramet 2010: 268-269).  
84 The local units in Croatia are the 426 municipalities, the 121 towns and the 20 counties. 
Zagreb has the status of a county. Cf. (EU Report 2004: 14).  
85 Croatia applied for EU membership on the 21st of February 2003 which was accepted by 
the Council of Ministers on the 14th of April that same year. Cf. (EU Report 2004: 4). 
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after 2000 and effectively slowed down Croatia’s path to EU integration. 
Indeed, the problematic relationship between the Croatian government 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
has been complicated and, at times, hostile due to the government’s 
unwillingness to extradite war criminals to the Tribunal86. Thus, however 
pro-Western and pro-European the Croatian policy since 2000 at times 
this reorientation has seemed to have been made rather reluctantly.  
The demographic dimension  
Croatia is a multinational state with a landmass stretching over 56.542 
km2 bordering on Slovenia and Hungary in the north and Serbia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Montenegro to the southeast. The population of 
Croatia amounts to 4,456,096 according to the 2011 census87. Before the 
war in 1991, Croats in Croatia amounted to approximately 78% of the 
population with the most important national “minority” being the Serbs 
who exceeded 12%. Due to the historic legacy of Croatia, the Serbs had 
constituted the majority of Eastern Slavonia, quite an important Croatian 
landmass neighbouring Serbia as well as having constituted an important 
community in the Krajina region. Thus, prior to the wars of Yugoslav 
Succession and Croatian independence, the territorially concentrated 
Serbs had acquired extensive autonomy and their legal status was not one 
of national minority but one of nation. Prior to the outbreak of the war, in 
the 1991 census, Croatian citizens declared themselves to be members of 
23 nationalities of which 22 are today recognised as having legal status as 
national minorities. In the 1991 census, apart from the most numerous 
Serb minority amounting to 12.2% and those identifying as Yugoslavs88, 
the numerically biggest minorities were the Muslims (0.9%), Slovenians 
(0.5%), Hungarians (0.5%) and Italians (0.4%) (see Table 6.1.).   
 
The ethnic wars in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had 
resulted in both ethnic cleansing as well as massive refugee movements 
                                                          
86 The complicated relationship is grounded in the fact that whereas the ICTY has viewed 
these persons as war criminals the media and especially the state television have 
oftentimes depicted the indictees as war heroes. Cf. (Lattimer 2003: 28-29). 
87 The figures have been accessed from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 
http://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm, 2011-10-09. 
88 The construction of a Yugoslav identity largely failed and was from its inception, 
officially at least, constructed as a category in the census of 1961 pertaining to those 
“nationally non-committed persons” (Sekulic et al. 1994: 84).   
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which had drastically changed the demographic structure of the Croatian 
society. According to the 2001 census, the share of Croats had increased 
from 78.1% to 89.6% at the same time as the proportion of Serbs had 
become significantly decimated, from 12.2 to a mere 4.5%. Furthermore, 
the Bosniaks, a national minority which was not recorded in the 1991 
census, had become the second largest minority group in Croatia after the 
war, amounting to 0.5%. Two national groups who had identified as 
Yugoslavs and Muslims, having been respectively the 3rd and 4th largest 
minority groups prior to the war had completely vanished89 from the 2001 
census. Apart from the Serbs and the Bosniaks, the Italians constituted the 
3rd largest group (0.4%), followed by the Hungarians (0.4%), and the 
Albanians (0.3%). (See Table 3) Consequently, the wars in both Croatia 
and the neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina had created more 
ethnically homogenous territories.  
 
The changes in the demographic structure not only refer to a numerical 
decrease in the number of ethnic minorities, especially the Serb one, but 
also pertain to a decrease in territorially-bound minorities. In fact, as 
opposed to the pre-war situation, Croatia of today is a state where ethnic 
minorities are dispersed (and not ethnically concentrated), which 
subsequently means that no minority groups are “able to demand power-
sharing as a form of regulating their status” (Lattimer 2003: 12). Thus, 
minorities that do enjoy a certain level of territorial autonomy, like the 
Serb minority in Eastern Slavonia, “insist on their rights, preferring 
identity protection rather than power-sharing” (Lattimer 2003: 12). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
89 Of course the entire groups had not vanished but preferred to be labelled as Bosniaks.  
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Table 6.1. Ethnic structure of the population in Croatia according to the 1991 
census and the 2001 census (data retrieved from Lattimer 2003: 5 and Croatia 
Bureau of Statistics, http://www.dzs.hr/default_en.htm, 2011-10-09) 
 
Nationality 1991 number 1991 % 2001 number 2001 % 
Albanians 
Bosniaks 
Croats 
Czechs 
Germans 
Hungarians 
Italians 
Macedonians 
Montenegrins 
Muslims 
Roma 
Ruthenians 
Serbs 
Slovaks 
Slovenes 
Ukrainians 
Yugoslavs 
Others 
Regional 
affiliation 
Non-
determined 
Unknown 
12.032 
- 
3.736.356 
13.086 
2.635 
22.355 
21.303 
6.280 
9.724 
43.469 
6.695 
3.253 
581.663 
5.606 
22.376 
2.494 
106.041 
7.102 
45.493 
 
73.376 
 
62.926 
0.3 
- 
78.1 
0.3 
0.1 
0.5 
0.4 
0.1 
0.2 
0.9 
0.1 
0.1 
12.2 
0.1 
0.5 
0.1 
2.2 
0.1 
0.9 
 
1.5 
 
1.3 
 
15.082 
20.755 
3.977.171 
10.510 
2.902 
16.595 
19.636 
4.270 
4.926 
- 
9.463 
2.337 
201.631 
4.712 
13.171 
1.977 
- 
25.215 
9.302 
 
89.130 
 
17.975 
 
0.3 
0.5 
89.6 
0.2 
0.1 
0.4 
0.4 
0.1 
0.1 
- 
0.2 
- 
4.5 
0.1 
0.3 
- 
- 
0.6 
0.2 
 
2.0 
 
0.4 
 
Total 4.784.265 100 4.437.460 100 
 
The sociolinguistic dimension 
Although Croatia has always been a multinational state, apart from the 
Serbs, the other national minorities were rather small in their numerical 
sizes. The most commonly spoken languages in Croatia have been, and 
still are, Croatian, Serbian and Hungarian. (Lattimer 2003: 4) However, 
since Italian “stands out as a regionally strong and generally prestigious 
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language with some degree of official and public use” (Bugarski 2004: 
197), it certainly deserves mentioning as well.  
 
Even though the language policy of Croatia under communist rule was 
based on the equality of all nations and national minorities inhabiting 
Croatia, the Serbo-Croat language had a particular legal standing as it 
was not only the most used, but also the most widely disputed. In fact, 
although the Croatian language with its Latin alphabet, and the Serbian 
with its Cyrillic alphabet, displayed such similarities as to be called the 
Serbo-Croat language, a generalised dispute over the Serbo-Croat 
language erupted in the 1960s by Croatian intellectuals who complained 
about the predominance of the official use of the Serbian language. What 
started as a conflict over the predominance of the Serbian language soon 
became a mass movement which had spread to all areas. (Baltic 2007: 16). 
The magnitude of the demonstrations in time and in space can be seen in 
that in 1972, 427 persons, including the Croatian president to be, Franjo 
Tudjman, were arrested and sentenced for “offences against the people 
and the state” (Baltic 2007: 16). Hence, in the Croatian Constitution of 
1974, in the aftermath of the Croatian Spring, recognition of the Literary 
Croatian language was made and defined as a “standard form of the 
national language of the Croatians and Serbs in Croatia, named Croatian 
or Serb (language)” (Art. 138 section II, cited in Baltic 2007: 37).   
 
The serious dismantling of the Serbo-Croat language (administratively 
that is), was, however, actively pursued in Croatia in the run-up to its 
independence when the necessity of defining the Croatian linguistic 
specificity, and its superiority, became vital in the state-building process. 
In fact, in the 1990 Constitution this became evident since it was stated 
that: “The Croatian language and the Latin script shall be in official use in 
the Republic of Croatia. In individual local units, another language and 
the Cyrillic or some other script may be introduced into official use along 
with the Croatian language and the Latin script under conditions 
specified by law” (Art. 12). During the Tudjman regime, and still 
prevailing today, much of the language policy in Croatia has been 
focusing on “directing the Croatian language away from Serbian and 
their common Serbo-Croatian heritage by means of purging it from actual 
or perceived Serbisms and of internationalisms, combined with reviving 
Croatian archaic and regional forms and creating neologisms” (Bugarski 
2004: 197). As concerns the other minority languages, it is true that the 
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dominance of the Croatian language has been emphasised to the 
detriment of minority languages. This has been implemented rather 
easily due to a general decrease of national minorities, and in particular 
the Serb one, in parallel with the fact that the territorially concentrated 
minorities that earlier constituted pockets of minorities are today 
dispersed in a more homogenous Croatian society.  
 
This, along with the implementation of quite high thresholds for the right 
to use the minority language in official contexts, paves the way for the 
Croatian language to pervade the whole of Croat society, or at least the 
very vast majority of it. However, one minority language which stands 
out as particularly strong and which has successfully escaped the 
Croatian linguistic “purge” is Italian. In fact, the Italian minority has been 
“able to use its language in contacts with authorities in a number of 
towns and municipalities in Istria” (Lattimer 2003: 24). The prestigious 
status of the Italian language is also seen in the educational system. In 
Istria, where the majority (approximately 85%) of the Italian minority 
lives, Italian is widely used in the educational establishments, from 
nursery school up to secondary schools.   
 
During the SFRY regime, the education system in Croatia was bilingual 
and Croatia provided “education in the first language and extensive 
learning of the second language (…) throughout primary and secondary 
education” (Lattimer 2003: 8). If instruction in the first language was not 
possible, usually for organisational problems, provisions were made for 
the pupils to take the minority language as a subject according to a 
“programme for cherishing minority language and culture” (Lattimer 
2003: 8). This minority language right was successfully provided for as 
concerned education in the Czech, Hungarian, Italian, Ruthenian, 
Slovakian and Ukrainian languages.   
 
Due to the nationalistic agenda under the Tudjman regime, but also due 
to changes in the demographic structure, the implementation of minority 
rights in education was restricted in the first decade of Croatian 
independence. The numerical decrease of national minorities enabled the 
government to juggle with the legal rights of minorities by introducing 
high thresholds which made it practically difficult for minority 
communities to demand their education rights. However, as concerned 
the Serb community, which had been downgraded from a constituent 
97 
nation to the status of national minority, one of the preconditions of the 
Erdut Agreement90, elaborated simultaneously with the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, provided for extensive minority rights protection and 
guarantees of Serb autonomous organisations in Eastern Slavonia.91 All 
the other national minorities of Eastern Slavonia also enjoy extensive 
minority educational rights. (Lattimer 2003: 14) In the rest of Croatia, 
from the beginning of the 2000s, however varying greatly from 
municipality to municipality, instruction in minority languages are 
provided for usually from nursery school up to secondary schools. Apart 
from Italian and Serbian, instruction in the mother tongue is provided for 
the Czechs92 and the Hungarians. (Lattimer 2003: 13) With the orientation 
towards European integration, minority language rights protection, as 
part of EU minority rights protection conditionality, became a 
precondition in Croatia’s path to EU integration. On the 24th of November 
2000, Croatia started negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement and in 2004, acquired status as a candidate state.   
Legislation in minority language rights protection upon 
gaining status as candidate state  
As early as the late 1990s, Croatia had started the process of complying 
with the EU requirements by signing and ratifying the Council of 
Europe’s Framework Convention on National Minorities (FCNM) on the 
                                                          
90 The Erdut Agreement was signed by the governments of Croatia and Serbia on the 12th 
of November 1995. The Agreement consisted of three parts: the first contained provisions 
for the establishment of a UN Transitional Administration; the second made provisions 
for extensive minority rights guarantees and the third inaugurated a system of minority 
rights monitoring. Cf. United States Institute of Peace, “The Erdut Agreement” in Peace 
Agreements Digital Collection, New York, 14 February 2000, 
http://www.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/croatia_erdut_11121995.
pdf, 2011-10-11.  
91 Article 6 of the Erdut Agreement states that: “The highest levels of internationally 
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be respected in the Region”, cf. 
United States Institute of Peace, “The Erdut Agreement” in Peace Agreements Digital 
Collection, New York, 14 February 2000. After a transitional period of being under UN 
administration, Eastern Slavonia was finally reintegrated into Croatian governance in 
1998. Cf. (Lattimer 2003: 10-11) 
92 The Czechs migrated into Croatia in the 19th century during the great migratory 
movements that took place under the Habsburg Monarchy. Cf. (Lattimer 2003: 13). 
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11th of October 1997.93 One month later, on the 5th of November, even 
though not part of the EU conditionality package, Croatia also signed and 
ratified the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional and 
Minority Languages (ECRML).94 The legal basis of minority rights 
protection in Croatia is particularly regulated by the Constitution of 1990 
and its amendments (last amendment prior to 2004 was made in 2001), 
the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities (CLNM), 
adopted in 2000, and the Law on the Use of Language and Script of 
National Minorities and the Law on Education in the Language and 
Script of National Minorities, both adopted in 2000. 
Non-discrimination  
In the equality clause the Croatian Constitution prohibits discrimination 
on the grounds of “race, gender, language, religion, political or other 
belief, national or social origin, property, birth, education, social status or 
other characteristics” (Art. 14 of the Constitution). The penalisation of 
discrimination is also enshrined in the Criminal Code, which was 
amended in 2003 and 2004. Henceforth, the Criminal Code “provides for 
criminal liability for those who, on the basis of difference in race, sex, 
colour of skin, nationality or ethnic origin violate basic human rights and 
freedoms” (EU Report 2004: 21). The amendment to the Labour Code in 
2003, furthermore, integrates the prohibition of both direct as well as 
indirect discrimination in the area of employment. (CoE Report 2004: 13) 
As regards the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, 
the legal document regulating all areas of minority rights, provisions are 
made for the protection against both direct and indirect discrimination. 
(Lattimer 2003: 20) The Human Rights Ombudsman could be argued to 
be equivalent to the Equality Body required by the Racial and Equality 
Directive. (EU Report 2004: 87) 
 
The monitoring reports of both the EU as well as the Council of Europe, 
both published in 2004, conclude that although Croatia has made some 
progress and has “adopted improved guarantees against discrimination 
and intolerance” (CoE Report 2004: 13), there are important shortcomings 
                                                          
93 Information accessed via the Council of Europe’s website on the FCNM, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/1_AtGlance/PDF_MapMinorities_bil.pdf
, 2011-10-10.  
94 Information accessed via the Council of Europe’s website on the European Charter of 
Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML), http://conventions.coe.int, 2011-10-10.  
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that need to be addressed for a complete transposition of the EU anti-
discrimination acquis. The shortcomings which are specifically 
highlighted are the lack of specific legislation as well as the lack of 
implementation. (EU Report 2004: 87; CoE Report 2004: 13; 16) Therefore, 
however positive the introduction of non-discrimination in both the 
Criminal Code and the Labour Code, the “lack of detailed legislation 
against discrimination persists in certain key fields, such as education and 
housing” (CoE Report 2004: 13). This is furthermore aggravated, as 
pointed out by the CoE Advisory Committee Report, by the scope of 
application of national minorities which is limited to citizens of Croatia 
and which then excludes national minorities which lack citizenship. 
Indeed, Article 5 of the CLNM defines a national minority as “a group of 
citizens whose members traditionally inhabit the territory of the Republic 
of Croatia, its members having ethnic, linguistic, cultural and/or religious 
characteristics different from other citizens and are led by the wish to 
preserve these characteristics” (Art. 5 cited by the CoE Report 2004: 11, 
emphasis added). The narrow scope of application is especially 
problematic as regards non-discrimination in education, “especially 
taking into account that a number of Roma and other persons affiliated 
with national minorities reside in Croatia without a confirmed citizenship 
and have had difficulties in acquiring citizenship” (CoE Report 2004: 11).    
 
The lack of specific legislation in housing is also addressed by the 
monitoring reports of the EU and the CoE, especially in regards to the 
repossession of property and refugee returns of particularly Croatian 
Serbs. Indeed, implementation of the Housing Care Programmes95, which 
guarantee the rights of former tenancy holders, needs to be speeded up96 
in order to “facilitate the return of Serb refugees from Serbia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina” (EU Report 2004: 119). Furthermore, even though non-
discrimination provisions are integrated in the Criminal Code, the 
Commission criticises the lack of implementation of non-discrimination 
in this domain, particularly as concerns discrimination against the Serb 
                                                          
95 The Housing Care Programmes were introduced by the Croatian government in 2000 to 
guarantee the rights of the former tenancy holders in order to facilitate the return of the 
Croatian Serbs. Cf. OSCE Mission to Croatia Report, “Croatian Government holds 
information session on housing solutions for former occupancy tenancy rights holders”, 
November 2006, http://www.osce.org/zagreb/23615, 2011-10-14.  
96 As of the end of 2002, the number of Croatian Serb returnees was poor in that less than 
1/3, 96.534 of the refugees had returned to their homeland. Cf. (Lattimer 2003: 32). 
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community, both generally, as well as pertaining to war criminals. In fact, 
the Commission points to discrimination against Serbs in the judicial 
proceedings where Serbs are disadvantaged compared to Croats. In fact, 
in the judicial proceedings pertaining to extradition of war criminals to 
the ICTY, “statistical data suggest that a single standard of criminal 
responsibility is not yet applied equally to all those who face war crime 
charges before Croatian courts” (EU Report 2004: 31). Furthermore, as 
regards citizens’ rights to enrol in Croatian higher education institutions, 
the Commission points out that, “on grounds of nationality laid down in 
Article 12 of the Treaty, Croatia should take measures to ensure that EU 
nationals have the right to enrol in its higher education institutions under 
the same conditions as nationals, without needing to be permanent 
residents in Croatia, and without having to pay different tuition fees” (EU 
Report 2004: 59).  
 
Even though Croatia is on their way of complying with the non-
discrimination acquis pertaining to the Racial and Equality Directive, and 
has made “some progress in tackling discrimination”, substantial 
progress needs to be made in order for a complete transposition of the EU 
anti-discrimination acquis. (EU Report 2004: 87). Although Croatia has 
integrated specific legislation in the areas of employment and the 
judiciary, the poor record of implementation is troublesome. In fact, the 
recommendations of the Commission in the area of the judiciary, is 
complemented with the recommendations of the CoE as regards 
implementing non-discrimination in the area of employment. In this 
regard, the Advisory Committee recommends Croatia to “introduce 
special measures, aimed at guaranteeing persons belonging to national 
minorities’ full and effective equality in the field of employment” (CoE 
Report 2004: 16). Furthermore, the lack of specific legislation in key areas, 
such as education and housing, calls for specific legislation in these areas 
as well as a redefinition of the CLNM’s narrow scope of national 
minorities. The recommendations from the Advisory Committee in this 
regard is that “Croatia should consider amending the CLNM in so far as 
it provides an a priori exclusion of non-citizens from its scope” (CoE 
Report 2004: 11). Taken altogether, and based on the non-discrimination 
index, Croatia upon gaining status as a candidate state has well complied 
with level 1 (having an equality clause in the Constitution). It becomes a 
question of interpretation whether Croatia should be considered to 
having complied with level 2.0, namely that non-discrimination have 
101 
been integrated in specific laws. Croatia does have specific laws in the 
areas of employment and the judiciary but lacks non-discrimination in 
specific laws such as education and housing (RED). It seems unfair to 
situate Croatia on the level of 1.0 and equally unfair to position her on 
level 2.0.  Consequently, it is argued that Croatia has gained an 
intermediate position, levelling on 1.5, in between tolerance and 
promotion.  
 
Fig. 6.1. Croatia and level of rule adoption in non-discrimination upon gaining 
status as candidate state 
 
2004 
   Tolerance                                 x                                                     Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
(0): Absence of any non-discrimination norm; 
(1): General provisions such as an equality clause in the Constitution;   
(2): Non-discrimination laws are inserted in specific laws;  
(3): Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation which then means 
that there has been a complete transposition of the EU anti-
discrimination acquis; 
(4): Non-discrimination laws exceed the minimum requirements of 
the Directive.  
Minority language use in official contexts 
Legislation pertaining to the use of minority languages in Croatia is 
provided for in the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National 
Minorities (CLNM), adopted in December 2002, and the Law on the Use 
of Languages and Scripts of National Minorities, adopted in May 2000. 
The special rights of minority language use are specified in the CLNM in 
articles 7, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 14 and provide for “the use of their language 
and script, private and public, as well as official use” (Art. 7, para. 1). 
Official use also pertains to minorities’ rights to use minority languages 
“in procedures before administrative bodies of local and regional self-
government units, in first-instance procedures before government bodies, 
in first-instance court proceedings, in procedures conducted by the Public 
Attorney’s Office, notaries public and legal persons with public powers” 
(CLNM Art. 12, para. 3). Furthermore, guarantees are given to minorities’ 
use of signs and symbols (Art. 7, para. 3). The right to freely use the 
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minority language and script, both in private, and in public, is further 
elaborated in Art. 10 which states that “Members of national minorities 
shall have the right to freely use their language and script, in private and 
in public, including the right to display signs, inscriptions and other 
information in the language and script of their use, in accordance to law” 
(Art. 10).  
 
However, these rights are limited by numerical thresholds, as articulated 
by Article 12 of the CLNM that states that, “Equality in the official use of 
a minority language and script shall be exercised in the territory of a self-
government unit where the members of a national minority make at least 
one third of the population” (CLNM Art. 12, para. 1). Even though the 
CoE Report acknowledges the positive developments of Croatia in the 
lowering of the threshold, from a previous obligatory majority to one 
third, the numerical threshold is still problematic since “it excludes a 
number of municipalities with a substantial number of persons belonging 
to national minorities” (CoE Report 2004: 24). The Advisory Committee 
particularly raises the issue of the Serb minority in the regions of 
especially Vukovar but also Knin. Whereas the Serb minority amounts to 
20.83% in Knin, the Serbs’ share of the population in Vukovar amounts to 
32.88% and just falls short of the numerical threshold. (CoE Report 2004: 
24) However, the critique of the Advisory Committee is problematic 
inasmuch as the articles of the FCNM don’t establish any numerical 
thresholds, given that CoE member states have not reached a consensus 
on where to set the bar. However, according to indications previously 
given by the CoE, thresholds around 10-20% would seem reasonable. 
(Lattimer 2003: 24) A real bone of contention, however, is in regions 
where the thresholds are met but where problems of implementation 
have been noted. In fact, “eight units of local self-government have failed 
to meet their obligation to introduce the official use of a minority 
language by September 2004, i.e. almost two years after the entry into 
force of the Constitutional Law on 23 December 2002” (CoE Report 2004: 
24-25).  
 
Pertaining to the free use of signs and symbols, these are also conditioned 
by the statutes of local self-government units which regulate the “official 
use and the manner of using the flag and the symbols of a national 
minority” (Art. 14, para. 3). While providing for the free use of minority 
symbols, they are at the same time conditioned or restricted by the 
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obligatory concurrent displaying of “the corresponding insignia and 
symbols of the Republic of Croatia” (CLNM Art. 14, para. 2). As concerns 
the equal official use of minority languages, which “also encompasses the 
obligation to provide bilingual or multilingual topographical 
indications”, as defined by Article 11 of the FCNM, the Advisory 
Committee notes the positive developments incurred by the amendments 
to the CLNM. (CoE Report 2004: 25) However, there is a lack of 
implementation and therefore the Croatian authorities, and especially the 
self-governing units, need to ensure that the legal provisions are 
implemented, as noted by the Advisory Committee. (CoE Report 2004: 
25) Even though the EU Commission does not make specific 
recommendations on the official use of minority languages, the 
Commission does point out in general terms that the implementation of 
the CLNM needs to be speeded up. (EU Report 2004: 119)  
 
Croatia has made extensive legal provisions in the area of minority 
language use protection, and just like the Advisory Committee points out: 
“Members of national minorities in Croatia exercise their right to use 
their mother tongue officially on an equal basis on the territory of 
cities/municipalities and counties, if their share of population is at least one 
third or if so provided by international agreements” (CoE Report 2004: 25, 
emphasis added). The contentious issue is the one related to the 
numerical threshold and what would constitute a reasonable threshold. 
Neither the EU nor the CoE have formulated any criteria as regards what 
would constitute a just threshold. Even though the CoE has given 
indications on reasonable numerical thresholds, these are only indications 
and do not, at present, constitute more than opinions on a matter that few 
organisations are willing to touch upon. However important the 
discussion on thresholds, this problem only concerns the issue at stake 
indirectly and does not have a real impact on the measurement at hand. 
The Advisory Committee, furthermore, adamantly stresses the 
importance that the legal guarantees are properly implemented when the 
thresholds have been met. Thus, the recommendations are that “the 
authorities at all levels should take more proactive measures to ensure 
that throughout Croatia local statutes and practices are in full compliance 
with the law” (CoE Report 2004: 8). In fact and as already pointed out by 
the Advisory Committee, the implementation at the local level needs to 
be ameliorated in order to ensure that the legal provisions on the equal 
official use of minority language are guaranteed. Since the measurement 
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limits itself to adoption of the legal provisions, and not their 
implementation, it must therefore be noted that Croatia has inaugurated 
extensive minority rights protection as concerns the official use of 
minority languages. Thus, having in mind the shortcomings of 
implementation, as regards the investigation at hand, and based on the 
index of minority language use, Croatia is positioned on the level of 3.0. 
 
Fig. 6.2. Croatia and level of rule adoption in minority language use in official 
contexts upon gaining status as candidate state  
 
2004 
   Tolerance                                                               x                       Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
(0): No recognition of minority languages; 
(1): The right to use the minority language in official contexts (before 
judicial and administrative authorities; i.e. the right to a translator);  
(2): The minority language can be used in Personal and Place Names 
(public signs); 
(3): The minority language can be used in official documents; 
(4): Minority language having status as official language. 
Minority language rights in education 
The CLNM as well as the Law on Education in Languages and Scripts of 
National Minorities, adopted in 2000, provide extensive education rights 
to national minorities. These legal provisions pertain both to the right of 
national minorities to learn their mother tongue, but also that “members 
of national minorities shall have the right to education in the language 
and script used by them” (CLNM Art. 11, para. 1). Furthermore, “the 
syllabus and curriculum of education in the language and script of a 
national minority shall, along with its general part, comprise minority-
specific subjects (native language, literature, history, geography and 
cultural tradition)” (CLNM, Art. 11, para. 4). These rights encompass 
schooling from nursery school up to secondary school and “all 
organizational costs of instruction in minority languages (maintenance, 
material costs, salaries, school construction) are financed by the Ministry 
of Education and Sports, following the same standard as those applied to 
Croat-language schools” (Lattimer 2003: 25). For purposes of minority 
education, minorities are furthermore entitled to set up their own private 
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schools, from kindergarten up to higher education institutions, “in the 
manner and under the conditions stipulated by law” (CLNM Art. 11, 
para. 8).  
 
On a general level, the provisions made in the area of minority rights in 
education are extensive and are in line with the FCNM and the articles 
that regulate education rights of minorities. Furthermore, specific 
regulations are provided concerning Eastern Slavonia which was re-
integrated into Croatia in 1998 after a three-year period of UN transitional 
administration. On the basis of the Erdut Agreement, signed in 1995, 
educational autonomy is provided, not only for the numerically large 
Serb minority, but also for other national minorities. (Lattimer 2003: 25) 
According to the EU, the legal provisions, established by Croatia, are 
sufficient and “consistent with the basic principles contained in the 
Croatian legislation in the Council of Europe Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages” (EU Report 2004: 25). However, at the 
same time, it should be noted that the EU pays little attention to 
educational rights of minorities since these are not even addressed in the 
Chapter on Education but are limited to very sparse formulations in the 
chapter on Minority rights. Thus, even though the EU concludes that 
Croatia has complied with the CoE’s Framework Convention on National 
Minorities, the more comprehensive assessment carried out by the CoE 
Advisory Committee reaches a more nuanced conclusion.   
 
In fact, the Advisory Committee notes that the Croatian Law on 
Education in Languages and Scripts of National Minorities does not 
“provide clear conditions and procedures for the implementation of 
educational models envisaged in the law, including the establishment of 
schools with education in minority languages” (CoE Report 2004:8). Thus, 
even though the CLNM does address the issue of minority language 
education in Article 11, it is addressed in general terms. Hence, the 
problem at hand is that “no clear criteria that would trigger the 
introduction of instruction in minority languages have been introduced in 
the Croatian legislation” (CoE Report 2004: 28). The problem of the legal 
uncertainty had already been pointed out by the Advisory Committee in 
a previous report as constituting the main barrier towards successful 
implementation of the rights granted by the Law. Indeed, as re-
emphasised in the 2004 Report, the lack of legal provisions as to the 
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respective responsibilities of state, county, and municipality for 
implementing the minority-specific educational models have impaired 
the implementation of Article 3 of the Law on Education in Languages 
and Scripts of National Minorities. (CoE Report 2004: 28) By referring to 
the problematic situation in Vukovar in Eastern Slavonia, where the Serb 
minority has encountered difficulties in establishing schools to conduct 
education in the Serb language, the Advisory Committee stresses that 
Croatia needs to clarify the “applicable rules and responsibilities”, in 
order to fill the vacuum and to ensure effective implementation. (CoE 
Report 2004: 8). Apart from the Serb minority, the Advisory Committee 
also points to the problematic situation of the Roma. Even though the 
Croatian National Programme for the Roma97, adopted in 2003, recognises 
their right to minority language education, these rights are not currently 
provided for and the Advisory Committee urges the Croatian authorities 
to increase “the valuable educational initiatives”, promoted in the 
National Programme. (CoE Report 2004: 28-29)  
 
At the same time, it should be stated that the lack of clear rules and 
responsibilities does not cause problems of implementation on a general 
level. For some minority groups, like the Italian, Czech, Hungarian and 
Slovak minorities, positive developments can be noted in the area of 
providing minority language education. (CoE Report 2004: 29) In fact, not 
only the Hungarian but also the Italian minorities successfully run 
language schools in Eastern Slavonia and Istria respectively. (Lattimer 
2003: 25) Thus, in conclusion, the Advisory Committee strongly 
recommends Croatia to ensure that “the Law on Education in Languages 
and Scripts of National Minorities is implemented in respect of all 
national minorities without any discrimination” (CoE Report 2004: 29). 
 
Another contentious issue, raised by the Advisory Committee as 
inhibiting implementation of the legal provisions, is the “lack of up-to-
date textbooks in some minority languages” (CoE Report 2004: 8). This is 
problematic especially in secondary schools and the concern voiced by 
the Advisory Committee is that this could become a “factor in the 
decisions of some pupils not to opt for minority language teaching” (CoE 
                                                          
97 The Croatian National Programme for the Roma was adopted in October 2003 as a 
systematic effort to increase inclusion of the Roma people into the Croatian society. The 
National programme is in turn part of a wider regional strategy, “The Decade of Roma 
Inclusion 2005 – 2015”. Cf. (EU Report 2005: 23). 
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Report 2004: 26). Subsequently, the recommendations of the Advisory 
Committee are that the Croatian authorities should take the issue of the 
lack of minority educational material seriously and provide for an 
“adequate domestic production of textbooks” in order not to hamper the 
educational rights given to the national minorities of Croatia. (CoE Report 
2004: 27) 
 
The educational rights of minorities are extensively provided for in the 
Croatian legislation which furthermore is strongly endorsed by the EU in 
their Report. Thus, national minorities have the right to learn their 
mother tongue, to receive education in the minority language from 
kindergarten up to secondary school, according to a curriculum which 
provides for instruction of minority-specific subjects. Furthermore, 
national minorities have the right to set up their own private educational 
establishments. However, as pointed out by the Advisory Committee 
these rights are not fully implemented in regards to all national 
minorities which is primarily explained by certain loopholes in the 
legislation. These loopholes consist of a lack of clear rules as concerns 
both the criteria of implementation as well as on which level of authority 
the responsibility for implementation lays. This legal uncertainty then 
hampers full implementation and allows for discrimination against 
certain national minorities of the Croatian society. Thus, even though the 
Advisory Committee does not explicitly urge Croatia to provide for more 
specific legislation, this can be argued to be implicit in their critique of the 
generality of legislation which produces legal uncertainty. On a more 
practical level, the other hampering factor towards full implementation of 
the educational rights of minorities is the shortcomings of the production 
of up-to-date minority textbooks which could become a decisive factor as 
to why minorities would decide against minority education.   
 
Turning to the measurement of the index on educational rights of 
minorities, the problem is that the legislation adopted is sufficient for 
some national minorities but not for others, i.e. the Serb minority and the 
Roma people, which would call for more specific legislation in order for a 
successful implementation. However, since the assessment of the 
Advisory Committee does not explicitly call for more specific legislation 
and that the lack of clear guidelines and responsibilities is assessed as 
being more of an implementation problem, I have chosen to argue that 
the Croatian legislation is well advanced in promoting educational rights 
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for national minorities. Furthermore, the EU Report confirms compliance 
of the legal provisions which is also an argument why Croatia is argued 
to be in compliance with all criteria except the minority university 
criterion. Having in mind that the legal uncertainty has resulted in 
disputes over particularly Serb minority education, based on the 
investigation at hand, these implementation difficulties are not taken into 
consideration and hence Croatia is positioned on the level of 3.0.   
 
Fig. 6.3. Croatia and level of rule adoption in minority language rights in 
education upon gaining status as candidate state 
 
2004 
   Tolerance                                                               x                      Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
 (0): No education of or in minority language; 
(1): Children belonging to minorities have the right to learn their 
mother tongue in school; 
(2): At least parts of the curriculum (e.g. history or religion) are taught 
in the minority language; 
(3): Minorities have the right to educate their children completely in 
the mother tongue, either in state schools with a complete syllabus 
taught in the minority language or in specific minority schools; 
(4): Minorities have their own universities. 
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7 
FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF 
MACEDONIA AND MINORITY LANGUAGE 
RIGHTS PROTECTION 
Macedonian independence 
Part of the prestigious kingdom of Alexander the Great in the 4th century 
B.C, very early in the first centuries of Christendom, Macedonia became a 
place of continuous discord between the territorial expansionisms of both 
Bulgaria and Serbia. By the end of the 10th century, Macedonia was 
annexed to the first Bulgarian Empire and became the cultural and 
political centre of this Empire. In the mid-14th century, Macedonia was 
incorporated into the first Serbian Empire which, however, became short-
lived since it came under Ottoman tutelage in 1380 under which it stayed 
for more than 500 years. Macedonia was liberated from the Ottoman 
Empire after the first Balkan war in 1912, a war which was instigated by 
Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia to free their ethnic populations 
from the Ottomans. Due to a dispute over the division of Macedonia 
between Bulgarians and Serbs, the second Balkan war erupted in 1913, 
during which Bulgaria was defeated. The final distribution of Macedonia 
was made in favour of Greece and Serbia and Bulgaria had to settle for a 
very small area that represented the Pirin Macedonia, 10%. (Desobre 
1994: 49) Incorporated without special status within the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Macedonia (also called Southern Serbia) 
became one of the six constituent republics of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945. Due to the centuries’ long subjugation 
under Bulgarian, Serbian and Turkish rules, Macedonia became a place 
where “ethnic Macedonians” lived side by side with other nationalities.  
 
Characteristic of the Macedonian independence, in comparison with the 
other former Republics of Yugoslavia, was that their proclamation of 
independence was not violently reacted to. In fact, Macedonia had no real 
interest in becoming independent in the sense that the maintenance of the 
SFRY constituted its best protection towards both Serbia and Bulgaria. 
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However, confronted with the secessions of both Croatia and Slovenia in 
June 1991, Macedonia was all of a sudden left without any counterbalance 
towards Serbia and was hence resigned into proclaiming its 
independence which took place after a referendum on the 8th of 
September 1991, a referendum which the Albanian community 
boycotted98. (Irwin in Ramet 2010: 334-335)  
 
The Constitution was adopted in November 1991, proclaiming 
Macedonia as a unitary and democratic parliamentary state based on a 
multiparty system and with “safeguards against authoritarianism”99 
(Irwin in Ramet 2010: 335). Up until the early 2000s, the Macedonian state 
was heavily centralised and the right to local self-government was 
limited. However, with the Ohrid Framework Agreement which also 
engaged in emphasising the importance of a “decentralized government, 
along with political and financial authority” (Irwin in Ramet 2010: 329), 
provisions were made to further the functions and responsibilities given 
to the local self-governing units by amendments to the Constitution, 
made in 2001 and 2003. In the same vein as in the other former Republics 
of Yugoslavia, with independence came the necessity of establishing “a 
state in which sovereignty resides with a particular nation” (Hayden 
1992: 656). The constitutional nationalism of Macedonia was blatant since 
the Constitution stated that Macedonia was the “national state of the 
Macedonian nation (narod), founded on the sovereignty of the nation” 
(Hayden 1992: 659-660). At the same time, however, it was repeatedly 
emphasised that the majority nation was living in peaceful cohabitation 
with the national minorities of Macedonia. (Hayden 1992: 659-660)  
 
                                                          
98 The Albanians, with an increasing sense of being discriminated against, boycotted the 
referendum on Macedonian sovereignty and threatened to hold their own referendum on 
territorial autonomy which would also include the Kosovo Albanians. The threat never 
materialised and the problem of the constituent nation status would prevail until the 
settlement agreed to in the Ohrid Framework Agreement of August 2001. Cf. (Irwin in 
Ramet 2010: 334-335). 
99 The Constitution limited the five-year mandate period to two terms (Art. 80) and since 
the presidential elections and the direct elections to the Assembly were held separately 
“the president was obligated to appoint a government from the party or parties which 
has/have a majority in the parliament” (Art. 90) (Irwin in Ramet 2010: 335). Another 
constitutional safeguard was the definition of a state of national emergency which was 
limited to “major natural disasters or epidemics” (Art. 125) where the Constitutional 
Court would maintain its mandate of upholding the protection of constitutionality and 
legality “for the duration of the state of war or emergency” (Art. 128).  
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The reference to peaceful cohabitation did nothing to settle especially the 
large Albanian community, making up almost a quarter of the population 
of Macedonia, which was claiming status as constituent nation and for 
whom the reference to “the national state of the Macedonian People” only 
confirmed their second-class status. Thus, even though the Albanian 
political parties “have participated in all the governments”100 (EU Report 
2005: 12) since independence, this could not prevent the increasing ethnic 
hostilities between the two largest communities.  In fact, according to a 
human rights study delegation, sent by the US Department of Justice to 
Macedonia in 1994, the Report concluded that “the fact that ethnic 
Albanians are reasonably well represented in Parliament and the 
Government does not eliminate this (anti-Albanian thinking) or prevent 
discriminatory treatment and sometimes repressive government policies 
from being followed, particularly at the local level” (Report cited in Irwin 
in Ramet 2010: 336).  
 
Apart from threats to the internal political stability, Macedonia was, early 
on, confronted with problems of a regional order connected to the 
recognition of the Macedonian state and the Macedonian nation. In 
January 1992, Bulgaria was the first country to recognise Macedonia as a 
state but not as a separate Macedonian nation since Bulgaria didn’t 
“recognize Macedonian as a nationality distinct from Bulgarian”101 (Irwin 
in Ramet 2010: 329). The real contentious issue, however, and which 
would cause far greater problems to the newly formed state, was the 
reaction of Greece. In fact, due to Greek memories of a turbulent history, 
and the fear of Macedonian expansionist ambitions against the Greek 
province of Macedonia, Greece made recognition conditional upon 
                                                          
100 The Albanian political parties have been represented in government ever since 
independence. During the governance of the Social Democratic Party (1991-1998), the 
plurality was assured by the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP). The change 
of government in 1998 and the dissatisfaction from the Albanian community against the 
slow pace of reforms in connection with Albanian claims resulted in a division of the PDP 
into a moderate and a radical faction. The more radical faction, the Albanian Democratic 
Party (ADP) was to form a coalition with the Macedonian nationalist party, the VMRO-
DPMNE. Cf. (Irwin in Ramet 2010: 336-338). 
101 Up until 1999, Macedonian was described as a dialect of Bulgarian; however in 1999 the 
Bulgarian Government officially recognised Macedonian as an independent language. Cf. 
(Bugarski & Hawkesworth 2004: 201). 
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amendment of the Macedonian Constitution.102 Even though Macedonia 
rapidly amended the Constitution, by declaring that “The Republic of 
Macedonia has no territorial pretensions towards any neighbouring 
state” (Amendment 1), the Greek government declared a trade embargo 
on Macedonia in February 1994, which put the already disastrous 
Macedonian economy on the brink of economic strangulation. Most of the 
initial difficulties with Greece were resolved with the Interim Agreement 
in September 1995, which subsequently paved the way for Macedonian 
membership in the Council of Europe, the OSCE and in NATO 
Partnership for Peace. Two years earlier, in April 1993, Macedonia had 
become a member of the United Nations under the provisional name of 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The Interim 
Agreement provided for the recognition of Macedonia by Greece, namely 
the establishment of diplomatic relations, the lifting of the trade embargo, 
and the changing of the flag of Macedonia. The question of the name of 
the Republic was however not resolved and negotiations pertaining to the 
name issue is still, after 20 years, to be resolved under the UN umbrella.103  
 
The missions of preventive deployment, invited at the instigation of the 
then Macedonian President, Kiro Gligorov, did not succeed in preventing 
tensions from escalating between the Albanians and the Macedonians. A 
series of clashes between Macedonian security forces and the Albanians, 
in parallel with the Kosovo crisis spilling over onto Macedonian territory, 
resulted in open armed conflict at the beginning of 2001. Under pressure 
from the EU and NATO, anxious not to see another violent ethnic conflict 
develop in the Balkans, the international community brokered the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement, signed on the 13th of August that same year. 
Three years later, on the 22nd of March 2004, Macedonia applied for EU 
membership which was endorsed by the Council of Ministers two 
months later on the 17th of May. (EU Report 2005: 4) The country acquired 
                                                          
102 In fact, in the Macedonian Constitution, Articles 3 and 49 had implied land claims that 
the Greek government perceived as a threat to the territorial integrity of Greece. In 1992, 
the first amendment to the Constitution was made and it was emphasised that “the 
Republic of Macedonia has no territorial pretensions towards any neighbouring state” 
(Amendment 1 to the Constitution). Cf. (EU Report 2005: 12).  
103 The dispute over the name issue still prevails since Greece adamantly is opposed to 
that the Republic be called Macedonia because of the historic legacy and the Macedonian 
region of Greece. Internationally, the Republic is therefore still referred to as the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Cf. (Irwin in Ramet 2010: 335-336) 
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status as a candidate state on the 9th of November 2005. (Irwin in Ramet 
2010: 348) 
The demographic dimension  
In the SFRY, Macedonia had the “second largest number of nationalities 
after SR Serbia, altogether 516,814 people according to the census of 1981” 
of a total population of slightly over 1.9 million inhabitants. (Baltic 2007: 
38) Apart from the numerically large Albanian community, Turks, Serbs, 
Roma, Vlachs and Bosniaks constitute primarily the other nationalities of 
Macedonia. For fear of Bulgarian claims on Macedonia, Tito had actively 
encouraged the development of a distinct Macedonian national identity, 
including the creation of a specific language, as distinct as possible from 
Bulgarian. For Tito the policy had the advantage of weakening any 
Bulgarian claims on the territory at the same time as limiting the power of 
Serbia within the Yugoslav federation. However, prior to 1945 the 
Macedonian “national consciousness did not exist among the ordinary 
people” but was limited to smaller pockets of intellectuals and party 
communists in society. (Brunnbauer 2004: 582) One strategy to construct a 
national identity which would permeate the whole of the Macedonian 
society was to construct “an essentially ethnic Macedonian 
administration” giving employment exclusively to Macedonians. 
(Brunnbauer 2004: 582). Furthermore, in order to cement the nascent 
national identity, it became indispensable to define it against other 
groups of people, consequently, it came to develop externally against the 
Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbians, and Albanians and internally naturally 
against the large Albanian community. (Brunnbauer 2004: 565) 
 
The multinational state of Macedonia is one of the poorest states of 
former Yugoslavia, bordering on Serbia and Kosovo to the North, Greece 
to the South, Albania to the West, and Bulgaria to the East. According to 
the latest census of 2002, the population amounts to 2,022,547, inhabiting 
a landmass of 25.713 km2. The population of Macedonia is partitioned 
into the majority group of ethnic Macedonians (64.2%), the Albanian 
community amounting to a numerically large 25.2%, the Turks (3.9%), the 
Roma (2.7%), the Serbs (1.8%), the Bosniaks (0.8%) and the Vlachs (0.5%). 
The other minorities which include amongst others Croats, Montenegrins 
and Bulgarians amount to a mere 1.0%. (EU Report 2005: 28)  
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Under the SFRY regime, the segregation between the ethnic Macedonians 
and the Albanians had already become blatant. Constituted, on the one 
hand, by the majority group of Macedonian language and of Orthodox 
religion104, and, on the other, by the largest nationality made up of 
Albanians who speak Albanian and practice Islam, the divisions and 
imbalances in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres were 
important. For instance, with the rapid urbanisation process, starting in 
the 1960s, the ethnic division was reinforced, since the majority of ethnic 
Macedonians left the countryside for white-collar jobs in the towns, 
whereas the Albanians “remained attached to their land and continued to 
subsist mainly in farming” (Brunnbauer 2004: 582). Hence, even though 
the increasing interethnic hostilities in the 1990s were to be centred 
around issues concerning rights pertaining to minority education and 
minority language use, typical in minority conflicts, the hostilities were 
rather “the expression of the deep social gulf which divides Macedonians 
and Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia” (Brunnbauer 2004: 589-590). 
When Macedonia became independent in 1991, and the new Constitution 
stated that Macedonia was “the national state of the Macedonian nation” 
(Hayden 1992: 659-660), the Albanians were demoted from the status of 
constituent nation to that of a national minority. This was perceived as a 
great injustice since the mere size of the Albanian population was an 
argument for not being treated as a minority. Therefore, ever since 
independence the core of the Albanian claims has been to “recapture” the 
status of constituent nation which especially their numerical size would 
justify. Just as the numerical size is the primary justification for the 
Albanian claims, the reluctance of the Macedonian government to abide 
by these claims is also explained in demographical terms. However, from 
the Macedonian perspective, the numerical size of the Albanian 
population is more problematic.  
 
The demographic fear of the Macedonians of becoming a minority in their 
own country, in the not too distant future, is explained by the high birth 
rate of the Albanians, which, by far, outnumbers the birth rate among the 
Macedonians. (Brunnbauer 2004: 569) The demographic fear was 
                                                          
104 In the promotion of a Macedonian national identity, apart from constructing a distinct 
Macedonian language, in parallel the creation of a self-governing Macedonian Orthodox 
Church which further “reinforced (the) national identity” was made (Irwin in Ramet 2010: 
331).  
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reactivated in 1998-1999, when the massive refugee flows105 of the Kosovo 
Albanians crossed the border into Macedonia. This consequently 
contributed to destabilising the already strained ethnic tensions between 
Macedonians and the Albanian community, which, finally, led to open 
armed conflict in the beginning of 2001. The demographic fear was 
furthermore aggravated by the fact that the numerically large, and 
increasing, Albanian community is heavily territorially concentrated. In 
fact, particularly in the North-western and Western parts of the country, 
bordering on both Kosovo and Albania, the Albanians make up the 
majority of the Macedonian population. Indeed, “fifteen out of 121 
municipalities, enlisted in the 2002 census, had populations more than 
90% Albanian, seven even more than 98%. In two municipalities, the 
share of the Albanian population was between 75 and 90%, and in eleven, 
between 50 and 75%. Thus, 28 municipalities had an outright Albanian 
majority in 2002, up from 25 in 1994” (Brunnbauer 2004: 568). As opposed 
to the case of Croatia, where the war not only meant a heavy decrease in 
the number of the Serb minority but also entailed a de-concentration of 
their territorial settlements, the result has been the opposite in the 
Macedonian case. In fact, after the violent conflict in 2001, the tendency 
“to form mono-ethnic settlements” has increased. (Brunnbauer 2004: 569) 
The fact that the Albanians constitute a majority in an increasingly 
significant number of municipalities, and that these concentrations are 
located on the border of Albania and Kosovo, has fuelled concerns for 
secessionist demands making the Macedonian authorities reluctant to 
give in to the Albanian claims. (Brunnbauer 2004: 568)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105 Due to the war in Kosovo, approximately 300 000 Kosovo Albanians crossed the border 
and sought refuge in Macedonia. Cf. (Irwin in Ramet 2010: 329).   
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Table 7.1. The development of the numerical sizes of the Albanians and the ethnic 
Macedonians during 1948 – 2002 (data retrieved from Brunnbauer 2004: 568) 
 
Year Total population 
in 1000 
Macedonians in 
% 
Albanians in 
% 
1948 1.115 68.5 17.1 
1953 1.303 66.0 12.4106 
1961 1.406 71.2 13.0 
1971 1.647 69.3 17.0 
1981 1.909 67.0 19.8 
1991107 2.034 65.3 21.7 
1994 1.946 66.6 22.7 
2002 2.023 64.2 25.2 
 
 
The number of the Albanians has also constituted a point of contention in 
the censuses carried out by Macedonia. Indeed, Macedonia is a case in 
point as regards contestations on the numerical sizes of ethnic minorities 
in ethnically divided societies. In the censuses carried out in Macedonia 
from 1991, the Albanian community has contested the census results of 
the Macedonian State Statistical Bureau, claiming that their share of the 
population by far supersedes the figures from the Macedonian 
authorities. In fact, due to contestations of the 1991 census, international 
monitoring bodies assisted Macedonia in the census of 1994.108  
 
 
                                                          
106 The sharp decrease of the Albanian community between 1948 and 1953 is explained by 
“the fact that in 1953 many Albanian-speaking Muslims identified themselves as “Turks” 
in order to be able to immigrate to Turkey” (Brunnbauer 2004: 568). 
107 The census of 1991, which was the last census carried out within the SFRY, was 
boycotted by a large majority of the Albanians in the SFRY as a whole, including those of 
Macedonia. The result, pertaining to the Albanian community, was thus based on 
estimations and extrapolations and consequently heavily contested by the Albanian 
community. Cf. (Brunnbauer 1994: 568)  
108 The international monitoring was conducted under the supervision of the EU with the 
assistance of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The national census was taking place 
from the 25th of June to the 11th of July, 1994. Although the census was internationally 
monitored, the results were immediately disputed by the Albanian community who 
claimed that their share of the population was around 35-40% and not 22.7%, which was 
displayed by the census results. (Cf. Brunnbauer 2004: 567) 
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Table 7.2. Ethnic structure of the population in Macedonia according to the 1994 
census and the 2002 census (data retrieved from the Macedonian State Report 
submitted to the Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe, 2003: 9 and CoE 
Report 2004: 9) 
 
Nationality 1994 
number 
1994 % 2002 
number 
2002 % 
Macedonians 1.295.964 66.6 1.297.981 64.2 
Albanians 441.104 22.7 509.083 25.2 
Turks 78.019 4.0 77.959 3.9 
Romani 43.707 2.2 53.879 2.7 
Serbs 40.228 2.1 35.939 1.8 
Muslims 15.418 0.8 2.553 0.1 
Bosniaks 6.829 0.3 17.018 0.8 
Montenegrins 2.318 0.1 2.003 0.1 
Croats 2.248 0.1 2.686 0.1 
Vlachs 8.601 0.4 9.695 0.5 
Bulgarians 1.682 0.1 1.417 0.1 
Others/unspecified 9.814 0.5 14.887 0.7 
Total 1.945.932 100 2.015.245 100 
 
The sociolinguistic dimension  
During the SFRY, as one of its constituent Republics, the existence of the 
Macedonian nation and the specificity of the language were called into 
question from neighbouring states. In fact, the Macedonian language did 
not exist independently from Bulgarian prior to the forming of the SFRY 
in 1945. For fear of particularly Bulgarian claims on Macedonia, Tito 
decided to construct a Macedonian national identity, as distinct as 
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possible from the neighbouring and potentially threatening Bulgaria, but 
also as a counterpart to the domineering Republic of Serbia. Hence, the 
construction of the Macedonian language was actively pursued from the 
mid to the late 1940s with the introduction of its official grammar and 
lexicon. As a consequence, contestations of the Macedonian language 
came to have repercussions on the language policy of the newly formed 
Macedonian state, as well as on the socio-linguistic relations with 
particularly the numerically considerable Albanian community. (Bugarski 
2004: 196) Apart from Albanian, the most widely used minority 
languages are Turkish, Romani, Serbian and Vlach. The Turkish language 
“still enjoys some prestige although its actual use is apparently 
decreasing, while the visibility of Romani and Vlach109 has increased 
perceptibly since independence” (Bugarski 2004: 196).    
 
In the 1991 Constitution, the Macedonian language and its Cyrillic 
alphabet was declared the official language of the newly formed State. 
(Art. 7) Justified by the considerable size of the Albanian-speaking 
population, the Albanians’ reaction was to demand official language 
status for the Albanian language. Just as constituent nation status was 
turned down by the Macedonian government, the status of official 
language for Albanian was never considered an option by the 
Macedonian authorities. The right to education in minority languages, 
especially in higher education, became another contentious issue which 
remained highly politicised throughout the 1990s. In fact, due to the poor 
education record of the Albanians, the insufficiencies of minority 
education were perceived as a core element of the more generalised 
discrimination against the Albanians. In fact, the majority of the Albanian 
population never accedes to the level of secondary schooling which 
subsequently means that an insignificant part enrol at university level 
(see Table 7.3. below). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
109 The Vlach minority is both a nationality and a specific linguistic category which refers 
to both “Daco-Romanian speakers inhabiting eastern Serbia and to Aromanians and 
Megleno-Romanians in Macedonia” (Bugarski & Hawkesworth 2004: 215). The religious 
affiliation of the Vlachs is Orthodox.  
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Table 7.3. Participation of Macedonians and Albanians in primary, secondary 
and tertiary education, 1998 - 1999 (data retrieved from Brunnbauer 2004: 588) 
 
 
 Primary  Secondary  Tertiary 
 education    education education 
  Percentage of all students  
     
Macedonian 59.0 79.2  89.2 
Albanian 30.2 15.6  5.5 
 
 
Education in minority languages, confined to primary and secondary 
public schools, was provided for in the Constitution, where it stipulates 
that, minorities “have the right to instruction in their language”, as 
determined by law, but where teaching of Macedonian is also 
compulsory. (Art. 48) As determined by law, means that minority 
language teachers have to be Macedonian citizens who know the 
Macedonian language with its Cyrillic alphabet.110 However, what is 
more controversial, is that teachers, who “do not know the minority 
language, are allowed to teach on the ‘subject of nationality’ in primary 
schools” (Vetterlein 2006: 9). The fact that teachers, involved in minority 
education, do not need to have any qualifications in the area of their 
teaching raises concerns connected to quality assurance. Consequently, it 
is not surprising that not only Albanians but also Turks have attempted 
to set up their own educational institutions, which instantly have been 
closed down by the Macedonian authorities. (Vetterlein 2006: 8) 
 
Normally, legal provisions related to minority language rights in 
education are limited to secondary school level. This was also the case in 
Macedonia where no legal provisions in minority languages were 
provided for in higher education. Adamant claims from the Albanians, of 
setting up their own Albanian-speaking university, were however to 
become the central issue of division, causing a number of clashes between 
the Macedonian security forces and the Albanians. The persistent claims 
were, in fact, related to the discriminatory policies imposed on the 
                                                          
110 In order to show a sufficient level of Macedonian, the Law postulates that teachers have 
to pass a language test. Cf. (Vetterlein 2006: 8). 
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Kosovo Albanians by the Serbian political leadership, of which one was 
to shut down the University in Pristina. In fact, prior to 1990, a non-
negligible share of the Macedonian Albanians had enrolled at the 
Albanian-speaking University in Pristina, Kosovo. With the closing down 
of the Pristina University in 1990, the resort of the Macedonian Albanians 
was shut, which led to increasing demands for an Albanian-speaking 
university.  
 
In December 1994, the Albanians established their own university in 
Tetovo, which became an important symbolic sign of Albanian cultural 
autonomy. The reaction of the Macedonian government was to declare 
the university illegal under Macedonian law; i.e. the teaching in Albanian 
was illegal as were privately run higher education institutions. (Vetterlein 
2006: 11) In February 1995, when the Albanians wanted to give their first 
Albanian-speaking courses, serious incidents took place when the 
Macedonian police closed down the university premises by force. During 
the clashes, the death of one Albanian and some twenty injured persons 
were recorded. (Ramelot & Remacle 1995: 54) Due to the diplomatic skills 
of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der 
Stoel, tensions calmed down and the activities of the Tetovo University 
were more or less condoned. However, the calm was treacherous and 
incidents broke out again “when in July 1996 the ‘dean’ of the university 
was arrested” (Swain & Swain 2003: 251). Up until 1998, and the regime 
change, President Gligorov had adamantly refused to legalise the 
Albanian-speaking University.  
 
The new government, however, confronted with internal instability, 
fuelled by rising unemployment, the repercussions from the Kosovo war, 
as well as the successful silent diplomacy from the High Commissioner 
on National Minorities, finally made the Macedonian Parliament, in 2000, 
accept “an OSCE sponsored proposal to establish a private college in 
Tetovo”, with tuition in Albanian. (Swain & Swain 2003: 252). This was 
confirmed by the new Law on higher education in 2001, which finally 
legalised private and non-Macedonian speaking universities, and made 
“the establishment of the trilingual (Albanian, Macedonian and English) 
South East European University (SEEU) in Tetovo possible” (Vetterlein 
2006: 12). Even though the Ohrid Framework Agreement did put an end 
to the violent conflict in 2001, by establishing a comprehensive and 
extensive legal framework for minority rights, specifically focusing on 
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Albanian rights, in parallel to paving the way for further integration into 
the EU, conflicts remain.111 Paradoxically, the implementation of 
extensive minority language rights, as well as minority education rights, 
has created a situation where increasing bilingualism has accentuated the 
ethnic division. In fact, the separation between the two communities, 
especially in predominantly Albanian areas, has produced a situation 
where Albanians become less and less fluent in the state language, which, 
consequently, has put the Albanians “in a position of linguistic and 
professional ghettoisation” (Caca cited in Vetterlein 2006: 18). On the 
basis of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, Macedonia applied for EU 
membership on the 22nd of March 2004, an application which was 
endorsed two months later on the 17th of May by the Council of Ministers. 
(EU Report 2005: 4) The country gained status as a candidate state on the 
9th of November 2005. (Irwin in Ramet 2010: 348) 
Legislation in minority language rights upon gaining 
status as candidate state 
As a consequence of the violent conflict that broke out between the ethnic 
Albanian community and the Macedonian security forces, early in 2001, 
the international community brokered the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
(OFA), signed on the 13th of August the same year. The Agreement was a 
package, aiming to further the integration of Macedonia into the 
structures of both the EU and NATO, in parallel with resolving the 
conflict between the Albanian minority and the ethnic Macedonians. The 
OFA is particularly centred on the status of the Albanian community, 
with a specific focus on their language rights. Furthermore, many of the 
regulating principles of the Framework have been centred on launching 
Macedonia on a decentralisation process. Full implementation of the 
regulating principles in the Framework Agreement was stipulated to be 
the “main condition for the process of integration of the Republic as a 
candidate for membership in the EU” (Vetterlein 2006: 7). After an initial 
period of hesitation, it was concluded that the Macedonian Parliament 
“has passed all the new laws” (Vetterlein 2006: 7). In fact, according to the 
                                                          
111 Education-related conflicts emerged already in 2002 between Albanian and 
Macedonian students where the “provocative changing of names of schools, from former 
Slavic names to Albanian ones and the placing of controversial monuments, especially in 
the western part of the country, are increasing interethnic tensions” (Vetterlein 2006: 16-
17).  
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EU Report, the broad legislative programme of the Framework 
Agreement had been completed by July 2005. (EU Report 2005: 12) 
Already in April 1997, Macedonia had ratified the CoE’s Framework 
Convention on National Minorities (FCNM), and the European Charter 
for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML). (EU Report 2005: 24) 
Non-discrimination  
The centrality of anti-discrimination legislation, as part of minority rights 
legislation, is accentuated by the Ohrid Framework Agreement, in which 
the principles of non-discrimination and equitable representation are 
incorporated. The non-discrimination norm is provided for in the 
equality clause of the Macedonian Constitution, which stipulates that 
“Citizens of the Republic of Macedonia are equal in their freedoms and 
rights, regardless of sex, race, colour of skin, national and social origin, 
political and religious beliefs, property and social status” (Art. 9). Even 
though amendment XI to the Constitution states that, “the Public 
Attorney shall give particular attention to safeguarding the principles of 
non-discrimination and equitable representation of communities in public 
bodies at all levels and in other areas of public life” (Amendment XI), 
there is no penalisation of discrimination as such. Hence, even though the 
Criminal Code incorporates some anti-discrimination provisions, the 
Commission Report points out that “there is no specific criminal 
provision forbidding acts of xenophobia (…) and non-discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation is not prescribed as such” (EU Report 2005: 
27). In July 2005, a new Law on Labour Relations was adopted, which 
incorporates and forbids discrimination on the basis of “race, colour of 
skin, gender, age, state of health, religious, political or other beliefs, 
sexual orientation or on the grounds of any other personal 
circumstances” (EU Report 2005: 27). However, as stated by the EU 
Commission, in order for anti-discrimination measures to be effectively 
implemented in labour relations, the Law needs to be supplemented with 
“the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation” (EU Report 2005: 27).  
 
Furthermore, although the equality clause does provide for some anti-
discrimination provisions, it is not encompassing enough since it leaves 
out “age, disability and sexual orientation” (EU Report 2005: 96). The lack 
of specific legislation is also pointed out by the Advisory Committee, 
which notes that particularly “some areas (such as housing, health care, 
access to services) are not covered by specific anti-discrimination 
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legislation” (CoE Report 2004: 10). It is also stressed by the Advisory 
Committee that the Roma minority is especially vulnerable, and that they 
“are often the victims of discrimination and prejudice”, especially in the 
social field, “in terms of access to social assistance and health care” (CoE 
Report 2004: 10). Pertaining especially to the Roma, the Advisory 
Committee also raises the issue on the scope of application of the 
citizenship criteria in relation to non-discrimination. In the revised 
preamble to the Constitution, amended in accordance with the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement, the scope of application of the citizenship 
criterion is stipulated to include “the Macedonian people, as well as 
citizens living within its borders who are part of the Albanian people, the 
Turkish people, the Vlach people, the Serbian people, the Roma people, 
the Bosniac people and others” (Preamble to the Constitution cited in CoE 
Report 2004: 8). Macedonia acknowledges, on the basis of the use of 
national minorities, made by the FCNM, that a national minority is 
equivalent to the term “nationalities”, and, on the basis of this 
interpretation, recognises “Albanian, Turkish, Vlach, Roma and Serbian 
national minorities” (CoE Report 2004: 8). Why the Macedonian 
government does not include the Bosniaks in their enumeration is 
astonishing, since they are specifically enumerated as one of the peoples 
of the Republic.  
 
The Advisory Committee is, however, more concerned with the lack of 
recognition of the Egyptian minority. In fact, as reported by the Advisory 
Committee, the Egyptian minority feels discriminated against since the 
authorities usually equate them with the Roma minority. Indeed, efforts 
of asserting themselves as distinct from the Roma, and the effort to enjoy 
the status of a separate national minority, on the basis of the Framework 
Convention for National Minorities, have met “with a negative response 
at various levels of government” (CoE Report 2004: 9). The Advisory 
Committee has, in general terms, drawn attention to the importance of 
recognising the numerically smaller communities. (CoE Report 2004: 7) In 
regards to particularly the Egyptian minority, the Advisory Committee 
“urges the Government to ensure that the identity of these people is 
respected by the authorities, and to examine the possibility of them being 
granted protection under the Framework Convention in their own right” 
(CoE Report 2004:9).  
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The Advisory Committee is, furthermore, concerned with the citizenship 
criterion, in relation to the naturalisation process, which causes “some 
problems (…) for some minority groups” (CoE Report 2004: 9). In fact, 
even though the Citizenship law of 1992112 was amended in December 
2003, and meant a relaxation of the naturalisation requirement, from 15 
years to 8 years of continuous residence, especially Albanians and Roma 
have experienced difficulties of obtaining the citizenship. (CoE Report 
2004: 12) The situation of the Roma minority is highlighted as particularly 
problematic, and, according to the Advisory Committee, the Roma 
minority is subjected to “de facto discrimination” (CoE Report 2004: 26). 
Since the discrimination is concluded to be the result of existing “gaps in 
the specific legal guarantees against discrimination”, the Macedonian 
authorities are recommended to examine a possible extension of the scope 
of the “non-discrimination provisions” (CoE Report 2004: 26). Even 
though the EU Commission does not specifically refer to the Roma, as 
being subjected to de facto discrimination, it is nevertheless acknowledged 
that “the Roma community suffers from a very difficult economic and 
social situation” (EU Report 2005: 30).  
 
Besides the lack of sufficient legal provisions, in the domain of anti-
discrimination, which also concerns the scope of application of the 
citizenship criteria, as well as the scope of the application of recognition 
of national minorities, the Advisory Committee notes, with satisfaction, 
that the Macedonian Government has taken steps to “develop a national 
strategy for the Roma”, of which the Advisory Committee urges a 
speedier development. (CoE Report 2004: 11) Furthermore, since the 
powers of the Ombudsman’s Office113 have been strengthened in the area 
of non-discrimination, these “may be helpful in identifying instances of 
discrimination and combating them” (CoE Report 2004: 11). In the same 
vein, the EU Commission notes, with satisfaction, that the newly elected 
Ombudsman of 2004, has taken a more active stance in safeguarding the 
principle of non-discrimination, although, noting at the same time, “that 
it is still too early to judge his effectiveness properly” (EU Report 2005: 
                                                          
112 The 1992 Citizenship Law entailed that the requirements for acquiring Macedonian 
citizenship were “15 years of continuous residence, a permanent source of income and 
production of the necessary identity papers” (CoE Report 2004: 11). 
113 The Ombudsman’s Office became operational in 1998 and acquired a new remit of 
powers with the Law on the Ombudsman of the 10th of December 2003, on the basis of the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement. (CoE Report 2004: 11) 
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30). However, as pointed out by the EU Commission, Macedonia has yet 
to establish the Equality Body, “required by the acquis” (EU Report 2005: 
96).  
 
Even though the equality clause does prohibit discrimination, on grounds 
of ethnic origin, and although there are some anti-discrimination 
provisions in the Criminal Code, specific anti-discrimination legislation is 
lacking. The EU requirement of developing specific anti-discrimination 
legislation is emphasised by the Advisory Committee, which, in fact, 
“urges the authorities to examine all the legislation in place and to fill any 
gaps in the protection against discrimination, including by covering 
indirect discrimination” (CoE Report 2004: 10). In fact, apart from the 
necessary establishment of the Equality Body, specific anti-discrimination 
legislation is required, in order to “implement EC legislation concerning 
discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
age, disability and sexual orientation” (EU Report 2005: 96). This makes 
the EU conclude that, the “national measures taken so far are by no 
means comprehensive” (EU Report 2005: 96). Based on the non-
discrimination index, Macedonia, upon gaining status as a candidate state 
in the EU, has only commenced to seriously implement the non-
discrimination acquis. In fact, even though the Criminal Code does 
integrate anti-discrimination provisions, there is no penalisation of 
discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin. Furthermore, the 
Macedonian authorities have yet to establish the Equality Body which is 
required by the non-discrimination acquis. Taken altogether, and based on 
our non-discrimination index, Macedonia is argued to having complied 
with the general provisions, stipulated by Article 9 of the equality clause, 
but has yet to develop specific anti-discrimination legislation. Therefore, 
Macedonia is positioned on the level of 1.0 according to the index scale.  
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Fig. 7.1. Macedonia and level of rule adoption in non-discrimination upon 
gaining status as candidate state 
 
2005 
   Tolerance                        x                                                              Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
  
(0): Absence of any non-discrimination norm; 
(1): General provisions such as an equality clause in the Constitution;   
(2): Non-discrimination laws are inserted in specific laws;  
(3): Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation which then means 
that there has been a complete transposition of the EU anti-
discrimination acquis; 
(4): Non-discrimination laws exceed the minimum requirements of 
the Directive.  
Minority language use in official contexts 
The use of languages, and the displaying of minority-related symbols, are 
also incorporated in the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), which, in 
order to be implemented, consequently called for a certain number of 
amendments to the Macedonian Constitution. Article 7 of the 
Constitution still declares that Macedonian and its Cyrillic alphabet is the 
official language of the Republic. (Art. 7) However, with the amendments 
made, Article 7 now stipulates that the Constitution “allows for the use of 
languages other than Macedonian” (CoE Report 2004: 17). As noted by 
the EU Commission, the new provisions made in the area of language use 
means that “any language spoken by at least 20% of the population is an 
official language, following the amendment of the Constitution in 2001” 
(EU Report 2005: 30). Therefore, the Albanian language, spoken by 
approximately 25% of the Macedonian population, is recognised as an 
official language, which entails that it can be used “in communications 
with the central administration and with the local administration in 
municipalities where the ethnic Albanian community makes up at least 
20% of the population” (EU Report 2005: 30). Also, the official language 
status of Albanian entails that the use of Albanian “is recognised in 
Parliament and in court proceedings” (EU Report 2005: 30). However, 
since these legal provisions have only started to be implemented, the EU 
Commission notes that “further progress will require heavy investments” 
(EU Report 2005: 30). The EU Commission also notes that legislative 
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provisions have been made as to permit the issuance of both ID cards, 
passports and driving licenses in Albanian, “implemented since May 2003 
for ID cards and since December 2004 for passports” (EU Report 2005: 
30). 
 
Although Albanian is the only minority language having received status 
as official language nationally, the Macedonian Constitution makes a 
distinction between the national and the local level. Indeed, locally, other 
minority languages than Albanian can also be used as official languages. 
As noted by the Advisory Committee, Article 7 of the Constitution 
stipulates that, on the local level, “where a language is spoken by at least 
20% of the inhabitants of the municipality, that language shall be used as 
an official language in addition to Macedonian” (CoE Report 2004: 17). 
Apart from Albanian, the Advisory Committee notes with satisfaction 
that also “Turkish, Romani and Serbian have been recognised as official 
languages in some municipalities” (CoE Report 2004: 18).114 Furthermore, 
the fact that local authorities have been delegated the powers to decide to 
grant the official use to numerically smaller minority languages, which 
don’t amount to the threshold of 20%115, this is welcomed by the Advisory 
Committee. (CoE Report 2004: 18) 
 
The right to use the minority language before judicial courts is provided 
for in both civil and criminal procedures. In fact, the Criminal Code 
makes provisions for the use of interpreters, “free of charge in criminal 
procedure” (CoE Report 2004: 18). However, the Advisory Committee 
notes that in court proceedings, the record of implementation, 
particularly as concerns Albanian and Turkish, has displayed deficiencies 
especially “owing to the shortage of qualified interpreters” (CoE Report 
2004: 18). With Amendment V to the Constitution, the official language 
status implies that, “any official personal documents of citizens, speaking 
an official language other than Macedonian, shall also be issued in that 
language, in addition to the Macedonian language, in accordance with 
                                                          
114 In fact, as noted by the Advisory Committee, along with Macedonian, “Albanian is an 
official language in 34 municipalities, Turkish in 5 municipalities, and Romany and 
Serbian in one municipality each” (CoE Report 2004: 18). 
115 According to Article 7 of the Constitution and Article 90 of the Law on Local Self-
Government, adopted in January 2002, local self-government units have the right to 
decide to grant minority languages, spoken by less than 20%, the right to official use. Cf. 
(CoE Report 2004: 18)  
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the law” (Article 7). As regards the free use of signs and symbols, this 
right is provided by the general rules regulating the use of languages. 
Therefore, when a minority language is spoken by at least 20% of the 
population, inscriptions such as local names, and other minority-related 
symbols, may be “displayed in a minority language” (CoE Report 2004: 
19). However, in practice, this rule has been applied at random and the 
Advisory Committee encourages the authorities, both at national, and at 
local level, “to take the necessary steps to encourage the use of languages, 
other than Macedonian, for displaying local names, in cases where there 
is sufficient demand for such indications, and the necessary conditions 
are met” (CoE Report 2004: 19).  
 
The legal changes, made in accordance with the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement as concerns the use of minority languages, are extensive, and 
according to the Advisory Committee, the Macedonian constitutional 
guarantees “reflect the principles of Article 10 of the Framework 
Convention” (CoE Report 2004: 28). Even though the use of minority 
languages are extensive, and the Albanian language has been granted the 
status as official language alongside Macedonian, the EU argues that, 
“although not formally required by the Framework Agreement, a law on 
the use of languages should be adopted to complement the substantial 
number of existing sectoral laws, specifying use of the Albanian 
language” (EU Report 2005: 30). Along the same line of reasoning, on a 
more general level, the Advisory Committee argues that, the authorities 
“should now further define the legal obligations, resulting from this 
constitutional provision, in the forthcoming law on the use of languages 
and alphabets, as well as take the necessary measures to implement the 
law on identity documents” (CoE Report 2004: 28). It is likely that these 
comments are due to concerns originating from the poor implementation 
in some areas, as well as fears, related to the interethnic relations between 
the Albanians and the Macedonians, that still show signs of tension.  
 
Since this investigation is exclusively centred on analysing the existing 
legislation in place, these implementation concerns are not taken into 
account in the analysis. Having taken into consideration that both the EU 
Commission and the CoE Advisory Committee want to see further legal 
specifications as regards the use of minority languages, and being fully 
aware of the implementation problems, particularly stressed by the 
Advisory Committee, these concerns are not integrated into the analysis. 
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In fact, according to our index on minority language use, and based on 
the extensive legislative rights in place, including the fact that nationally 
Albanian is recognised as an official language alongside Macedonian, the 
Macedonian authorities are argued to largely promote minority language 
use. Therefore, Macedonia scores high and has been positioned on the 
level of 4.0 according to the index scale. 
 
Fig. 7.2. Macedonia and level of rule adoption in minority language use in 
official contexts upon gaining status as candidate state 
 
2005 
   Tolerance                                                                                   x   Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
   
    (0): No recognition of minority languages; 
(1): The right to use the minority language in official contexts (before 
judicial and administrative authorities; i.e. the right to a translator);  
(2): The minority language can be used in Personal and Place Names 
(public signs); 
(3): The minority language can be used in official documents; 
(4): Minority language having status as official language. 
Minority language rights in education 
On the basis of the regulations stipulated by the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement, amendment VIII, to the Constitution, provides for minority 
education in primary and secondary schools. Article 48 stipulates that, 
“members of communities have the right to instruction in their language 
in primary and secondary education, as determined by law” (Art. 48); 
rights which in turn are assessed as implemented by the EU Commission. 
(EU Report 2005: 29). Furthermore, and on the basis of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement, the Law on Higher Education was amended, 
which “finally” instituted legal provisions enabling minorities to set up 
their own universities. The legal provisions were implemented by the 
establishment of the first minority-speaking university, the South East 
European University (SEEU), which opened in 2001, and which offers 
tuition in Macedonian, Albanian and English. Also, the Albanian 
University in Tetovo was reopened in 2004/2005, “based on the so-called 
“University of Tetovo”, which had no legal status” prior to the amended 
Law on Higher Education. (EU Report 2005: 30) The positive effects of 
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these two minority universities are that the share of minority populations, 
and especially the Albanians116, enrolled at higher education institutions, 
have considerably increased. (EU Report 2005: 30) Furthermore, and also 
possibly a contributing factor to explain the rapid increase of the share of 
enrolled minorities at Macedonian universities, the new Law on Higher 
Education also provided for “affirmative action in the enrolment process 
at State universities (Skopje, Bitola)” (EU Report 2005: 30).  
 
However, and as underlined by the Advisory Committee, statistics show 
that even though the introduction of quotas117 in higher education has 
increased the share of national minorities, “the system has not brought 
the expected results as far as the Roma are concerned” (CoE Report 2004: 
20). Therefore, the Advisory Committee advises the Macedonian 
authorities to introduce a monitoring system, in order to “ensure that the 
various groups have equitable access to higher education” (CoE Report 
2004: 20). Also, in view of the above, the Advisory Committee notes that 
the faculties of Skopje only specialise in Albanian and Turkish, and, that 
it would be advisable to “extend this provision to include other 
languages, in order to meet needs which are not currently catered for” 
(CoE Report 2004: 20). Furthermore, as regards the Albanian-speaking 
Tetovo University, the Advisory Committee expresses concerns as to 
deficiencies in the accreditation measures, which call for stronger efforts 
from the Macedonian authorities, which specifically would entail “the 
approval of the curricula and the recognition of diplomas delivered by 
the University of Tetovo” (CoE Report 2004: 21).   
 
In the assessment made by the EU Commission, no concern as to the 
implementation of the rights granted to minorities in the educational 
sector has been expressed. However, even though the Commission 
concludes that minority rights in education have been implemented, 
there is nevertheless concern as to what impact these rights have on the 
social cohesion of the Macedonian society. (EU Report 2005: 29-30) In fact, 
the reporting of incidents at some schools between various communities 
                                                          
116 The share of the Albanians enrolled in higher education institutions in Macedonia more 
than doubled, from a mere 6.7% in 2001/2002 to 15.5% in 2004/2005. Cf. (EU Report 2005: 
30). 
117 The quota system was introduced already in 1996 as an effort to increase the share of 
national minorities in higher education institutions in Macedonia. Cf. (CoE Report 2004: 
20). 
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raises concerns as to how these rights “contribute to promoting cultural 
identities and, at the same time social cohesion” (EU Report 2005: 30). 
These concerns are  furthermore elaborated in the Report of the Advisory 
Committee, which previously had “expressed deep concern at the 
attitudes of intolerance which have led to clashes between Macedonian 
and Albanian pupils over the introduction of additional classes in 
Albanian and the functioning of ethnically mixed schools” (CoE Report 
2004: 19). Paradoxically, minority rights education, instead of 
contributing to social cohesion, has instead increased “the linguistic gap 
between the various communities”, which makes the Advisory 
Committee point out that, “special attention should be given to 
encouraging individuals’ knowledge of the languages spoken in their 
region” (CoE Report 2004: 19). In regards to the Albanian-speaking 
University in Tetovo, the Advisory Committee has expressed fears that 
this might lead to “further segregation in the education sector”, since it 
does nothing to facilitate interaction between the different communities. 
(CoE Report 2004: 20)  
 
Apart from the concerns raised on the adverse effects of the very 
extensive minority rights in education, instituted by the Macedonian 
authorities, the Advisory Committee has also raised other concerns. 
Related to minority education in primary and secondary schools, the 
Advisory Committee notes the difficulty of obtaining “up-to-date 
textbooks in languages other than Macedonian”, which would call for 
measures from the Macedonian authorities. (CoE Report 2004: 19) 
Another barrier towards effective implementation, which the Advisory 
Committee urges the authorities to “give a high level of attention to”, is 
the shortage of qualified teachers “for providing instruction of, and 
instruction in, minority languages” which “is particularly acute in the 
case of certain minorities such as the Roma and the Vlachs” (CoE Report 
2004: 19). The difficult situation of the Roma, “and Roma girls in 
particular”, is stressed by the Advisory Committee and they welcome the 
National strategy for the Roma, under development by the Macedonian 
authorities. (CoE Report 2004: 20) Even though Article 48, of the 
Constitution, provides for minorities’ rights to be instructed in and to 
learn their mother tongue, these rights have shown to display deficiencies 
in practice, especially with regard “to persons belonging to Vlach, Roma 
and Serb minorities” (CoE Report 2004: 22). In consequence, the Advisory 
Committee urges the Macedonian authorities to specifically look into the 
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needs of these communities, in order to “provide appropriate support for 
teaching of and in their minority languages” (CoE Report 2004: 22).  
 
Extensive rights in minority education in Macedonia are provided as a 
consequence of the implementation process, initiated by the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement. These rights not only provide instruction of and 
in minority languages in primary and secondary schools, since 2001, these 
rights also encompass higher education where minorities now have the 
right to set up their own universities. Since this study is focused on 
measuring the legal provisions in place, barriers to minority education in 
practice, however important these may be, are not integrated into our 
analysis. Therefore, the rights provided by the Macedonian authorities 
are extensive, which in turn positions Macedonia on the far right hand 
side of the minority education index, on the level of 4.0. 
 
Fig. 7.3. Macedonia and level of rule adoption in minority language rights in 
education upon gaining status as candidate state 
 
2005 
   Tolerance                                                                                   x   Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
  (0): No education of or in minority language; 
(1): Children belonging to minorities have the right to learn their 
mother tongue in school; 
(2): At least parts of the curriculum (e.g. history or religion) are taught 
in the minority language; 
(3): Minorities have the right to educate their children completely in 
the mother tongue, either in state schools with a complete syllabus 
taught in the minority language or in specific minority schools; 
(4): Minorities have their own universities. 
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8 
SERBIA AND MINORITY LANGUAGE 
RIGHTS PROTECTION 
Serbian independence 
The history of Serbia is one of early nation-building, where the 
conversion to the Orthodox Church became a constitutive characteristic, 
as well as a driving force, in the development of the Serbian national 
identity. The national identity was, furthermore, fertilised by the 
collective memory of a glorious past of the Serbian Empire, whose 
expansionism had peaked during the 14th century, before being stopped 
by the Ottomans in what was to become the symbolically value-laden 
battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389. However, due to the successful Serbian 
opposition, which peaked in the Belgrade uprisings and the Serbian 
conquest of Belgrade in 1806, the Ottoman tutelage over Serbia became 
relatively short. Therefore, in 1806, Serbia gained de facto independence 
“which mark(s) the beginning of the construction of the Serbian nation-
state” (Lukic in Ramet 2010: 45). De jure independence was granted in 
1878, when Serbia gained international recognition by the Congress of 
Berlin.  
 
The Serbian nation-state was constructed on the French Jacobin state 
model, where nation and state were presumed to go hand in glove. Serb 
nationalism was based on centralism and hegemony, formulated in the 
concept of “Greater Serbia”, which was to become particularly articulate 
in the 19th and in the beginning of the 20th century. (Bilandzic 1972: 161) 
As a consequence of the victory in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, a large 
part of Macedonian territory, as well as Kosovo, were integrated into the 
jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Serbia in 1913. (Briza 2000: 7) Hence, not 
only population wise118, but also statehood wise, Serbia became a 
domineering nation in the first multinational Yugoslav states. Just like the 
former Serbian King Alexander, during the SHR regime, fought to 
                                                          
118 The Serbs were to account for almost 40% of the total population in the first two 
Yugoslavias, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS) and the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. Cf. (Banac 1988: 58; Baltic 2007: 25).  
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preserve the unity and to counter the separatist claims of particularly the 
Croats, by installing a personal dictatorship, history would repeat itself in 
the early 1990s.  
 
The Serbian aggressive nationalistic policies incarnated in the Milosevic 
regime, from 1987 to 2000119, had no interest in becoming independent but 
quite the opposite, aiming at an aggrandizement of Serbia within the 
confines of the SFRY. Thus, with the successive proclamations of 
independencies from the Socialist Republics between 1991 and 1992, 
which became the igniting factor to the aggressive wars planned by 
Milosevic120, Serbia was resigned in April 1992 into proclaiming the 
establishment of a new state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), 
with Montenegro, and also including the Serbian provinces of Vojvodina 
and Kosovo. (Ramet 2010: 290) The Kosovo war, and the subsequent 
NATO-intervention in 1999, would, however, worsen the conditions of 
the Montenegrin-Serbian coexistence within the FRY.121 In fact, the 
estrangement between the two Republics became blatant during the 
NATO-intervention when Montenegro, “although a constituent unit of 
the FRY, declared itself “neutral”!” (Ramet 2010: 293). Hence, as a natural 
consequence thereof, with the ending of the NATO intervention, the 
Montenegrin government initiated a pro-independence agenda which 
eventually was turned down by the international community. (Ramet 
2010: 293-294).  
 
A compromise was however found when in February 2003, the Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro replaced the FRY. The longevity of the new state 
was however to be short since in June 2006, the time was finally122 ripe for 
                                                          
119 Slobodan Milosevic seized power in Serbia in 1987 and stayed in power until the 
elections of 2000 when he was defeated. One year later he was taken into custody of the 
ICTY charged with war crimes but was found dead in his cell in 2006 before the trials 
were over. Cf. (Ramet 2010: 304).  
120 The Wars of Yugoslav Succession were never fought on Serbian territory which could 
also explain the popularity and the longevity of the Milosevic regime. Cf. (Ramet 2010: 
274).  
121 In fact, already in 1997 the coexistence between Montenegro and Serbia started to wane 
and there was a noticeable shift in the Montenegrin government which started to oppose 
the Milosevic leadership. Cf. (MRGI 2008). 
122 The pro-independence agenda of Montenegro had been supported by the US and 
Western Europe up until the ousting of power of Milosevic and his subsequent jailing at 
the ICTY. However, with Milosevic gone so was also the pro-independence stance of the 
Western powers. Cf. (Ramet 2010: 296). 
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Montenegro to acquire independence. (Ramet 2010: 296, 304) The 
Republic of Serbia became independent with the adoption of the new 
Constitution in October 2006, which stipulates that, “Kosovo is an 
inalienable part of Serbia” (Ramet 2010: 304). In fact, even though Serbia 
had countered the external threats to Serbia by waging wars, 
particularly123 against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
initiated interventions from the UN, NATO and the OSCE, the Kosovo 
problem remained within Serbia itself. Even though the internal stress of 
the Kosovo claims became acute upon the Serbian political leadership in 
the late 1980s, the Kosovo issue had in fact preoccupied SR Serbia ever 
since the 1974 Constitution, when the Serbian Autonomous Provinces 
gained an almost equivalent status to the Republics, which consequently 
meant that in Kosovo the Serbs were demoted to the status of a national 
minority. Apart from the fact that the decentralisation went counter to the 
Serbian ideology of centralism, the legal act was perceived as a 
miscarriage of justice since it was perceived as a violation upon both the 
Serb nation as well as the Serb state. Added with the external threats on 
the Serb nation and state, internally the Serbian political leadership 
decided to suppress the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989, later manifest in the 
Serb Constitution of 1990, which lowered the Province of Kosovo to the 
rank of District, renaming it Kosovo-Metohija.  
 
Open war between the Kosovo Albanians, under the banner of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and the Serbs, ensued between 1998 and 
1999. It was ended by the three-month’s long NATO-intervention in 
spring 1999, which resulted in a de facto separation of Kosovo from Serbia 
and the establishment of a UN protectorate in Kosovo. In 2003, on the 
basis of the Thessaloniki Agenda, Serbia acquired the status of a potential 
candidate state to the EU. The path towards EU integration has, however, 
been cumbersome and even though the negotiations on the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement started in October 2005, it was not until April 
2008, that the Agreement was signed. In fact, especially the Serbian 
reluctance to cooperate with the ICTY124, in the extradition of war 
                                                          
123 The Yugoslav Wars of Succession refer not only to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina but also to the war in Slovenia however short the war fought. Cf. (Hoare in 
Ramet 2010: 111). 
124 Cooperation with the ICTY is one of the key conditions of the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (SAA) and when the Agreement was signed the EU stipulated 
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criminals, has delayed Serbia’s chances of integrating into the EU. 
Furthermore, the democratisation process in Serbia has been lengthy, and 
cumbersome, and as opposed to the Croatian case, where the death of 
Tudjman meant a relaxation of the nationalistic policies, the end of the 
Milosevic regime did not have the same effects. In fact, after the 
assassination of the Serbian Prime minister Zoran Djindjic in 2003, who 
had pursued a pro-western integration agenda, the Kostunica 
government (2004-2008) relapsed into aggressive nationalistic policies125 
and Serbia “slipped backwards, basking in revanchist Chetnik 
nationalism” (Ramet 2010: 274-275).  
 
Furthermore, the Kosovo issue is still an unresolved problem for Serbia. 
For the international community the problem of the status of Kosovo was 
partly settled in April 2007, when the UN-envoy Ahtisaari presented his 
plan on “supervised independence” for Kosovo. (Trix in Ramet 2010: 373) 
Less than a year later, in February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally proclaimed 
independence which Serbia has since adamantly refused to recognise. In 
fact, even though constructive cooperation “on matters relating to Kosovo 
is a key European Partnership priority”, Serbia still cannot come to terms 
with the fact that Kosovo no longer constitutes “an inalienable part of 
Serbia”. (EU Report 2009: 21) 
The demographic dimension 
Population wise, and territory wise, Serbia was by far the most 
domineering Republic of former Yugoslavia. Situated in the North-
eastern parts of former Yugoslavia, the Serbian population, according to 
the 2002 census, amounted to 7,498,001 and the Serbian landmass extends 
over 77.474 km2.126 The Republic of Serbia, of which Vojvodina is still a 
part, is surrounded by Hungary to the North, Croatia to the far North-
West, Bosnia and Herzegovina to the West, Montenegro to the South-
West, Kosovo and Macedonia to the South, Bulgaria to the South-East 
and finally Romania to the North-East. Even though Serbia proper was 
                                                                                                                                                
that Serbia “will not get any concrete benefits from it until Belgrade is judged to be fully 
cooperating with the ICTY” (Bokulic & Kostadinova 2008: 28).  
125 To Kostunica, the Serb war criminals were glorified as Serb heroes and consequently 
the Kostunica government adamantly refused to cooperate with the ICTY in the 
extradition of Serb wars criminals. Cf. (Ramet 2010: 297-300).  
126 Exempted from the figures, population-wise and territory-wise is the former Kosovo 
Province.  
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highly mono-ethnic, when taking into account the two Autonomous 
Provinces, Vovjodina and Kosovo, the Serbian Republic had, in fact, and 
by far, the largest share of national minorities in the former Yugoslavia.  
 
In fact, in the SFRY, according to the 1981 census, “75.8% of all 
nationalities and ethnic groups lived in SR Serbia” (Baltic 2007: 38). Up 
until recently, de facto since 1999, and de jure since 2008127, the Republic of 
Serbia was constituted by Serbia proper, and the two Autonomous 
Provinces, Vojvodina in the North and Kosovo in the South. Whereas 
Serbia proper was relatively mono-ethnic, constituted by approximately 
85% of Serbs, when taking into account the highly multi-ethnic provinces, 
the Serbs only amounted to 66.4%. Serbia proper had a share of national 
minorities of which the most important were constituted by the 
Albanians (1.3%) and the Bulgarians (0.5%), which “made up the two 
largest nationality groups” (Baltic 2007: 39). In the multi-ethnic 
Vojvodina, although constituted by a majority of Serbs (55.8%), the 
Province had a high concentration of settled homeland minorities, of 
which the most important were the Hungarians (21.7%), the Croats (7.1%) 
and the Slovaks (3.7%). In fact, and according to the 1981 census, 
approximately 90% of the Hungarian minority in the SFRY128 was settled 
in Vojvodina. (Baltic 2007: 38) In Kosovo, the “heartland of Serbia”, the 
population was predominantly Albanian which amounted to an 
important 77% of the Kosovo population and the Serbs only amounted to 
13%. (Trix in Ramet 2010: 361) On the basis of the 1981 census, the 
Albanian minority in the SFRY129 was, in fact, largely concentrated to 
Kosovo (70.9%). (Baltic 2007: 38) 
 
Even though the Yugoslav Wars of Succession naturally were to create 
ethnic conflictive divisions with the Croat and Bosniak minorities, the 
primary ethnic conflict in Serbia was to develop between the Serbs and 
the Kosovo-Albanians. Just as the Albanian question became a threat to 
                                                          
127 Kosovo was placed under international protectorate in 1999 which consequently means 
that however not officially, Kosovo was separated from the domestic jurisdiction of 
Serbia. De jure independence was granted in 2008 when Kosovo unilaterally proclaimed 
independence on the 17th of February 2008. Cf. (Baldwin 2006: 11; Trix in Ramet 2010: 373).  
128 The remainder of the Hungarian minority was primarily settled in Croatia (5.96%) and 
in Slovenia (2.22%). Cf. (Baltic 2007: 38).  
129 According to the 1981 census, the share of the Albanian minority in the SFRY was 
primarily settled in Macedonia (21.8%), in Serbia proper (4.19%) and in Montenegro 
(2.18%). Cf. (Baltic 2007: 38). 
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the internal stability of Macedonia, the same was true for Serbia. In 
Serbia, though, the increasing ethnic hostilities between the Serbs and the 
Kosovo-Albanians were primarily located to the Kosovo-question which 
involved problems of another order. Thus, the root problem to the 
Kosovo territory is to be found in two competitive claims of a historic 
homeland, where both the Serbs and the Albanians claim exclusive 
authority over the same territory. Just as the Albanians view Kosovo as 
the cradle of their national identity, Kosovo represents “the holy place of 
all Serbs because it had formed the centre of the Medieval Serbian 
Empire”, which was destroyed in the mythical battle at Kosovo Polje by 
the Ottoman armies in 1389. (Swain & Swain 2003: 180) Furthermore, 
since the “ancient seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church – the Patriarchate 
of Pec – is situated in Kosovo/a”, Kosovo became the symbol of the 
essence of the Serbian nationhood, grounded in the Serbian heroism, as 
well as in the Serbian spirituality. (Briza 2000: 12) The Serbian aversion 
towards the Albanians is therefore not only explained from a classical 
religious antagonism between Christianity and Islam, it is further 
accentuated by the previous national wars of liberation where leaders 
from the Orthodox Church participated against the Muslims to free 
Serbia from the Ottoman tutelage. The importance of the Church, in the 
strengthening of Serbian nationalism, was on display during the 
Milosevic regime, when priests were participating in “the carrying of 
King Lazar (the Serbian ruler who was killed in the battle of Kosovo/a) at 
the 600th anniversary of the battle in 1989”, which was a way to mark that 
Kosovo belonged to the Serbs. (Briza 2000: 10).  
 
Demographically, the Albanians also constituted a threat to the Serb 
nation in Kosovo. This is especially due to the comparatively very high 
fertility rate of the Albanians who, by large, constituted the majority in 
the province. In fact, whereas the Albanian population increased by 7.6% 
between 1961 and 1991, concomitantly the Serb population decreased by 
8% during the same time-period. (Eberhardt 2002: 388) These 
demographic changes were, however, not only explained by the high 
fertility rate of the Albanians but also by economic hardships and ethnic 
tensions that subsequently resulted in a continuous exodus of the Kosovo 
Serb minority from Kosovo to Serbia proper, especially between 1971 and 
1981. 
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The systematic discrimination of the Kosovo Albanians that resulted from 
the decision of the Serbian political leadership to suppress the autonomy 
of Kosovo in 1989130, found its politico-legal justification in the 1974 
Constitution which had upgraded the Serbian Autonomous Provinces to 
an almost equivalent status to the Republics. This, in turn, meant that in 
Kosovo, the Serbs had been demoted to the status of a national minority 
in a territory that was conceived of as the very cradle of the Serb 
nationhood, and statehood. However, even though Kosovo henceforth 
constituted a federal unit, the Kosovar situation was not matched by the 
Republics, since the “Albanians were recognized as a nationality and not 
as a nation” (Baltic 2007: 41). The distinction between nation and 
nationality was to become important since the right to secede was legally 
limited to those recognised as nations. (Baltic 2007: 41) The Albanians’ 
claims for status of Federal Republic, as well as claims of secession, 
started to be voiced in the Kosovo riots in the beginning of the 1980s. 
These claims exacerbated Serb nationalistic sentiments, of which the 
famous Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art, a 
document produced by former nationalist dissidents opposed to 
Titoism131, expressed the quintessence of the Serbian nationalistic project. 
The Memorandum declared that the constitutional order from 1974, 
denied the Serbs their right to their own state and, not only Kosovo, but 
“the western Yugoslav republics, were exploiting Serbia economically, 
and that the regime was acquiescing in the Albanian “genocide” of Serbs 
in Kosovo, as well as in Croatia’s assimilation of its Serb population” 
(Hoare in Ramet 2010: 115). When Slobodan Milosevic came to power in 
1987, he endorsed the conclusion of the Memorandum, which stated that 
the status of Kosovo was primordial to the very survival of the Serb 
nation. Thus, logically following from this, the autonomy of Kosovo was 
suppressed in 1989. In 1998 open war broke out between the Serbs and 
the Kosovo-Albanians.  
 
Demographically, not only the Kosovo war, but also the wars of Yugoslav 
Succession, had changed the ethnic structure of Serbia. As a result of the 
massive loss of lives, as well as the displacements of people, Serbia 
proper had become even more mono-ethnic, as a result of an influx of 
                                                          
130 In parallel to the suppression of the Kosovo autonomy, the Serbian parliament had also 
“revoked the right of self-government” in Vojvodina. Cf. (MRGI 2008: 2). 
131 The Serbian opposition to Titoism and the constitutional order of 1974 accelerated after 
Tito’s death. Cf. (Hoare in Ramet 2010: 115). 
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Serb refugees and also Roma refugees, from especially Kosovo, as well as 
from Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, Serbia, and 
especially the multi-ethnic Vojvodina, lost many “among its traditional 
minorities, in particular Hungarians, Croats and Bosniaks” (MRGI 2008: 
3).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 
Table 8.1. Ethnic structure of the population in the Republic of Serbia according 
to the 1991132 census and the 2002 census133 (data of 1991 retrieved from the 
State Report submitted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Advisory 
Committee of the Council of Europe of 16 October 2002 and data from 2001 
census derived from the CoE Report 2003: 10)134 
Nationality 1991 number 1991 % 2002 number 2002 % 
Serbs 
Montenegrins 
Yugoslavs 
Albanians 
Bosniaks 
Bulgarians 
Bunyevtsi 
Vlachs 
Gorantsi 
Hungarians 
Macedonians 
Moslems135 
Roma 
Romanians 
Ruthenians 
Slovaks 
Slovenes 
Ukrainians 
Croats 
Others 
Non-declared 
Regional aff. 
Unknown 
6.252.405 
118.934 
320.168 
78.281 
- 
26.698 
21.434 
17.804 
- 
343.900 
45.068 
180.222 
94.492 
42.316 
18.052 
66.772 
- 
- 
97.344 
20.518 
10.718 
4841 
47.958 
79.9 
1.5 
4.1 
1.0 
- 
0.3 
0.3 
0.2 
- 
4.4 
0.6 
2.3 
1.2 
0.5 
0.2 
0.9 
- 
- 
1.2 
2.6 
0.1 
- 
0.6 
6.212.838 
64.049 
80.721 
61.647 
136.087 
20.497 
20.012 
40.054 
4.581 
293.299 
25.847 
19.503 
108.193 
34.576 
15.905 
59.021 
5.104 
5.354 
70.602 
11.711 
107.732 
11.485 
75.483 
82.9 
0.9 
1.1 
0.8 
1.8 
0.3 
0.3 
0.5 
0.1 
3.9 
0.3 
0.3 
1.4 
0.5 
0.2 
0.8 
0.1 
0.1 
0.9 
0.2 
1.4 
0.1 
1.0 
Total 7.822.795 100 7.498.001 100 
                                                          
132 Even though Kosovo was integrated in the 1991 census, in order to facilitate 
comparison between 1991 and 2002, the Kosovo District has been removed from this chart. 
133 The 2002 census did not cover Kosovo. Cf. (CoE Report 2003: 10). 
134 Only minorities amounting to at least 0.1% have been integrated into the list. Thus, the 
German minority (0.05%), the Russian minority (0.03%) as well as the Czech minority 
(0.03%) have been removed. Cf. (CoE Report 2003: 10). 
135 Moslems and Bosniaks did not constitute separate categories in the 1991 census. Thus 
Bosniaks and Moslems together amounted to 2.3% in the 1991 census. Cf. State Report 
submitted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Advisory Committee of the 
Council of Europe, ACFC/SR(2002)003, 16 October 2002, p. 11. 
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The sociolinguistic dimension 
Just as the aggressive nationalistic policies of Serbia never aimed at 
independence, but rather the contrary, the same was true for their 
language policy. In fact, as opposed to Croatia, Serbia was never 
interested in pursuing linguistic nationalism but “had continued to insist 
on the joint language and readily accepted the term Serbo-Croatian” 
(Greenberg 2000: 625).136 The Serbian reluctance of defining the specificity 
of a Serbian language was already blatant in the language policy 
discussions that emanated from the 1974 Constitution, which 
“guaranteed the language rights of all nations and nationalities in 
Yugoslavia” (Greenberg 2000: 636). Hence, as opposed to the Croatian, 
Montenegrin and Bosnian Republican Constitutions, which all made 
modifications in favour of their respective linguistic specificities, Serbia, 
by contrast, “did not make constitutional provisions for a Serbian, 
standard linguistic idiom” (Greenberg 2000: 636). As a response to the 
Croatian Constitution of 1990137, however, the Serbs finally declared 
Serbian to be the official language of the newly formed Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia in 1992. (Greenberg 2000: 625) 
 
The evolution of the denomination of the majority language, and the 
gradual emphasis on the specificity of the Serbian language, is noticeable 
in the consecutive Constitutions of Serbia. In the 1990 Constitution, article 
8 stipulates that “the Serbo-Croatian language and the Cyrillic alphabet 
are in official use, and the Latin alphabet is in official use, as stipulated by 
law” (Art. 8, 1990 Constitution). A gradual shift is noticeable in the 1991 
Constitution, whereby a more precise identification of the Serbian 
linguistic specificity is made when it is declared that “in official use is the 
Serbo-Croatian language, which, when it represents the Serbian linguistic 
expression, ekavian or ijekavian, is also called the Serbian language 
(henceforth the Serbian language)” (Art. 1, 1991 Constitution). Finally, in 
the 1992 Constitution with the proclamation of the FRY138, the Serbo-
Croatian terminology had completely vanished since Article 15 declared 
                                                          
136 The Serbian linguistic stance was to hold on to the Novi Sad Agreement of 1954 which 
“declared Serbo-Croatian to be a single language with two equal and official variants” 
(Greenberg 2000: 626). 
137 The Croatian Constitution of 1990 declared the Croatian language to be the official 
language of Croatia. Cf. (Greenberg 2000: 625).  
138 In April 1992 the proclamation of the FRY, consisting of the Republics of Serbia, 
including Kosovo and Vojvodina, and Montenegro, was made. Cf. (Ramet 2010: 304).  
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that, “the Serbian language in its ekavian and ijekavian pronunciations 
and the Cyrillic alphabet are in official use, and the Latin alphabet is in 
official use, in accordance with the constitution and the law” (Art. 15, 
1992 Constitution). However, even though there has been a shift in the 
terminology of the majority language, this has not impacted on the 
substance or the structure of the language itself, and the changes can thus 
be “described as external acts with few implications for internal language 
development” (Bugarski 2004: 192).139   
 
As far as minority language use is concerned, there is no change in 
substance in that all Constitutions establish that “in areas of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia where national minorities reside, their languages 
and alphabets are also in official use, in accordance with the law” (Art. 15, 
1992 Constitution). Thus, minority language rights, up until the Serbian 
independence of 2006, have been regulated by one Federal Constitution, 
the Serbian Republic Constitution, as well as the statutes of the two 
Autonomous Provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. The most widely used 
minority languages in Serbia are Albanian, Hungarian, Romani and, to 
some extent, Croatian and Bosnian. Even though minority language 
rights in post-war Serbia are still extensive by international standards, the 
wars, and especially the Kosovo war, drastically changed the situation in 
both Kosovo and Vojvodina, whose respective autonomies were radically 
reduced. Compared to the 1974 Republican Constitution of Serbia, in 
which it was stated that the provincial constitutions themselves 
stipulated the minority language in official use140, this had changed in the 
early 1990s, resulting in the “relegation of the official use of their minority 
languages from provincial to municipal level” (Bugarski 2004: 192).  
 
In fact, prior to the suppression of the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989, the 
Albanian language had “enjoyed a high degree of rights” (Bugarski 2004: 
                                                          
139 As opposed to the Croatian case where the independence and the new language policy 
entailed not only a terminological change, from Serbo-Croatian to the Croatian language 
but also an active pursuance of a linguistic purge to remove any “actual or perceived 
Serbisms” at the same time as “reviving Croatian archaic and regional forms and creating 
neologisms” (Bugarski 2004: 197). 
140 According to Article 5 of the Vojvodina Constitution, apart from Serbo-Croatian, the 
following minority languages were in official use at the state level: Hungarian, Slovak, 
Romanian and Ruthenian. In Article 236 of the Kosovo Constitution, Albanian and Serbo-
Croatian were in official use on the state level. On the municipal level it was also 
stipulated that the Turkish language could be used as well. Cf. (Baltic 2007: 39)  
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192). However, after 1989, these rights were eliminated and the increasing 
conflictive relations between Serbs and Albanians were accentuated by a 
linguistic estrangement between the two antagonists. However, in 
Vojvodina, “one of the most multi-ethnic and multilingual regions of 
Europe”, minority language rights have continued to be provided rather 
extensively and Vojvodina is, by far, the region in Serbia where national 
minorities “enjoy both de jure and de facto, the greatest collective rights in 
Serbia” (Briza 2000: 9). However, the record of implementation displays 
great variations as to how these rights are adhered to in practice and, as a 
consequence of the wars, “attendance of mother tongue education and 
production of mother tongue media for minorities (…) has dropped 
significantly” (Bugarski 2004: 192). In Serbia proper, the gap between de 
jure rights, and de facto rights, have been the most blatant. One example is 
the recent linguistic upheavals in the Sandzak region141, which have 
engaged the population, predominantly Moslems speaking the Serbo-
Croatian language, in a campaign of defining themselves as Bosnian 
speaking Bosniaks, “thus identifying with their kin in Bosnia” (Bugarski 
2004: 192). 
 
Minority language rights in education have also been extensively 
provided for, and guarantees in the three Constitutions of the 1990s (1990, 
1991 and 1992), provide for education in minority language, “from 
primary school to university level” (Briza 2000: 9). However, the 
campaign initiated in 1990-1991, for creating a Serbian uniform 
educational system, with a standardised curriculum, went counter to the 
legal minority rights provisions, and were to have disastrous effects, 
particularly in Kosovo, during the 1990s. In fact, a “number of 
educational facilities and institutes in Kosovo/a were closed”, and 
approximately 18 000 Albanian teachers were let go as a consequence of a 
general refusal from the Albanian teachers to use the imposed textbooks 
of the new curriculum. (Briza 2000: 9) Just as the peaceful resistance of the 
Albanians had installed a system of parallel political institutions in 
Kosovo, the same was done in the educational sector, “with the 
development of a wide parallel school network by the ethnic Albanians” 
(Briza 2000: 9). Even though the wars had had negative effects on 
minority education in Vojvodina as well, the situation was radically 
                                                          
141 The Sandzak region is an area which extends into the territory of Montenegro and is in 
proximity to both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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different. In fact, both at primary and secondary school levels, in the 45 
municipalities of Vojvodina, instruction in minority languages, especially 
in Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian and Ruthenian, was provided for. 
Furthermore, since 1998, “some primary schools in Vojvodina have 
voluntarily introduced instruction in the Roma language” (Briza 2000: 9).  
The situation in Serbia proper, however bearing in mind that Serbia 
proper is relatively mono-ethnic, stands in stark contrast to the one in 
Vojvodina, and once again the gap between theory and practice is the 
most acute, since “no primary or secondary schools in central Serbia (…) 
teach in minority languages” (Briza 2000: 9).  
Legislation in minority language rights protection upon 
gaining status as potential candidate state 
The 2003 monitoring Reports of both the EU and the Council of Europe 
were published the same year as the European Council decided upon the 
Thessaloniki Agenda and Serbia became a potential candidate state to the 
EU. 2003 also marks the year, as solemnly pointed out by the EU Report, 
of the assassination of the pro-western Serbian Prime Minister Zoran 
Djindjic. Furthermore, in February 2003, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia was replaced by the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, a loose 
confederation instigated by the EU142 and reluctantly entered into by the 
two former Republics. The reluctance was particularly manifest from the 
Montenegrin side and its non-recognition of the new federal institutions 
was visible in the “non-implementation of important newly adopted 
federal laws (e.g. Criminal Procedure Code, Law of Minorities” (EU 
Report 2003: 3). As pointed out both by the CoE and the EU, the 
monitoring process is situated in a context of a precarious politico-legal 
situation, which, furthermore, can be seen in the “parallel existence of 
obsolete legislation from the previous era143, and newly adopted acts, and 
a lack of harmonization between laws and policies at different levels” (EU 
Report 2003: 3). However, the precarious politico-legal situation 
notwithstanding, the EU is also careful to emphasise that progress “has 
been slow even in areas without constitutional/institutional problems” 
(EU Report 2003: 36).  
                                                          
142 The Belgrade Agreement, brokered by the EU and signed in March 2002, and the 
Constitutional Charter made provisions on how the joint state was to be regulated. Cf. 
(Kim 2005: 1-2).  
143 Previous era refers to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 
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The monitoring reports survey the situation in both Serbia and 
Montenegro, however since Serbia is the focus of investigation, 
information regarding the Montenegrin legislation has been discarded 
where possible. Furthermore, even though the EU Report does, to some 
extent, address the situation in Kosovo, information regarding the 
province is not integrated since it is “outside the effective control of the 
Government of Serbia and Montenegro” since 1999 when it was placed 
under a UN protectorate. (CoE Report 2003: 6). Serbia ratified the CoE’s 
Framework Convention on National Minorities (FCNM) on the 11th of 
May 2001, but had not, as of March 2003, signed the European Charter on 
Regional and Minority Languages. (EU Report 2003: 18) Legislation 
pertaining to the protection of national minorities that has been adopted 
includes: The Union Charter of Human Rights and Minority Rights and 
Civil Freedoms, as well as the Federal Law on the Protection of Rights 
and Freedoms of National Minorities. Furthermore, and as noted by the 
Advisory Committee, this legislative framework contains “promising 
innovations such as the National Councils of national minorities” (CoE 
Report 2003: 3). Also, the Law on the Official Use of Language and Script 
of Serbia regulates the right to use minority languages in official contexts. 
However, as consistently stressed by the monitoring reports, the 
fundamental constitutional changes which entails that the country is 
“undergoing comprehensive reforms (…) also affect the protection of 
national minorities” (CoE Report 2003: 7).   
Non-discrimination 
Just as the recent politico-legal changes have created a situation of a 
constitutional limbo, the same goes for the anti-discrimination legislation 
where the EU points out that “the legal system has a variety of anti-
discrimination provisions, but these are dispersed across different laws at 
all levels” (EU Report 2003: 14). Furthermore, the legacy of the previous 
ethnic violence is seen in the inherited legislation, where some acts are 
“discriminatory in content” (EU Report 2003: 14). Thus, even though an 
Anti-discrimination Act is in preparation, it has not yet been adopted 
since it is “contingent on the new constitutional division of power” (EU 
Report 2003: 14). The EU notes, however, that the country has made real 
progress in the area of integrating ethnic communities into society, 
“where the authorities have continued to demonstrate a strong reform 
commitment” (EU Report 2003: 18). Noteworthy in this regard is the 
introduction of the Federal Law on the Protection of Minorities, which 
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provides for both individual, as well as collective rights, “including 
protection instruments” (EU Report 2003: 18).  As noted by the CoE 
Advisory Committee, the lack of a clear status of the Federal Law is 
discernible in the fact that even though the Law is considered applicable 
in Serbia, adoption has been refused by the Montenegrin authorities. 
(CoE Report 2003: 7) However, as pointed out by the Advisory 
Committee, there “exist general guarantees against discrimination” 
which, apart from the above stated Federal Law, are provided for in the 
Union Charter of Human Rights and Minority Rights and Civil Freedoms, 
as well as in criminal law and civil law. (CoE Report 2003: 11) However, 
these provisions are not sufficient and the Advisory Committee 
specifically notes that, “both legislative and practical measures are 
needed to improve the implementation of the principles of non-
discrimination and full and effective equality” (CoE Report 2003: 4). 
 
The Advisory Committee further raises the issue of the scope of 
application of the citizen criterion in relation to national minorities by 
noting that the Federal Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of 
National Minorities144 gives an encompassing definition of a national 
minority.145 The objections raised by the Advisory Committee, however 
positive the Committee finds the encompassing nature of the definition, 
pertains to the scope of a national minority which is limited only to 
citizens of Serbia and Montenegro. This would per definition, not only 
exclude many of the Roma community, but also “other persons whose 
citizenship status, following the break-up of Yugoslavia and the conflict 
in Kosovo, has not been regularized, including those displaced persons 
from Kosovo who, in the absence of personal documentation, have had 
difficulties in obtaining confirmation of their citizenship” (CoE Report 
2003: 10). Furthermore, since the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian minorities 
consider themselves as having distinct identities from one another, the 
                                                          
144 This Law, from 2002, is an example of an inherited law from the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.   
145 According to the Federal Law, a national minority is “a group of citizens of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, sufficiently representative, although in a minority position in the 
territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, belonging to a group of residents having a 
long term and firm bond with the territory and possessing some distinctive features, such 
as language, culture, national or ethnic belonging, origin or religion, upon which it differs 
from the majority of the population, and whose members should show their concern over 
the preservation of their common identity, including culture, tradition, language or 
religion” (CoE Report 2003: 9).  
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Advisory Committee calls upon the authorities not to treat them as “one 
indivisible minority” (CoE Report 2003: 10). The citizen-criterion is thus 
problematic in regards to non-discrimination, since the “relevant 
guarantees in the Constitution of Serbia (…) are largely limited to 
“citizens” only” (CoE Report 2003: 12).  
 
Therefore, even though the Advisory Committee recognises the 
legitimacy of differentiating between citizens and non-citizens, at the 
same time they stress the necessity for non-citizens to be legally protected 
against discrimination. In this regard it is also pointed out that “Article 
134 of the federal Criminal Code protects only “citizens” from violence 
motivated by ethnicity or race” (CoE Report 2003: 12). Thus, even though 
the Advisory Committee positively notes that the authorities recognise 
the existence of ethnic discrimination in Serbia, especially as regards the 
Roma community, the Advisory Committee stresses “the importance of 
having adequate legislation in place to protect persons belonging to 
national minorities from discrimination” (CoE Report 2003: 12). Along the 
same line of reasoning, the EU notes that although there has been obvious 
progress in the area of protection of national minorities, “sporadic 
discrimination against some ethnic groups”, and especially against the 
Roma community, still exists. (EU Report 2003: 18-19) Also, hate speeches 
are occurring and even though sporadic in manifestation, the EU notes 
with concern that these sometimes also involve “prominent politicians or 
officials” (EU Report 2003: 19). The Advisory Committee is, furthermore, 
concerned about reported discrimination against national minorities by 
the police and other law enforcement agencies, and in this regard the 
Advisory Committee welcomes “the information received from the 
Ministry of Interior of Serbia that new instructions concerning police 
ethics emphasise the principles of non-discrimination and the protection 
of national minorities” (CoE Report 2003: 18). A good example of 
interethnic promotion in law enforcement agencies in this regard is the 
introduction of a multi-ethnic police force in Southern Serbia, as noted 
satisfactorily both by the CoE and the EU. (CoE Report 2003: 18; EU 
Report 2003: 12) Also, in order to promote greater inclusion of the Roma 
community in society, the EU notes, with satisfaction, that, in cooperation 
with both the OSCE, and the United Nations High Commissioner on 
Refugees, a National Strategy for Roma integration has been developed. 
(EU Report 2003: 18)  
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In order to combat ethnic discrimination more effectively, the Advisory 
Committee considers that specific institutional structures need to be 
established. The Advisory Committee welcomes the decision taken by the 
Assembly of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina of December 2002, 
to set up an Ombudsman’s Office which would be “devoted to the 
protection of national minorities” (CoE Report 2003: 12). Also, the 
Advisory Committee stresses the need to launch “additional positive 
measures in the field of employment”, in order to ensure effective 
equality of people previously discriminated against, especially as 
concerns “persons belonging to Albanian, Bosniac, Croatian and Muslim 
minorities” (CoE Report 2003: 13). Furthermore, in the same vein as the 
EU Report, the Advisory Committee stresses the precarious situation of 
the Roma, which is particularly difficult, not only in the field of 
employment, but also in such fields as housing and education. (CoE 
Report 2003: 13) Therefore, the Advisory Committee finds it encouraging 
that the authorities are underway to draw up “a comprehensive Strategy 
for the Integration and Empowerment of Roma”, where the prioritised 
issues would, in fact, pertain to “housing, economic empowerment, 
education and living-conditions of displaced Roma” (CoE Report 2003: 
14). 
 
It is obvious that the precarious politico-legal situation of the newly 
established Union of Serbia and Montenegro makes the monitoring, and 
subsequently, the analysis of non-discrimination legislation difficult, 
since “the legal system has a variety of anti-discrimination provisions, but 
these are dispersed across different laws at all levels” (EU Report 2003: 
14). However, even though it is stated that there “exist(s) general 
guarantees against discrimination”, these provisions are not sufficient 
and “both legislative and practical measures are needed to improve the 
implementation of the principles of non-discrimination and full and 
effective equality” (CoE Report 2003: 11, 4). In the same vein, the EU 
Commission notes that even though Serbia has made real progress in the 
area of non-discrimination, Serbia needs to adopt and to implement 
“general anti-discrimination legislation” (EU Report 2003: 26). 
Furthermore, and not surprisingly, the EU stresses the need to implement 
the “new constitutional arrangements”, in line with the Council of 
Europe’s FCNM. (EU Report 2003: 26) The EU also recommends the 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro to ratify the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and also to proceed with 
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“implementation and guarantees of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” (EU Report 2003: 25).  
 
Taken in this study, and on the basis of the conclusions of both the EU 
and the CoE, general guarantees against discrimination do exist even 
though the general is problematic since these do not encompass a 
considerable share of non-citizens. People lacking citizenship are 
primarily constituted by a large portion of the Roma community, but also 
a considerable share of displaced persons, resulting from the Yugoslav 
wars of Succession, as well as from the Kosovo war. However, even 
though it is stressed by the Advisory Committee that non-citizens need to 
be legally protected against discrimination, at the same time, they abide 
by the legitimacy to differentiate between citizens and non-citizens. Also, 
according to the EU Report, Serbia needs to adopt and to implement 
general anti-discrimination legislation. Although the Constitutional 
Charter, instituting the new constitutional framework, had not been 
adopted at the time of writing, the equality clause of the FRY Constitution 
from 1992 does stipulate that “Citizens shall be equal irrespective of their 
nationality, race, sex, language, faith, political or other beliefs, education, 
social origin, property, or other personal status” (Art. 20, FRY 
Constitution 1992). Therefore, one could argue that, partially at least, 
general provisions exist in the passing from one Constitution to another. 
Thus, on the basis of the above, and substantially due to the 
constitutional limbo that Serbia finds itself in, Serbia is argued to have 
only partially constitutional guarantees against discrimination, and is 
thus positioned on the level of 0.5 according to the index scale. 
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Fig. 8.1. Serbia and level of rule adoption in non-discrimination upon gaining 
status as potential candidate state 
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(0): Absence of any non-discrimination norm; 
(1): General provisions such as an equality clause in the Constitution;   
(2): Non-discrimination laws are inserted in specific laws;  
(3): Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation which then means 
that there has been a complete transposition of the EU anti-
discrimination acquis; 
(4): Non-discrimination laws exceed the minimum requirements of 
the Directive. 
Minority language use in official contexts 
The EU Report does not touch upon the use of minority languages in 
official contexts other than stating that the country is on its way to 
signing the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages 
(ECRML). (EU Report 2003: 18) Following the more comprehensive 
review of the Advisory Committee, which devotes a considerable part of 
their Report to the status of the official use of minority languages in 
Serbia, the difficult legal situation of the country is once again 
emphasised. However, and bearing this in mind, the Advisory 
Committees notes, with satisfaction, that the already mentioned Federal 
Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities 
does contain legal provisions for the official use of minority languages, as 
does Article 52 of the Union Charter of Human Rights and Minority 
Rights and Civil Freedoms. In fact, articles 10 and 11 of the Federal Law 
contain obligations to “introduce the “official use” of minority languages 
– which includes the oral and written use of the said language in relations 
with authorities – in those local self-governing units where the number of 
persons belonging to the national minority concerned has reached 15 per 
cent, and that the local self-government units may decide to introduce 
this measure even with a lower percentage of the minority population” 
(CoE Report 2003: 21). Additionally, Article 16, of the Law on the Official 
Use of Language and Script of Serbia, identifies the conditions which 
regulate the use of minority languages in procedures before agencies also 
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“in areas where a minority language is not in official use” (CoE Report 
2003: 21). Furthermore, Article 11 also provides rights as to the use of 
minority languages in official documents, such as “the issuance of public 
documents, and keeping official registers and registers of personal data 
also in the language of national minorities, and the acceptance of those 
public documents as legally valid” (Art. 11 of the Federal Law on the 
Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities).  
 
On the question of implementation of the said laws the Advisory 
Committee notes, in general terms, that there exist wide regional 
variations as to how these laws are implemented in practice. In fact, in 
Vojvodina these laws have been extensively applied, also having been 
recently “extended with respect to the Croatian language” (CoE Report 
2003: 21). Furthermore, laudable initiatives have been recorded in some 
municipalities of Southern Serbia, where the Albanian language, after 
intense debates, has been introduced in official use. The same can be said 
of the Bosnian language, having acquired status as in official use in “the 
municipalities of Novi Pazar, Sjenica and Tutin” (CoE Report 2003: 21). 
However, and keeping in mind that “the present legal situation is rather 
complicated”, and considering the great differentiation of the regional 
variations, the Advisory Committee considers that the authorities should 
review the situation in order to guarantee that “the above-mentioned 
legal obligations have been implemented  de facto, and de jure, in all 
municipalities concerned” (CoE Report 2003: 21). Furthermore, and 
pertaining to the complicated legal situation, the Advisory Committee 
notes, with concern, that the rights provided for in the Federal Law are 
not compatible notably with Article 20 of the Law on the Official Use of 
Language and Script of Serbia. In fact, according to Article 20, “the 
annotation of an enterprise, institution and other legal person may be 
written, in addition to Serbian, also in the language of a nationality that is 
in official use in the location of the seat or business of the entity” (CoE 
Report 2003: 22). The Advisory Committee is wary that this provision 
could be interpreted in a way that would limit persons belonging to 
minority languages, not in official use, the right to display information of 
a private nature to the public, which goes counter to Article 11 of the 
FCNM. Thus, the Advisory Committee calls upon the Serbian authorities 
to make adjustments to the said provision in order for it to be compatible 
with the FCNM. (CoE Report 2003: 22). 
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As concerns the use of signs and symbols, Article 16, of the Federal Law 
on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities, 
stipulates that national minorities do have the right to “choose and use 
their national symbols but that these symbols cannot be identical with 
symbols of another state” (CoE Report 2003: 22). Furthermore, Article 19, 
of the Law on the Official Use of Language and Script of Serbia, provides 
guarantees as to the right to use signs and symbols and that these de jure 
rights have been followed by commendable initiatives in practice 
especially as concerns the “display of topographical indications intended 
for the public in those local self-government units where a minority 
language is in official use” (CoE Report 2003: 22). As noted by the 
Advisory Committee, however, more pervasive efforts are needed, 
especially in areas inhabited by large shares of Romanians and Croats, 
particularly in regards to street names in minority languages. 
Furthermore, the Advisory Committee calls for more “vigilance and 
consistency (…) to ensure that, in addition to the local self- government 
units, the agencies of the constituent states display inscriptions in 
minority languages in areas traditionally inhabited by a substantial 
number of persons belonging to a national minority, when there is a 
sufficient demand” (CoE Report 2003: 22). 
 
Bearing in mind the complicated legal situation which, here, is 
exemplified by the incompatibility between the Federal Law and the Law 
on the Official Use of Language and Script of Serbia, one has nevertheless 
to conclude that the use of minority languages in official contexts is quite 
extensively provided for. Furthermore, even though regional variations 
do exist as to the compatibility between the de jure provisions, and the de 
facto situations, the Advisory Committee confirms that overall these 
rights have been quite successfully implemented. Hence, taken in this 
study, Serbia is positioned on the level of 3.0. 
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Fig. 8.2. Serbia and level of rule adoption in minority language use in official 
contexts upon gaining status as potential candidate state 
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      (0): No recognition of minority languages; 
(1): The right to use the minority language in official contexts (before 
judicial and administrative authorities; i.e. the right to a translator);  
(2): The minority language can be used in Personal and Place Names 
(public signs); 
(3): The minority language can be used in official documents; 
(4): Minority language having status as official language. 
Minority language rights in education 
Just as the status of minority languages in official use in Serbia does not 
get a lot of attention from the EU, the same is true for rights pertaining to 
minority language rights in education. The only comment the EU Report 
makes, in this respect, is that a “comprehensive review of school curricula 
has been conducted, and minorities will, in the future, have a say” (EU 
Report 2003: 18). The CoE Report is, however, more extensive, and based 
on particularly the Federal Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms 
of National Minorities, as well as the Law on Elementary Schools of the 
Republic of Serbia, the Advisory Committee notes that, on the 
constitutional level, guarantees are made for minorities to have education 
in their own languages. This right is further accentuated in Article 13, as 
well as in the Law on Elementary Schools of the Republic of Serbia. 
Article 13, of the Federal Law, stipulates that “Persons belonging to 
national minorities have the right to instruction in their own language in 
pre-school, elementary school and secondary school education” (Art. 13). 
However, for instruction in minority language to take place, a minimum 
of 15 persons need to have applied for this right to be implemented. As 
noted by the Advisory Committee, “such teaching can also be organised 
for a smaller group upon approval by the Ministry of Education of 
Serbia” (CoE Report 2003: 25). Furthermore, Article 15, of the Federal 
Law, establishes the right for minorities to establish their own private 
educational institutions, from primary up to university level. (Art. 15 of 
the Federal Law)  
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In practice, these rights seem to be upheld rather well in a number of 
minority languages, and the Advisory Committee specifically welcomes 
new initiatives like the one in Vojvodina where instruction in Croatian 
was introduced recently. (CoE Report 2003: 25) However, shortcomings 
in practice have been recorded and the Advisory Committee specifically 
notes that instruction in the Vlach language in municipalities in the 
North-eastern parts of Serbia has not been made available. Even though 
the Serbian authorities assert that this is due to limited demand, the 
Advisory Committee considers that “the authorities should take more 
proactive measures to analyse the level of demand and introduce such 
teaching whenever the criteria established by the domestic legislation are 
met” (CoE Report 2003: 25). The Advisory Committee also notes that 
there is a demand from representatives of the large Bosniak community 
in the Sandzak region to have instruction in the Bosnian language in the 
public educational system. However, although calling on the authorities 
to ensure that “the domestic legislation pertaining to the teaching in, or 
of, minority languages, is fully implemented also in respect of the Bosniac 
language”, the Advisory Committee is at the same time wary and 
recognises the problem with an unwarranted linguistic separation in the 
Serbian educational system. (CoE Report 2003: 25) 
 
Another issue related to the implementation of minority language rights 
in education is that the Serbian legislation stipulates that when 
instruction is made in a minority language, it is obligatory in parallel to 
study Serbian. This is hardly surprising, however, the problem raised is 
that “such Serbian language teaching has been introduced as an addition 
to, rather than part of, the regular school work of the pupils concerned” 
(CoE Report 2003: 25). The Advisory Committee considers that the 
Serbian authorities should review the situation in order not to potentially 
discourage minority language pupils to opt out from minority education 
because of increased school work. Another more serious shortcoming 
raised by the Advisory Committee is the problem of Serbian school 
textbooks that have, up to date, contained very limited information on the 
history and culture of national minorities. Even more worrying is that in 
too many cases these textbooks have contributed to “negative stereotypes 
as regards Albanians, Germans, Muslims and persons belonging to other 
national minorities” (CoE Report 2003: 23). This goes counter to Article 
12, of the Federal Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of 
National Minorities, which stipulates that “the expression, preservation, 
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cultivation, promotion, inheritance and public demonstration of the 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic specificity as the part of 
the tradition of citizens, national minorities and their members, is their 
inalienable individual and collective right” (Art. 12 Federal Law on the 
Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities). The Advisory 
Committee notes, satisfactorily, that the authorities are taking measures 
in order to redress the situation in line with Article 12 and in line with the 
FCNM. (CoE Report 2003: 23) Other shortcomings, and potentially 
contributing to the discouragement of national minority pupils to pursue 
minority education, is the shortage of qualified teachers, which has been 
addressed as a problem, primarily amongst the Albanians, the Slovaks, 
the Romanians and the Ruthenians. (CoE Report 2003: 23) 
 
The poor integration of the Roma minority into the Serbian educational 
system is also raised by the Advisory Committee. Specifically alarming is 
the fact that, according to recent research provided by the Serbian 
authorities, “Roma children account for 50 to 80% of the total number of 
pupils” in Serbian special schools for the mentally disabled. (CoE Report 
2003: 23) The large share of Roma in these schools is explained by the 
proceedings regulating the enrolment into elementary schools, which are 
specifically  based on verbal tests which have not taken into account the 
“specific needs, social and cultural characteristics or language skills of 
Roma” (CoE Report 2003: 23). The Advisory Committee notes, 
satisfactorily, that these shortcomings have been recognised by the 
Serbian authorities and that the Ministry of Education of Serbia has 
already indicated an introduction of a new enrolment policy for 
2004/2005 that would prevent such misdemeanours from reoccurring. 
However, in order to redress the present unfortunate situation, the 
Advisory Committee urges the authorities to “pursue this issue as a 
matter of high priority and to introduce additional measures to integrate 
in regular schools those Roma children who have been unduly placed in 
special schools” (CoE Report 2003: 23). Generally, as regards integration 
of Roma into the Serbian educational system, the Advisory Committee is 
concerned about the low school attendance and the high drop-out rate, 
especially as regards Roma girls, from elementary schools. Thus, however 
laudable some initiatives from the Serbian authorities to increase the 
access of the Roma to education, such as providing for free textbooks, the 
situation is still very problematic. (CoE Report 2003: 24) 
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The Advisory Committee also addresses problems specifically in relation 
to the Albanian minority as regards non-recognition of diplomas from 
abroad and from Kosovo. Since progress has been noted in the area of 
recognition of diplomas from educational institutions in Kosovo, the 
Advisory Committee “finds that there is a need to make further progress 
with respect to diplomas obtained in Albania or other foreign countries” 
(CoE Report 2003: 24). Furthermore, as concerns the right for minorities to 
set up their own educational institutions, the Advisory Committee notes 
that this right should not only be reflected in the Federal Law, but also 
“be better reflected in other pertinent legislation, notably in the Law on 
Elementary Schools of the Republic of Serbia, which at present excludes 
the establishment of regular private primary schools” (CoE Report 2003: 
24). 
 
Bearing in mind that there are some legal inconsistencies in the domain of 
minority language rights in education, and even though there are 
regional variations as to the implementation of the said provisions, it has 
to be concluded that Serbia, nevertheless, provides for extensive legal 
guarantees in this domain. The Federal Law on the Protection of Rights 
and Freedoms of National Minorities even provides legal rights for 
minorities to set up their own higher education institutions. However, 
since there are no such minority-run universities, Serbia does not score 
the maximum according to the index scale but is positioned on the level 
of 3.0.  
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Fig. 8.3. Serbia and level of rule adoption in minority language rights in 
education upon gaining status as potential candidate state 
 
2003 
   Tolerance                                                               x                       Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
  (0): No education of or in minority language; 
(1): Children belonging to minorities have the right to learn their 
mother tongue in school; 
(2): At least parts of the curriculum (e.g. history or religion) are taught 
in the minority language; 
(3): Minorities have the right to educate their children completely in 
the mother tongue, either in state schools with a complete syllabus 
taught in the minority language or in specific minority schools; 
(4): Minorities have their own universities. 
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9 
KOSOVO AND MINORITY LANGUAGE 
RIGHTS PROTECTION 
Kosovo semi-independence 
Just as the other Balkan states had been the battleground of competing 
Empires, the same was true for the Kosovo region. During the 13th 
century the common destiny of Serbia and Kosovo was sealed when 
Kosovo became part of the Serbian Kingdom146. From 1455, when Serbia 
lost its independence to the Ottomans, Kosovo was also incorporated 
under Ottoman tutelage up until 1912 when it was reincorporated, 
against the wishes of the Albanian majority147, into the Kingdom of 
Serbia, as a result of the Serb victory in the first Balkan war. Thus, just as 
the other Balkan states and regions had experienced great migrations and 
settlements of what were to become various historic homeland minorities, 
this was also true for Kosovo where primarily Albanians and Serbs had 
inhabited the same territory for centuries. However, the exclusivity of the 
Kosovo territory as it was to develop in the 1980s, apart from the 
international legal dimension, is not comparable to the other Balkan 
states. Indeed, the exclusivity lies in the politico-mythical domain where 
the territory is associated with legends of the first settlers148, as well as 
associated with the national birth of both the Serbs (14th century) and the 
Albanians (19th century). The Kosovo problem can be traced back to the 
constitutional changes of 1963, when Kosovo was upgraded from the 
                                                          
146 Kosovo was a part of the Serbian Kingdom between 1200 and 1450 and in the famous 
battle at Kosovo Polje in 1389 the Albanians in fact fought the Ottomans alongside King 
Lazar and the Serbs. Cf. (Trix in Ramet 2010: 359-360). 
147 The incorporation of Kosovo into the Kingdom of Serbia was sanctioned by the Great 
Powers in the Treaty of London of 1913. Cf. (Trix in Ramet 2010: 360).  
148 There is dispute over who were the first to settle on Kosovo territory. The Albanians 
claim the territory as being the direct descendants of the Illyrics, perceived as the first 
inhabitants of the territory around 7th century B.C. thus many centuries prior to the Slavic 
tribes whose presence is attested to be situated around 7th century A.D. Furthermore, the 
settlement of the Illyrics is argued to have been continuous as opposed to the Serbs who 
left Kosovo en masse during the 17th century not to return until the beginning of the 20th 
century and their re-conquest of the territory. Cf. (Baltic 2007: 4; Baldwin 2006: 6-7)  
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status of Region to that of Autonomous Province. The increased 
autonomy granted to Kosovo by the 1974 Constitution, gaining almost 
Republican status, consequently strengthened the independence of 
Kosovo from Belgrade.149 The 1981 riots150 became the start of a long 
political stalemate, where the Albanian calls for increased autonomy and 
claims of the establishment of a Republic of Kosovo were countered by an 
increasing Serbian concern that the constitutional order of 1974 was a 
violation of the Serbian state and nation.  
 
The reaction of the Kosovo Albanians to the suppression of the autonomy 
of Kosovo in 1989 was to auto-proclaim Kosovo as a federal Republic of 
the Yugoslav Federation, by installing a parallel “State” with a 
Constitution, a Parliament and a Presidency, with a shadow government 
in the strongest sense of the term. In a secret ballot, held in May 1992, 
Ibrahim Rugova, of the newly formed Democratic League of Kosova 
(LDK)151, was elected President and pursued a policy of peaceful passive 
resistance against the Serbs. However, the policy of Rugova did nothing 
to change the systematic discrimination, imposed upon the Albanians, 
which led to a rapidly deteriorating socio-economic situation. Parallel to 
the incapacity of the international community to resolve the conflict, open 
war broke out in 1998 between the Serb security forces and the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA).  (Briza 2000: 13) The escalation of violence, not 
only from the Serbian side, but also the KLA’s offensive, changed the 
prerequisites of the conflict, and with an impending humanitarian 
catastrophe, the international community was forced into action. With the 
failure of the peace conference at Rambouillet152, NATO intervened and 
put an end to the conflict, after a three-month period of airborne raids.  
                                                          
149 The increased autonomy meant that Kosovo was allowed its own Constitution and in 
the same token the University of Pristina was established which consequently permitted 
that “Albanians took positions of leadership in Kosova” (Trix in Ramet 2010: 360). 
150 The riots of 1981 started out with an incident at the Pristina University but rapidly set 
in motion contestations of a more general character directed against the authorities which 
resulted in violent demonstrations. The protests were rooted both in a disastrous 
economic situation with massive unemployment and extremely poor socio-economic 
conditions of the Kosovars in parallel to rising nationalism. Cf. (Trix in Ramet 2010: 360).    
151 The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was established in December 1989 and was to 
become the main political party of the Kosovo Albanians throughout the 1990s and into 
the 2000s. Cf. (Trix in Ramet 2010: 362). 
152 The Peace conference at Rambouillet was instigated by the US diplomat Richard 
Holbrooke. The Albanians were pressurised into signing the treaty but the treaty became 
void since the Serbs never signed it. Cf. (Trix in Ramet 2010: 365). 
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On the 10th of June 1999, and with the establishment of the United 
Nations’ Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), following UN resolution 1244, 
Kosovo became a UN protectorate, still “under the technical sovereignty 
of Yugoslavia but to be administered by the UN” (Trix in Ramet 2010: 
366). The UN resolution also allowed for the presence of NATO forces on 
Kosovo territory. However, even though the war was over and the quasi-
state was under international protection, ethnic hostilities persevered and 
exploded in ethnic clashes in the riots of March 2004.153 The build-up to 
the riots was rooted in a profound frustration which was directly related 
to “the economic crisis, precipitated by Kosova’s unresolved political 
status” (Trix in Ramet 2010: 368). Consequently, the riots were not limited 
to interethnic strife but were also directed against the UNMIK 
administration, which was blamed for lagging behind in the resolution of 
the Kosovo status. In fact, the “political vacuum” that ensued in the 
aftermath of the war, was partly due to the fact that too many actors154 
were involved in the reconstruction of a state, in transit from war as well 
as from a police state. Although all were under the command of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), the ambiguities of 
their mandates created coordination problems which resulted in 
“overlapping and lack of clarity in accountability” (Trix in Ramet 2010: 
367). As a result, the set- up of institutional structures was too slow and 
without a working system of both the judiciary and the local security, 
“there was no clear way to control the incipient violence” (Trix in Ramet 
2010: 366).  
 
The establishment of Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government155 from 2001 further increased the complexity of the 
governance structures in Kosovo. The powers of the provisional 
government were sharply curtailed in favour of the SRSG, and the local 
government was, by no means, allowed to take decisions on the final 
status of Kosovo whose negotiations had stalled. The riots of 2004 would 
however precipitate the international negotiations and in April 2007, the 
                                                          
153 Apart from deaths that were reported in both the Albanian and the Serbian camps, the 
riots led to the displacement of several thousands of Serbs. Cf. (Trix in Ramet 2010: 369).  
154 UNMIK was in fact made up of an array of international organisations and apart from 
the UN encompassed the UNHCR, the OSCE and the EU. Cf. (Trix in Ramet 2010: 367).  
155 The Constitutional Framework of May 2001 provided for “elections every three years 
for the Kosova Assembly which in turn would elect the president and the prime minister” 
(Trix in Ramet 2010: 367). 
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UN envoy Ahtisaari presented his plan of “supervised independence” for 
Kosovo. (Trix in Ramet 2010: 373) One year later, in February 2008, 
Kosovo unilaterally proclaimed its independence which has, up to date, 
been recognised by 22 EU member states, but still is adamantly contested 
by Serbia. The contested independence has led to that Kosovo is still a 
semi-protected state under international supervision. However, Kosovo is 
considered a sui generis case, and the aim of the EU has, ever since the 
Thessaloniki Declaration of June 2003, been to integrate Kosovo into the 
European structures. This aim was even more explicit when the EU 
Commission adopted the Communication to the Council and the 
European Union on “A European Future for Kosovo”, in April 2005.156 In 
support of the official declarations, the deployment of EULEX157 was 
established in Kosovo from 2008, in order to “mentor, monitor and advise 
Kosovo institutions in the area of law enforcement, and police, customs 
and the judiciary” (Stevens 2009: 6), in order to facilitate the compliance 
of Kosovo with the conditions of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement.   
The demographic dimension 
The region the least developed in former Yugoslavia, according to the 
1981158 census Kosovo was inhabited by approximately 1.5 million people, 
of which the majority were Albanian (77.4%), and the two largest 
minority groups were the Serbs, amounting to 13.2%, and the Bosniaks 
(3.7%). The other national minorities were divided up primarily between 
the Roma (2.2%), the Montenegrins (1.7%), the Turks (0.8%) and the 
Croats (0.5%). (Briza 2000: 12) The conflict, as it was to develop in the 
1980s and the 1990s, was, however, limited to the ethnic strife between 
the Albanian majority and the Serb minority. Hence, rooted in a fight for 
exclusive control of a symbolically value-laden territory, the Serbs were 
                                                          
156 European Commission (2005) Communication from the Commission. A European Future for 
Kosovo, COM (2005) 156 final, Brussels, 20 April 2005, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidates/kosovo/key-
documents/index_en.htm, 2011-12-14. 
157 The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) within the framework of 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is to date the largest civilian mission 
ever deployed by the EU, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-
operations/eulex-kosovo, 2011-12-15. 
158 After 1981 it is difficult to find reliable censuses. The 1991 census was boycotted by the 
Albanians and after 1999 there have been no censuses carried out. Cf. (Stevens 2009: 8).  
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fearful that the increasingly numerous Albanian majority would secede, 
first from the Socialist Republic of Serbia, and subsequently from the 
FRY, and then unite with Albania in a Greater Albania. The geographical 
position of Kosovo, stretching throughout a landmass of approximately 
11.000 km2, borders on Albania to the southwest and Macedonia, with its 
numerically large Albanian community, to the south. To the west, Kosovo 
is bordering on Montenegro and, to the northeast, it neighbours Serbia. 
Even though the Serbs for a long time had been a “numerical minority in 
Kosovo”, they were a domineering minority which imposed 
discriminatory policies on the Albanian majority and not vice versa. 
(Baldwin 2006: 8) 
 
Although rooted in two peoples, separated by distinct religious and 
linguistic affiliation, the conflict was located to a territory over which 
both Serbs and Albanians claimed exclusive ownership.159 Even though 
the majority of the Kosovo Albanians converted to Islam during the 
tutelage of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of the Albanian national 
consciousness had little to do with religious affiliation, as was attested by 
the “League of Prizren”160, which became the start of the Albanian 
national revival, and which was, along with the birth of the Serb nation, 
located to Kosovo. (Baldwin 2006: 7). The main purpose of this first 
transnational Albanian organisation was to protect Albanian land from 
being confiscated by Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. (Trix in 
Ramet 2010: 359) In the case of Kosovo this failed, since Kosovo was 
incorporated into the Serbian Kingdom in 1912. As a way to fortify the 
authority over the Kosovo region, the Serbs started to confiscate lands, 
and to actively pursue a policy of colonisation of the territory during the 
1920s and the 1930s.161 Discriminatory policies against the Kosovo 
Albanians were also introduced as a means of serbianising the territory, 
and these were to continue up until the initiation of the decentralisation 
process in the 1960s, during the SFRY regime. (Briza 2000: 12) 
 
                                                          
159 The divergent historical perceptions of the Albanians and the Serbs are formed on the 
basis of the identification of the first occupant of the territory. Cf. (Baldwin 2006: 7).  
160 The first Albanian organisation, the League of Prizren consisted of Albanian 
representatives from four of the Ottoman Provinces, including Kosovo. The League was 
made up of both Muslims as well as Christian Albanians. Cf. (Trix in Ramet 2010: 359). 
161 In the interwar period during the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the 
colonisation endeavour of the Serbs meant the settlement of 10.877 Serbian families which 
were allotted lands taken from especially Turkish landowners. Cf. (Briza 2000: 12).   
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The interlude of increased political and cultural autonomy, given to 
Kosovo by the Constitutional changes of 1963, and particularly 1974, 
strengthened the position of the Kosovo Albanians162, but was short. 
Hence, in 1989, when the Serbian political leadership suppressed the 
autonomy of Kosovo, this would lead to a generalised policy of 
repression where discrimination against the Albanians was effectuated in 
every area. This continued up until the NATO intervention in 1999, when 
the Albanians became “once more in a position of power in Kosovo as a 
whole” (Baldwin 2006: 9). The war, and the subsequent UN-
administration in place in Kosovo since June 1999, changed the 
prerogatives of Kosovo, both in terms of the national structure of the 
population, but also in terms of discrimination and minority rights 
protection.  
 
The development of the national structure of Kosovo during the 20th 
century is attested by the censuses, and ever since 1912, there have been 
important changes in the demography, primarily due to migrations, but 
also to huge imbalances in the fertility rates. According to the censuses 
between 1948 and 1981, the percentage of the Albanians in Kosovo rose 
from 68% to 77.4%, in parallel with a decrease in the Serb population 
during the same period, from 24.1% to 13.2%.163 For instance, it is 
estimated that between 1971 and 1981, “over 30,000 Serbs and 
Montenegrins left Kosovo/a because of ethnic tensions and for economic 
reasons” (Briza 2000: 12).  The population figures from 1981 are difficult 
to measure accurately since there have been no reliable censuses carried 
out since 1981. However, estimations have it that on the eve of the 
NATO-intervention in 1999, there were “up to 300,000 Serbs living in 
Kosovo” (Baldwin 2006: 8). The Serbs were primarily living in the big 
cities and in the capital of Pristina, where they amounted to 
approximately 25% of the population. Furthermore, the Serbs were 
primarily located to three municipalities in northern Kosovo, the 
municipality of Strpce in the south, as well as in the town of Kosovo Polje, 
where they formed the majority. (Baldwin 2006: 8) Prior to the war, the 
Serb minority, along with the Bosniaks, and the Turks, were, to a large 
                                                          
162 In parallel to the increased autonomy given to Kosovo was the establishment of the 
University of Pristina which would provide the manning of Kosovo Albanians to 
positions in the public sector. Cf. (Baltic 2007: 42; Trix in Ramet 2010: 360). 
163 Statistical Office of Kosovo (2008) “Demographic changes of the Kosovo population 
1948 – 2006” in Series 4: Population Statistics, Pristina, February, 2008, p. 7. 
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degree, living in ethnically quite homogeneous societies. The war and the 
subsequent UN-protectorate have further accentuated these ethnically-
concentrated communities.  
 
The consequences of the war and the NATO-intervention had led to 
thousands killed, as well as huge refugee movements approaching the 
million. In fact, records have it that during the NATO-intervention, which 
was not only limited to Kosovo but also directed towards Serbia proper, 
over 800,000164 Albanians were forced to leave Kosovo. The Serbs also left 
in huge numbers to escape the bombings, approximating the 100,000 and 
decimating the Serb population in Kosovo by one third. However, the 
main reason for the exodus in 1999 was not the bombing in itself, but was 
rather the consequence of a “systematic campaign of intimidation against 
minorities”, which meant the purification of villages and towns where 
Albanians were expelled from Serb-ruled municipalities and vice versa. 
(Baldwin 2006: 13). Furthermore, the intimidation was not only directed 
against the Albanians and the Serbs, other minorities165, and especially the 
Roma, accused of having been the collaborators of the Milosevic 
regime166, were targeted in systematic raids which, according to the 
European Roma Rights Centre, have been “the single biggest catastrophe 
to befall the Romani community since World War II” (Baldwin 2006: 14).  
 
With the war over and the UN-led administration in place, the majority of 
the Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo “in the largest spontaneous 
movement of refugees since the Second World War” (Trix in Ramet 2010: 
366). The majority of the Serb refugees, however, never returned, neither 
did a large part of the Roma167, nor the Bosniaks, nor the Croats. Thus, the 
impact of the war on the national structure of Kosovo had led to a 
situation where the former multinational region had developed into a 
                                                          
164 The Kosovo Albanians found refuge primarily in Albania and in Macedonia but also to 
some degree were taken in by Montenegro and Turkey. Cf (Trix in Ramet 2010: 365).  
165 In fact, the intimidation of the Turks has almost gone unnoticed but as a consequence of 
the 1999 war a part of the Turkish community fled to Macedonia. Cf. (Bugarski & 
Hawkesworth 2004: 209). 
166 The systematic discrimination against the Albanians during the Milosevic regime had 
set in motion “bureaucratic expulsions” of the Albanians from all positions in the public 
sector and many from the Roma community filled the vacancies left from the systematic 
expulsion of the Albanians. (Trix in Ramet 2010: 362).  
167 The Roma who fled the war primarily sought refuge in Serbia and Montenegro. Cf. 
(Briza 2000: 14). 
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highly mono-ethnic society, in which the most drastic changes were seen 
in the decrease of the Serb share of the population, from 9.9% to a mere 
5.3%, in parallel with an enormous increase in the Albanian population, 
from 81.6% to 92.0%.168 The reasons for the increasing mono-ethnic 
character of the Kosovo society are two-fold and can primarily be 
ascribed to the failure of the UNMIK administration, which was in place 
already in June 1999. Despite the fact that the main task of the UNMIK 
mandate was the protection of minority rights, and especially to secure 
the safe return of refugees to Kosovo, this policy failed because of the 
incapacity to provide a secure environment for the returnees. 
Furthermore, interethnic strife, between primarily the Albanians and the 
Serbs, continued to contaminate the society and, in parallel with the 
unresolved political status of Kosovo, exploded into violent conflict in 
2004, which neither the UNMIK nor the KFOR armed forces had the 
capacity to prevent. In fact, the post-conflict phase169, instead of leading to 
an integration of the different ethnic communities, has further 
accentuated the segregation, entailing a congregation of “mono-ethnic 
enclaves”, where the ethnic marker has become even more rigidly 
divisive. (Baldwin 2006: 17) In fact, the segregation of the Kosovar society 
today has made some minority rights experts comment that, “nowhere 
else in Europe is at such a high risk of ethnic cleansing occurring in the 
near future – or even a risk of genocide” (Baldwin 2006: 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
168 Statistical Office of Kosovo (2008) “Demographic changes of the Kosovo population 
1948 – 2006” in Series 4: Population Statistics, Pristina, February 2008, p. 7. 
169 The UN-administered protectorate of Kosovo has in fact been the longest and most 
expensive international administrations ever experienced since the creation of the UN. Cf. 
(Baldwin 2006: 3).  
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Table 9.1. Demographic changes of the Kosovo population, 1948 – 2006 (data 
retrieved from The Statistical Office of Kosovo, February 2008, p. 7) 
 
 Census  Total   Albanians Serbs Turks  Roma Others 
 year 
1948 733.034 498.244 176.718 1.320 11.230 45.522 
% 100 68.0 24.1 0.2 1.5 6.2 
1953 815.908 524.562 189.869 34.590 11.904 54.983 
% 100 64.3 23.3 4.2 1.5 6.7 
1961 963.988 646.605 227.016 25.764 3.202 61.401 
% 100 67.1 23.5 2.7 0.3 6.4 
1971 1.243.693 916.168 228.264 12.244 14.593 72.424 
% 100 73.7 18.4 1.0 1.2 5.8 
1981 1.584.440 1.226.736 209.798 12.513 34.126 101.267 
% 100 77.4 13.2 0.8 2.2 6.4 
1991 1.956.196 1.596.072 194.190 10.445 45.745 109.744 
% 100 81.6 9.9 0.5 2.3 5.6 
2006 2.100.000 1.932.000 111.300 8.400 23.512 24.788 
% 100 92 5.3 0.4 1.1 1.2 
 
The sociolinguistic dimension 
Whereas religious affiliation is of minor importance to the Albanian 
national identity, linguistic affiliation is at the core of the national revival, 
as it was to develop at the meeting in Prizren in 1878. In fact, the 
linguistic marker is essential for the Albanians because they are the sole 
people of the Balkans for whom the national identity exclusively has been 
formed around the linguistic identity, and where linguistic unity is seen 
as a prerequisite for Albanian national unity. (Roux 1992: 205) The 
correlation between linguistic unity and national unity was obvious 
when, in 1992, at a conference170 on the future of the Albanian literary 
language, and at the height of the Serbian systematic discrimination 
against the Kosovo Albanians, the Kosovar representatives adamantly 
resisted any attempts at introducing linguistic pluricentrism, arguing that 
“a unified literary standard is necessary for national unity” (Bugarski & 
Hawkesworth 2004: 204). The Albanian language spoken in Kosovo and 
                                                          
170 The Conference, The national literary language and the Albanian world today, was held in 
Tirana on the 20-21 November 1992. Cf. (Bugarski & Hawkesworth 2004: 204). 
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the standard used in Albania have, however, developed independently 
from one another ever since a conference held in Pristina in 1952. 
(Bugarski & Hawkesworth 2004: 2003) 
 
In the beginning of the SFRY regime, the Albanian language was officially 
recognised in Kosovo. As enshrined by the 1974 Constitution of Kosovo, 
the official languages were the Albanian and the Serbo-Croatian, which 
could be used “in procedures before state agencies and organizations 
with official authority” (Baltic 2007: 39). Although the Turkish minority 
was numerically quite small (0.8%)171, the Turkish language held a 
prestigious position and could be used officially, as determined by the 
statutes of the municipalities. (Baltic 2007: 39) Thus, just as in the other 
Republics of the SFRY, the equality of the languages and scripts was 
extensive in Kosovo, not only de jure, but also de facto. This situation 
prevailed at least up until the 1981 riots and the subsequent abolition of 
minority rights protection for the Kosovo Albanians, instituted with the 
suppression of the Kosovo autonomy in 1989. As a consequence thereof, 
Albanian lost its status as official language, and the official language use 
of Albanian was relegated from the provincial to the municipal level. 
(Bugarski 2004: 192) This situation persevered throughout the 1990s.   
  
In the education system, and with the official recognition of the Albanian 
language, great effort was put into raising the literacy rate of the 
Albanians172. Indeed, “the opening of 122 Albanian language departments 
in elementary schools in 1946”, and the establishment of a Province-wide 
educational system, would provide schooling for the rapidly growing 
Kosovo population. (Baltic 2007: 42). The number of Albanian teachers 
grew, which was facilitated by the opening of the Pristina University, 
established in parallel to the increased Kosovo autonomy in the 1970s. 
However, “attempts to provide the growing population with adequate 
schools were insufficient” and underpaid teachers, as well as a shortage 
of teaching material, resulted in second-grade diplomas of the Kosovo 
Albanians. This, in turn, limited the career possibilities of the Kosovar 
graduates to Kosovo which “itself had an enormously high 
                                                          
171 The Turkish minority amounted to 0.8% according to the 1981 census. Cf. Statistical 
Office of Kosovo “Demographic changes of the Kosovo population 1948 – 2006” in Series 
4: Population Statistics, Pristina, February 2008, p. 7. 
172 Just like the illiteracy rate was particularly high amongst the Albanian community in 
Macedonia, the same was true for the Kosovo Albanians. Cf. (Baltic 2007: 42). 
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unemployment rate” (Baltic 2007: 42). The riots of 1981 started on the 
University premises but were soon extended to the whole Kosovar 
society, grounded in frustration over the poor socio-economic conditions. 
The subsequent suppression of the Kosovo autonomy resulted in the 
abolition of the Albanian education system and the implementation of “a 
uniform educational programme and curriculum throughout the 
Republic of Serbia” (Briza 2000: 9). This, in turn, led to the dismissal of 
18,000 Albanian teachers and other staff when they protested against the 
imposed Serbian standardised curriculum. This was the start of an 
Albanian parallel educational system where the “instruction of Albanian 
students was held in “private homes, storerooms, mosques, and Sufi 
centres” (Trix in Ramet 2010: 363). At the same time, under the regime of 
the Serbian standardised education system, education in minority 
languages in elementary schools were offered in Albanian, Serbian, 
Turkish, and sometimes also in the Romani language throughout the 
1990s. (Bugarski & Hawkesworth 2004: 201) 
 
Even though the legalisation of the Albanian education system naturally 
was restored with the UNMIK administration after the war, the division 
of the education system has remained and has been further accentuated. 
In fact, the UNMIK’s original educational policy was based on a 
philosophy where a resurgence of ethnic violence, between the Serbs and 
the Albanians, would be the most effectively prevented in a system of 
“two schools under one roof” (Baldwin 2006: 18). However, to promote a 
system where Albanian and Serbian students, respectively, get 
entrenched in different historiographies has led to further segregation 
and has proven ineffective from a conflict prevention perspective, which 
the riots of 2004 were an obvious example of. Furthermore, minority 
language rights in education have been heavily undermined in terms of 
the numerically smaller minority languages in post war Kosovo, since the 
focus has been almost exclusively on the two biggest communities, the 
Albanians and the Serbs. This has led to a situation where the 
numerically smaller minority languages have been treated offhandedly 
which has been criticised particularly by the Turks who have been 
“complaining about the downgrading of their language” (Baldwin 2006: 
22). Indeed, reports from Prizren indicate that, not only the Turkish 
community, but also the Bosniaks, have been denied education in their 
languages. Furthermore, by 2000, the children from the Roma 
community, as well as the Ashkali and the Egyptian communities, “were 
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still largely not receiving education” (Baldwin 2006: 18). The de facto 
situation of minority rights in education is problematic and is far from the 
de jure rights which were instituted by the Constitutional Framework as 
of May 2001.  
 
In the Constitutional Framework, set up as a means of regulating 
Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, minority language 
rights are extensively provided for and, in fact, “go far beyond the 
international standards and, indeed, those that apply in other countries, 
as they appear to apply to all communities, at all times, and in all places” 
(Baldwin 2006: 22). In fact, according to chapter 4 of the Constitutional 
Framework, and regardless of the numerical size of the national minority, 
“communities and their members shall have the right to: a) use their 
language and alphabets freely, including before the courts, agencies, and 
other public bodies in Kosovo; b) receive education in their own 
language; c) enjoy access to information in their own language” (Baldwin 
2006: 22). Although commendable in theory, these extensive rights have 
proven difficult to implement in practice, since there are no limits that 
regulate the minority language rights in question. Hence, as shown in 
practice, although the numerically smaller minorities do have legal rights 
to use their languages in official contexts, as well as to get instruction in 
their minority languages, oftentimes these rights have been denied them 
in practice. 
Legislation in minority language rights upon gaining 
status as potential candidate state  
Even though Kosovo was also integrated in the Thessaloniki Agenda with 
the aim of moving the Western Balkan States into the structures of the 
European Union, the status of Kosovo has been a challenge ever since the 
start. Hence, the Thessaloniki Agenda of 2003 applies to Kosovo, “as 
governed under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 1244” 
(EU Report 2005: 4). The unclear legal status of Kosovo does not only 
pertain to the division of power between the international administration 
and Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Government, it also pertains to 
the complicated relationship with Serbia, which still, de facto, was 
administering the Serbian-populated municipalities, although UN 
Resolution 1244 specifically transferred the administration to the UN. (EU 
Report 2005: 12) The challenges of the relations between Kosovo and 
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Serbia were also blatant since, prior to 2005, no assessments were carried 
out individually for the Kosovo region but, these were integrated in the 
reports pertaining to the FRY and later to the Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro.  Hence, even though Kosovo did become a potential 
candidate state to the EU in 2003, along with the other states of the 
Western Balkans, it is only in 2005 that Kosovo becomes assessed 
individually in the Reports of the EU and the Council of Europe.  
 
The complexity of the legal and institutional set-up of Kosovo is stressed 
throughout the EU Report, as well as the Report of the Advisory 
Committee in 2005, the latter describing the Kosovo situation as “a 
complicated and politically sensitive legal and institutional context” (CoE 
Report 2005: 6). Indeed, the problem of the future status of Kosovo, in 
relation to a situation of an unclear division of power between the 
international actors and the local government, permeates the Reports and 
are stressed as being seriously detrimental to the security situation, and 
the protection of minority rights. In fact, and as underlined by the 
Advisory Committee, “the present complex and ambiguous institutional 
arrangements, coupled with uncertainty as regards the future status of 
Kosovo, have at times obscured the respective authorities’ responsibilities 
and accountability for the implementation of the Framework Convention, 
to the detriment of persons belonging to minority communities” (CoE 
Report 2005: 37). However, at the same time, it is also true that the 
implementation of existing legislation “remains exceptionally difficult in 
Kosovo, where inter-ethnic violence has seriously eroded trust between 
communities” (CoE Report 2005: 37). However, it has to be stressed that 
both Reports were produced at a time of excessive interethnic hostilities 
in the wake of the 2004 events, which became an indicator of the failure of 
both the UNMIK administration as well as NATO to provide an 
environment of security, necessary for the reconciliation process, not only 
between Albanians and Serbs, but also a secure environment for smaller 
minority communities. 
Non-discrimination 
In the wake of the 2004 riots, an Anti-Discrimination Law was adopted by 
the Kosovo Assembly, and, subsequently, imposed by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General on the 20th of August 2004, as 
specified in UNMIK Regulation No. 2004/32. (CoE Report 2005: 14) Even 
though the Advisory Committee recognises the encompassing nature of 
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the Law, which “provides far-reaching guarantees against both direct and 
indirect discrimination in both public and private spheres”, the 
generalised nature of the Law does remain a problem. (CoE Report 2005: 
14) In fact, the lack of conditions regulating the anti-discrimination law, 
seeing that there are no “specific structures to combat ethnic 
discrimination”, inhibits effective implementation. (CoE Report 2005: 14) 
Furthermore, and as underlined by the EU, the lack of “subsidiary 
legislation” in the area of non-discrimination is also hampering more 
effective implementation. (EU Report 2005: 21) 
 
The Ombudsperson and the judicial courts have been entrusted with “the 
task of receiving, respectively, complaints and claims in accordance with 
the existing legislation” (CoE Report 2005: 14). However, even though the 
EU stresses the important role played by the Institution of the 
Ombudsperson which has, “continued to play a crucial role in 
safeguarding human rights and the protection of minorities”, the 
weakness of the judicial institutions and the law enforcement agencies 
need to be “substantially improved” to be able to more effectively 
implement the said law. (EU Report 2005: 25-26) In fact, the weakness of 
the judicial institutions, both in civil and criminal sectors, remains a 
problem, not only as concerns anti-discrimination provisions, but also to 
the undermining of the rule of law in Kosovo more generally. The 
underlying problem is the legal uncertainty, prevalent in Kosovo, where 
the “applicability of laws (…) is divided between UNMIK regulations and 
certain (Yugoslav) laws in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989” (EU Report 
2005: 14). This, consequently, produces a situation of legal uncertainty 
where practitioners are left interpreting which laws are actually in force, 
consequently, contributing to the undermining of the rule of law.  
 
Effective implementation of anti-discrimination provisions is, in fact, to a 
great extent dependent upon the introduction of “an extensive, coherent 
and comprehensive body of law governing Kosovo” (EU Report 2005: 14). 
Even though the weakness of all the law enforcement agencies persists in 
Kosovo, progress has been made in the Kosovo Police Service, where the 
recruitment from minority communities has increased and currently 
amounts to 15%, of which 9% are Serbs. (EU Report 2005: 53) Even 
though there has been some positive effects of the implementation of 
“mixed patrols in mixed areas”, where citizens have the opportunity to 
get assistance in the minority language, there have been “a number of 
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complaints that police reports were written in a language not understood 
by the citizen” (EU Report 2005: 53).    
 
Legislation in Kosovo does not use the term national minority to describe 
persons of a non-Kosovo Albanian ethnic origin. The term employed is 
“communities”, which the Constitutional Framework and the Kosovo 
legislation define as “inhabitants belonging to the same ethnic or 
religious or linguistic group” (CoE Report 2005: 11). The communities 
covered by the Framework Convention, as specified by the Kosovo 
legislation, are: Kosovo Serbs, Turks, Bosniaks, Gorani, Torbesh, Roma, 
Ashkaelija, Egyptians, and Kosovo Croats. (CoE Report 2005: 11) Whereas 
the Advisory Committee does not consider the term “community” 
problematic, inconsistencies have been noted in regards to “the 
endorsement of the specific identity of certain communities” (CoE Report 
2005: 12). In fact, the tendency to lump together the Egyptians and the 
Ashkali with the Roma, often referring to them as “RAE communities”, is 
considered a problem since such a designation could be “perceived as a 
sign of lack of acceptance of the specific identities of the groups 
concerned” (CoE Report 2005: 12).  
 
The reconciliation process, particularly between the Albanian and the 
Serb communities, was heavily undermined by the March 2004 events 
and even though no major incidents have been reported since then, 
“relations between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians have remained 
strained” (EU Report 2005: 25). Thus, the poor implementation of the 
anti-discrimination law is particularly blatant as concerns the Serb 
community, but also the Roma community, who both “face 
discrimination, restrictions in freedom of movement, access to education, 
health care, public utilities and social assistance due to poor quality of 
services and security concerns” (EU Report 2005: 21). Also, in relation to 
minority-related crimes, there is concern about the “perceived impunity 
of actors against Serbs, Roma, and others, including in relation to the 
violence of March 2004” (which) is a particularly serious problem that 
needs to be addressed as a high priority” (CoE Report 2005: 38). 
However, and as underlined by the Advisory Committee, this would 
necessitate concerted action from both local as well as international 
bodies and therefore there is an absolute necessity that both “judicial 
institutions and the law enforcement agencies need to be substantially 
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improved to be capable of fully enforcing the law” (CoE Report 2005: 38; 
EU Report 2005: 25).   
 
The problem of the internally displaced persons (IDP), as well as the 
difficult situation of returnees in general, deserves particular mention.  
According to estimates, the number of minority IDPs in Kosovo amounts 
to approximately 22,000, of whom the greatest part are constituted by 
Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians, where particularly a high percentage of 
Roma “still live in hazardous and very precarious conditions in northern 
Kosovo and in the Pristina region” (EU Report 2005: 22). Even though 
there have been attempts at taking down the camps, the EU most strongly 
underlines that these efforts need to be accelerated. (EU Report 2005: 22) 
As for the situation of the returnees, the remaining problem is that 
“sufficient security guarantees for minorities” need to be implemented. 
Hence, as long as minority-related crime is left unpunished, the problem 
of returnees will remain. Furthermore, in regards to particularly the 
Roma, but also the Ashkali and the Egyptians, the lack of documentation 
as well as the lack of education “represent an obstacle for them to reclaim 
land and access social structures and services” (EU Report 2005: 22). 
Contributing to the discriminatory effects against the Roma, Ashkali and 
Egyptians is also their almost complete lack of representation at the level 
of public institutions. (EU Report 2005: 23)   
 
Thus, although an encompassing Anti-Discrimination Law was adopted 
in 2004, the generality of the Law, i.e, the lack of conditions that would 
regulate the non-discrimination provisions, is a problem which is 
emphasised by the monitoring bodies. Furthermore, and as underlined by 
both the EU and the Council of Europe, since no subsidiary legislation in 
the area of non-discrimination has been adopted, the lack of regulatory 
structures and conditions hampers full and effective equality. Thus, the 
Law, however encompassing, cannot be considered comprehensive and, 
furthermore, since no subsidiary legislation has been adopted, Kosovo is 
positioned on the intermediate level of 1.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
175 
Fig. 9.1. Kosovo and level of rule adoption in non-discrimination upon gaining 
status as potential candidate state 
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      (0): Absence of any non-discrimination norm; 
(1): General provisions such as an equality clause in the Constitution;   
(2): Non-discrimination laws are inserted in specific laws;  
(3): Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation which then means 
that there has been a complete transposition of the EU anti-
discrimination acquis; 
(4): Non-discrimination laws exceed the minimum requirements of 
the Directive.  
Minority language use in official contexts  
Legal uncertainty is very much prevalent also in the domain regulating 
minority language use in official contexts. The complexity of the legal 
guarantees, as well as the weak regulatory status of existing legislation, is 
a problem that is consistently addressed by the EU Report and 
particularly by the CoE Report. The Advisory Committee notes, with 
satisfaction, that legislation pertaining to the use of minority languages in 
official contexts is provided for in Kosovo, however, “with guarantees 
scattered across various legal texts, including the Constitutional 
Framework, UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/45 on Self-Government of 
Municipalities in Kosovo and the 1977 Law on the Implementation of the 
Equality of the Languages and Alphabets in the Socialist Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo (1977 SAP Law on Languages)” (CoE Report 2005: 
22). In the above-mentioned legal texts, it is particularly clear, as pointed 
out by the Advisory Committee, that the importance of preserving the 
official language status of Serbian has been an overarching goal. 
However, when it comes to the status of the Turkish language, it becomes 
more problematic since the 1977 SAP Law, “which contains provisions 
that are still applicable pursuant to UNMIK Regulation 1999/24”, 
provides for the official language status to the Turkish language, “in 
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areas where members of the Turkish minority live” (CoE Report 2005: 
23).173  
 
In the area of minority languages pertaining to smaller communities, 
legal provisions guarantee that these communities have the possibility “to 
address the Assembly of Kosovo in their own language and to have 
access to legislation translated in their language” (CoE Report 2005: 22). 
These legal guarantees also pertain to the local level, where “persons 
belonging to these communities (have) the right to communicate in their 
own language with municipal bodies and with municipal civil servants” 
(CoE Report 2005: 22). However, the regulatory status of these provisions 
is weak, since there are neither conditions nor any thresholds attached to 
them. The lack of thresholds is, in fact, disturbing, since this entails that 
“municipalities are left with considerable discretionary power in 
determining the provisions, relating to the use of languages of the 
communities in the municipality at issue” (CoE Report 2005: 23). The 
concern of the Advisory Committee has, in fact, been confirmed by the 
EU Commission which states that “the use of minority languages in 
central and municipal authorities is insufficient and hinders participation 
into the institutions” (EU Report 2005: 26). In the judicial system, the new 
provisional criminal code does provide for the right of communities to be 
assisted with “free-of-charge interpreters, if the person cannot 
understand or speak the language of the proceedings in a criminal 
procedure” (CoE Report 2005: 23). However, implementation of this right 
varies and is heavily dependent on factors such as, “the language 
proficiency of the judicial staff, the availability of interpreters as well as 
the jurisdiction in which the proceedings are held” (CoE Report 2005: 23). 
Thus, on the basis of the above-mentioned shortcomings, the Advisory 
Committee “urges the competent bodies to closely monitor the courts’ 
compliance with the existing language requirements” (CoE Report 2005: 
24). 
 
                                                          
173 The legal uncertainty of the status of the Turkish language has caused frustration 
among the Turkish community. Since the status as official language is legally enshrined, 
this has caused expectations among the Turkish community that “the Turkish language 
should generally be given a status similar to that of the Albanian and Serbian languages in 
today’s Kosovo, regardless of the numerical importance of the Turkish community living 
in particular regions” (CoE Report 2005: 23).   
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As regards the right to display names and other signs for Albanian and 
Serbian, these rights are regulated by UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/45, 
and the Advisory Committee welcomes the fact that “official signs 
indicating the names of localities, street signs and other topographical 
indications intended for the public, must be displayed in both the 
Albanian and Serbian languages” (CoE Report 2005: 24). The Advisory 
Committee contends that implementation of the said regulations has been 
slow and even in some instances the systematic disfiguration and 
obliteration of signs in Serbian has been noted. The “Albanisation” of 
names in certain municipalities has been worrying and the Advisory 
Committee finds it “essential, that in the Kosovo context, local names, 
street names and other topographical indications, intended for the public, 
duly reflect the multi-ethnic character of the area at issue” (CoE Report 
2005: 24). Pertaining to minority languages of smaller communities, 
UNMIK Regulation 2000/45 also provides rights to display names and 
signs in the minority language, “in those municipalities where these 
communities form a substantial part of the population” (CoE Report 2005: 
24). Implementation of these legal provisions has not held good, however, 
and requests from different communities, especially from Bosniaks, Turks 
and Roma, have claimed their right to display signs in their respective 
minority language, “in those municipalities where they live in substantial 
numbers” (CoE Report 2005: 25). However, since the term “substantial 
part of the population” is equated with a “two-third majority”, these 
rights are practically invalidating themselves since they only would be 
applicable to municipalities which are dominated by one community.  
 
In view of the serious shortcomings in the implementation of legislation, 
which provides for smaller communities the right to use minority 
languages in official contexts, the Advisory Committee strongly 
recommends the adoption of “new language legislation in order to bring 
clarity and legal certainty as regards the use of languages, including in 
relations with administrative authorities, topographical indications, and 
registration of personal names, and closely monitor compliance with 
language requirements in the relevant sectors, including in the judiciary” 
(CoE Report 2005: 40). In this regard, the Advisory Committee 
satisfactorily notes that the Ministry of Public Service, with the support of 
UNMIK, has initiated a process with the aim of adopting a 
“comprehensive law on languages” (CoE Report 2005: 24).  
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It is evident that the focus on ensuring the equality of the Serbian 
language to that of the Albanian language has been done to the detriment 
of language rights of smaller communities. Hence, even though the 
Kosovo legal framework does provide for smaller communities to use 
their minority languages in official contexts, the complexity of the legal 
guarantees, as well as the weak regulatory status of existing legislation, 
inhibit effective implementation. In fact, the absence of thresholds, or the 
very high thresholds, that condition these provisions, severely undermine 
applicability and actually relegate these legal provisions to a legal void. 
However, as concerns the use of the Serbian language in official contexts, 
the existing legislation is far-reaching since the official language status of 
Serbian has been preserved. This consequently means, that the language 
rights granted to Serbian are on the same legal footing as those granted to 
the Albanian language. The clear division of the legal rights granted to 
smaller communities, as opposed to the very extensive legal rights that 
protect the use of the Serbian language, does present a problem as 
regards the investigation at hand. Thus, on the basis of the index scale, if 
we were to focus on the rights granted to smaller communities, Kosovo 
would be positioned at the far left corner of our index scale, most likely 
amounting to 1.0. However, since interethnic relations have been centred 
on the conflictive relationship between Albanians and Serbs, and still is, it 
is considered more relevant to actually measure existing legislation that 
protects the use of the Serbian language in official contexts. Hence, on the 
basis of the above, Kosovo is instead positioned at the far right corner, 
amounting to the level of 4.0.  
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Fig. 9.2. Kosovo and level of rule adoption in minority language use in official 
contexts upon gaining status as potential candidate state 
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(0): No recognition of minority languages; 
(1): The right to use the minority language in official contexts (before 
judicial and administrative authorities; i.e. the right to a translator);  
(2): The minority language can be used in Personal and Place Names 
(public signs); 
(3): The minority language can be used in official documents; 
(4): Minority language having status as official language. 
Minority language rights in education  
Just as the clear division between the Serb minority and the smaller 
communities was pertinant in the domain of minority language 
protection, the same division is clear also as regards minority rights in 
education. In fact, the cleavage of the Kosovo society in the educational 
sector is blatant since it is actually constituted by two educational 
systems, one Albanian and the other Serbian. The existence of two 
parallel education structures, or “parallel schools”, where the Serbian 
Ministry of Education and Sports still finance the Serbian-led schools, 
which furthermore have their own curriculum, “means the de facto 
existence of a separate school system” (CoE Report 2005: 26). In 2004, 
with the legalisation of the Serbian-speaking and Serbian-led University 
of Northern Mitrovica, as established “by UNMIK Regulation No. 
2003/14, on the Promulgation of a Law adopted by the Assembly of 
Kosovo on Higher Education in Kosovo”, the division of the Albanian 
and Serbian educational systems was complete. (CoE Report 2005: 28) 
The strict separation of the two systems entails that there is “little mutual 
recognition of certificates and diplomas”, which, in turn, allows for 
further cementation of the ethnic segregation that characterises the 
Kosovo society. (EU Report 2005: 12) As stressed by the Advisory 
Committee, this situation is unfortunate and the non-mixing of Serb and 
Albanian pupils is particularly detrimental to the reconciliation process, 
and the efforts to build trust, and to promote inter-ethnic tolerance, 
particularly between Albanians and Serbs, but also with other minority 
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communities. Hence, the Advisory Committee recommends that the 
authorities “consider ways to create opportunities for interaction between 
pupils from Serbian and Albanian communities, and design a 
comprehensive plan that would progressively remove barriers, including 
linguistic ones, between pupils from different communities” (CoE Report 
2005: 41).  
 
Legislation pertaining to minority language rights in education of the 
smaller communities exists, as guaranteed by the Constitutional 
Framework. According to Chapter IV of the Constitutional Framework, 
members of national minorities “have the right to set up their own 
private educational and training establishments”, and financial 
assistance, “including public funds”, may be provided to realise these 
objectives. (CoE Report 2005: 29). The Advisory Committee furthermore 
notes, with satisfaction, that the Constitutional Framework guarantees 
“rights of persons belonging to a community to receive education in 
his/her own language” (CoE Report 2005: 29). However, no conditions or 
threshold regulate application of this right, but, as noted by the Advisory 
Committee, there seems to have developed a policy requiring a minimum 
of 15 pupils for opening a “class with instruction in a minority language” 
(CoE Report 2005: 29). Even though the Advisory Committee finds the 
policy of a minimum of 15 pupils reasonable, concern is nevertheless 
raised as regards the numerically smaller communities, like the Bosniaks 
who often find themselves numerically inferior to the established 
minimum of 15. Therefore, the Advisory Committee argues that “the 
situation as regards the threshold should be clarified, including through 
the adoption of specific regulation that would also allow for flexibility to 
accommodate, to the extent possible, requests made by smaller groups” 
(CoE Report 2005: 29). 
 
On the issue of higher education in Kosovo, UNMIK Regulation No. 
2003/14 provides guarantees as to the access of “all persons in the 
territory of Kosovo (…) without direct or indirect discrimination on any 
actual or presumed ground such as national, ethnic (…) origin, 
association with a national community” (CoE Report 2005: 28). 
Furthermore, in order to enhance minority representation in higher 
education, in 2004, a system of quotas was introduced in the University in 
Pristina. However, since instruction is carried out in Albanian only, but 
“with the possibility of taking exams in Serbian”, the effectiveness of the 
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quota system is heavily reduced due to language problems. (CoE Report 
2005: 28) Thus, to receive higher education in minority languages, 
communities are relegated to parallel structures or, in the Bosniak case, to 
receive higher education either at “the Business School in Pec or at the 
Faculty of Pedagogy of the University of Prizren, which deliver education 
in the Bosnian language” (CoE Report 2005: 28).  
 
Existing legislation is rather extensive and even though the regulatory 
status of having the right to receive education in minority languages is 
weak, since there are no conditions regulating implementation, the policy 
that has emerged sets the bar for implementation at 15 pupils, which has 
to be considered reasonable. However, the lack of effective 
implementation pertains especially to a shortage of textbooks, as well as a 
lack of qualified staff to teach in minority languages. Furthermore, and 
even more serious, more effective implementation is heavily undermined 
by the difficult security situation. It has, for instance, been reported from 
the Bosniak, Turkish and Gorani communities, that pupils have had 
difficulty in accessing educational facilities with instruction in minority 
languages. Thus, the problem of not being able to ensure safe 
transportation for these “minority pupils” is serious, and calls for “an 
urgent need to make progress in this respect, given that the absence of 
such transportation harms access to mother tongue education of persons 
belonging to a number of minority communities” (CoE Report 2005: 30). 
 
On a more general level, the Advisory Committee also raises the issue of 
the poor integration of especially the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian pupils 
into the educational system. Since these communities find themselves in a 
particularly vulnerable situation, the authorities need to address this 
problem with vigour. The Advisory Committee strongly recommends the 
authorities to take decisive steps to “address the educational needs of 
Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, including by ensuring the 
sustainability of the programmes, designed to help pupils from these 
communities to integrate and stay in the education system” (CoE Report 
2005: 41). In fact, in this regard the Advisory Committee welcomes the 
initiative from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology 
(MEST), “with the support of the OSCE and international NGOs, to 
address this problem by providing catch-up classes for children from 
these communities in order to help them integrate into regular schools” 
(CoE Report 2005: 27). 
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Legislation protecting smaller communities is quite extensive, even 
though there are shortcomings which hamper more effective 
implementation. As regards legislation protecting the Serb minority, and 
once again the rights protecting the Serb minority are considered more 
relevant as concerns the investigation at hand, these rights can be 
equalled to those of the Albanian majority. Hence, when in 2004 the 
Serbian-speaking and Serbian-led University of Mitrovica was legalised, 
the educational rights of the Serbs became manifest also in the domain of 
higher education. Paradoxically, these extensive rights are problematic 
since this situation has entailed the furtherance of ethnic segregation, 
which, in turn, the Advisory Committee considers to be the greatest 
challenge in the educational domain. This is also shown in the concluding 
remarks of the Advisory Committee when they recommend the 
authorities of Kosovo to “consider ways to create opportunities for 
interaction between pupils from Serbian and Albanian communities, and 
design a comprehensive plan that would progressively remove barriers, 
including linguistic ones, between pupils from different communities” 
(CoE Report 2005: 41). In the light of the investigation at hand, viewed the 
extensive rights of particularly the Serb minority, Kosovo is positioned on 
the level of 4.0. 
 
Fig. 9.3. Kosovo and level of rule adoption in minority language rights in 
education upon gaining status as potential candidate state 
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  (0): No education of or in minority language; 
(1): Children belonging to minorities have the right to learn their 
mother tongue in school; 
(2): At least parts of the curriculum (e.g. history or religion) are taught 
in the minority language; 
(3): Minorities have the right to educate their children completely in 
the mother tongue, either in state schools with a complete syllabus 
taught in the minority language or in specific minority schools; 
(4): Minorities have their own universities. 
 
 
183 
10 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA174 AND 
MINORITY LANGUAGE RIGHTS 
PROTECTION 
Bosnian semi-independence 
Just as the Serbian Empire during the 14th century had reached its peak in 
terms of territorial conquest and political power, the same was true for 
Bosnia which was considered “the strongest Slavic Kingdom in South 
Eastern Europe” during the reign of Tvrtko I175 (1353-1391). (Bebler 2006: 
2) Having experienced more or less three centuries of independent 
statehood (12th century – 15th century), Bosnia would, henceforth, become 
a pawn in the game of territorial conquest, first between the Ottomans 
and the Austro-Hungarians, and in the 20th century, between Serbs and 
Croats. The four centuries’ long Ottoman rule would leave a long-lasting 
imprint, politically, culturally, religiously as well as socially, on the 
Bosnian society, where the larger part of the Bosnian Christians would 
convert to Islam. In 1878, and as a consequence of the decision made at 
the Congress of Berlin, Bosnia was annexed to the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire.  
 
With the Austro-Hungarian defeat in World War I, Bosnia was integrated 
into the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, where the 
Bosnian Moslems would acquire a second-rate status, becoming the 
victims of systematic killing and expulsion, leading to a relatively large 
share of the “Bosniaks” migrating to Turkey. (Bebler 2006: 4) 
Furthermore, in the Serb-dominated Kingdom and following the royal 
coup of 1929, the territory of Bosnia would succumb to numerous 
partitions where the newly created “banovinas”176 were “gerrymandered 
                                                          
174 Bosnia and Herzegovina will hereinafter be labelled Bosnia.   
175 The Bosnian king, Tvrtko I, entitled himself the “King of the Serbs and of all Bosnia” 
(Bebler 2006: 2). 
176 The “banovinas” were provinces that became the administrative units of the first 
Yugoslavia. The banovinas were created on a non-national criterion. Cf. (Bebler 2006: 5). 
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with the clear purpose of giving the ethnical Serbs, at least, a plurality in 
as many among the nine Yugoslav “banovinas” as possible” (Bebler 2006: 
5). Thus, in the 4 Bosnian banovinas, the Bosnian Moslems “found 
themselves in a distinct minority position” (Bebler 2006: 5). In 1939, 
Bosnia was partitioned between the Serbs and the Croats, with the greater 
part “allotted to “Banovina Croatia” (Bebler 2006: 5). As a consequence of 
the German and Italian occupation of 1941, and the forming of the fascist 
Independent State of Croatia the same year, Bosnia was formally annexed 
to Croatia, before becoming liberated by the Partisans during spring 1945. 
As one of six constituent Republics in the SFRY, Bosnian statehood was 
partly restored when Bosnia, in 1946, for the first time in its history, 
“obtained a constitution, all representative institutions, symbols and 
other distinct features of statehood” (Bebler 2006: 6).  
 
With the crumbling of the SFRY, Bosnia was, in fact, the least prone as 
well as the least apt, to secede from the SFRY and begin the transition 
from the old communist regime to multiparty democracy. In fact, having 
been one of the most authoritarian and non-democratic Republics of the 
SFRY, where repression of “all signs of opposition” had been much more 
severe than in the “big sister” Republics of Croatia and Serbia, the civil 
society had been left weakened, aggravating the transition to a multiparty 
democracy. (Bebler 2006: 7) Also, with the increasing Serbo-Croat war, 
the raison d’être of an independent Bosnian state raised problems of 
another order than was the case in Croatia. Indeed, since the Bosnian 
Republic was constituted by the three constituent nations, of which two 
had their kin states in Serbia and Croatia, the Bosnian Republic was 
highly “vulnerable to possible attempts of partition and annexation by 
two neighbouring states” (Bebler 2006: 8). This vulnerability became 
acute when, in December 1991, Serbia made public their intention of 
creating a “Serbian Republic” in Bosnia which almost coincided with “a 
very similar pronouncement in Croatia” (Bebler 2006: 8). 
 
The proclamation of independence was accelerated by the start of the 
disintegration process of Bosnia, rapidly leading to three “politically 
segregated but territorially considerably overlapping systems” (Bebler 
2006: 8). After a referendum177, imposed as a condition of recognition by 
                                                          
177 The majority of the Serbs boycotted the referendum; however more than two thirds of 
the Bosnians voted yes to independence. Cf. (Oellers-Frahm 2005: 184).  
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the Badinter Commission, Bosnia declared independence on the 4th of 
March of 1992178, unanimously recognised by the EU Member states on 
the 7th of April 1992.179 Upon proclamation of independence, as Serbia had 
already warned Bosnia180, much of the Serbo-Croat conflict moved to 
Bosnia, beginning as an open war between the two primary antagonists, 
Croats and Serbs, and continuing as a proxy war in which Croatia and 
Serbia were using community leaders in Bosnia to stir up resistance. 
When “the Muslim-Croat coalition in Bosnia fell apart in 1993”, this 
consequently resulted in a three-sided war. (Bieber in Ramet 2010: 313) 
Indeed, the highly adulterated character of Bosnia led to what was to 
constitute one of the worst battlegrounds of ethnic cleansing on European 
soil since World War II.181 After years of passivity, the international 
community finally reacted and the NATO intervention182, of 1995, and the 
subsequent signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, would finally put an 
end to the atrocities.  
 
The Dayton Peace Agreement183, although putting an end to the 
devastating bloodshed between the parties, has been highly criticised and 
is exceptional since it, not only, laid the groundwork for the new Bosnian 
state, but actually “created the state as such” (Oellers-Frahm 2005: 193-
194). With the well-intentioned aim of preventing future ethnic conflict 
from resurfacing, the architects at Dayton were convinced that the 
                                                          
178 On the basis of the popular referendum, the Assembly in Sarajevo proclaimed the 
independence of Bosnia after having gained the majority from the predominantly Moslem 
and Bosnian Croatian deputies. The Bosnian Serbs either absented from voting or voted 
no thus rejecting the Bosnian secession from the FRY. Cf. (Bebler 2006: 8).  
179 On the 22nd of May 1992 Bosnia became a member state of the United Nations. Cf. 
(Oellers-Frahm 2005: 184). 
180 In fact, already in 1991 Serbia had threatened the Bosnians of armed conflict if Bosnia 
would secede from the SFRY. As a consequence of the very real threat of Serbian military 
intervention, President Izetbegovic had called upon the UN to deploy preventive forces 
on the Bosnian territory. Cf. (Oellers-Frahm 2005: 184).  
181 Estimations have it that the war cost approximately 100.000 lives of which around 
70 000 were Moslems. The number of refugees and internally displaced persons has been 
estimated at over one million. Cf. (Bebler 2006: 9). 
182 The NATO-intervention was welcomed by the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian 
Moslems but was adamantly resisted by the Bosnian Serbs. Cf. (Bebler 2006: 10). 
183 The Agreement, signed by the new state as well as by the Republic of Croatia and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consists of the General Framework Agreement for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (GAF) as well as 12 Annexes. While the GFA is merely a framework 
with no actual substance, the 12 Annexes added to the Framework “contain the details for 
the peace settlement” (Oellers-Frahm 2005: 189). 
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“ethno-territorial autonomies, carved out during the war”, were to be 
preserved. (Bieber in Ramet 2010: 314) Accordingly, the Bosnian state was 
constructed as a highly decentralised federation, consisting of the two 
entities, the Bosnian Serb enclave “Republika Srspska”, and the 
“Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Whereas Republika Srpska is 
highly centralised, the Federation, domineeringly populated by Bosnian 
Croats and Bosniaks, is organised into 10 cantons, largely populated on 
an ethno-territorial basis. (Oellers-Frahm 2005: 189) Paradoxically though, 
however well-intentioned the partitioning of the three constituent 
nations, the cementing of the ethnic segregation soon turned out to be 
detrimental upon both the transition towards democracy and also upon 
the functioning of a state where, “ethnicity often took precedence over 
democratization” (Bieber in Ramet 2010: 311). Already in 1996, with the 
first democratic elections taking place184, it became evident that the 
political system only accentuated the stronghold of nationalist parties in 
power, resulting in a situation where multiparty democracy in Bosnia 
was limited, “within each of the three ethnic groups and the entities”, 
making the transition to democracy cumbersome. (Bieber in Ramet 2010: 
316) Furthermore, although a highly decentralised state, the power-
sharing system, based on ethnicity, has led to an enormous bureaucratic 
colossus on the state level. In fact, the “principal governmental organs are 
designed to have an equal number of Bosnian, Serb and Croat members 
and to provide for means to prevent the adoption by any groups joining 
of decisions ‘destructive of a vital interest’ of any of the groups” (Oellers-
Frahm 2005: 191).  
 
A situation with strong ethno-nationalist entities, in parallel with a weak 
and dysfunctional state level, dashed the hopes of a rapid transfer of 
authority from the international to the domestic level, as envisaged in the 
Dayton Peace Agreement.185 In fact, the situation on the ground, early on, 
led to an increased international presence, where especially the Office of 
the High Representative (OHR)186 acquired extensive powers, both 
                                                          
184 The 1996 elections, the first elections of the new state, were monitored by the OSCE. Cf. 
(Bieber in Ramet 2010: 315). 
185 The first five Annexes added to the GFA regulate the transitional arrangements of 
Bosnia “giving formal approval to NATO and other forces and authorities to carry out 
particular functions in the country” (Oellers-Frahm 2005: 190). 
186 The Office of the High Representative (OHR) is an ad hoc body, established in 1995 and 
becoming responsible for the implementation of the civilian aspects of the General 
Framework Agreement. Cf. (Bieber in Ramet 2010: 315).  
187 
legislative as well as executive, as early as from 1997.187 Thus, not only 
was the state structure imposed on Bosnia with the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, but core functions and duties of the new state were also, to a 
large extent, managed by international actors. This “international 
imposition over domestic state-building”, however indispensable, has, at 
the same time, inhibited the transition to a more viable and democratic 
Bosnia. (Bieber in Ramet 2010: 311) Furthermore, and in line with the 
Thessaloniki Agenda and the aim of integrating the Western Balkan states 
into the EU structures, there has been a significant “Europeanization” of 
the international presence in Bosnia. In 2003, the EU took over the police 
mission from the UN, and the following year, shouldered the 
peacekeeping mission from NATO. In addition, from 2002 the High 
Representative “has been simultaneously the EU’s Special Representative 
(EUSR)” (Bieber in Ramet 2010: 318). The Europeanisation efforts have, 
however, not yet borne fruit, since the prospects of EU integration have 
“featured lower on the list of Bosnian priorities than in other countries, 
such as Croatia and Macedonia” (Bieber in Ramet 2010: 318). 
Consequently, the negotiations between the EU and Bosnia over the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement only started in 2005, and the 
Agreement was signed as late as in June 2008.   
The demographic dimension 
In comparison with both Croatia and Serbia, Bosnia stands out as 
different since the country is constituted by three numerically large 
constituent nations, the Serbs, Croats and the Bosniaks, with a very small 
share of national minorities. Indeed, in comparison with all the other 
former Republics of Yugoslavia, Bosnia had the smallest share of national 
minorities in the SFRY. According to the 1981 census, out of a population 
of approximately 4.1 million inhabitants, the share of national minorities 
only amounted to 0.6%. (Baltic 2007: 36)  
 
                                                          
187 At a conference in Bonn in 1997 it was decided that the powers of the OHR would be 
extended in the executive and legislative domains. These “Bonn-powers” meant that the 
High Representative could dismiss public officials “ranging from members of the state 
presidency and presidents of the entities, down to mayors and local police officials” as 
well as impose legislation which also has included “far-reaching changes to entity 
constitutions, and voting mechanisms in the state government” (Bieber in Ramet 2010: 
315).  
188 
Strategically positioned between Croatia (Northwest) and Serbia (East), as 
well as Montenegro (in the south), the territory of the Bosnian state 
stretches throughout 51.197 km2. As is the case in the other former 
Republics, changes to the national structure have been significant, mainly 
due to wars, migrations, and diverging fertility rates. The most blatant 
change throughout the 20th century has been the decrease in the Serb 
share of the population (from 44.3% in 1948 to 31.2% in 1991), and the 
Croat share of the population (from 23.9% in 1948 to 17.4% in 1991), in 
parallel with an increase in the Bosnian Moslems (from 30.7% in 1948 to 
43.6% in 1991).188 The status as constituent nation was granted to the 
Bosnian Moslems as late as in the 1960s, manifest in the 1963 Federal 
Constitution. In fact, prior to the 1961 census there was not even a 
“Muslim” category, often reducing the Moslems to the category of the 
“undecided”. Indeed, as a consequence of the relaxation of the 
discriminatory policies against the Moslems of Yugoslavia, and the 
elevated status of the Bosnian Moslems, in parallel with the fact that they 
became the largest ethnic group in Bosnia189, the dominance of the 
Bosnian Serbs came to a halt.190 Although this would constitute a 
psychological blow to the Serbian self-image of a domineering nation, the 
cohabitation between the three constituent nations was rather 
unproblematic up until the beginning of the 1990s. (Bebler 2006: 7)  
 
Upon the Bosnian proclamation of independence in March 1992, 
however, this situation would change and the worst genocidal war since 
World War II would take place on Bosnian soil. The continued 
“coexistence” between the three constituent nations was only possible 
with international intervention, first with the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, and then with a continued international governance. The 
coexistence is, however, artificial, since the new Bosnian “phantom state” 
                                                          
188 However, the Bosnian Moslems’ share of the population prior to the 1961 census is 
difficult to estimate since “Muslims” was integrated as a category in the censuses carried 
out within the SFRY as late as in 1961. The figure 30.7% is therefore to be considered with 
some caution. During the same time period the share of the Croat population in Bosnia 
also decreased from 23.9% to 17.4%. Cf. (Baltic 2007: 27) 
189 The numerical shift was largely due to a higher birth rate of the Bosnian Moslems at the 
same time as a considerable share of the Bosnian Serbs emigrated, not only to Serbia 
proper but also to Western Europe. Cf. (Bebler 2006: 7). 
190 However, the loss of political dominance in Bosnia constituted a blow to the Serbs and 
would later become a tool of the Serbian nationalists in their attempts to recapture 
political power and to prevent the SFRY from disintegrating. Cf. (Bebler 2006: 7). 
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(Hayden 1992: 661) has been designed on the basis of ethno-territorial 
autonomies, where at least the Republika Srpska is highly mono-ethnic, 
as a result of the Bosnian Serbs’ purification policies during the Bosnian 
war. This, in turn, has resulted in a situation where Serbs constitute 
almost 97% of the population in the Republic with almost no national 
minorities. However, even though Bosniaks and Croats have status as 
constituent nations at the state level, de facto they find themselves in a 
minority position in the Republic where the Croats amount to 1% and the 
Bosniaks to 2.2%. Even though the Croat and Bosniak Federation is more 
heterogeneous, constituted by the two constituent nations, and a share of 
national minorities amounting to 2.4%, the 10 cantons are likewise highly 
ethno-territorially based.191 The numerically largest minority groups 
according to the 1991 census were the Yugoslavs (5.5%), the 
Montenegrins (0.2%), the Roma (0.2%), the Albanians (0.1%), followed by 
the Ukrainians (0.09%), Slovenians (0.05%), and the Macedonians (0.03%). 
(CoE Report 2004: 10) Although not having status as a national minority, 
the ethnic Serbs, who amount to 2.3% of the population in the Federation, 
de facto, are in a minority position. This, in turn, has resulted in a situation 
where the previously adulterated character of Bosnia has in fact been 
replaced by two largely ethno-territorial Entities which has led to a 
system of cemented segregation.   
 
The exclusive focus on resolving the conflictive relations between the 
three constituent nations at Dayton has entailed that the issue of the 
rights of national minorities has been relegated to the background. In fact, 
in the constitutional framework of Bosnia, the national minorities of the 
Bosnian state are indiscriminately referred to simply as, “the Others”192, 
and in the statistics carried out since 1991, there is no categorisation of 
ethnic groups, except for the three constituent nations. Although ethnic 
minorities were recognised as categories during the SFRY regime, the 
focus on minority rights protection was lacking to the benefit of the 
“equality of the constituent nations” (Hayden 1992: 661), as articulated by 
                                                          
191 Whereas the 5 Cantons around Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Bihac and Gorazde have a 
distinct Bosniak majority, the 3 Cantons in the western parts as well as in the North-east of 
the Federation are predominantly populated by Bosnian Croats. Only 2 Cantons are 
multiethnic, however internally divided into a Croat and a Bosniak part. Cf. 
(Vladisavljevic 2004: 12-13). 
192 In the Preamble to the 1995 Constitution, the term “Others” refers indiscriminately to 
all national minorities. Cf. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995, 
http://confinder.richmond.edu, 2011-12-14.  
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articles 1, 2 and 3 of the 1974 Constitution. The equality of the three 
constituent nations was also the basis of the power-sharing system in the 
Republic of Bosnia, however, regulated on a “non-territorial basis”, as 
opposed to the present ethno-territorial basis. (Bebler 2006: 7) Thus, the 
lack of minority rights protection in Bosnia is not only a Dayton 
constitutional construction since it was pertinent in Bosnia already during 
the SFRY regime. 
 
Table 10.1. Ethnic structure of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
according to the 1991 census and statistics provided by 2001 (data retrieved from 
the CoE Report 2004: 10 and the State Report submitted by Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to the Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe of 20 February 
2004, pp. 3-7) 
 
Nationality 1991 number 1991 
% 
2001 number 2001 
% 
Bosniaks 
Serbs 
Croats 
Yugoslavs 
Montenegrins 
Roma 
Albanians 
Others193 
No declared 
ethnicity 
Regional affiliation 
Unknown 
1.902.956 
1.366.104 
760.872 
242.682 
10.048 
8.864 
4.922 
30.106 
14.585 
 
224 
35.670 
43.6 
31.2 
17.4 
5.5 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
0.7 
0.3 
 
- 
0.8 
1.626.843 
1.142.948 
519.478 
- 
- 
- 
- 
75.556 
- 
 
- 
- 
48.3 
34.0 
15.4 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2.3194 
- 
 
- 
- 
Total 4.377.033 100 3.364.825 100 
                                                          
193 In the category “Others” have been integrated numerically smaller minorities that 
amount to less than 0.1% of the Bosnian population. These numerically smaller minorities 
are: Czechs (590), Italians (732), Jews (426), Hungarians (893), Macedonians (1.596), 
Germans (470), Poles (526), Romanians (162), Russians (297), Ruthenians (133), Slovaks 
(297), Slovenians (2.190), Turks (267) and Ukrainians (3.929). Cf. (CoE Report 2004: 10). 
194 Since there are no records on the numerical sizes of national minorities in the statistics 
submitted by the Bosnian state in 2001, the national minorities have been grouped in the 
category “Others”. Cf. State Report submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Advisory 
Committee of the Council of Europe, ACFC/SR (2004) 001, Strasbourg, 20 February 2004, 
p. 7. 
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The sociolinguistic dimension 
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the forming of the Bosnian and 
Croat Federation, it became indispensable to strengthen a Bosniak195 
national identity, anchored in the “community of Islamicised Bosnian 
Slavs”, and with it a specific Bosnian language, clearly separated from the 
Serbo-Croatian language. (Okey 2005: 436) Even though the specificity of 
a Bosnian language, as distinct from Serbo-Croatian, was raised in the 
1970s, it was during the initial phase of the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
that “claims of Bosnian linguistic autonomy” were stressed. (Okey 2005: 
434) In the Bosnian case, however, there was never question to claim 
linguistic independence since the Bosniaks recognised their linguistic 
proximity to the Serbian and Croatian languages.196 But, since the Serbo-
Croatian language had become defunct197, as a consequence of the 
emergence of the specific Croatian and Serbian languages, it was only 
natural for the Bosniaks to follow suit and to argue for a Bosnian 
language. However, the attempt to define a Bosnian “majority language” 
would not only create problems of a linguistic order, as had been the case 
in Croatia and Serbia, it furthermore raised problems of a state-forming 
order, a state which furthermore lacked many of the prerogatives of a 
state, including a majority nation.  
 
The term, ‘Bosnian language’, is therefore problematic since it refers to 
the name of the Republic and suggests that the Bosnian language should 
be the language of all the Republic’s citizens, thus entailing a potentially 
territorial designation. (Bugarski 2004: 194). This is inconceivable both for 
the Bosnian Croats (amounting to almost a quarter of the population in 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and certainly for the Bosnian 
Serbs, who constitute almost 97% of the inhabitants in the Republika 
Srpska. However, in reality, the “Bosnian” label is more prone to refer to 
an ethnic designation, where the specificity of the Bosnian language is 
closely associated with the Bosniak national identity, and where it should 
be comprehended as a “symbol of actual ethnic identity” (Bugarski 2004: 
194). However interpreted, territorially or ethnically, it highlights the 
                                                          
195 With independence the Bosnian Muslims freed themselves of the label, “Muslims in the 
national sense”, a concept imposed upon them during the SFRY regime, and the new 
“independent” nation chose to call themselves Bosniaks. Cf. (Okey 2005: 436).  
196 In this sense, the Bosnian case was different from that of the Croatian and Macedonian 
linguistic nationalisms established with the proclamation of independencies.   
197 Defunct in the administrative sense of the word. 
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inherent problem of the state-forming of Bosnia anchored in three distinct 
and constituent nations, who are not prone to sacrifice their national 
identity or their territory, subsequently creating two mini-states with 
their respective official languages.   
 
In the SFRY, the official languages of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as stipulated by Article 4 of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, were the Serbo-Croatian and the Croat-Serbian languages 
with the Cyrillic and the Latin alphabets. (Baltic 2007: 36) The Dayton 
constitutional framework, and the official recognition of the two Entities, 
entailed that the declaration of the official languages are stipulated in the 
Constitutions of the respective entities. Hence, in the Bosniak-Croat 
Federation, the Bosnian and the Croatian languages and the Latin 
alphabet are declared official, as stipulated by Article 6 of the 
Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Bugarski 
2004: 194) In the Republika Srpska, on the other hand, only the Serbian 
language, “in the ijekavian and ekavian pronunciations and the Cyrillic 
alphabet, are in official use, and the Latin alphabet as stipulated by law” 
(Art. 7 of the Constitution of the Serb Republic, 1992, Bugarski 2004: 194).  
 
Even though the equality of the constituent nations was particularly 
stressed also in the former Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, minority 
rights provisions were constitutionally protected. As far as minority 
language rights were concerned, the former Constitution stipulated that 
minorities had the right to use their languages “before the agencies of 
official authority”, if so stipulated by the statutes of the municipalities. 
(Baltic 2007: 36) Minority language rights in education were also 
provided for, even though the small share of minorities, as well as their 
dispersion, made this right difficult to implement in practice. In the 
constitutional framework, initiated at Dayton, the focus on the 
constituent nations, and the official use of the three “separate” majority 
languages, overshadowed everything else. Hence, in the Constitutions of 
the Entities198 which should regulate rights pertaining to national 
minorities, these rights were to a large extent left constitutionally 
unprotected. In line with the conditionality package, established with the 
                                                          
198 The Constitutions of the two Entities were adopted at the height of the Bosnian war. 
The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted in 1994 and 
the Constitution of the Serb Republic was adopted as early as in 1992 when the 
“Republika Srpska” was proclaimed. Cf. (Bebler 2006: 9). 
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Stabilisation and Association Agreement, Bosnia did adopt, in 2003, a 
Law on the Protection of Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
Minorities. This Law provides, at least de jure, for minority language 
rights of the 17 minority groups199 that are recognised, of which the 
Romany, Albanian and the Ukrainian languages are the most widely 
spoken. 
Legislation in minority language rights upon gaining 
status as potential candidate state 
The monitoring Report of the EU was adopted in 2003, the same year as 
Bosnia became a potential candidate state of the EU. The Report of the 
Council of Europe was adopted the following year, in 2004. The EU 
Report initially stresses the need for Bosnia to become a “self-sustaining 
state”, in order for a future accession to take place. (EU Report 2003: 3) At 
the same time, however, the EU Report acknowledges that the reforms, 
necessary to further the democratisation process, as the reforms already 
taken have proven200, are possible only with the help of international 
governance. Thus, the EU Report emphasises that “the role of the 
international Community remains vital” to the continued and necessary 
reform process. (EU Report 2003: 8) What is clear from the EU Report is 
that, in order for Bosnia to be able to start complying with minority rights 
conditionality, Bosnia has to make considerable progress in many 
domains and particularly as concerns harmonisation of legislation 
between the different levels of government.  
 
In the same vein, the Advisory Committee addresses the problem of the 
complexity of the governmental structures, between the Federal and the 
State level, and points out that there is a “lack of information on the 
implementation of the Framework Convention at the sub-state level, a 
matter that should be addressed through enhanced co-operation between 
the Entities and the State authorities” (CoE Report 2004: 6). Furthermore, 
the Advisory Committee takes note of the poor socio-economic 
                                                          
199 Bosnia and Herzegovina’s National Law on the Protection of Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National Minorities, adopted on the 12th of April 2003, recognises the 
following national minorities: Albanians, Czechs, Germans, Hungarians, Italians, Jews, 
Macedonians, Montenegrins, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, 
Slovenians, Turks and Ukrainians. Cf. (Cicak & Hamzic 2006: 1).   
200 The vital reforms made were to a large extent adopted by imposition of the High 
Representative. Cf. (EU Report 2003: 5).  
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conditions of the country, which are argued to inhibit implementation of 
the regulatory principles of the Framework Convention. (CoE Report 
2004: 8) In the area of minority rights protection, the constitutional 
changes, made “as a result of the 2000 Constitutional Court decision on 
“constituent peoples”, represented an important advance in formally 
securing citizens’ civil and political rights throughout BiH” (EU Report 
2003: 11). Another step in this direction was Bosnia’s ratification of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, made in July 2002. Furthermore, 
Bosnia adopted the Law on the Protection of Rights of National 
Minorities in April 2003. In 2002, Bosnia became a member of the Council 
of Europe, having ratified the Council of Europe’s Framework 
Convention in February 2000. Whereas the assessment of the Advisory 
Committee is all-encompassing, the EU Report neither assesses legislation 
pertaining to minority language rights protection, nor, and which is even 
more surprising, legislation pertaining to non-discrimination.  
Non-discrimination  
The discriminatory effects of the “overly ethnically based politics”, 
pervasive also in the institutional arrangements of Bosnia, are 
consistently, however prudently201, pointed out in the Report of the 
Advisory Committee. (CoE Report 2004: 19) In this regard, the problem of 
the division of the polity into constituent peoples and “Others”, as 
stipulated in the preamble to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
raises concerns. These concerns are not only of a terminological order, but 
pertain to the discriminatory effects these have on the rights of national 
minorities, as well as to who should be considered a national minority. 
(Preamble to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995) On the 
basis of criticisms raised by representatives of minority groups, the 
Advisory Committee stresses the problematic use of the term “Others” as 
an all-encompassing label of those persons not affiliating with the 
constituent peoples. However, in the 2003 Law on the Protection of Rights 
of Persons Belonging to National Minorities, the term “Others” has been 
substituted by national minorities and the Advisory Committee expresses 
the hope that, at both State level and at Entity level, the authorities would 
                                                          
201 Prudently in the sense that the Advisory Committee recognises that the status granted 
to the three constituent peoples as a guarantee for the equal treatment of the Serbs, 
Bosniaks and Croats has been instrumental “in ensuring a lasting peace and stability in 
the country after the conflict” (CoE Report 2004: 10).  
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“contemplate the possibility of consistently introducing similar 
terminology at the constitutional level” (CoE Report 2004: 11).   
 
According to Article 3, of the Law on the Protection of National 
Minorities, national minorities are defined as “a part of the population – 
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina – that does not belong to one of the 
three constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it consists of 
the people of the same or similar ethnic origin, same or similar tradition, 
customs, religion, culture, and spirituality, and close or related history 
and other features” (CoE Report 2004: 10). The national minorities 
covered by this status are Albanians, Montenegrins, Czechs, Italians, 
Jews, Hungarians, Macedonians, Germans, Poles, Roma, Romanians, 
Russians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Slovenians, Turks, Ukrainians and “others 
who satisfy requirements from paragraph 1 of this Article” (CoE Report 
2004: 10). Whereas the Advisory Committee satisfactorily notes that also 
smaller minority groups are included in the enumeration, there is, at the 
same time, concern as to the scope of application, limited to citizens only, 
which would exclude many from the Roma community, as well as the 
numerically large refugee groups, emanating from the dissolution of the 
SFRY in general, and the Bosnian war in particular. (CoE Report 2004: 10) 
Furthermore, since there still is the division between constituent people 
and national minorities, this raises concerns as to the status, both de jure 
and de facto, of constituent peoples who find themselves in a de facto 
minority position (Croats and Bosniaks in the Republika Srpska and Serbs 
in the Federation as well as Bosniaks and Croats on the cantonal level).  
 
In this regard, the Advisory Committee welcomes the decision of the 
Constitutional Court of 2000202, stipulating that, “Bosniacs, Croats and 
Serbs are to be considered constituent peoples across the whole territory 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no matter the Entity in which they reside” 
(CoE Report 2004: 12). The importance of ensuring legal equality of the 
constituent peoples has, however, been detrimental to minority 
representation, and the Advisory Committee is of the opinion that 
“consideration should be given to finding ways and means of remedying 
the total exclusion of persons belonging to national minorities” (CoE 
                                                          
202 On the basis of the partial decision on the status of constituent peoples taken by the 
Constitutional Court on the 30th of June and the 1st of July 2000, the Constitutions of both 
Entities were amended as to allow for the “three constituent peoples to be represented in 
the Parliaments of the Entities” (CoE Report 2004: 14).  
196 
Report 2004: 14). Furthermore, the constitutional provisions are 
incompatible with the provisions stipulated in the 2003 Law on the 
Protection of National Minorities, as Article 19 of the said law declares 
that “persons belonging to national minorities shall have the right to be 
proportionally represented in the bodies of public authorities and other 
civil services at all levels” (CoE Report 2004: 14-15). Thus, in order to 
guarantee minority representation, at the same time as harmonising the 
legislation, the Advisory Committee considers that this situation “may 
ultimately require constitutional amendments at the Entity level” (CoE 
Report 2004: 15). 
 
Despite the discriminatory effects of the fundamental principle of the 
constituent peoples, as well as the lack of harmonisation of legislation, the 
Advisory Committee recognises, with satisfaction, that “there exist 
general guarantees against discrimination, including in the Constitution 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the Constitutions of the Entities and in the 
2003 Law on the Protection of Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
Minorities” (CoE Report 2004: 12). At the same time, though, it is clear 
that the existing Bosnian legal order, based on a division of ethnic 
affiliation, which, in turn, is based on the superiority of the three 
constituent nations, greatly hampers the necessary development of a 
more comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, which would require 
a reorientation from protection of collective rights to the protection of 
individual rights. (CoE Report 2004: 12) In this regard, the Commission 
on Human Rights, instituted as part of the General Framework 
Agreement203, and consisting of the Office of the Ombudsman204 and the 
Human Rights Chamber, have been “instrumental in the fight against 
discrimination, including for persons belonging to national minorities as 
well as those belonging to constituent peoples in a minority situation” 
(CoE Report 2004: 12-13). 
 
                                                          
203 The Commission of Human Rights was established in Annex 6 of the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cf. (Oellers-Frahm 2005: 
191).  
204 The Office of the Ombudsman actually consists of three Ombudsman Institutions, one 
at State level and the other two at the level of the Entities. Each Ombudsman Institution in 
turn consists of 1 representative from each of the constituent peoples. Cf. (CoE Report 
2004: 12).   
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However, de facto discrimination against both national minorities, and 
especially against the Roma, but also against constituent peoples in a 
minority situation, is frequent and gives evidence to the poor 
implementation of the existing non-discrimination legislation, but also to 
the interethnic animosities that still are simmering under the surface. 
Indeed, the vulnerable situation of the Roma, who face “particular 
difficulties in fields such as housing, health care, employment and 
education”, is alarming and calls for remedial measures. (CoE Report 
2004: 4) In fact, the Advisory Committee recommends the Bosnian 
authorities to promptly draw up a “comprehensive national strategy”, in 
order to meet the needs of this vulnerable group. (CoE Report 2004: 4)  A 
factor, considered inhibiting more effective implementation of the 
existing non-discrimination legislation, is the lack of up-to-date statistics 
of the numerical sizes of the minority groups. Because there has been no 
official census carried out in Bosnia since 1991, the Advisory Committee 
fears that there are “wide discrepancies between the latest official 
statistics of the Government and the unofficial estimates of the actual 
number and geographical location of persons belonging to national 
minorities” (CoE Report 2004: 17). As long as these discrepancies exist, 
this is considered to “hamper the ability of the State to target, implement 
and monitor measures to ensure the full and effective equality of persons 
belonging to national minorities” (CoE Report 2004: 17).  
 
Even though the legally protected status of Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats 
should pertain to the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as 
decided by the Constitutional Court in 2000, this decision has not been 
effectively implemented. Discrimination against constituent peoples who 
find themselves in a de facto minority situation, is pointed out by the 
Advisory Committee and raises concerns as to the protection of these 
“minority groups”, which are not protected by minority rights 
provisions, thus reducing their status to a legal vacuum. When viewed 
the extensive organisational autonomy and the extensive powers of the 
two Entities, the Advisory Committee therefore considers that these 
constituent peoples, in a minority position in their respective Entities, 
should “be given the possibility – in case they so wish – to rely on the 
protection provided by the Framework Convention, as far as the issues 
concerned are within the competence of the Entities” (CoE Report 2004: 
11). 
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General provisions against discrimination exist, both on the State level 
and the level of the Entities, as stipulated in the Constitutions and in the 
Law on the Protection of Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
Minorities. However, for a more comprehensive anti-discrimination 
legislation to take place there is the need to reorient the emphasis on 
ethnically-based rights towards an emphasis on individual rights. As 
underlined by the Advisory Committee, the Bosnian authorities are 
expected to develop “comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that 
protects individuals from discrimination” (CoE Report 2004: 12, emphasis 
added). Furthermore, harmonisation of legislative acts between the State 
level and the Entities, as well as between the Entities, is instrumental in 
developing a Bosnian legal system that assures the protection against 
discrimination throughout its territory. However, on the basis of the 
current legal system, and having taken into consideration the fact that 
there is a lack of harmonisation between the Constitutions and the 2003 
Law on the Protection of National Minorities, Bosnia is positioned on the 
level of 0.5. 
 
Fig. 10.1. Bosnia and level of rule adoption in non-discrimination upon gaining 
status as potential candidate state 
 
2003 
   Tolerance              x                                                                        Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
(0): Absence of any non-discrimination norm; 
(1): General provisions such as an equality clause in the Constitution;   
(2): Non-discrimination laws are inserted in specific laws;  
(3): Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation which then means 
that there has been a complete transposition of the EU anti-
discrimination acquis; 
(4): Non-discrimination laws exceed the minimum requirements of 
the Directive.  
Minority language use in official contexts  
The lack of harmonisation between the legislative acts in Bosnia is also 
apparent in the domain of the protection of the official use of minority 
languages. Minority language rights are constitutionally protected as is 
clear from the Constitutions in both Entities. However, although the 
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Advisory Committee welcomes the fact that the Constitutions of both 
Entities205 have made Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian the official language 
in both Entities, and that the right to the official use of minority 
languages, likewise, is constitutionally protected, minority language use 
has not been “regulated by law at the entity level, in the Republika Srpska 
or in the Federation” (CoE Report 2004: 23). The Law on the Protection of 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities, however, provides 
for the protection of the use of minority languages. Hence, Article 11, of 
the said Law, stipulates that “BiH shall recognise and protect the right of 
each member of a national minority in BiH to use his/her language freely 
and without any hold-ups, both in private and in public, both orally an in 
writing” (Law on the Protection of Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National Minorities, Art. 11). Article 11, furthermore, provides for the 
right of members of national minorities to “use his/her name in the 
language of minority and to request it to be used as such in public” (Art. 
11). As regards the right to use minority languages in official contexts, 
Article 12 determines that the competent authorities have the obligation 
to “ensure the use of minority languages in contacts with persons 
belonging to a national minority” (CoE Report 2004: 23). The same 
Article, furthermore, provides for the right of minorities to use, in public, 
inscriptions and other signs as well as street names and place names in 
the minority language. (Art. 12) 
 
These legal rights are, however, problematic, and pose serious challenges 
to their implementation, seeing as how the high numerical threshold, that 
conditions protection of these legal rights, drastically reduces de facto 
implementation. Hence, these rights are only provided for given that “the 
minority in question constitutes an absolute or relative majority in the 
city, municipality or local community at issue” (CoE Report 2004: 23). The 
high numerical threshold, established by the Law, is problematic since, in 
practice, it nullifies the substance of these legal provisions. In fact, the 
                                                          
205 Article 7, of the Constitution of Republika Srpska, stipulates that ”the official languages 
of the Republika Srpska are: the language of the Serb people, the language of the Bosniak 
people and the language of the Croat people. The official scripts are Cyrillic and Latin. In 
regions inhabited by groups speaking other languages, their languages and alphabet shall 
also be in official use, as specified by law”. Article 6 of the Constitution of the Federation 
likewise declares that “The official languages of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
shall be: Bosnian language, Croat language and Serb language. The official script shall be 
Latin and Cyrillic. Other languages may be used as a means of communication and 
instruction” (CoE Report 2004: 23).  
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Advisory Committee notes that the threshold is so high, that “it raises 
doubts about its compatibility with the Constitution, as suggested by the 
case-law of the Constitutional Court itself” (CoE Report 2004: 23-24). The 
high threshold is, furthermore, aggravated by the fact that there is neither 
any up-to-date statistics on the numerical sizes of national minorities, nor 
any information as to their geographical concentrations. Thus, the lack of 
updated census results, subsequently, means that the authorities have to 
rely on the latest census results, carried out in 1991, which are unlikely to 
give an accurate picture of both the numerical sizes, as well as the 
geographical location of the national minorities. Hence, on the basis of 
discussions between the Advisory Committee and the authorities of the 
Republika Srpska, it became clear that the legal rights pertaining to 
minority language use protection were “largely considered inapplicable 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since there was not a single municipality in 
the country in which a given minority constituted a majority, when the 
last general census was taken in 1991” (CoE Report 2004: 23).  
 
The legal impasse of minority language use in official contexts is, 
however, opened up by the possibility, as stated in Article 12 of the said 
Law, for cities and municipalities, as determined in their statutes, to 
lower the threshold. Thus, as stipulated by Article 12, the right to use a 
minority language in official contexts could be provided, on condition 
that the statutes of the cities and municipalities so determine, even when 
national minorities “do not constitute an absolute or relative majority of 
the population” (Law on the Protection for Persons Belonging to National 
Minorities, Art. 12). In this regard the Advisory Committee “expresses the 
hope that the competent authorities will make systematic use of the 
possibility they have to rely on a lower threshold to activate the right to 
use minority languages in contacts with administrative authorities” (CoE 
Report 2004: 24).     
 
As concerns the use of signs and symbols, Article 10, of the Law on the 
Protection of National Minorities, declares that members of national 
minorities “may freely display and bear insignia and symbols of a 
national minority” (Law on the Protection for Persons Belonging to 
National Minorities, Art. 10). However, and as underlined by the 
Advisory Committee, this right will only be provided for, on condition 
that minority members, at the same time, “display the official insignia 
and symbols of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as those of the Entities, 
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Cantons and municipalities” (CoE Report 2004: 22). The Advisory 
Committee finds this additional formulation disturbing, since it 
“prescribes the systematic additional use of State symbols”, without 
making any distinction between the public and the private spheres. The 
recommendation of the Advisory Committee is that the Bosnian 
authorities amend “this provision with a view to restricting the 
compulsory use of State symbols to the public sphere only” (CoE Report 
2004: 22). 
 
Even though there are legal provisions as regards the right to use 
minority languages in contacts with official authorities, as well as to use 
minority languages in personal and place names, these legal provisions, 
in fact, nullify themselves in view of the very high threshold that 
conditions the guaranteeing of these rights. Hence, even though the Law 
on the Protection of National Minorities does give the cities and 
municipalities the right to determine lower thresholds, this possibility is 
voluntary and does not guarantee that this will be implemented. In light 
of the above, along with the fact that Bosnia does recognise minority 
languages, Bosnia is positioned on the level of 0.5 according to the index 
scale. 
 
Fig. 10.2. Bosnia and level of rule adoption in minority language use in official 
contexts upon gaining status as potential candidate state 
 
2003 
   Tolerance             x                                                                        Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
     
(0): No recognition of minority languages; 
(1): The right to use the minority language in official contexts (before 
judicial and administrative authorities; i.e. the right to a translator);  
(2): The minority language can be used in Personal and Place Names 
(public signs); 
(3): The minority language can be used in official documents; 
(4): Minority language having status as official language. 
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Minority language rights in education  
On occasion of the Bosnian ratification of the Council of Europe’s 
Framework Convention, discussions on the educational sector, and the 
necessary reforms, focused particularly on the problem of the highly 
fragmented Bosnian education system. In fact, the system of “two schools 
under one roof”206, prevalent in the Croat and Bosniak Federation, was 
rooted in a system which meant the complete separation, both physically 
as well as academically, of Croat and Bosniak pupils. This went 
completely counter to the regulatory principles of the FCNM, and Article 
12, which underlines the importance of facilitating “contacts among 
students and teachers of different communities” (CoE Report 2004: 24). In 
fact, in order to promote national cohesion and avoiding the furtherance 
of segregation, the introduction of “a common core curriculum should be 
instrumental” to this end. (CoE Report 2004: 25) In the same vein, a core 
curriculum would also facilitate “the integration of returnee children and 
student mobility, which remains a challenge, given the number of 
displaced persons and refugees” (CoE Report 2004: 25).  
 
The attempts to unify the system, and to go “from three distinct curricula 
– and set of textbooks – to a common core curriculum”, have proven 
difficult, and especially Croat officials have been reticent to give up their 
school system for fear of assimilation. (CoE Report 2004: 24) As 
underlined by the Advisory Committee, it is important that the 
unification process does not impede on the rights of the three constituent 
peoples to have instruction of/in minority languages and, thus, “ensures 
that persons belonging to each of the three constituent peoples have an 
equal right to use their language, without discrimination” (CoE Report 
2004: 25). Interestingly, the Advisory Committee, by making reference to 
the regulatory principles of the FCNM, clearly treats the constituent 
peoples as having status as national minorities which is surprising seen as 
how the three constituent peoples are neither covered by the Law on the 
Protection of National Minorities and consequently nor by the FCNM.  
 
The Law on the Protection of Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
Minorities provides for minority rights in education, where Article 13 
                                                          
206 The system of ‘two schools under one roof’ was still in existence especially in Canton 6 
(Middle Bosnia) and Canton 7 (Herzegovina Neretva) at the time of the writing of the CoE 
report. Cf. (CoE Report 2004: 24). 
203 
stipulates that it is the responsibility of the Entities and the Cantons of the 
Federation to determine, in their respective legislations, “the possibilities 
for the members of national minorities to establish, and preserve their 
own private institutions, for education and vocational training” (Law on 
the Protection of National Minorities, Art. 13). It should, however, be 
added that this provision does not guarantee any State funding but that 
the financing “shall be secured by persons belonging to national 
minorities themselves” (CoE Report 2004: 26). Article 14, of the said Law, 
also provides for the right of education in minority languages, from pre-
school level up to secondary school level, where the Entities and Cantons 
in Bosnia are obligated to ensure that “members of national minorities 
shall be enabled to have education in the minority language in the cities, 
municipalities, and inhabited areas, in which the members of national 
minorities represent an absolute or relative minority” (Law on the 
Protection of National Minorities, Art. 14).  
 
Again the very high threshold is problematic, and even more so since 
Article 14 does not open up possibilities for cities and municipalities to 
allow for lower thresholds. Surprisingly, even though the Advisory 
Committee is “concerned” that the high threshold “might constitute an 
obstacle for receiving instruction in certain minority languages”, this 
problem does not seem to merit further attention. (CoE Report 2004: 27, 
emphasis added) In fact, it seems that the national cohesion principle, 
here, is stressed to the detriment of the rights of minorities to receive 
education in their minority languages. In fact, the Advisory Committee 
welcomes the more flexible approach, taken by the 2003 Framework Law 
on Primary and Secondary Education, where Article 8 “prescribes that the 
language and culture of any significant minority in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina shall be respected and accommodated within the school, to 
the greatest extent practicable, in accordance with the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities” (CoE Report 2004: 
27). 
 
More emphasis of the Advisory Committee is devoted to the legal 
provisions regulating the right to receive teaching of the minority 
language, a right that is not conditioned by any numerical threshold. 
Hence, Article 14, of the Law on the Protection of National Minorities, 
stipulates that “regardless of the number of members of national 
minorities, the entities and cantons shall be bound to secure that the 
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members of national minority, if they request so, may have instruction on 
their language, literature, history, and culture in the language of minority 
they belong to as additional classes” (Law on the Protection of National 
Minorities, Art. 14). The Advisory Committee, furthermore, notes, with 
satisfaction, that the “legislation on Primary and Secondary Education in 
the Entities is being harmonised with the 2003 Framework Law on 
Primary and Secondary Education” (CoE Report 2004: 27). However, 
whereas the new Law on Primary and Secondary Education in the 
Republika Srpska, adopted in 2004, was amended207 in accordance with 
the Framework Law, the harmonisation process has not yet been 
completed in some cantons of the Federation. Hence, the Advisory 
Committee recommends the authorities in these cantons to “follow suit, 
by speeding up the process of harmonising their legislation, with both the 
2003 Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education, and the 2003 
Law on the Protection of Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
Minorities” (CoE Report 2004: 27). Thus, once again, the Advisory 
Committee stresses the problem of the highly fragmented education 
system, which constitutes a barrier towards more effective 
implementation of minority language rights in education. Hence, the 
Advisory Committee considers that “there is an urgent need to 
coordinate matters in the field of education” to ensure that these are in 
line with the regulatory principles of the Framework Convention. (CoE 
Report 2004: 25)  
 
Even though there exist some legislative provisions, and these mainly 
concern the right for minorities to get instruction of minority languages, 
this legal provision seems to be poorly implemented in practice. Hence, 
the highly segregated education system is blatant also as concerns 
minorities’ language rights in education. Even though the de facto 
situation confirms that instruction of minority languages is provided with 
“additional classes for certain national minorities, (which) already exist 
both in the Federation and in the Republika Srpska”, these classes are 
often provided by “minority associations outside the public education 
system” (CoE Report 2004: 28). Even though the initiatives from minority 
associations are welcomed both by the Advisory Committee, as well as by 
                                                          
207 The Law on Primary and Secondary Education was adopted on the 30th of April 2004 
and the amendment made was to abolish the previous legal threshold of 20 pupils, 
needed for the application of having “a minority language taught at the primary school 
level” (CoE Report 2004: 27).  
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the minorities themselves208, the Advisory Committee points out that 
there is a perceived need to “increase State support, not least of all to pay 
for the teachers and their training, as well as to provide textbooks in 
minority languages” (CoE Report 2004: 28). In this regard, the Advisory 
Committee notes, with satisfaction, that State support in this domain 
already is legally provided for, since Article 14, of the Law on the 
Protection of National Minorities, stipulates that the competent 
authorities “shall be bound to secure funds, means for the education of 
teachers to teach in the language of the national minority, (…) as well as 
printing of textbooks in the languages of national minorities” (Law on the 
Protection of Rights Belonging to National Minorities, Art. 14).    
 
However, as concerns the minority language the most widely spoken in 
Bosnia, it is only occasionally that the Romany language is taught. In fact, 
the poor inclusion of Roma pupils into the education system in Bosnia, in 
general, is a serious problem, as underlined by the Advisory Committee. 
Apart from the poor socio-economic conditions of the Roma, which 
greatly hampers more effective integration of Roma pupils into the 
educational system, direct discrimination from teachers, administrators 
and other pupils has been reported. (CoE Report 2004: 26) Thus, the 
Advisory Committee encourages the State authorities “to introduce more 
systematically Roma language teaching in schools, attended by Roma 
children, as well as develop curriculum resources to enable teachers to 
teach the Roma language, culture and history, as provided for in the 
Action Plan on the Educational Needs of Roma and Members of Other 
National Minorities”209 (CoE Report 2004: 28). 
 
Legal provisions regulating minority language rights in education exist, 
although they are, to a large extent, hampered by the very high threshold 
that conditions these rights and which, consequently, does not allow for 
implementation. However, independently of any numerical threshold, 
the right to be instructed of minority languages, as well as the culture and 
                                                          
208 These additional classes of minority languages have been held mainly for Czechs, 
Poles, Italians and Ukrainians and they have “expressed an interest to consolidate and to 
develop them further” (CoE Report 2004: 27-28).  
209 The Action Plan was adopted on the 17th of February 2004 by both Entities and the 
Cantonal Ministers of Education on the initiative of the OSCE. The Plan is an effort to try 
to “meet the needs of the national minorities and especially the Roma” (CoE Report 2004: 
25).  
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history of national minorities, is provided for by the Law on the 
Protection of Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities (Art. 14). 
However, these rights are restricted to additional classes and are not 
integrated into the curriculum. Furthermore, these rights have only been 
implemented in the Republika Srpska, and not in the Federation so, not 
only are these rights referred to extra-curriculum activities, but they are 
also only provided for in one of the Entities. Thus, in light of the above 
and based on the index scale, Bosnia is positioned on the level of 0.5. 
 
Fig. 10.3. Bosnia and level of rule adoption in minority language rights in 
education upon gaining status as potential candidate state 
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   Tolerance              x                                                                        Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
 (0): No education of or in minority language; 
(1): Children belonging to minorities have the right to learn their 
mother tongue in school; 
(2): At least parts of the curriculum (e.g. history or religion) are taught 
in the minority language; 
(3): Minorities have the right to educate their children completely in 
the mother tongue, either in state schools with a complete syllabus 
taught in the minority language or in specific minority schools; 
(4): Minorities have their own universities. 
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11 
THE SOVIET EMPIRE 
From construction to deconstruction 
The origins of the Russian Empire’s colonial endeavours can be traced 
back to the 16th century, when pre-tsarist Russia incorporated parts of 
Siberia into Russian territory. (White 2011: 264) The major parts of the 
territorial annexations were, however, gained during the 18th and 19th 
centuries, when most of the territories of Central Asia, the Caucasus and 
parts of Eastern Europe were subjugated to imperial authority. The policy 
of territorial annexation was later continued by the Soviet Union, which, 
by 1990, had created “one of history’s greatest land empires” (Hughes & 
Sasse 2001: 225). Indeed, the vast majority of territories and the mosaic of 
nationalities which were incorporated into tsarist Russia, and 
subsequently into the Soviet Union, had turned it, not only, into a 
European, but also an Asian power. In 1905, and as a consequence of the 
defeat in the Russo-Japanese war, the attempt to stretch the Empire 
further, in order to become the “dominant power in the Pacific”, never 
materialised. (White 2011: 264).  
 
Not only did 1905 constitute a backlash in the area of foreign policy, even 
more serious were the internal problems of the Empire. Caused by ethnic 
and social distress, the revolution of 1905 became the start of the 
withering of tsarist Russia. Although the territorial might was the 
empire’s strongest geopolitical asset, the diversity of the nationalities, 
inhabiting the territory, was to become one of its primary weaknesses. In 
fact, just as the nationality problem was a pervasive problem in the 
Yugoslav context, the nationality problem, and the policies inaugurated 
to tend to the nationality problem, were a contributing factor to the 
demise of tsarist Russia, as well as a facilitator to the establishment of the 
second empire, the Soviet Union. The revolution of 1905 was, partly at 
least, a reaction to the harsh policies of assimilation, which had started in 
the 18th century, however, seriously initiated in 1830, when the “Russian 
authorities began to promote Russification and conversion to Orthodoxy” 
(MRGI 2011a: 2). These policies caused uprisings in 1830 and 1863, in the 
territories of Poland, Lithuania and Belarus, which were violently 
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crushed, and the Governor, in charge of the 1863 operations, famously 
remarked that, “’what the Russian bayonet did not accomplish, the 
Russian school will’” (Vollebaek 2009: 3).  
 
Both the ethnic and the social components210 of the revolution were, 
however, cleverly exploited by the Bolsheviks, which facilitated their 
accession to power in the subsequent October revolution of 1917. Indeed, 
by making use of the “overlap between the social and ethnic cleavage in 
the Russian Empire (...), the idea of the ‘world proletariat brotherhood’” 
was promoted. (Vollebaek 2009: 4). Furthermore, the demise of tsarist 
Russia, which had seen a resurgence of long subjugated nationalist 
sentiments, was effectively used by the Bolsheviks to win the ensuing 
civil war against the nationalists. Indeed, by linking the socialist 
revolutionary movement to the principle of national self-determination of 
nations, the Bolsheviks developed a strategy which meant that, in return 
for allegiance to the Bolshevik cause, important ethnic groups would be 
granted territorial rewards. With the subsequent establishment of the 
Soviet state, the “practice, of granting ethno-territorial autonomy to 
leading ethnic groups, was institutionalised as an organising principle of 
the Soviet state” (MRGI 2011a: 2).  
 
In 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was 
constitutionally enshrined as a federation based on the principle of ethno-
territorial autonomy. On the basis of the major ethnicities, the large 
multinational socialist federation was divided into 15 union republics as 
well as 20 autonomous regions. However, although de jure a federation, 
where the ethno-territorial union republics had “sovereignty with the 
right to secession inscribed in their constitutions”, de facto the USSR was 
highly centralised. (Lundestad 1994: 134) In fact, with the exception that 
the new Soviet Empire was based on a totalitarian ideology, in which the 
supremacy of the Communist Party was to pervade every sphere of both 
                                                          
210 In the beginning of the 20th century the social distress of the peasants, who had largely 
been compelled to serfdom and the industrial workers was extremely difficult. In 1913 
tsarist Russia was a backward society composed of mainly peasants (77% according to the 
1897 census) and the “Russian share of world industrial output as a whole was very 
small” (White 2011: 117-118). Furthermore, the devastation of World War I and the 
ensuing Civil war in parallel to poor harvests had decimated the population by 10 % in 
1921 “through fighting, disease and starvation” (Harrison 2011: 104).   
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system and society, the USSR displayed much of the same characteristics 
as centralist and unitary tsarist Russia.  
 
Indeed, even though the ethno-territorial divisions had been created, with 
the aim of stimulating national consciousness as a means of preventing 
national strife, there was never any question of transferring decision 
making authority to the union republics. In fact, as was to become very 
clear in the early stages of the “unitary state in disguise” (Lundestad 
1994: 133), “Soviet totalitarianism was fundamentally incompatible with 
genuine region-based federalism and autonomy” (Starovoitova 1997: 10). 
Furthermore, since the principle of democratic socialism assumed that 
citizens’ had a common interest211, regardless of any ethnic belonging, the 
integrative force of socialism was thought to annihilate any nationality 
issue in the end. However, in the beginning of the new Soviet Empire, the 
Communist Party did institute the policy of indigenisation (korenizatsiia). 
This policy was part of a bigger nation-building programme and involved 
“systematic efforts to ensure that local administrations, courts and 
schools function in local languages” (Pavlenko 2008: 280). However, this 
policy stance was soon abandoned, since it was counterproductive to the 
process of increasing centralisation and uniformity, which “clearly 
emerged as the regime’s basic political goals”, from the late 1920s.  
(Starovoitova 1997: 10) Consequently, this entailed a policy shift, which 
was based on advanced russification which, in parallel, with the 
introduction of a pathological control system, would lead to purges 
against, not only, local nationalities212, but pervaded all spheres of Soviet 
society. (Starovoitova 1997: 10) The indiscriminate nature of Stalin’s 
political terror reached its peak in 1937, when “Stalin set out to 
exterminate all his enemies, including those he designated as ‘objective’ 
or ‘unconscious’ enemies” (Harrison 2011: 115). Apart from mass killing 
and deportation, the regime of political terror paralysed both industry 
and the economy. Furthermore, the collectivisation of agriculture in 1929-
1930 had devastating effects, leading to mass starvation. A decade later, 
World War II, primarily fought on Soviet territory, “killed one in eight 
                                                          
211 The conviction was that working people, regardless of ethnic belonging, had a common 
interest which was “based upon their ownership of the means of production” (White 2011: 
62). 
212 For instance the regime had identified that there was resistance to the collectivisation of 
the agriculture in Polish and German villages in Ukraine and Belarus which led to 
deportations of whole communities. Cf. (Blitstein 2006: 289).  
210 
Soviet citizens, and destroyed one third of their national wealth” 
(Harrison 2011: 104).  
 
In light of the devastations that had struck both humans, and 
infrastructure in the pre-World War II period, the economic recovery of 
the industrialised Soviet Union, especially from the 1950s, was 
remarkable. Indeed, compared with the backward pre-war tsarist Russia, 
“just a couple of generations later (...), the USSR had by this time become 
one of the world’s economic superpowers, with a gross domestic product 
(GDP) that was second only to that of the United States” (White 2011: 
118). The change into the economic and military might213 of the USSR was 
the more astonishing in the light of the fact that, neither the political 
system, nor the economic institutions, had undergone any significant 
changes. Thus, even though post War USSR underwent a de-Stalinisation 
process, under the thaw introduced by Chrustchev, there was never any 
real rupture with the past. Both “the Stalinist and the post-Stalinist 
epochs were characterised by an extreme centralisation of the economy, 
predominance of bureaucratic administrative methods of management, 
and the failure of all attempts at reforming the economy” (Lundestad 
1994: 148). This, in turn, would lead to economic stagnation from the 
beginning of the 1970s, and even though this decade was marked by 
world economic recession with two oil crises, the Soviet economic 
collapse was more encompassing and would, consequently, lead to the 
breakdown of an entire system. 
 
Indeed, the inefficiency and corruption of the centralised economic and 
political systems, maintained during the Breshnev regime, became 
particularly blatant in the period of accelerated superpower arms race 
during the late 1970s. The increasingly strained economy would lead to 
what the new leadership under Gorbatchev in the 1980s would call a 
‘crisis situation’. (White 2011: 115) In fact, even though observations had 
had it that the USSR during the 1960s was almost in parity, economically 
and militarily, with the USA, it was claimed that the USSR, in 1985, “was 
as far behind America as the Russian Empire had been in 1913” 
(Lundestad 1994: 139-140). Since the crisis situation was diagnosed as 
having been brought on, not only by the defaults of the economic system, 
                                                          
213 By the 1970s the Soviet Union ”maintained one of the world’s largest merchant marines 
and deployed one of its most formidable concentrations of military might” (White 2011: 
118). 
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but also the political system, centralisation as a model of development 
became rejected. Hence, with the emergence of an understanding that 
“the totalitarian one-party, one-policy model of a multinational state was 
wrong”, nationalist ideas and movements, inhibited for half a century, 
surfaced and were promoted not only as legal214, but also as legitimate by 
the new leadership. (Lundestad 1994: 149)  
The demographic dimension   
Stretching from Eastern Europe215, via the Transcaucasus216 to Central 
Asia217, the vast territory of the Soviet Union encompassed 22.4 million 
km2 covering 1/6th of the earth’s inhabited area. It neighboured twelve 
other states and shored three oceans, however, with parts of its territory 
largely inhabitable.218 The population of almost 286 million (according to 
the 1989 census)219, was highly multiethnic and the officially recognised 
ethnic groups exceeded the one hundred, however, unofficially “more 
inclusive counts as many as eight hundred” (White 2011: 164). Of the 15 
union republics, the Russian republic was by far the most important, not 
only by its geographical size, extending over ¾ of Soviet territory, but 
also in terms of its sizeable population and its political might. Indeed, the 
Russians outnumbered by far the other major nationalities, accounting for 
50.8% of the total population, and “Russia, and the Russians were the 
power base of the Soviet regime” (Starovoitova 1997: 10). The second 
largest nationality was constituted by the Ukrainians, who amounted to 
15.5%, with the Uzbekhs ranked as the third largest nationality, 
                                                          
214 Although the right to secession was formally enshrined in Article 72 of the Soviet 
Constitution, it was not until 1990 and the passing of a law “codifying the procedure for 
secession”, that this right became legally enforceable for the Union republics. 
(Starovoitova 1997: 13)  
215 The republics of Eastern Europe were: Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Baltic States: 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Cf. (Pavlenko 2008: 285) 
216 The Transcaucasus was a relatively small geographical area which was composed of 
three smaller union republics: Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. All three stood out in 
terms of very high levels of national consciousness as well as having a large share of the 
intelligentsia, particularly in Armenia and Georgia. Cf. (Pavlenko 2008: 280)   
217 Central Asia was a vast geographical area composed of the union republics of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and a large proportion 
of the populations were adhering to Islam. Cf. (White 2011: 164).   
218 The southern republics were largely desert and much of the northern territory was 
“permanently frozen” (White 2011: 164).   
219 U.S. Bureau of the Census, USA/USSR: Facts and Figures. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC, 1991, p. 1-4. 
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amounting to 5.8%. Among the 22 nationalities, which accounted for 
more than 1 million each, the Estonians were the numerically smallest 
nationality to have their own Republic (see Table 11.1. below). 
 
Table 11.1. Ethnic structure of the USSR in 1979 and 1989 (data retrieved from 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census, USA/USSR: Facts and Figures, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1991, pp. 1-4) 
 
Nationality 1979 
numbers 
1979 
% 
1989 
numbers 
1989 
% 
Russian 137.397 52.4 145.155 50.8 
Ukrainian 42.347 16.2 44.186 15.5 
Uzbek 12.456 4.8 16.698 5.8 
Belorussian 9.463 3.6 10.036 3.5 
Kazakh 6.556 2.5 8.136 2.8 
Tatar 6.317 2.4 6.649 2.3 
Azerbaijanian 5.477 2.1 6.770 2.4 
Armenian 4.151 1.6 4.623 1.6 
Georgian 3.571 1.4 3.981 1.4 
Moldavian 2.968 1.1 3.352 1.2 
Tadzhik 2.898 1.1 4.215 1.5 
Lithuanian 2.851 1.1 3.067 1.1 
Turkmen 2.028 0.8 2.729 1.0 
German 1.938 0.7 2.039 0.7 
Kirgiz 1.906 0.7 2.529 0.9 
Jewish 1.811 0.7 1.378 0.5 
Chuvash 1.751 0.7 1.842 0.6 
People of 
Dagestan 
1.657 0.6 2.066 0.7 
Latvian 1.439 0.5 1.459 0.5 
Bashkir 1.371 0.5 1.449 0.5 
Mordvinian 1.192 0.5 1.154 0.4 
Polish 1.151 0.4 1.126 0.4 
Estonian 1.020 0.4 1.027 0.4 
Others 8.369 3.2 10.077 3.5 
TOTAL 262.085 100 285.743 100 
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Although religion was “banned” from the communist agenda, the major 
part of the population was of the Orthodox faith even though the share of 
the population adhering to Islam was also substantial. In fact, in Central 
Asia as well as in Azerbaijan, the majority of the population was Muslim 
which, by consequence, meant that the Soviet Union in fact was the 
“world’s fifth largest Muslim state” (White 2011: 164). Apart from the 
Orthodox and Muslim adherents, the Jewish and Buddhist minorities 
were also quite numerous. Even though the administrative units of the 
Soviet Union had been made on the basis of ethno-territorial divisions, 
“within each of which a particular national group was supposedly 
predominant”, the union republics were highly heterogeneous.220 (White 
2011: 164) Indeed, with the exception of Armenia, which was particularly 
mono-ethnic, the majority of the union republics housed both substantial 
ethnic minorities as well as a substantial share of ethnic Russians.221  
 
Even though the beginning of the Soviet regime had been characterised 
by the policy of indigenisation, where national cultures and languages 
were promoted, both in the administration, the media and in the 
education system, this policy was abandoned in favour of russification 
policies, introduced from the mid-1930s. Russification under Soviet rule 
was, however, different from Tsarist Russia since “Soviet russification 
was more pervasive – it was no longer just people who were russified but 
also languages, their lexicons, grammars and orthographies, and even 
territories, russified as a result of state-sponsored migration” (Pavlenko 
2008: 281). However, Soviet russification did not mean the annihilation of 
the national specificities of the union republics. In fact, on a general level, 
russification took place concomitantly to the continued use of national 
cultures and languages, specific to the various union republics. However, 
at the same time, it is also true that the level of the impact of russification 
varied greatly between the union republics, as well as within. Indeed, 
depending upon factors such as the level of national consciousness, the 
                                                          
220 Kazakhstan was the union republic where the Kazakh nationality did not even 
constitute a majority and only amounted to 39.7% of the population. Apart from having 
substantial ethnic minorities, Kazakhstan furthermore had a sizeable Russian population 
that amounted to almost the numerical size of the Kazakhs, namely 37.8%. Cf. (Pavlenko 
2008: 284). 
221 The largest share of ethnic Russians outside of Russia was living in Ukraine where they 
amounted to more than 17 million. Also, apart from Kazakhstan, the Russian-speaking 
minority constituted an important 34% in Latvia and 30.3% in Estonia. Cf. (Pavlenko 2008: 
284).  
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proportion of native intelligentsia and, consequently, the importance given 
to the republic, as well as the national structure and the structure of 
population settlements within the union republics, russification was more 
or less successful. In fact, already in the 1920s, the Soviet leadership noted 
the differences in the level of russification when noting that, “while the 
Bielorussians ‘lacked’ national consciousness, the Ukrainians had too 
much” (Hirsch cited in Pavlenko 2008: 291). 
 
Indeed, among the union republics of Eastern Europe, Belarus stood out 
as particularly russified compared with Ukraine, although Ukraine 
housed the largest population of ethnic Russians outside of Russia, 
amounting to more than 17 million. The three Baltic States were harsh 
opponents to russification, even though both Latvia and Estonia had very 
large shares of ethnic Russians, 34% and 30.4% respectively.222 Indeed, the 
three Baltic States displayed very high levels of national consciousness, 
partly explained by the forceful re-annexation of the three Baltic States 
into the USSR in 1940, after the short period of independence experienced 
by the Baltic States upon the demise of tsarist Russia.223 Moldova was 
particular in that, in parallel with russification, efforts at Moldovanising 
the deep Romanian imprints of the union republic were actively pursued 
since the 1920s. Whereas russification was highly successful in Moldova, 
the attempts to construct a Moldovan ethnicity proved rather fruitless.     
 
Whereas the union republics of Eastern Europe had a significant share of 
ethnic Russians, the union republics of the small geographical area of the 
Transcaucasus had very small shares of ethnic Russians.224 The level of 
the national consciousness was very high with strong nationalist 
movements, especially in Armenia and Georgia, which also had large 
native intelligentsias. This, in turn, meant that both union republics, in 
fact, were overrepresented, viewed their share of the total population in 
the central leadership of the communist party (CPSU). As opposed to 
Georgia and Armenia, which were historically rooted in Christianity, 
                                                          
222 In comparison to both Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania’s share of 9.4% of Russians was 
small. Cf. (Pavlenko 2008: 284).  
223 The three Baltic States had succeeded in becoming independent during the Civil war. 
However, during World War II and on the basis of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the 
Baltic States were re-annexed into the USSR in 1940. Cf. (Pavlenko 2008: 288).  
224 The highly mono-ethnic Armenia had an insignificant share of ethnic Russians which 
amounted to 1.6%. Georgia and Azerbaijan, much more multi-ethnic, housed Russians 
populations of 6.3% and 5.6% respectively. Cf. (Pavlenko 2008: 284). 
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Azerbaijan was however predominantly Islamic and, furthermore, was 
not ranked as high as the two other union republics by the central Soviet 
leadership. However, the special position, and the prerogatives, that all 
three union republics enjoyed during Soviet rule, was manifest in the 
relaxation of the russification policies. Part of this relaxation, in fact, 
meant that, exclusively in these union republics, their “national languages 
were already declared official under the Soviet regime” (Pavlenko 2008: 
292).  
 
As opposed to the union republics of the Transcaucasus, the situation of 
the five union republics, stretching over the vast territory of Central Asia, 
was very different since the population of almost 50 million was 
predominantly Islamic. Ranked low by the Soviet central leadership, 
these republics had no privileged position. Also, the republics were 
largely multi-ethnic, housing not only significant shares of ethnic 
Russians but also a substantial share of national minorities. In fact, 
Kazakhstan, being the most heterogeneous of all 15 union republics, 
housed the largest share of ethnic Russians (37.8%), in proportion to its 
total population of 16.5 million, and had a substantial number of national 
minorities.225 The national structure of Uzbekistan, the largest of the 5 
Central Asian republics, was highly different with the titular nationality 
amounting to 71.4%, compared with the mere 39.7% of Kazakhs in 
Kazakhstan, and with the ethnic Russians amounting to the relatively 
small share of 8.3%.  Of the three smaller republics, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan had rather small shares of ethnic Russians, 9.7% and 9.5%, 
respectively, while Kyrgyzstan had a significant share (21.5%). (Pavlenko 
2008: 284) Although russification policies were severely applied 
throughout the vast Central Asian territory, the level of success varied 
greatly. In fact, largely successful in the urban areas, particularly among 
the titular nationalities, the inefficiency of these policies was blatant in the 
large rural areas, predominantly inhabited by large segments of national 
minorities, where the illiteracy rate was very high.  
 
                                                          
225 In fact Kazakhstan was the only union republic in which the domineering nationality 
was not in a majority position. Cf. (Pavlenko 2008: 284). 
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Minority language rights protection in the former 
Soviet Union 
Although the level of success of the russification policies varied greatly, 
between the 14 union republics, as well as within, it is evident that the 
Russian language was the lingua franca throughout the Union, and by the 
end of Soviet rule, “82 per cent of the population spoke it fluently or as a 
native language“ (White 2011: 164). Concomitantly, however, the 
languages of the titular nationalities, as well as the multitude of minority 
languages, were very much part of the linguistic repertoire since “about 
130 other languages were spoken somewhere on Soviet territory” (White 
2011: 164). The multitude of linguistic communities that inhabited the 
vast Russian Empire, and subsequently, the Soviet Union, made language 
planning a central component of the russification policies that were 
introduced from the mid-19th century. In the beginning, the spread of 
Russian was harshly, however, selectively applied, reaching its peak with 
the introduction of the Ems Edict of 1876, which “prohibited the use of 
the Ukrainian language” (Vollebaek 2009: 3). In the aftermath of the 1905 
revolution, however, a relaxation of the repressive language policies was 
introduced, which, in turn, meant that not only did language planning 
become more systematic, the spread of the Russian language started to be 
made concomitantly to the promotion of minority languages.226 With the 
coming of the Russian revolution in 1917, the goal of late imperial Russia 
had been reached, since the national elites had “integrated Russian into 
their linguistic repertoires” (Pavlenko 2008: 279). However, bilingualism 
was limited to the national elites and never reached the vast segments of 
the population, which largely remained monolingual.  
 
The promotion of the Russian language was momentarily stopped by the 
indigenisation policy that was introduced by the new Soviet leadership in 
the beginning of the 1920s. Indeed, part of the bigger nation-building 
programme, these “early language policies, advanced by Lenin and his 
followers, aimed to support and develop national and ethnic languages 
on the assumption that the new regime would be best understood and 
accepted by various minority groups if it functioned in their own 
                                                          
226 The promotion of minority languages was particularly seen in an increase of minority 
language schools as well as a flourishing of publication houses which had started to 
publish books and periodicals in a multitude of minority languages. Cf. (Pavlenko 2008: 
279).    
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languages” (Pavlenko 2008: 280). The strengthening of national cultures 
and languages not only meant an important increase in minority 
language schools, in general, but, in particular, it helped contribute to the 
fact that “millions of minority peasants became literate by attending 
schools in their own language” (Vollebaek 2009: 4-5). Thus, whereas the 
policy of bilingualism had contributed to making national elites more 
proficient in Russian, the promotion of national and minority languages 
under the indigenisation policy was more encompassing. Apart from the 
fact that it allowed national languages to take on a hegemonic position, 
since “titular languages began to assume their functions across all 
domains”, it helped educate the masses by schooling them in their 
minority languages. (Pavlenko 2008: 280) However, the explosiveness of 
these national and minority language policies soon became manifest, 
especially in republics with strong nationalist movements, like Armenia 
and Georgia, which subsequently, led to “a wave of repressions and 
purges of national elites” (Pavlenko 2008: 280).  
 
Caused by concerns primarily over the emergence of increasing 
nationalism, but also over apprehensions of decreasing mastery in the 
Russian language among the vast non-Russian population, the 
abandonment of the indigenisation policy became inevitable. Therefore, 
policies to promote and strengthen the Russian language started to be 
implemented from the mid- 1930s. Anchored in the increasing Soviet 
centralisation, the Russian language was propagated as “a language of 
state consolidation, industrialisation, and collectivisation” (Pavlenko 
2008: 280). In education, the 1938 decree introduced a centralised 
curriculum where the instruction of the Russian language was made 
compulsory in non-Russian schools. This, however, did not mean the 
rejection of minority schools which continued to run in native languages. 
Thus, the new language policy was, in fact, a continuation of the policy of 
bilingualism, introduced in the last phase of imperial Russia, where the 
promotion of the Russian language was made concomitantly to the 
promotion of minority languages. This was further formalised with the 
1958 amendment to the Soviet Education Act, which, on the one hand, 
emphasised that “each child should be educated in his or her mother 
tongue”, at the same time as it was emphasised that “the question of 
which languages children should learn or be instructed in was a matter of 
parental choice” (Vollebaek 2009: 6).  
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Since social mobility presupposed proficiency in the Russian language, 
parents’ choice was, however, often limited to enrol their children into 
schools where instruction was Russian. This consequently meant that the 
“law led to an increase in enrolment in Russian-medium schools” 
(Pavlenko 2008: 281). The amendment was “violently” resisted by the 
union republics since this entailed that the populations of the republics 
“no longer had to study the local language as a second language” 
(Vollebaek 2009: 6). Whereas the consequences of this change of policy 
were favourable to increase the spread and proficiency of the Russian 
language to the general masses of the population, the effects were highly 
detrimental to the titular national languages, whose importance had 
become formally not only secondary to the Russian language but also 
secondary to minority languages. In view of the increasing importance of 
the Russian language, both as the language of social mobility, as well as 
the language of interethnic communication, large segments of national 
minorities throughout the Union either went to schools where the 
medium of instruction was Russian, or, alternatively, were educated in 
their minority languages with Russian as the obligatory second language.  
The consolidation of the new language policy, anchored in the 
prerogatives given to the Russian language, concomitantly to the 
promotion of minority languages in education, manifested itself in the 
1977 Constitution. Indeed, “for the first time in Soviet history, republican 
Constitutions contained no reference to the language of the titular 
republican group as the State language” (Vollebaek 2009: 6-7). Because of 
the sanctified status of the Georgian language, resistance to this 
revolutionary clause was particularly voiced in Georgia, which, in fact, 
led to the re-establishment of the Georgian language as the State language 
in the Georgian republican Constitution. 
 
Although the policy change meant an enormous increase in the share of 
the population becoming Russian-speaking, as attested by the fact that 
upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union the 14 union republics “were 
home to 25 million ethnic Russians and 36.5 million native speakers of 
Russian” (Pavlenko 2008: 283), there were huge variations in-between the 
union republics. Whereas there was an enormous increase in the share of 
the population becoming Russian-speaking in Moldova, Ukraine and 
particularly Belarus, the increase was insignificant in the union republics 
of the Transcaucasus as well as in the majority of the union republics in 
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Central Asia227. (Pavlenko 2008: 284) The russification of the education 
system took place concomitantly though to the continued existence of 
minority education, where large segments of minority groups still were 
educated in minority education establishments. Particular for these 
minority schools of the Soviet Union was that generally these were 
completely segregated from the various national educational 
establishments, and actually often belonged to the national educational 
system of the neighbouring kin-state. For instance, minority schools in 
Kyrgyzstan, where the medium of instruction was Uzbek, were in fact 
part of the educational system of Uzbekistan, and vice versa. This 
arrangement, furthermore, meant that “some Soviet republics supplied 
personnel, curricula and textbooks to their co-ethnics in other Soviet 
republics” (Vollebaek 2009: 9). When, in the beginning of the 1990s, the 
Soviet Union disintegrated into its 15 constituent parts, the segregation of 
these minority groups became particularly blatant since they neither 
spoke the national language, nor had been instructed in the history, 
culture and geography of what was to become their home state.  
The deconstruction of the Soviet Union  
The rejection of the Soviet totalitarian system would lead, not only to the 
destruction of the Soviet system, but also to the destruction of the Soviet 
State, even if it became apparent that the demise of the Soviet State was 
neither what the new Soviet political leadership had predicted nor 
wanted. Upon the ascent to power in 1985, Gorbatchev diagnosed the 
disastrous economic situation as having been the result of, not only the 
centralisation of the economy, but also the centralisation of the political 
system. This would, consequently, lead to a series of reforms under the 
policies of glasnost and perestroika, where the restructuring of the economy 
(perestroika) was diagnosed as being dependent upon the democratisation 
of the society (glasnost). Since glasnost meant “real freedom also for the 
nationalities”, this would, consequently, lead to the liberation of the 
nationality component. (Lundestad 1994: 140) The repercussions of 
glasnost on the nationality issue would, subsequently, mean that not only 
was there rejection of the system but the very essence of the constitution 
of the multinational State started to become seriously questioned. 
                                                          
227 In Central Asia it was only the very heterogeneous Kazakhstan that experienced a large 
increase in the share of the population becoming Russian-speaking. Cf. (Pavlenko 2008: 
284).   
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Facilitated by the fact that the 15 Union republics legally had both 
autonomy as well as the right to secession inscribed in their respective 
republican Constitutions, the nationalist impoundments were rapidly to 
burst. What is highly surprising, in retrospect, is that Gorbatchev and the 
ideologues of the new political leadership did not predict the pitfall of the 
nationality component of democratisation since they apparently “saw 
nationalism as no threat to the Soviet Union’s existence” (Vollebaek 2009: 
7). 
 
Although “the nation became the alternative to communism”, there were 
great variations between the Union republics as to the level of nationalist 
strife and nationalist independence claims. (Kennedy 1991: 9) Whereas 
the Baltic States, Georgia and Armenia rapidly were endorsing their 
nationalist aspirations and their claims for independencies, outright 
secession was not part of the agenda of most of the other Soviet Union 
republics. However, the centrifugal forces entailed by democratisation, in 
parallel with the rapidly deteriorating economy, would lead to a process 
of rapid generalised secession and the subsequent demise of the Soviet 
State. Furthermore, not only would the increased autonomy lead to 
increased nationalism on the republican level, this would in turn generate 
intra-republican tensions which, in some cases, would escalate into 
violent inter-ethnic conflict, which, in fact, contributed to further weaken 
the Soviet State at the same time as it “precipitated its demise” (Vollebaek 
2009: 7). 
 
The upsurge of promotion of national languages and cultures on the 
republican level, in parallel with social unrest, would cause upheavals in 
the minority-dominated Autonomous regions of particularly the 
Transcaucasus but also in Moldova. What started as strikes in the 
Armenian-dominated Azerbaijani province of Nagorno-Karabakh228, in 
1988, would develop into inter-ethnic violent conflict and outright war 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as a consequence of the unilateral 
secession of the Autonomous Republic. The conflicts in the Georgian 
Autonomous region of South Ossetia and the Moldovan region of 
Transnistria were directly linked to, and in opposition to, the nationalist 
agendas of the respective governments. In fact, the promotion of the 
                                                          
228 Although domineeringly populated by Armenians, Nagorno-Karabakh was integrated 
into Azerbaijan in the 1920s as an Autonomous province. Cf. (Matveeva 2002: 7) 
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national languages as sole official languages provoked nationalist 
uprisings in the highly russified enclaves of South Ossetia and 
Transnistria which, as a consequence, were proclaiming unilateral 
secessions from their mother republics. Weakened by both loss of 
political power and the catastrophic economic situation, the central Soviet 
leadership was incapable of handling the nationalist conflicts and 
particularly “the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan further 
weakened the Union” (Lundestad 1994: 140). 
 
The final blow to the survival of the Soviet Union was to be anchored in 
the power struggle between the leading Union republic and the federal 
level. Indeed, increased autonomy for the Union republics naturally 
entailed increased autonomy also for the powerful Russian republic, 
which meant that “the nominally federal structure of the RSFSR assumed 
a real significance for the conduct of domestic politics” (MRGI 2011a: 3). 
The legitimacy of the newly elected Russian president, Yeltsin, who came 
to power by furthering the agenda of increased “regional powers, built on 
an alliance between regional economic interests and local nationalist 
groups”, challenged the agenda of Gorbatchev. (MRGI 2011a: 3) Indeed, 
having miscalculated the power of the liberation of the nationality 
component, Gorbatchev realised that in order to guarantee the survival of 
the Soviet Union, at the same time as winning the power struggle with 
Yeltsin, which actually boiled down to the same thing, the federative 
structure of the Soviet Union had to be altered. By launching the Union 
Treaty in November 1990, in an attempt to establish a confederation of 15 
sovereign states, Gorbatchev sought at the same time to use the power of 
the local nationalities in the 20 Autonomous Republics. In fact, in the 
Union Treaty, the sovereign status was not only granted to the 15 Union 
republics but also to the Autonomous republics which were put “on a par 
with the Union republics” (MRGI 2011a: 3). The power struggle between 
Yeltsin and Gorbatchev ended with the failed coup229 of August 1991, 
which, in turn, contributed to the defeat of Gorbatchev, and, 
subsequently, to “the formal abolition of the party”, which was rapidly 
followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. (Lundestad 1994: 144)  
 
                                                          
229 In opposition to the Union Treaty of Gorbatchev the putsch was staged by communist 
hard-liners who sought to restore the centralised nature of the Soviet Union. Cf. (White 
2011: 22-23).  
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Even though the nationality component contributed to dismantle the 
second Russian Empire, as it did the first, it is at the same time true that 
this was one factor amongst many. The major cause, however closely 
linked to the liberation of the nationality component, must be sought in 
the rejection of the totalitarian socialist ideology, which, in turn, meant 
the “collapse of the legitimacy of communist rule and of the party as 
ruler” (Lundestad 1994: 144). Soviet disintegration had devastating effects 
upon national minorities, generally, and particularly, in the realm of 
minority languages and minority education. Indeed, in the newly 
proclaimed independent states, where nation-building processes would 
run concomitantly to state-building, de-russification policies were 
introduced as a consequence of nationalist policies. These policies 
generally meant that “Russian lost its status of a supra-ethnic language”, 
in favour of the national titular languages which became sole official 
languages.230 (Pavlenko 2008: 282) Consequently, the minority groups, 
which generally spoke Russian but had no or little knowledge in the 
newly proclaimed state language, became naturally excluded from the 
societies in which they lived. The increasing segregation of national 
minorities became particularly blatant in the area of education. Since 
large segments of national minority groups did not have mastery in the 
new state language they, consequently, were dependent on minority 
education establishments. However, whereas minority education during 
Soviet times had been anchored in a transnational arrangement of mutual 
obligations with the respective kin states, this system had seriously been 
severed in the new national settings, which both undermined the quality 
of minority education, in parallel with fortifying the segregation of large 
minority groups. (Vollebaek 2009: 9)  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
230 Except in Belarus where it was decided to preserve Russian as an official language 
concomitantly to the introduction of Belarussian as official language. Cf. (Pavlenko 2008: 
285).  
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12 
MOLDOVA AND MINORITY LANGUAGE 
RIGHTS PROTECTION 
Moldovan independence 
In the wake of the failure of the Soviet putsch in August 1991, Moldova 
rapidly proclaimed its independence on the 27th of August 1991. Already 
prior to the proclamation of independence, however, the viability of the 
new state was challenged both internally as well as externally. The 
external factors were historically engrained and pertained to the great 
influences of both Romania and Russia, which, in turn, would be the root 
causes of the internal divisions of the newly formed state and which still 
permeates Moldovan politics and society.  
 
The independence of the principality of Moldova, formed in the 1350s, 
and peaking in terms of political power in the latter part of the 15th 
century, became short-lived. (Crowther & Josanu in Berglund et al. 2004: 
549-550) In 1538, the principality became a vassal to the Ottoman Empire, 
before becoming a pawn in the wars of imperial expansionism during the 
18th and 19th centuries. Under Ottoman tutelage, the internal autonomy of 
Moldova was, however, preserved, and during the 17th century a 
Romanian “transnational” movement231, transposing also the 
principalities of Wallachia and Transylvania232, started to construct a 
Romanian identity, based on “a common ethno-genesis and started to 
consolidate and propagate a national consciousness on this basis” (van 
Meurs 1998: 40). The awakened Romanian national consciousness was, 
however, not ripe enough to create a Romanian nation-state, as was 
attested by the 1848 revolution which in fact failed in all three 
principalities. Furthermore, the consecutive Russo-Turkish wars during 
                                                          
231 Intellectuals from the three principalities laid the foundations for the construction of 
the idea of a common ancestry and the creation of a national identity and independence. 
Although the revolutions of 1848 “failed in all three principalities, these ideals remained 
on the political agenda” (van Meurs 1998: 40).  
232 Whereas both Moldova and Wallachia were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire, the 
principality of Transylvania belonged to the Habsburg Empire. Cf. (van Meurs 1998: 40). 
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the 18th and 19th centuries would heavily undermine the realisation of the 
pan-Romanian movement. Indeed, as a consequence of the Russian 
victory in the Russo-Turkish war of 1806-1812, and as manifest by the 
Treaty of Bucharest of 1812, “the bulk of current Moldova, Bessarabia, 
was annexed by Russia” (Crowther & Josanu in Berglund et al. 2004: 550). 
As a result of the annexation and in order to russify the sparsely 
populated territory, tsarist Russia actively pursued a policy of 
colonisation where Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians as well as 
Gagauzians233 would settle in the area, contributing to making the major 
part of Moldova ethnically highly diverse. (Crowther & Josanu in 
Berglund et al. 2004: 550)  
 
The Russian influence over Moldova was, however, intermittently 
reduced with the Treaty of Paris in 1856, ending the Crimean War and 
returning parts of Bessarabia under Ottoman tutelage, at the same time as 
granting internal autonomy to Moldova. A few years later, with the 
formation of the Kingdom of Romania (1859), the principality of Moldova 
ceased to exist, and was integrated into the new Romanian state.234 In 
1918, in the wake of the Russian revolution and as a result of the 
emergence of the Moldovan national movement235, Bessarabia was 
integrated into Romania, as was attested by “the proclamation of 
unification with Romania on 9 April 1918” (van Meurs 1998: 42). 
However, the unification with Romania had little support among the 
broad masses of the Bessarabian population, who had been under the 
Russian sphere of influence since 1812, and for whom the unification was 
more perceived as a “Romanian annexation” (van Meurs 1998: 45).   
 
As part of the newly established Soviet Union’s policy of extending its 
sphere of influence in the Balkans, in general, and to allow for the future 
re-annexation of Bessarabia, in particular, the Moldovan Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) was “established on 12 October 1924 in 
                                                          
233 The Gagauzians, originating from the Turkish people but of Christian faith, were 
brought to Bessarabia from the Balkan Peninsula. Cf. (Chinn & Roper 1998: 88). 
234 Although formed in 1856, the Kingdom of Romania stayed under Ottoman rule until 
the Ottoman defeat in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 when recognition of 
independence was granted to Romania at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Cf. (Lukic in 
Ramet 2010: 45-46) 
235 The national movement, which emerged already in the 1905 revolution, was quite an 
insignificant organisation constituted primarily by a small group of local intellectuals. Cf. 
(van Meurs 1998: 42). 
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extreme south-western Ukraine along the border with Romania” (King 
1998: 59). Apart from consisting of a 2% share of the present-day territory 
of Ukraine, the other part consisted of roughly the territory of present-
day Transnistria. In 1940, parts of Bessarabia were annexed by the USSR, 
and along with present-day Transnistria, the Moldovan Soviet Socialist 
Republic (MSSR) was established. During the approximately 50 year 
longevity of the Republic under Soviet tutelage, the painstaking efforts of 
the Soviet political leadership to “moldovanise” the inhabitants of the 
Republic and to construct a Moldovan nation, distinct from the Romanian 
nation “in terms of ethno-genesis, language, culture and history”, had 
proven rather futile. (van Meurs 1998: 44) Hence, when it became obvious 
that the Soviet Union would dissolve into its constituent parts in the 
beginning of the 1990s, the Moldovan Republic was ill-prepared, both 
politically as well as economically, to embark on the state-building 
process. The absence of a Moldovan national identity, and the attempts to 
formulate one, would create strong ethnic divisions, both within the 
Romanian-speaking camp (pan-Romanian nationalists versus Moldovan 
nationalists), as well as in between the Romanian-speaking camp and the 
Russian-speaking camp. In fact, the language issue would become the 
linchpin of the ethnic conflict, which would permeate party politics as 
well as becoming the catapulting factor to the decision of both Gagauzia 
and Transnistria to break away from the newly established Republic.  
 
As early as in September 1989, and as a reaction to the Moldovan Popular 
Front’s “growing Romanian ethno-nationalism”236, as well as a reaction to 
the newly adopted state language laws237, the leaders of the Russian-
dominated area of Gagauzia had proclaimed independence.238 In 1990, the 
                                                          
236 The growing ethno-nationalism raised fears of unification with Romania which would 
relegate both ethnic Moldovans as well as ethnic Russians to the status of minorities “in 
an enlarged Romania” (Kaufman & Bowers 1998: 138). These fears were not groundless 
since the nationalists of the Popular Front movement pursued an “increasingly open 
agenda of reunification with Romania” (Crowther & Josanu in Berglund et al. 2004: 574).  
237 The state language laws adopted in 1989 stipulated that Moldovan was the “state 
language of the republic” (van Meurs 1998: 52). Adding to the controversial declaration it 
was stated that the Moldovan language was in fact identical to the Romanian language 
“and that it was best represented by the Latin alphabet” (Chinn & Roper 1998: 93).  
238 Although the fear of unification with Romania was the overwhelming cause to the 
proclamation of independence, the trigger can be traced to a Moldovan parliamentary 
report on minorities, published in 1989, which classified the Gagauz “as an ethnic 
minority rather than an indigenous people” (Chinn & Roper 1998: 92).  
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Transnistrian region rejected the legitimacy of the newly democratically 
elected Moldovan parliament and proclaimed a Transnistrian Republic, 
independent from Chisinau. (Roper in Ramet 2010: 475) Whereas the 
autonomy of Gagauzia presented little problem to the Moldovan 
government and to the Russians, as attested by the rapid resolution of the 
conflict and the subsequent agreement on autonomy for Gagauzia of 
1994239, the stakes of the Transnistrian breakaway republic were far 
greater and were to have implications of another order, both 
domestically, as well as internationally. Domestically, being the most 
industrialised and urbanised region, along with a highly educated 
population, consisting of mainly Ukrainians, Moldovans and Russians, 
Transnistria was the economic locomotive of Moldova, at the same time 
as having “a large cadre of politically aware and active people” (Chinn & 
Roper 1998: 93).  
 
The domestic conditions, along with the fact that the location of 
Transnistria, historically being of a “strategic interest and vital for 
Russia”, entailed a transnational dimension to the conflict which only 
aggravated the same. (Kaufman & Bowers 1998: 141) In fact, the hardened 
positions, between the separatists of the ethnic Russians in Transnistria 
and the Moldovan government, were exacerbated when the 14the 
Russian Army intervened on the side of the separatists in 1992, leading to 
outright war.240 Even though the peace agreement of the 21st of July 1992, 
signed between Moldova and Transnistria, ended the violent conflict, a 
viable solution to the Transnistrian conflict has yet to be found. (Roper in 
Ramet 2010: 487) Thus, although de jure still part of Moldova, de facto the 
Moldovan government has no effective control over the Transnistrian 
                                                          
239 The agreement of December 1994 between the Moldovan government and the Gagauz 
leadership sets “the terms for extensive cultural, political, and social autonomy within 
Moldova” (Chinn & Roper 1998: 87). 
240 The peak of the military intervention was the Bendery battle which constituted a 
watershed both for Moldovan domestic politics as well as for Russian foreign policy. In 
Moldova, the Transnistrian war and particularly the Bendery battle made almost all 
members of the Popular Front government resign due to an imminent fear that the conflict 
threatened the political independence of Moldova. (Roper in Ramet 2010: 477) For Russia, 
the Bendery battle was the first military intervention in a former Soviet Republic. 
Furthermore, due to the fact that this intervention was met with almost no criticism from 
the West, this military intervention would be followed by others in the “Near Abroad” 
(Kaufman & Bowers 1998: 134).  
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republic, and internationally, the border with Ukraine is still monitored 
by OSCE peacekeepers241.  
 
Another serious challenge to the path of EU integration, and equally 
challenging to the viability of the newly formed state, was the breakdown 
of the Moldovan economy, which markedly aggravated Moldova’s post-
communist transition. This, furthermore, entailed that particularly the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank provided 
Moldova with heavy loans. However, due to the weak institutional 
structure of the newly established semi-presidential political system, 
“which left lines of authority between the president, parliament and 
government unclear”, the pace of the economic legislative reforms was 
slowed down. (Crowther & Josanu in Berglund et al. 2004: 575) Hence, 
although the pro-Romanian nationalists abdicated from the government 
in 1992242, and the “ethnic card” was played down, the social cleavages, in 
parallel to the disastrous economic conditions, were capitalised upon by 
the political parties. This, in turn, meant that during the greater part of 
the 1990s, “intra-elite fighting was prominent among the factors that led 
to political bankruptcy in the second half of the 1990s” (Crowther & 
Josanu in Berglund et al. 2004: 575).  
 
Even though the first decade of the 21st century meant significant positive 
changes, both economically243 as well as politically244, there are still severe 
shortcomings that the Moldovan government needs to address in order to 
assure an increase of the pace of EU integration. Hence, apart from the 
high levels of corruption that permeates Moldovan society, the frozen 
Transnistrian conflict remains the main stumbling block, both 
domestically, but also as concerns the Moldovan government’s pro-
European agenda and the furtherance of the negotiations of EU 
                                                          
241 Since 2003, the Transnistrian conflict has been mediated by the OSCE along with Russia 
and the Ukraine. (EU Report 2004a: 10) 
242 The Popular Front Movement lost its legitimacy when the national independence of 
Moldova was threatened by the Russian military intervention in the Bendery battle of 
1992. Cf. (Roper in Ramet 2010: 476-477). 
243 Even though there was a recovery in the Moldovan economy from the beginning of the 
2000s, still the situation is alarming and in 2002 “over 40% of the Moldovan population 
lived under the absolute poverty line” (EU Report 2004a: 15). 
244 The constitutional amendments of 2000 would transform the semi-presidential system, 
inaugurated by the 1994 Constitution, into a parliamentary regime. (Roper in Ramet 2010: 
487).  
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integration. This, in turn, explains why the aim of the Moldovan 
government to be integrated into the framework of the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement has not yet received any support from the EU. In 
March 2004, Moldova “recognised the importance of the Neighbourhood 
Policy for Moldova’s internal reform process, and as a way to come closer 
to the EU” (EU Report 2004a: 5). 
The demographic dimension  
Primarily a rural country with an agrarian-based economy, multi-ethnic 
Moldova was one of the smallest and poorest of the former Soviet 
republics. Stretching over a landmass of 33.851 km2 and bordering on 
Ukraine and Romania, the country was, however, of a strategic interest to 
the Russians due to its geographical location, where particularly the 
Transnistrian region historically had been the “key to the Balkans” 
(Kaufman & Bowers 1998: 140-141). The historically engrained Romanian 
influence on the population of Moldova, however actively discouraged 
by the Russians, became blatant when attempts at forming a Moldovan 
national identity in the late 1980s encountered competing visions of this 
Moldovan nation in the making. Thus, however active the Russian efforts 
during the 20th century at constructing a Moldovan nation (with a distinct 
history, language, and culture), these attempts largely failed, since the 
Romanian influence was overwhelming and actually would mean to 
“carve out a Moldavian part out of Romanian history” (van Meurs 1998: 
39). On the other hand, and causing both Gagauzia’s proclamation of 
autonomy as well as the Transnistrian proclamation of independence, the 
russification of Moldova had been particularly successful especially in 
these territories which claimed autonomy and independence in 1989-
1990. Hence, although all three “territorial units” are ethnically diverse, 
the origins of the Moldovan conflict pertain both to ethnic conflictive 
lines, as well as to geographic ones.  
 
The main geographic conflictive line is naturally established by the 
Dnestr River separating Transnistria, located on the right bank of the 
river, from the bulk of Moldova. This geographical demarcation line also 
goes hand in hand with the strongly russified Transnistria, as opposed to 
the strongly Romanian influence which permeates the greater part of 
Moldovan society on the left bank of the Dnestr. Bordering on Ukraine to 
the east, the ethnic structure of Transnistria has undergone radical 
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changes since the area started to be colonised under tsarist Russia from 
the beginning of the 19th century. Immigration of particularly Ukrainians, 
which formed the majority245 of the Transnistrian population, Russians, 
Gagauz and Bulgarians contributed to the ethnic diversification of the 
area that would become the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (MASSR) in 1924. Ethnic diversity notwithstanding, the 
successful russification of the approximately half a million inhabitants246, 
would in fact lead to a blurring of the ethnic boundaries, which, by the 
late 1980s, had led one analyst to define the dominant ethnic group of 
Transnistria “as the sum of Russians, Russified Ukrainians, Russified 
Moldovans and other groups that consider Russian as their first language 
and the USSR as their country” (Kolstö & Malgin 1998: 104). Not 
surprisingly then, when the Moldovan political elite, by the late 1980s, 
started to show clear signs of pan-Romanian nationalism, by adopting 
state language laws which proclaimed Moldovan as the state language, 
the Russian-speaking Transnistrians rapidly proclaimed independence 
from the otherwise Romanian influenced Moldova. The Transnistrian 
Republic covers approximately 11% of the territory of Moldova and the 
population amounts to approximately half a million. (EU Report 2004a: 
10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
245 In the 1926 census the share of the Ukrainians amounted to 48.5% in comparison to the 
Moldovans who constituted 30.1% of the former Moldovan Autonomous Republic, which 
more or less represents present-day Transnistria. Cf. (King 1998: 60).    
246 According to the 2004 census carried out by the Republic of Transnistria the population 
amounted to 555.347. Cf. (CREDO Report 2004: 8). 
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Table 12.1. Ethnic structure of the MASSR population according to the 1926 
census compared with the ethnic structure of the Transnistrian Republic 
according to the 2004 census carried out by the Republic (data retrieved from 
King 1998: 60 and the CREDO Report 2004: 8) 
 
Nationality 1926 
number 
1926 
% 
2004 
number 
2004 
% 
Moldovan/Romanian 172.556 30.1 177.156 31.9 
Russians 48.868 8.5 168.270 30.3 
Ukrainians 277.515 48.5 159.940 28.8 
Gagauz - - 11.107 2.0 
Bulgarians 6.026 1.0 11.107 2.0 
Other/non-declared 67.149 11.9247 27.767 5.0248 
Total 572.114 100 555.347 100 
 
 
Although the majority of the Moldovan controlled area on the left bank of 
the Dnestr had been highly impacted by the Romanian influence, the 
Russian influence since the Second World War had also been strong in 
parts of the bulk of Moldova. Thus, although located in the southernmost 
parts of Moldovan controlled territory and bordering on Romania, the 
“autonomous territorial unit”249 of Gagauzia had also been most 
vulnerable to the “harsh and continuing russification, experienced since 
the end of the Second World War” (Chinn & Roper 1998: 92). Stretching 
over 10-12% of the Moldovan landmass, with a population amounting to 
approximately 300 000, composed by a majority of Gagauz250 (47%) as 
                                                          
247 In the 1926 census the numerically large portion of “Others/Non-declared” referred 
primarily to: Jewish (8.5%), Germans (1.9%), Poles (0.8%) and Romani (0.2%). Cf. (King 
1998: 60).  
248 In the category “Others/Non-declared” of the 2004 census, the group consists amongst 
others of Romani (0.4%) and Jews (0.1%). Cf. (CoE Report 2009: 6)   
249 The Law on the status of Gagauzia was approved by the Moldovan Parliament on the 
23rd of December 1994. Article 1 of the said Law recognises Gagauzia as an “autonomous 
territorial unit with a special status for the self-determination of the Gagauz people”. 
However, at the same time it is stipulated that Gagauzia is a “constituent part of the 
Republic of Moldova” (Chinn & Roper 1998: 98).  
250 The Gagauzians originate from the Turkish people, however being of Christian faith. 
Being discriminated against by the Ottoman Moslems they migrated from Bulgaria (then 
under Ottoman rule) and settled in the Bessarabian part of Moldova in the late 18th 
century. Cf. (Chinn & Roper 1998: 87-88).  
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well as Ukrainians, Moldovans, Bulgarians and a small share of Russians, 
the imprint of the Russian influence was remarkably strong. (Chinn & 
Roper 1998: 93; King 1994: 357-358) Largely due to the fact that the 
educational establishments only provided for instruction in Russian, 
Russian remained “the language of public life” and so the population of 
Gagauzia became almost completely Russian-speaking. (Chinn & Roper 
1998: 93) Thus, just as in the Transnistrian case, the population of 
Gagauzia was to react with provocation to the state language laws of 
1989. However, even more provocative was the 1989 parliamentary 
report on minorities, “classifying the Gagauz as an ethnic minority rather 
than an indigenous people” (Chinn & Roper 1998: 92). 
 
Table 12.2. Ethnic structure of the Moldovan controlled areas according to the 
censuses of 1989 and 2004 (data retrieved from the CoE Report 2009: 6) 
 
Nationality 1989 number 1989 % 2004 number 2004 % 
Moldovan 2.796.307 64.5 2.578.099 76.2 
Romanian -251 - 74.433 2.2 
Ukrainian 598.280 13.8 284.200 8.4 
Russian 563.597 13.0 199.617 5.9 
Gaugazian 151.738 3.5 148.867 4.4 
Bulgarian 86.707 2.0 64.283 1.9 
Jews 43.354 1.0 3.383 0.1 
Roma 13.006 0.3 13.533 0.4 
Others/non-
declared 
82.371 1.9 16.917 0.5 
Total 4.335.360 100 3.383.332 100 
 
 
Even though the language issue, and “the fear of unification with 
Romania”, made both Gagauzia and Transnistria natural allies against the 
central government in Chisinau, the internal prerequisites of the two 
breakaway regions were very different and would, consequently, present 
very different stakes, both to the central government in Chisinau, 
internationally, but also internally to the respective political leaderships 
                                                          
251 In the 1989 census the Moldavian and the Romanian nationalities are not separated 
from one another but lumped together in the category of the “Moldovans”. Cf. (CoE 
Report 2009: 6). 
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of the two regions. (Chinn & Roper 1998: 93) Thus, the urbanised and 
highly industrialised Transnistria stood in stark contrast to the “almost 
entirely agricultural and village-oriented” Gagauzia, which, furthermore, 
had the lowest educational attainment, as opposed to Transnistria, which 
had a highly educated population. (Chinn & Roper 1998: 93-94) 
Furthermore, the geographic location of Transnistria, the longevity of the 
Russian influence252, as well as the numerically large shares of ethnic 
Russians and Ukrainians, had had an enormous impact on every sphere 
of the Transnistrian society. The politically active population of 
Transnistria would react more violently to the pro-Romanian policies of 
Moldovan state-building, where the state language laws were only part of 
the problem, and which went completely counter to the pro-Russian 
political agenda of the Transnistrian political elite. Hence, where the 
limited claims of the Gagauz were rapidly endorsed by an agreement in 
1994, setting the terms “for extensive cultural, political and social 
autonomy within Moldova”, the Transnistrians would not settle for 
anything less than outright independence, which, consequently, resulted 
in much higher stakes, as attested by the still unresolved Transnistrian 
conflict. (Chinn & Roper 1998: 87) 
The sociolinguistic dimension 
The language issue did not only pertain to the conflict between the 
Russian-speaking communities and their Romanian-speaking confreres, 
but also pertained to divisions within the Romanian/Moldovan-speaking 
camp. Thus, in the late 1980s, when the search for the foundations of 
Moldovan statehood became acute, the issue of a distinct Moldovan 
language, separate from the Romanian one, emerged. The politicisation of 
the language issue, which even today remains a highly politically 
sensitive issue, concerned whether, in fact, Moldovan and Romanian 
boiled down to the same language, as stipulated by the pan-Romanian 
nationalists, forming the first democratically elected government, or 
whether there was a distinct Moldovan language, as declared by the pro-
Moldovan nationalists. The problematic demarcation between the two 
languages became obvious when, in 1989, the state language laws 
stipulated that the official language was Moldovan, however, adding at 
                                                          
252 Even though the russification of the Gagauz region had been strong since the end of the 
Second World War, the russification had been even more pervasive in Transnistria. Cf. 
(Kolstö & Malgin 1998: 104). 
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the same time that the two languages were in fact identical. The persistent 
linguistic debate, rooted in the Moldovan nation-building efforts and the 
attempt to form a nation, distinct from the Romanian one, is historically 
engrained and lies “in the linguistic and cultural debates of the 1920s and 
early 1930s” (King 1999: 141). 
 
The attempt to “moldovanise” the Moldovans started in the early 1920s 
and coincides with the creation in 1924 of the Moldovan Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic (MAASR). The Soviet policy was clear from the 
outset: in order to free the Moldovans from the Romanian bourgeois and 
capitalist yoke, and in order to prevent any future Romanian annexation 
of the territory, it was vital to “liberate” the Moldovans. The liberation 
was to be made within the Soviet realm, however, with the aim of 
creating a Moldovan language, as distinct from Romanian as possible. In 
the mid- 1920s the construction of the Moldovan language commenced 
with a new Moldovan grammar and lexicon. In the foreword to the first 
grammar book of Moldovan, it was stated that “the Moldovan language 
is an independent language, different from Romanian and also different 
from the language of all Moldovan books which were published before 
the formation of the Autonomous Moldavian SSR” (Dyer 1998: 74).  
 
The aim of the architects of the new Moldovan language was to construct 
a simple language, free from the French influenced capitalist Romanian 
language, and thus more democratic. The barriers to the implementation 
of the new language were, however, numerous and explain the failure of 
this linguistic experiment. In fact, the main target group of this highly 
artificial language was the ethnic Moldovans, which accounted for 
approximately one third of the MASSR population. This group primarily 
consisted of uneducated, often illiterate, peasants who had difficulty 
understanding the new language which often led to misinterpretations.253 
However, since misunderstandings were also noted amongst the 
educated cultural elite, there was a general fear that this could lead to 
“serious misinterpretations of the party’s policies” (King 1999: 136). 
Furthermore, the resistance of the cultural elite was, not only grounded in 
a lack of comprehension, they “were also reluctant to adopt a language 
based on forms of speech and writing they themselves found uncultured” 
                                                          
253 One quite hilarious example of a misinterpretation was a slogan published in a journal 
that went: “A cow to every collective farm worker” which had been interpreted as “Every 
collective farm worker is a cow” (King 1999: 136). 
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(King 1999: 119). Therefore, resistance from the Moldovans, in general, in 
parallel with a fear of the Soviet political leadership that party policies 
would neither be understood, nor properly implemented would 
consequently lead to a change of policy in the mid- 1930s. Even though 
the rhetoric of an independent Moldovan language remained, in practice, 
the policy change would lead to the abandonment of the simple language 
construction and the return to a more correct and educated form, which, 
paradoxically, “bore far more resemblance to literary Romanian than to 
the neologisms and archaisms of the Madan254 grammar” (King 1999: 
142). Consequently, by the late 1980s, when the Moldovan language was 
to be launched as the national language, there was in fact little to tell 
Moldovan and Romanian apart, other than the Cyrillic script that had 
been in use since 1938. (King 1999: 141-142)  
 
The focus on the identification of a state language, and the conflicts 
produced thereof, had relegated the issue of the protection of minority 
languages to the background. Even though the whole territory of 
Moldova (including the Transnistrian Republic) is composed of large 
segments of minority groups, where the Ukrainians make up 11.2% of the 
population, the Russians 9.4%, the Gagauzians 4% and the Bulgarians 
1.9%, the russification of these numerically largest minority languages 
remains a pervasive problem. This has entailed that even though ethnic 
Russians account for 9.4% of the population, “the Russian language is 
claimed by a much larger proportion of the population than chooses 
Russian nationality” (Ciscel 2008: 383). Thus, even though cultural 
autonomy was granted to national minorities, as a consequence of the 
Transnistrian violent conflict, these language rights are rarely upheld in 
practice. This situation became particularly blatant in Gagauzia, which 
acquired a special legal status in 1994, by the adoption of the Agreement 
regulating the autonomy of Gagauzia, and which, furthermore, stipulates 
that the official languages in this region are Moldovan, Russian and 
Gagauzian. However, although composed of almost 50% of the Gagauz 
minority “Russian remains the primary language of administration, 
commerce and education” (Chinn & Roper 1998: 91). Even though there 
have been attempts to raise the awareness of the Gagauzian minority 
language in the media and in schools, these efforts have proven rather 
                                                          
254 Madan was the “chief linguist” and the architect behind the first grammar book on 
Moldovan. Cf. (King 1999: 124). 
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fruitless. Thus, apart from two schools, which furthermore use Moldovan 
as the language of instruction, all the other schools in Gagauzia “use 
Russian as the language of instruction” (Chinn & Roper 1998: 91). 
 
Legal protection notwithstanding, the primary threat, not only to the 
survival of the Gagauzian language, but also to Ukrainian and Bulgarian, 
is the threat of total language assimilation with Russian. (CREDO Report 
2004: 3) Thus, the historically strong Russian influence on, not only the 
minority languages, but also on the state language255, both inhibits 
implementation of minority language rights, at the same time as it is 
manifest of the uneasy compromise between the Russian and the 
Moldovan languages, which still is at the core of the political dispute of 
Moldova. (Ciscel 2008: 375) 
Legislation in minority language rights upon gaining 
status as ENP-state 
Moldova ratified the Framework Convention on National Minorities 
(FCNM) on the 20th of November 1996, and has, as stated in the EU 
Report, “ratified most of the international Human Rights instruments” 
(EU Report 2004a: 8). The monitoring reports of both the EU and the 
Council of Europe, from 2004, are not as encompassing as the reports on 
the Western Balkan states. Furthermore, and especially as concerns the 
Report of the Council of Europe, it is consistently more focused on 
assessing the situation on the ground than monitoring existing legislation. 
As noted consistently throughout the Report of the Advisory Committee, 
more effective implementation of the legal framework, as well as 
assessment of the de facto situation, is primarily hindered by the “present 
socio-economic crisis”, and the lack of resources as well as the lack of 
statistics. (CoE Report 2004: 7) An even greater impediment to effective 
implementation, however, is the lack of law enforcement, in general, 
which permeates Moldovan society, “and the laws on protection of 
national minorities are no exception”, which furthermore is explained by 
                                                          
255 In Transnistria the discrimination against Moldovans to use the Latin script both in 
official contexts as well as in education has been reported by various human rights 
agencies and international organisations. Hence, the Russian influence also on the state 
language is demonstrated by “the continued vulnerability of even majority language 
groups” (Ciscel 2008: 373). 
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a lack of political determination which needs to be addressed by the 
Moldovan authorities. (CoE Report 2004: 7)  
 
At the same time, however, there is a conciliatory attitude of the Advisory 
Committee of the sensitivity of the linguistic issue, which has 
“understandably” produced a situation where the Moldovan government 
finds itself in a cul-de-sac. Indeed, for fear of disturbing the shaky social 
cohesion of the country, the Moldovan government has opted for the 
status quo which subsequently hinders any positive developments. The 
complex linguistic issue has, in fact, entailed that the state language is 
sometimes treated as being in need of particular legal support. (CoE 
Report 2004: 24) The fact that Moldova hadn’t, as of 2004256, adopted the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, is an example of 
the explosiveness of the prevailing linguistic issue in Moldova. (CoE 
Report 2004: 25) In this regard, the Transnistrian conflict and the 
problematic minority language situation does present the biggest 
problem, both to the Moldovan government, as well as to the Council of 
Europe and primarily the EU, since the conflict constitutes the very “key 
to enabling the country to develop into a stable and secure neighbour of 
the Union” (EU Report 2004a: 10).  
 
Although the situation in Transnistria is addressed by both the EU and 
the Council of Europe, no real assessment of the situation is made. 
Consequently, for practical reasons assessment of minority language 
rights protection in Transnistria has been left out of our study of 
investigation. Furthermore, due to the fact that information on existing 
legislation is less comprehensive in both monitoring reports, 
supplementary assessments, produced the same year, has been 
consulted.257 The legislative acts regulating minority language rights in 
Moldova are: the Constitution of 1994 (amended in 2000); the Law on 
National Minorities, adopted in August 2001; the National Policy Law of 
December 2003 (aimed at strengthening the legal basis for the protection 
of national minorities) and the Law on Education. Also, the Law on 
Functioning of Languages Spoken in Moldova, adopted in 1989, is still in 
                                                          
256 However, in the National Human Rights Action Plan, 2004 – 2008, one of the measures 
deals with the “projected ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages” (CoE Report 2004: 6). 
257 Resource Center for Human Rights (CReDO) (2004) Report on the Implementation of the 
Minorities Rights in Moldova, Chisinau, Moldova, 2004. 
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force. (Stoianova 2002: 2) Furthermore, the National Human Rights 
Action Plan 2004 – 2008, ratified by the Moldovan Parliament in October 
2003, sets out the measures that need to be adopted in the area of 
minority rights during the set time frame. 
Non-discrimination  
Assessment of Moldovan legislation pertaining to non-discrimination is 
scarce in both monitoring Reports, and as concerns the EU Report this is 
specifically surprising, seeing as how the non-discrimination norm 
generally attracts most of the EU Commissions’ attention. Non-
discrimination is, however, integrated as part of the EU-Moldova Action 
Plan from 2004, where it is stated that the Moldovan government has to 
“ensure effective protection of rights of persons belonging to national 
minorities” (EU Report 2004b: 12). Explicitly referring to the non-
discrimination norm, the EU points out that Moldova needs to “put in 
place and implement legislation on anti-discrimination, and legislation 
guaranteeing the rights of minorities, in line with European standards” 
(EU Report 2004b: 12 emphasis added). Whereas the EU Action Plan 
evidently points out that Moldova lacks legislation on anti-
discrimination, the Advisory Committee is of the opinion that this 
legislation exists, since they recommend the Moldovan authorities to 
“step up their efforts to find ways of obtaining a more complete picture of 
the implementation of the principles of non-discrimination and full and 
effective equality with respect to persons belonging to national 
minorities” (CoE Report 2004: 13, emphasis added).  
 
According to both the Moldovan Constitution of 1994, and the Law on 
National Minorities, adopted in 2001, it is, however, clear, that the legal 
provisions in the domain of non-discrimination, exist. Thus, Article 16, of 
the Constitution, stipulates that “All citizens of the Republic of Moldova 
are equal before the law and the public authorities, without any 
discrimination as to race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, 
sex, political choice, personal property or social origin” (Art. 16, 
Constitution of Moldova). Furthermore, instigations to “…ethnic, racial 
or religious hatred, the incitement to discrimination…” are prohibited 
and shall be prosecuted. (Art. 32, Constitution of Moldova). The Law on 
National Minorities, also guarantees the protection of persons belonging 
to national minorities, and, furthermore, stipulates that “any kind of 
discrimination based on the national minority affiliation is prohibited” 
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(Art. 4 of the Law on National Minorities). Thus, and concurring with the 
Report of the Advisory Committee, legal provisions pertaining to non-
discrimination do exist, even though they are not extensive.      
 
As regards implementation of existing legislation, the Advisory 
Committee recommends the Moldovan authorities to “continue their 
efforts to combat discrimination and promote tolerance and intercultural 
dialogue, through more effective monitoring and law enforcement in 
these areas; in addition, further awareness-raising measures, inter alia 
addressed to the police and the media should be taken” (CoE Report 
2004: 38). Even though the Advisory Committee points out that the 
“general climate of Moldovan society is one of tolerance and mutual 
respect”, ethnic discrimination has been reported. (CoE Report 2004: 7) 
Especially vulnerable are the Roma, where there have been reported 
incidents of violence and harassment, and where the media has 
contributed to fuel these incidents, by disseminating prejudices against 
the Roma. Furthermore, discriminatory acts, directed against the Roma 
by “members of the law enforcement bodies, are reported in most areas” 
(CoE Report 2004: 14). This is particularly serious, since it inhibits the 
willingness to report crimes, since “the police and judicial authorities 
tend to be reluctant to conduct necessary investigations and prosecute 
known perpetrators of violence against the Roma, especially when such 
acts are committed by police officers” (CoE Report 2004: 19).  
 
Even though the Advisory Committee notes, with satisfaction, that the 
Moldovan authorities have taken measures to fight discrimination against 
the Roma, of which the Governmental Programme for Roma Integration, 
adopted in 2001, is one example, it “has not resulted yet in tangible 
improvement of the situation” (CoE Report 2004: 14). Thus, the Advisory 
Committee encourages both central and local authorities to step up their 
efforts, and to “adopt a more resolute stance”, in order to fight the 
exclusion of the Roma more systematically. (CoE Report 2004: 8) Another 
problem, addressed by the Advisory Committee, and of great significance 
to more effective implementation, is the lack of data on the situation of 
persons belonging to national minorities. Hence, the problem of the lack 
of reliable statistics makes it “difficult to determine the real number of 
ethnically motivated manifestations of intolerance and hostility”, and 
therefore the Advisory Committee advises the authorities to “take all 
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steps necessary to enable adequate monitoring of the situation in this 
field” (CoE Report 2004: 19).  
 
Whereas the assessment of the Advisory Committee almost exclusively 
focuses on monitoring the situation on the ground, and the factors that 
impede more effective implementation, existing legislation is not one of 
these impeding factors and is therefore left unchecked. Thus, one has to 
conclude that the existing legislation does neither present a problem, nor 
necessitates developing, since it seems that it is only the development of 
“the implementation of the principles of non-discrimination” that would 
call for action from the Moldovan authorities. (CoE Report 2004: 13) The 
EU Report, on the other hand, provides neither assessment of existing 
legislation, nor assessment of the de facto situation. However, when 
accessing the information provided for in the EU-Moldova Action Plan, 
adopted in 2004, it is clear that the EU finds that no legislation pertaining 
to non-discrimination exists, since it is recommended that Moldova needs 
to “put in place and implement legislation on anti-discrimination” (EU 
Report 2004b: 12). The contradictory assessments of the two monitoring 
bodies are remarkable. However, when conducting a reading of both the 
Constitution as well as the Law on National Minorities, it is evident that 
legislation on non-discrimination exists, even though it is by no means 
comprehensive. Thus, taken in this study and based on the index scale, 
Moldova is positioned on the level of 1.0. 
 
Fig. 12.1. Moldova and level of rule adoption in non-discrimination upon 
gaining status as ENP-state 
 
2005 
   Tolerance                        x                                                              Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
(0): Absence of any non-discrimination norm; 
(1): General provisions such as an equality clause in the Constitution;   
(2): Non-discrimination laws are inserted in specific laws;  
(3): Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation which then means 
that there has been a complete transposition of the EU anti-
discrimination acquis; 
(4): Non-discrimination laws exceed the minimum requirements of 
the Directive. 
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Minority language use in official contexts  
The sensitivity of the linguistic issue is prevalent in the reports of both 
monitoring bodies. In fact, the particular status of Russian258, although a 
minority language, and the precarious stance of Moldovan, although the 
state language, is manifest throughout both monitoring reports. The 
fragility of the state language and its need for support, in parallel with the 
special status granted to Russian, becomes evident when the Advisory 
Committee takes note of the positive developments “made in recent years 
to make more efficient the learning of the State language by adults, and 
eliminate the difficulties previously found in implementing the 
Moldovan-Russian bilingualism, required of public servants” (CoE 
Report 2004: 24). Furthermore, the fact that the largest minority 
languages, Ukrainian and Gagauzian, to a very large degree, have been 
assimilated with Russian, in fact, centres the assessment on the protection 
of the Russian minority language and relegates, not only assessment of 
smaller minority languages, but also larger ones, to the background. This 
is also manifest in the legislative provisions of Moldova, as attested 
primarily by the Law on National Minorities, adopted in 2001. The 
sensitivity of the linguistic issue, which, furthermore, explains the 
cautious approach of particularly the Advisory Committee, is related to 
the fact that the language issue is a “vital aspect of the building process of 
the Moldovan State and of people’s identity” (CoE Report 2004: 8). 
Indeed, even though the Moldovan authorities “should ensure that 
legislation and the related practice provide the necessary conditions for 
effective implementation of the rights of persons belonging to minorities, 
relating to the use of their languages under the Framework Convention”, 
it is equally important that the authorities “should try to maintain a 
balanced approach that take into account the particular features of the 
linguistic situation in Moldova and the sensitivities of the groups 
concerned” (CoE Report 2004: 25).   
 
The differentiation of minority languages, and the various rights attached 
to them, is confirmed by the Law on National Minorities. Even though 
the Law provides all linguistic minorities, irrespectively, with the “right 
to have free use of their mother tongue, both in written and verbal form, 
                                                          
258 The initiatives made by the communist-led government to upgrade the Russian 
language to official status resulted in violent upheavals which in consequence led to the 
“moratorium on introducing measures to give Russian higher status” in 2002. (CoE Report 
2004: 25)  
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to have access to information in this language, to disseminate it, and to 
exchange information”, this right is very imprecise and does not pertain 
to the official realm. (Art. 7, Law on National Minorities). Indeed, rights 
pertaining to minority language use in official contexts are very much 
restricted to the Russian language and attests of its special status, and 
even though not yet having de jure status as official language, one could 
argue that Russian has de facto status as official language. Thus, Article 8 
stipulates that the “state shall ensure the publication of normative acts, 
official communication and other information of national importance in 
the Moldovan and Russian languages” (Art. 8, Law on National 
Minorities). Equally, the right to use Russian in judicial contexts is 
provided for in Article 12 which declares that “persons belonging to 
national minorities shall have the right to appeal to public institutions, in 
writing or verbally, in the Moldovan or Russian languages” (Art. 12, Law 
on National Minorities). The special status of the Russian language is 
equally manifest as regards the legal provisions regulating the display of 
signs and symbols. Hence, Article 10 equally provides for that “the name 
of localities, streets, institutions and public places shall be indicated in the 
Moldovan and Russian languages” (Art. 8, Law on National Minorities).  
 
The second group of rights pertains to minority languages having 
obtained autonomy status. Thus, in the locality of the Gagauz region, the 
legally protected status of the Gagauz language enjoys as extensive legal 
provisions as Russian. Hence, as stipulated by Article 8, in areas where 
the minority language enjoys autonomy status, “the normative acts of 
local importance, official communications and other information shall be 
published also in other official languages established by the respective 
laws” (Art. 8, Law on National Minorities). The same extensive legal 
provisions also pertain to the domain of judicial authorities, as well as 
regarding the display of signs and symbols. (Art. 12 and 10, Law on 
National Minorities) However, even though the autonomy status of the 
Gagauz language provides for extensive legal rights, the de facto situation 
is more problematic since these rights are rarely upheld in practice due to 
the predominant status of the Russian language.   
 
The third group of rights is attached to minority languages with neither 
special status nor autonomy status. These rights are less extensive and 
more imprecisely defined. Hence, the Law stipulates that in districts 
where the minority languages are spoken by a “considerable part of the 
242 
population, the acts of the local public administration shall be published in 
the language of such minority, if necessary” (Art. 8, Law on National 
Minorities, emphasis added). Just like the “considerable part” is not 
defined in terms of a numerical threshold, the phrase, “if necessary”, 
equally raises concerns as to what criteria this necessity would pertain to. 
Furthermore, and in the same vein, regarding provisions regulating the 
use of minority languages with public administration, Article 12 declares 
that “in localities where persons belonging to national minorities 
constitute a significant part of the population, the language of 
communication with public authorities may also be the language of the 
respective national minority” (Art. 12, Law on National Minorities). In the 
area of the displaying of signs and symbols, there are no legal provisions 
provided for. Not surprisingly, the Advisory Committee points out that 
the Moldovan authorities need to give “clarifications on the numerical 
threshold, required for the use of minority languages in relations with the 
administrative authorities” (CoE Report 2004: 25). 
 
However vague and imprecise the provisions of the last group, the EU 
Report notes that “in areas where the Ukrainian, Russian and Bulgarian 
population, or other ethnic minorities form a significant part of the 
population, it allows the use of minority languages in the public 
administration, as well as in the drafting of official acts” (EU Report 
2004a: 9). The assessment of the Advisory Committee is more nuanced 
and although reports have it that, on a general level, national minorities 
are content with “the opportunities they are given to use their own 
languages (…), more resolute efforts must be made to increase the actual 
presence of those languages – particularly Ukrainian and the languages 
of the smaller minorities, including the Roma – in such sectors as media, 
education and relations with authorities” (CoE Report 2004: 9). However, 
the special status of the Russian language, having de facto official 
language status, in fact, means that although previously coerced into 
learning it, the minority groups of today have no alternative to opt it out. 
Indeed, since proficiency in Russian is indispensable to guarantee any 
career opportunities, the use of other minority languages, although 
legally provided for, have often been opted out. Even though the 
differentiation of the rights attached to the different minority language 
groups is strong, where the Gagauz and the Russian languages enjoy 
much greater legal protection than other minority languages, in this 
study the assessment is based on the status of the Russian language. 
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Indeed, since the linguistic conflict primarily concerns the status of the 
Russian language that is what is of interest here. Thus, based on the index 
scale, Moldova is positioned on the level of 3.0.  
 
Fig. 12.2. Moldova and level of rule adoption in minority language use in official 
contexts upon gaining status as ENP-state 
 
2005 
   Tolerance                                                               x                       Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
    
(0): No recognition of minority languages; 
(1): The right to use the minority language in official contexts (before 
judicial and administrative authorities; i.e. the right to a translator);  
(2): The minority language can be used in Personal and Place Names 
(public signs); 
(3): The minority language can be used in official documents; 
(4): Minority language having status as official language. 
Minority language rights in education  
The division of the Moldovan society is blatant also in the educational 
domain, where the sensitivity of the linguistic issue also pertains to issues 
of the Moldovan national identity. Thus, the assessment of particularly 
the Council of Europe Report makes evident that, not only is it vital that 
the culture and history of national minorities are integrated in the 
Moldovan curriculum, but also that this takes place in parallel to a 
“strengthening of Moldova’s distinct identity” (CoE Report 2004: 27). 
Here again, the fragility of the Moldovan language in the context of 
education is emphasised, which also is attested by the fact that one 
section of the Council of Europe Report also integrates an assessment of 
the teaching of the state language. In this regard, the Advisory 
Committee points to the problematic situation of Moldovan-speaking 
pupils in Transnistria who are prohibited to use the Latin script. Indeed, 
the Advisory Committee “considers that the situation of the pupils, 
families and teachers concerned, who are de facto – at least in language 
terms – in a minority position in Transnistria, is unacceptable” (CoE 
Report 2004: 6). The gravity of the problem of the uncontrolled area of the 
Moldovan government is further emphasised, since the Advisory 
Committee stresses that “the principles enshrined in the Framework 
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Convention must be upheld, ensuring that the rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities living anywhere in Moldovan territory are 
respected” (CoE Report 2004: 6, emphasis added). Thus, just like the 
sensitivity of the language issue in minority language use called for a 
balanced approach, the linguistic issue, in parallel with Moldovan nation-
building, is equally challenging in the domain of minority language 
rights in education. Hence, “the intention (…) to include in the new books 
a multicultural dimension and to take a balanced approach to the 
country’s history, while strengthening Moldova’s distinct identity”, is an 
approach that is recommended by the Advisory Committee. (CoE Report 
2004: 27)  
 
The Constitution provides for educational rights for minorities. Hence, 
according to Article 35, of the Constitution, it is stipulated that, “the State 
will enforce under the law the right of each person to choose his/her 
language in which teaching will be effected” (Art. 35, Constitution of 
Moldova). The same article, furthermore, specifies that, “in all forms of 
educational institutions, the study of the country’s official language will 
be ensured” (Art. 35, Constitution of Moldova). Whereas the 
constitutionally protected guarantees provide for minority rights in 
education on a general level, the Law on National Minorities is more 
specific as concerns the scope of application. Hence, Article 6 of the Law, 
stipulates that, persons belonging to national minorities are entitled to 
“pre-school education, middle school, high school and professional, 
undergraduate and graduate education in Moldovan and Russian” (Art. 
6, Law on National Minorities). Furthermore, the same article stipulates 
that, the State “shall create conditions for the realization of their rights to 
education and training in their mother tongue (Ukrainian, Gagauz, 
Bulgarian, Jewish, etc)” (Art. 6, Law on National Minorities). In 
educational institutions, where “teaching is done partially or integrally in 
the languages of national minorities, the State shall contribute to the 
development of curricula and teaching materials, as well as to training of 
teaching staff, cooperating with other countries in this area” (Art. 6, Law 
on National Minorities). Also, minority groups are given the right to 
establish “pre-school institutions and private educational institutions of 
all levels”, on condition that “teaching of the Moldovan language and 
literature, as well as of the history of Moldova in all educational 
institutions”, is provided for. (Art. 6, Law on National Minorities) 
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The Advisory Committee considers that the Moldovan legal framework 
provides for “a generous legal basis, generally in line with international 
standards” (CoE Report 2004: 8). However, these legal provisions are not 
sufficiently implemented in practice, an assessment, furthermore, 
supported by the EU Report, which refers to the UN Human Rights 
Committee which has concluded that “effective implementation is 
lacking” (EU Report 2004a: 9). Hence, as regards the de facto situation, it is 
evident that the poor implementation concerns primarily the Roma and 
the Gagauz minorities who live in rural areas. The vulnerable situation of 
the Roma is particularly stressed by the Advisory Committee which 
points out that, “the complete isolation of Roma children, when they live 
in Roma villages far from other localities”, in parallel with a “lack of 
qualified teachers”, result in the very poor integration of Roma into the 
Moldovan educational system. (CoE Report 2004: 29) However 
commendable the measures259 introduced by the Moldovan authorities 
“there is as yet no possibility of learning Roma language in Moldovan 
schools” (CoE Report 2004: 31). In consequence, the Moldovan authorities 
“should redouble their efforts to improve the situation of the Roma” (CoE 
Report 2004: 8). On a more general level, the Advisory Committee raises 
the issues of, both the “lack of qualified teachers”, as well as the lack of 
“textbooks, appropriate for the education of national minorities”, as 
impediments to more effective implementation, and which the Moldovan 
authorities should address as a priority. (CoE Report 2004: 29). At the 
same time, the Advisory Committee points to the need to integrate an 
intercultural dimension which is “lacking in the history textbooks, 
currently used in Moldovan schools” (CoE Report 2004: 28).    
 
The problem of the lack of qualified teachers and textbooks 
notwithstanding, and apart from the Roma minority language, 
instruction in other minority languages is provided for. In fact, the 
continuous efforts of the Moldovan authorities, to “offer persons 
belonging to national minorities adequate opportunities to learn their 
languages, or study in those languages”, have increased the possibilities 
of minority language instruction. (CoE Report 2004: 31) Even though the 
                                                          
259 The measures introduced by the Moldovan authorities have specifically concerned both 
“socio-economic support” for the Roma families as well as introduction of “quotas for 
access to higher education” which have resulted in a numerical increase in Roma students 
in Moldovan universities. (CoE Report 2004: 29)  
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very low numerical thresholds260 enable pupils of Russian, Ukrainian, 
Bulgarian and Gaguzian descent to “study their mother tongue as part of 
the normal curriculum”, apart from instruction in Russian, there seems to 
be little interest from the other minority communities to pursue minority 
language instruction. (CoE Report 2004: 31-32) One factor inhibiting more 
effective implementation seems to be a lack of interest from the minority 
communities themselves, which surely is explained by the predominant 
position of the Russian language, but also an increased attention to the 
importance of the State language. The outstanding position of the Russian 
minority language can be seen in the fact that only the Moldovan and the 
Russian languages “are used in primary and secondary education” (CoE 
Report 2004: 32). Furthermore, the predominant position of the Russian 
minority language is also evident in the two newly opened State 
Universities, although on the initiative of the Gagauz and Bulgarian 
minorities, respectively, “the language of instruction in these 
establishments is, at least for the moment, Russian” (CoE Report 2004: 
31).  
 
Furthermore, the increased efforts from the Moldovan authorities, to 
“boost learning of the State language by persons belonging to national 
minorities”, have made minority communities more sensitive to the 
importance of becoming proficient in the state language, which is seen as 
“a precondition for the future socio-economic integration of their 
children” (CoE Report 2004: 30). This, in turn, has resulted in a situation 
where proficiency in Russian and Moldovan is considered far more 
important than, however legally provided for, the right to receive 
instruction in the minority language. Thus, as concluded previously, the 
Russian minority language has a particularly predominant position at all 
levels of the education system in Moldova, where not only the state 
language is perceived as a socio-economic guarantee for the future of 
minority pupils, but also in which the Russian minority language has an 
outstanding position, thus becoming prioritised before other minority 
languages. Furthermore, and on the basis of the index scale, since the 
legal framework actually provides the right to even establish minority 
universities, of which the two Gaugaz state universities are an example 
of, Moldova is positioned on the level of 4.0. 
                                                          
260 The numerical threshold is reported to be extremely low and sets the bar at four to five 
pupils. (CoE Report 2004: 31)  
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Fig. 12.3. Moldova and level of rule adoption in minority language rights in 
education upon gaining status as ENP-state 
 
2005 
   Tolerance                                                                                  x    Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
  (0): No education of or in minority language; 
(1): Children belonging to minorities have the right to learn their 
mother tongue in school; 
(2): At least parts of the curriculum (e.g. history or religion) are taught 
in the minority language; 
(3): Minorities have the right to educate their children completely in 
the mother tongue, either in state schools with a complete syllabus 
taught in the minority language or in specific minority schools; 
(4): Minorities have their own universities. 
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13 
GEORGIA AND MINORITY LANGUAGE 
RIGHTS PROTECTION 
Georgian independence 
Prior to the proclamation of independence on the 9th of April 1991, 
Georgia had little experience of being a sovereign state. Due to the 
strategic location of the country, at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and 
the Middle East, it had for long been the battleground of regional 
Empires. Furthermore, the region in the South Caucasus, consisting of 
present-day Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, was, in fact, territorially 
unsettled and “until the Soviet period, the region constituted more or less 
a single whole” (Lattimer 2003: 6). However, during the 11th and 14th 
centuries, and “after periods of Roman, Pontic, Iranian and Arab 
domination”, Georgia experienced an interlude of independent statehood 
and political unity. (MRGI 2011b: 1) In the 12th and early 13th centuries, 
the Georgian kingdom peaked in terms of political and cultural influence. 
Culturally, the early conversion to Christianity261, and the forming of the 
autocephalous Georgian Orthodox Church, “and its close link to 
Georgian as its liturgical language”, became central to what was to 
become the foundation of the Georgian nation. (MRGI 2011b: 1) However, 
from the mid-15th century, subsequent successive invasions from the 
Mongolians, the Turks, and the Persians contributed to the division and 
subjugation of Georgia which, to a large extent, remained fragmented, 
into a western part, under Ottoman tutelage, and an eastern part, under 
Persian suzerainty, until becoming successively incorporated into the 
Russian Empire.   
 
However, what started as a small Russian protectorate262, consisting of the 
region of Kartli-Kakheti in present-day eastern Georgia, consented to, and 
                                                          
261 In fact Georgians along with Armenians are two “of the oldest Christian people” 
(Lattimer 2003: 6). 
262 For fear of the growing Persian expansionism by the late 18th century, the King of the 
Eastern Georgian Kingdom, consisting of the Kartli-Kakheti region, sought protection 
from “co-religionist Russia” (MRGI 2011b: 1).   
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concluded by, both parties in the Treaty of Georgievsk of 1783, soon 
developed into coerced piecemeal Russian annexation of the entire 
Georgian territory during the course of the 19th century. The violent 
reactions from the Georgians during the 19th century were to no avail. 
However, in the aftermath of the Russian revolution, and at the height of 
civil war, Georgia proclaimed independence from Russia in 1918. The 
independence was, however, short-lived, and “despite Russia’s non-
aggression pact with Georgia”, the Red Army invaded Georgia in 1921 
and sealed its fate for the next 70 years as one of the Soviet Socialist 
Republics263. (Lattimer 2003: 7) In comparison with many of the other 
Soviet republics, Georgia held a particularly predominant position within 
the USSR which meant that Georgia actually enjoyed “de facto domination 
of the republic’s key political and economic posts” (MRGI 2011b: 2).  
 
Parallel to that, and as a consequence thereof, the highly multi-ethnic 
Georgia was also one of the least russified republics. Just as the Soviet 
nationalities policy emphasised “ethnicity before citizenship as the 
ultimate badge of belonging”, the same was true for Soviet Georgia 
where the state policies privileged the majority nation to the detriment of 
national minorities. (MRGI 2009: 2) However, also part of the Soviet 
nationalities policy and with the aim of accommodating the specific needs 
of national minorities, autonomous regions were established. In Soviet 
Georgia, the autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had 
been created and these regions had quite extensive self-rule. When the 
Georgian nationalist movement started its struggle towards 
independence in the late 1980s, multi-ethnic Georgia was badly prepared 
for statehood since the very foundation of the state-building process was 
lacking, namely a strong nation. Hence, the highly divided multi-ethnic 
society, both politically, culturally as well as territorially had produced a 
society where the “identification with the Georgian state among its 
various minorities” was almost inexistent. (MRGI 2011b: 2) As a 
consequence, ethnic nationalism became a prerequisite to, and closely 
intermingled with, the state-building process where the “independence 
and the legitimacy of the new state were largely expressed and 
understood as based on the unity of ethnic Georgians” (MRGI 2009: 2).   
                                                          
263 Georgia became an “independent Soviet republic” as late as in 1936 when the Georgian 
Soviet Socialist Republic was formed. In between 1922 and 1936 Georgia formed part of 
the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic along with Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. Cf. (Lattimer 2003: 7).  
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The strengthening of the nation-building process actually boiled down to 
rejecting everything non-Georgian where alternative identities came to be 
viewed as foreign, at best, and as threats, at worst. After having 
proclaimed independence on the 9th of April 1991, the first government 
under the lead of former Soviet dissident, Zviad Gamsakhourdia, 
introduced nationalist policies264 that “threatened to exclude minorities 
from political life” (MRGI 2011b: 2) Furthermore, the self-rule, previously 
granted to the Autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, was 
withdrawn. The nationalist policies of the short-lived government of 
Gamsakhourdia, which was ousted from power already in 1992265, 
radically worsened majority-minority relations. Even though the 
nationalist policies were denounced by the new administration, led by 
Eduard Shevardnadze, no real change was introduced, other than that the 
nationalist rhetoric was toned down. As a result of the aggressive 
nationalist policies of the Gamsakhourdia’s government, ethnic violent 
conflicts broke out in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in parallel with 
civil struggle in between Shevardnadze’s “government forces, and 
militias loyal to former president Gamsakhourdia” (MRGI 2011b: 2).  
 
Whereas Shevardnadze, with the support of Russian forces, went 
victorious from that battle, Georgia was defeated in the wars of the 
breakaway regions, which ultimately led to unilateral secessions and de 
facto independence. Viewed, however, the potential explosiveness of the 
unrecognised secessions of the two breakaway republics, bordering on 
the Russian Federation, in parallel to the weak Georgian government, 
Shevardnadze was prompted to agree to “Russian-led peacekeeping 
missions”, which marked the beginning of “protracted and heavily 
internationalized peace processes” (MRGI 2011b: 2). Thus, the beginning 
of Georgian independence was turbulent, both domestically as well as 
internationally, and throughout the 1990s, the weak state was challenged 
both from within and from the outside. Whereas the intra-élite fighting 
                                                          
264 The policies in question concerned the state language laws, the electoral laws and the 
citizenship law which were highly controversial since they further excluded minorities 
from political participation. Cf. (MRGI 2011b: 2).  
265 The 1992 January coup was a result of the violent conflicts that ravaged the country due 
to the unilateral secessions of the breakaway republics. The violent conflicts were also due 
to the authoritarian style that characterised Gamsakhurdia’s regime and which 
consequently led to that many of his former supporters lost confidence in him which 
actually resulted in “low-level civil strife and eventually outright civil war in 1991” 
(MRGI 2011b: 2).  
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eventually petered out, the challenges of the secessionist republics 
remained, and so did the international peacekeeping forces, where the 
“presence of Russian soldiers would become increasingly contentious”, as 
evidenced from the outbreak of war in 2008. (MRGI 2011b: 2)  
 
The political system of Georgia was confirmed in the Constitution, 
adopted on the 24th of August 1995, which, although establishing Georgia 
as a unitary state, at the same time integrated the Autonomous Republics 
and, thus, opened up the possibility for “federalism as a way of 
reintegrating these regions” (Kymlicka 2007: 179). Following the Rose 
Revolution of 2003, the pro-European agenda of the government, already 
initiated in the beginning of the 1990s with the aim of further distancing 
the future of Georgia from any Russian influence, was re-launched with 
emphasis. Already in 1999, Georgia had become a member of the Council 
of Europe, and the Framework Convention for National Minorities “was 
ratified by Parliament in late 2005” (Wheatley 2009: 4). However, even 
though President Saakashivili’s administration “has made efforts to 
devise new policies for the integration of minorities”, as attested by the 
ratification of the FCNM in 2005, this international commitment has been 
poorly implemented domestically. (MRGI 2011b: 3)  
 
Even though the rhetoric of the present government makes way for a new 
perception that would enable the integration of national minorities into 
the demos of the Georgian state, it is still blatant that the old perception, 
where everything non-Georgian is perceived as an anomaly, and thus, as 
a threat to the Georgian nation and the Georgian state, still prevails. 
Paradoxically, it is the exclusion of national minorities that consolidates 
the weakness of the Georgian nation and state, and which furthermore 
explains why the breakaway republics are still the most serious threat to 
Georgia, whose government adamantly refuses to recognise their 
independencies. Furthermore, the unresolved status of the breakaway 
republics, and the transnational dimension of these conflicts, as attested 
by the Russian military intervention in South Ossetia, siding with the 
separatists in the 2008 war, confirms that the threats to the territorial 
integrity of Georgia are not only domestic but also international. The 
frozen conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are also the main 
preoccupations of the EU, which became involved in the peace-process 
during the 2008 war, under the leadership of the French president who 
took responsibility of negotiating a cease-fire agreement. Furthermore, 
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and “under international pressure to comply with the terms of the 
ceasefire agreement, Russia eventually agreed to allow 200 EU observers 
into the buffer zones south of Abkhazia and South Ossetia” (MRGI 2011b: 
4). In the EU-Georgia Action Plan, adopted in 2006, in the framework of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, the settlement of Georgia’s on-
going civil conflicts is one of the set priorities as is the protection “for 
rights of persons belonging to national minorities” (MRGI 2009: 7). 
The demographic dimension 
The strategic location of Georgia made the Georgian territory vulnerable 
to the expansionist regional empires, as attested by the many invasions 
Georgia succumbed to. Bordering on the Black Sea, the landmass of 
69.700 km2, sandwiched in between present-day Russia to the north, 
Turkey to the south-west, Armenia to the south and Azerbaijan to the 
south-east, the Georgian territory became the home of a multitude of 
ethnic groups. Consequently, when Georgia was incorporated into the 
Soviet Union, the mosaic of different ethnic groups made Georgia one of 
the most multi-ethnic Republics, with national minorities making up 
“one-third of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia’s population” 
(MRGI 2009: 1).  
 
Due to the minority-unfriendly policies, introduced upon the 
proclamation of Georgian independence and which subsequently 
contributed to the emergence of wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
heavy migrations led to an enormous depopulation266 where the number 
of national minorities decreased by almost half, from 29.9% in 1989, to 
16.2% in 2002. (Popjanevski 2006: 25) According to the 2002 census, the 
population of Georgia, excluding South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, amounted 
to 3.661.173, of which 83.8% are ethnic Georgians. (CoE Report 2009: 11) 
Although Georgia houses a great number of different ethnic 
communities, it is the numerically largest ones, territorially concentrated 
and located near their kin-states, which have posed the greatest threat to 
the Georgian government and to the territorial integrity of the Georgian 
state. The numerically largest minority groups, according to the 2002 
census, are the Azeri and the Armenians who amount to 6.1% and 5.7%, 
                                                          
266 The population of Georgia was decimated by 1 million between 1989 and 2002 and 
even though the largest proportion of the decrease was constituted by national minorities, 
the share of ethnic Georgians also decreased. Cf. (MRGI 2011b: 1)  
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respectively, of the Georgian population. The Russians constitute a mere 
1.5%, the Ossetians amount to 0.9%, followed by numerically smaller 
minority groups, of which the Abkhaz minority, categorised as “Others” 
in the Table below, only constitutes 0.1% of the population. 
 
Table 13.1. Ethnic structure of the Georgian controlled area according to the 
2002 census267 (data retrieved from the National Statistics Office of Georgia; 
MRGI 2011b: 1; CoE Report 2009: 11) 
 
Nationality 2002 number 2002 % 
Georgians 2.954.119 83.8 
Azeris 284.761 6.1 
Armenians 248.929 5.7 
Russians 67.671 1.5 
Ossetians 38.028 0.9 
Yezidi 18.329 0.4 
Greeks 15.166 0.3 
Kists 7.110 0.2 
Ukrainians 7.039 0.2 
Others268 32.950 0.9 
Total 3.661.173 100 
 
 
Although dispersed across the whole Georgian territory, the numerically 
large minority groups are to a great extent territorially concentrated in 
regions bordering on their kin-states. Apart from the northern regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, territories which had extensive self-rule 
during the Soviet regime as part of the Soviet nationalities policy, the 
southern and south-eastern regions of Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo-
Kartli also have large minority concentrations, where they “may 
constitute numerical majorities” (MRGI 2009: 1). According to the 2002 
census, the population of Samtskhe-Javakheti, bordering on Armenia and 
Turkey, is composed of 55% ethnic Armenians who are especially 
concentrated in Javakheti, where they make up “94 per cent of the 
                                                          
267 The census carried out by the Georgian authorities in 2002 only covered the Georgian 
controlled area thus leaving out Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Cf. (CoE Report 2009: 11; 
Popjanevski 2006: 25). 
268 In the category “Others” are primarily included Jews, Abkhaz, Assyrians and Kurds 
who account for 0.1% each. Cf. (CoE Report 2009: 11). 
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population in the Akhalkalaki district and 96 per cent in the Ninotsminda 
district” (MRGI 2009: 1). Although not as mono-ethnic as the Armenian 
districts, the Kvemo-Kartli region, bordering on both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, reflects the same challenge of minority-concentrated 
settlements. Hence, in 2002, the Kvemo-Kartli region was home to 45% of 
ethnic Azeri, as well as “to a number of Armenians and Greeks, mainly 
located in the Tsalka district” (MRGI 2009: 1). In the districts of Marneuli 
and Bolnissi, however, the Azeris were in a majority position, amounting 
to 83% and 66% respectively.  
 
Since these numerically large minority concentrations are bordering on 
their kin-states, the Georgian government has seen these as potentially 
secessionist areas, where, for instance, the Samtskhe-Javakheti region “is 
sometimes branded as a potential conflict zone where Armenian 
separatists could threaten the integrity of Georgian territory” (MRGI 
2009: 2). The problem is historically grounded and relates to the ethnic 
accommodation policy of the Soviet Union, in parallel to Georgia’s 
discriminatory policies of non-titular, i.e. non-Georgian, nations. Thus, 
although the Soviet nationalities policy, based on ethnic accommodation, 
resulted in extensive self-rule and autonomy status for certain territories, 
at the same time, it contributed to the exclusion of these minority 
communities from Georgian society. This consequently entailed that both 
Armenians and Azeri have much stronger kinship to their mother nations 
than to the Georgian state to which they belong. This problem was only 
accentuated when Georgia became independent, since everything non-
Georgian was seen as a threat to the state-building process. As a 
consequence, the government withdrew the extensive self-rule, 
previously enjoyed by these minority communities, which only resulted 
in further segregation since these communities were left with neither 
ethnic nor civic protection. The absence of any civic integration has left 
large minority communities on the verge of Georgian society, where 
“these populations live together in close-knit communities, with little 
attempt on the part of the state to provide them with services that could 
help them integrate, so they remain isolated from mainstream society” 
(MRGI 2009: 2).   
 
The wars in the breakaway republics attest to the gulf between ethnic 
Georgians and the numerically largest minority communities which has 
contributed to the ethnic segregation. In the aftermath of the war in 
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Abkhazia, when the breakaway region acquired de facto independence 
from Georgia, approximately 250 000 ethnic Georgians were expelled 
from the territory. (Wheatley 2009: 14) Furthermore, the sufferance of 
ethnic minorities, following the 2008 war with Russia, was reported from 
various sources. Indeed, as stated by the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), “at its height, the ten-day war displaced 128.000 
people within Georgia, with another 30.000 people (Ossetians) fleeing to 
Russia” (MRGI 2011b: 4). Even though positive developments have been 
noted recently in efforts to bridge the gulf between ethnic Georgians and 
the largest minority communities, much work remains in order to 
address the long-lasting segregation. Especially problematic is the 
linguistic barrier, where the lack of mastery of the Georgian language 
strongly contributes to inhibit “contacts between the majority population 
and ethnic minorities”, and to further the isolation of minority 
communities, economically, politically as well as socially. (MRGI 2011b: 
5) 
The sociolinguistic dimension  
The language issue became highly politicised in Georgia’s state-building 
process from the late 1980s, and still is, as attested by the fact that 
although Georgia undertook to sign and ratify the European Charter for 
Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML), upon signing the FCNM in 
1999, this undertaking has up to date not been met. The Georgian 
language, although weakened during Soviet rule by the Soviet 
nationalities policy, became indispensable in the strengthening of the 
nation-building process. Furthermore, since the Georgian language was 
closely linked to the emergence of the autocephalous Georgian Orthodox 
Church, the language was “bestowed with almost sacred status as a 
wellspring of the Georgian nation” (Wheatley 2009: 4). Although spoken 
by only 71% of the Georgian population, according to the 1989 census, the 
Georgian language acquired the status as sole official language. However, 
in light of the developments in the Abkhaz region, the Georgian 
government had to succumb to giving the Abkhaz language status as the 
official language in the breakaway republic of Abkhazia. (Art. 8, 
Constitution of Georgia). This was a huge concession on the part of the 
Georgian authorities, since “ethnicity in Georgia was more or less defined 
by linguistic identity” (Popjanevski 2006: 38). Consequently, just as 
members of national minorities are viewed as anomalies and potential 
256 
threats to the territorial integrity of the Georgian state, “the continuing 
use of minority languages in Georgia is somehow seen by the Georgian 
majority as an aberration that needs to be corrected” (Wheatley 2009: 5). 
 
The language issue is at the very core of the ethnic divide and the poor 
inclusion of ethnic minorities, particularly as regards the numerically 
large linguistic minority communities. In fact, in the highly multilingual 
Georgia, which harbours as many as 29 minority languages269, it is the 
numerically larger minority languages that pose the threat to the 
Georgian government, and contributes to both the ethnic divide and the 
furtherance of their marginalisation. The numerically largest minority 
languages in the Georgian controlled areas270 are Azeri and Armenian, 
which account for 6.5% and 5.4% of mother tongue speakers, 
respectively271. Apart from Laz, Svan and Megrelian272, other minority 
languages are: Russian (1.9%), Ossetian (0.7%), Kurmanji (0.2%), Kist 
(0.2%), Ukrainian (0.1%) and Abkhazian (0.1%).273 However, even though 
the numerically smaller languages pose no threat to the Georgian 
government, these languages are instead threatened by extinction and 
complete assimilation with the Georgian and the Russian languages. 
Indeed, even though Russian is a minority language, it has however a 
particular status since Russian was the language of interethnic 
communication during Soviet rule. Consequently, even though Russian is 
the mother-tongue of merely 1.9%, “around half of the population of 
                                                          
269 29 minority languages if one includes Svan, Megrelian and Laz as distinct languages. 
However, Georgian linguists claim that these are not distinct languages but dialects of the 
Georgian language. Others argue however that even though these languages “belong to 
the same (Kartvelian) subgroup of languages as Georgian” they are in fact distinct 
languages and hence constitute minority languages. Cf. (Wheatley 2009: 12). 
270 The Georgian-controlled areas exclude the two breakaway republics of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia since no up-to-date information is available on the numerical sizes of 
minority languages. Cf. (Wheatley 2009: 12). 
271 Whereas Azeri is a sub-group of the Turkic language, Armenian is a Thracian language 
part of the Indo-European language tree. Cf. (Wheatley 2009: 10-12). 
272 Since the speakers of these languages consider themselves to be Georgian and 
“virtually all can also speak Georgian fluently”, these groups can be argued to be 
integrated into the mainstream of the Georgian society and do neither pose a threat to the 
Georgian authorities nor are threatened by exclusion. Cf. (Wheatley 2009: 12). 
273 Apart from the Slavic Russian and Ukrainian languages, Ossetian and Kurmanji are 
part of the Iranian subgroup and Kist and Abkhazian are part of the Caucasian language. 
Cf. (Wheatley 2009: 10-12).  
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Georgia speaks relatively good Russian as a second language” (Wheatley 
2009: 23).  
 
Upon the proclamation of Georgian independence, the weak affiliation to 
the Georgian state and the exclusion of national minorities from the 
Georgian society was particularly rooted in an alienation of the Georgian 
language. In fact, as a result of the Soviet nationalities policy, where the 
nationality concerns was upheld to the detriment of civic integration, 
“knowledge of Georgian was not necessary during Soviet times” which 
entailed that the promotion of particularly the larger minority languages 
was maintained over learning the majority language. (MRGI 2009: 3) This 
consequently meant that when Georgia became independent, and 
Georgian became the official language, “only 31% of members of national 
minorities in Georgia” spoke Georgian fluently. (Wheatley 2009: 5) Since 
official documents are only published in Georgian, and proficiency in 
Georgian is a prerequisite for government officials, the poor command of 
the Georgian language amongst national minorities severely contributes 
to aggravate the exclusion of large segments of the Georgian minority 
populations, who find themselves on the verge of Georgian society, 
politically, socially and economically. (MRGI 2011b: 3) 
 
The ethnic divide is especially blatant as regards the larger minority 
languages, and is a remnant from the Soviet regime where guarantees of 
minority language education were provided for. Hence, a parallel system 
of education was established for the numerically large minority 
communities, where “Russian, Azeri, Armenian, Abkhazian and Ossetian 
schools provided tuition in the respective languages” (Wheatley 2009: 17). 
The system of two parallel education systems remains for the Azeri, 
Armenian and Russian minorities. As a consequence of the breakaway 
republics, however, tuition in Abkhazian and Ossetian is no longer 
provided for. Taken into consideration that the main problem of minority 
exclusion is due to the poor mastery of the Georgian language, these 
minority schools only provide for instruction in the respective minority 
languages and the teaching of the Georgian language is almost non-
existent. Also, the lack of quality education for minorities, due to a lack of 
resources, has been a persistent problem, and although there have been 
attempts to redress this situation, for instance by harmonising the 
curricula with Georgian-language schools, these efforts have been 
insufficient. (MRGI 2009: 3) Thus, the lack of any real efforts from the 
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Georgian authorities to provide for instruction of the Georgian language 
in these minority establishments has only led to a situation where these 
“minorities tend only to speak their native languages”, which, by 
consequence, only accentuates their marginalisation. (MRGI 2011b: 3) The 
lack of any serious incentives from the Georgian government is 
astonishing, since this situation only cements the “separate development 
of large linguistic communities” in territories like Kvemo Kartli and 
Samtskhe-Javakheti, where Azeri and Armenians are in a majority 
position and which, furthermore, are considered potential secessionist 
areas and thus, a threat to the territorial integrity of the Georgian state. 
(Wheatley 2009: 6)  
Legislation in minority language rights upon gaining 
status as ENP-state  
The challenging balancing act between civic integration and ethnic 
accommodation also permeates the legislation pertaining to minority 
language rights protection in Georgia, as it does the assessments of the 
monitoring bodies. Indeed, as a consequence of the weak Georgian state, 
which still is in the process of state-building, the strengthening of the 
state institutions and the state language need to be made concomitantly 
to the implementation of the principles of the Framework Convention for 
National Minorities (FCNM). The weakness of the state is also attested by 
the two breakaway republics and the secessionist claims that were voiced 
from the southern regions of Georgia at the beginning of the 1990s. By 
consequence, the ethnic conflicts of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
entail that the issue of the territorial integrity of Georgia is also the key in 
the discussions on minority protection, in general, and as regards 
minority language protection, in particular. At the same time as the 
equality principle enshrines minority rights protection, the Georgian 
constitution stipulates that “the exercise of minority rights shall not 
oppose the sovereignty, state structure, territorial integrity and political 
independence of Georgia” (Art. 38 (2), Constitution). Minority rights 
protection is, thus, viewed, if not as a threat, at least as counterproductive 
to the process of civic integration, viewed as indispensable to the 
strengthening of the Georgian state. Thus, the inherent resistance to the 
furtherance of minority language rights protection is naturally due to the 
weakness of the Georgian language and the necessity to strengthen the 
same.  
259 
The implementation of the FCNM has not yet begun and is, not only 
dependent upon an intrinsic resistance to minority rights protection, but 
also relates to the weakness of the rule of law where “the weak 
implementation of legislative acts, especially in the regions, is a problem 
in general” (Popjanevski 2006: 55). Furthermore, upon ratification of the 
FCNM, the Georgian Parliament explicitly stated that “it could not ensure 
full implementation of the Convention before the territorial integrity of 
Georgia is restored, and pleaded for aid from the Council of Europe in 
resolving the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia” (Popjanevski 2006: 
31).  
 
Assessment of the legislative provisions from the two monitoring bodies 
in the domain of minority language rights is scarce. Whereas there is no 
assessment made from the Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee in 
2006, the assessment of the EU is very general and does neither evaluate 
the legislation in the area of non-discrimination nor in the area of 
minority language rights. Furthermore, even though the EU-Georgia 
Action Plan, adopted in 2006, has as one of its objectives to “ensure 
respect for rights of persons belonging to national minorities”, it is also 
very general in its contents. (MRGI 2009: 7) As a consequence, other 
sources produced that same year have been consulted.274  
Non-discrimination 
Upon independence, and as a consequence of integrating into the major 
international organisations, legal provisions protecting the rights of 
national minorities were integrated into the 1995 Constitution. Hence, 
Article 14, of the Constitution, stipulates that “Everyone is free by birth 
and is equal before law regardless of race, colour, language, sex, religion, 
political and other opinions, national, ethnic and social belonging, origin, 
property and title, place of residence” (Art. 14, Constitution of Georgia). 
Furthermore and more specifically related to minority rights protection, 
                                                          
274 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2007) Second report on Georgia 
adopted on 30 June 2006, CRI (2007) 2, Strasbourg, 13 February 2007, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/countrybycountry_en.asp, 2012-01-23. 
Popjanevski, J. (2006) “Minorities and the State in the South Caucasus: Assessing the 
Protection of National Minorities in Georgia and Azerbaijan”, Silk Road Paper, September 
2006. Washington-Uppsala: Central-Asia Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program 
– A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Centre.  
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article 38 stipulates that “Citizens of Georgia shall be equal in social, 
economic, cultural and political life, irrespective of their national, ethnic, 
religious or linguistic belonging. In accordance with universally 
recognised principles and rules of international law, they shall have the 
right to develop freely, without any discrimination and interference, their 
culture, to use their mother tongue in private and in public” (Art. 38, 
Constitution).  
 
Upon signing the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ethnic 
Discrimination, the Criminal Code was amended and integrated a 
provision stating that “Racial discrimination, that is, an act committed 
with the intention of inciting ethnic or racial hatred or conflict, injuring 
national dignity, or directly or indirectly restricting human rights or 
granting advantages on the grounds of race, skin colour, social status or 
national or ethnic affiliation, shall be punishable by deprivation for up to 
three years” (Popjanevski 2006: 47-48). Even though the ECRI report 
welcomes the amendments made, the Georgian authorities are 
recommended to supplement the criminal law provisions further and to 
“take further actions in a number of areas” (ECRI Report 2006: 6). Legal 
provisions in the civil and administrative domains are scarce, and apart 
from the Labour Code, which includes a provision prohibiting “the 
reduction of remuneration for ethnic minorities”, no other anti-
discrimination guarantees are provided. (Popjanevski 2006: 48) Hence, 
the ECRI Report calls on the Georgian authorities to strengthen and 
complement the legal provisions “by adopting further provisions, 
prohibiting racial discrimination in a precise and exhaustive manner, to 
ensure that all areas of life, such as education, access to housing, to public 
services and to public places and contractual relations between 
individuals, are covered” (ECRI Report 2006: 12).   
 
Upon Georgia’s accession to the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the signing of the 
FCNM in 1999, the Georgian government “approved of an action plan for 
the protection of minorities in Georgia, entitled Plan of Action for 
Strengthening Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms of Minorities Living 
in Georgia (2003 – 2005)” (Popjanevski 2006: 28). As part of this Plan, the 
authorities began by setting up minority protection bodies within the 
state institutions, of which particularly the Public Defender’s Office has 
been actively promoting minority rights issues. Indeed, in coordination 
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with the European Centre for Minority Issues, as well as various minority 
rights NGOs, the Public Defender’s Office launched the Council of 
National Minorities in December 2005. The Council’s aim is to function 
“as a forum for dialogue between the authorities and members of 
minority communities, as well as coordinating the activities of 
organisations working in the field of national minorities” (Popjanevski 
2006: 34). 
 
Even though the Georgian authorities claim that discrimination against 
national minorities is non-existent, as evidenced by the lack of legal 
proceedings in this domain, discrimination exists. Indeed, reports from 
both monitoring bodies and minority group representatives in the 
country “continuously express concerns about isolation and 
discrimination of ethnic minorities and about xenophobic sentiments 
among the Georgian public, fuelled by media stereotyping” (Popjanevski 
2006: 25). This is also underlined by the ECRI which reports that 
“stereotypes and prejudice liable to cause discrimination persist among 
the majority population, particularly against ethnic minorities, non-
traditional religious minorities, refugees from Chechnya and Meskhetia 
Turks275” (ECRI Report 2006: 6). Indeed, the lack of implementation of the 
legal provisions is more related to the general segregation of national 
minorities, who mostly live concentrated in poor rural areas on the verge 
of Georgian society. Hence, the lack of both financial resources, as well as 
the generally poor mastery of the Georgian language, create a situation 
where the “awareness of legal remedies, in relation to human rights 
abuses, is generally low in the country, and due to weak communication 
between the local and central structures, violations on ethnic grounds 
which take place in rural areas are not brought to the attention of Tbilisi-
based institutions” (Popjanevski 2006: 49). Since knowledge of the legal 
provisions is greatly hampered by minority groups’ lack of proficiency in 
the Georgian language, the ECRI Report calls upon the Georgian 
                                                          
275 The Meskhetian Turks were a minority group, numbering 100.000 and inhabiting the 
southern region of Javakheti up until 1944 when they were expelled from Georgian 
territory under the Stalin regime. As a consequence of minority rights claims, a 
repatriation process started in the 1990s where approximately 600-700 of the Meskhetian 
Turks have been repatriated up until now. However, the process has been slow and 
cumbersome “and further repatriation of the deportees is an issue currently under 
consideration and may take place over the coming years” (Popjanevski 2006: 27). 
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authorities to step up their efforts in providing opportunities for 
minorities to learn the Georgian language. (ECRI Report 2006: 6)  
 
The ECRI Report also stresses the need for awareness-raising and the 
strengthening of competencies amongst judicial officials, and 
recommends that Georgian authorities provide them “with more training 
on the importance of applying provisions of this kind” (ECRI Report 
2006: 6). The strengthening of the judicial system is further underlined in 
the EU-Georgia Action Plan, where it is stated that Georgia should make 
improvements in its judicial system, specifically, as regards the “training 
of judges, prosecutors, and officials in the judiciary, Ministry of Justice 
administration, police and prison, in particular, with regard to human 
rights issues and judicial internal cooperation” (EU Report 2006: 8). 
Furthermore, however important the work of both the Public Defender’s 
Office as well as the Council of National Minorities, the ECRI report 
recommends the authorities to set up “an independent specialised body, 
to combat racism and racial discrimination” (ECRI Report 2006: 6). 
 
Another hampering factor to more effective implementation concerns the 
scope of application of the groups that need protection. Since the 
Georgian authorities have absented from giving an official definition of a 
national minority, the interpretation given upon the ratification of the 
FCNM is the prevailing one. According to this interpretation, members 
belonging to a national minority are “Georgian citizens (who) stand out 
from the prevailing population in terms of their own language, culture 
and ethnic identity; have inhabited the territory of Georgia for an 
extended period of time; and densely populate a region of Georgia” 
(Popjanevski 2006: 36). Whereas the citizenship requirement is clear, 
however not consistent with the principles of the FCNM, the problematic 
requirements of “extended period” and “densely populated area” are 
extremely vague and left undefined. Furthermore, and as stressed by the 
ECRI Report, even though the 2002 census provides for some information 
on national minorities, the statistics are inadequate and do not 
correspond to the current situation in Georgia which consequently 
inhibits a proper assessment. (ECRI Report 2006: 22) 
 
General legal provisions in the domain of non-discrimination exist, and 
the recent amendment to the Criminal Code furthermore penalises 
discrimination on ethnic grounds. However, and as stressed by 
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particularly the ECRI Report, the provisions are not encompassing 
enough, and especially in the domain of the civil sphere, anti-
discrimination provisions need to be developed. Hence, on the basis of 
the index scale, Georgia is positioned on the level of 1.0. 
 
Fig. 13.1. Georgia and level of rule adoption in non-discrimination upon gaining 
status as ENP-state 
 
2006 
   Tolerance                        x                                                             Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
(0): Absence of any non-discrimination norm; 
(1): General provisions such as an equality clause in the Constitution;   
(2): Non-discrimination laws are inserted in specific laws;  
(3): Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation which then means 
that there has been a complete transposition of the EU anti-
discrimination acquis; 
(4): Non-discrimination laws exceed the minimum requirements of 
the Directive. 
Minority language use in official contexts 
The balancing act between ethnic accommodation and civic integration is 
particularly blatant in the context of legislation regulating the language 
laws of the country. Whereas the stance of the Georgian authorities, ever 
since independence, has been to strengthen legislation in favour of the 
state language and, thus, relegate minority language rights to the 
background, little effort has been put in to actually create opportunities 
for minorities to increase their proficiency in the Georgian language. 
Since the strengthening of the state language has been seen as the key to 
civic integration, and as a way to fight off any further secessionist claims 
from particularly the southernmost regions, concomitantly there has been 
a reluctance to legislate in favour of minority language rights. Thus, even 
though the European monitoring bodies recommend that Georgia signs 
and ratifies the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 
Georgian authorities have, up to date, refused to comply with this 
demand. (ECRI Report 2006: 8)  
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The Constitution of Georgia consecrates Georgian as the official language 
of the country and acknowledges the official language status of 
Abkhazian in the Abkhazia region. (Art. 8, Constitution of Georgia). 
Constitutionally, minority language rights protection is limited to 
provisions pertaining to the use of minority languages before judicial 
authorities. Even though it is stated that the language of communication 
in legal proceedings is the state language, “an individual not having 
command of the state language shall be provided with an interpreter” 
(Art. 85, Constitution). Added to this, and referring to the densely 
populated minority areas, where the population “does not have a 
command of the state language, teaching of the state language and 
solution of the issues related to the legal proceedings shall be ensured” 
(Art. 85, Constitution). The strengthening of the state language in official 
contexts is also pertinent in the 1999 Administrative Code, which states 
that “all administrative proceedings should be in Georgian and in 
Abkhazian in Abkhazia” (Popjanevski 2006: 39). The Public Service Act, 
of 1997, extensively limits the career opportunities for minorities in the 
public sector, since the regulation states that “those applying for posts in 
the public services and local autonomous entities must be proficient in 
the official language. It likewise states (Article 98-1) that lack of 
knowledge of Georgian, on the part of officials, may be a ground for 
dismissal” (ECRI Report 2006: 26). Furthermore, the electoral code greatly 
hampers the political participation of minorities, since the code stipulates 
that “members of parliament must know Georgian” (ECRI Report 2006: 
26).  
 
Whereas the State language has been strongly promoted in every sphere 
of Georgian public life, it has almost relegated the use of minority 
languages to non-existence. The reluctance to provide minority languages 
with legal protection was particularly blatant upon the ratification of the 
FCNM, when the Georgian Parliament expressed concerns as to its 
implementation. Indeed, in the negotiations preceding the ratification, the 
Parliament “noted that the state is obliged to provide for interpreters in 
administrative and legal proceedings, and that it should provide 
minorities with the opportunity to learn the State language, but expressed 
no recognition of its obligation to promote or support minority 
languages” (Popjanevski 2006: 31-32).  
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The legal emphasis on the state language and the lack of legal provisions 
for the use of minority languages in official contexts put heavy 
responsibility on the Georgian authorities to provide opportunities for 
minorities to learn the State language. However, even though this 
responsibility is constitutionally stipulated, it has been poorly 
implemented in practice, especially in the heavily minority concentrated 
regions. Thus, in the Armenian and Azeri dominated regions of 
Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo-Kartli, the minority populations “do not 
speak Georgian or speak it very little” (ECRI Report 2006: 26). 
Furthermore, in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region, the most common 
“language for administrative purposes is Armenian for spoken 
transactions, and Russian for written ones” (ECRI Report 2006: 27). The 
poor implementation of the legal provisions in the Javakheti region also 
applies to the courts, since the poor mastery of the Georgian language is 
also manifest among the judicial representatives, which then entails that 
“most trials are carried out in Armenian” (Popjanevski 2006: 40).    
 
Not only is there no legal provisions for the use of minority languages, 
but the problem of the insufficient efforts made in the area of providing 
minorities with teaching of the State language, in fact entails that, de facto, 
minority language use in official contexts prevails. Thus, instead of 
integrating these minority groups (especially in the densely populated 
minority areas) into the Georgian society, it contributes to further the gap 
between minorities and the majority. Even though the assessments of the 
monitoring bodies are not opposed to the promotion of the State 
language, which, in fact, “is not contrary to international 
recommendations to use the state language in this way”, the Georgian 
authorities need to find ways to overcome the unfortunate situation 
which challenges the rule of law, at the same time as it relegates 
minorities to a state of limbo, both de jure, as well as de facto. (Popjanevski 
2006: 52) Thus, the ECRI Report recommends the Georgian authorities to 
“maintain their efforts to improve all present or intending officials’ 
command of Georgian” (ECRI Report 2006: 27). However, since learning 
the state language is a long process, the Georgian authorities are strongly 
recommended to “provisionally devise practical and legal arrangements 
allowing access to public services for Georgian citizens, who do not speak 
the official language” (ECRI Report 2006: 28). 
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However laudable the efforts to strengthen the legal provisions for the 
State language, the Georgian authorities have, at the same time, rejected 
the introduction of any legal provisions in the domain of minority 
language use in official contexts. The agenda of civic integration has 
however back-lashed on the authorities since the aim of decreasing the 
existing segregation rather has had the reverse effect. Thus, as 
recommended by the ECRI, in parallel to the strengthening of the State 
language, it is important that “the authorities take care to preserve and 
encourage use of minority languages alongside the official language” 
(ECRI Report 2006: 29). In the context of our study, Georgia is positioned 
on the level of 0.5. 
 
Fig. 13.2. Georgia and level of rule adoption in minority language use in official 
contexts upon gaining status as ENP-state 
 
2006 
   Tolerance             x                                                                        Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
(0): No recognition of minority languages; 
(1): The right to use the minority language in official contexts (before 
judicial and administrative authorities; i.e. the right to a translator);  
(2): The minority language can be used in Personal and Place Names 
(public signs); 
(3): The minority language can be used in official documents; 
(4): Minority language having status as official language. 
Minority language rights in education 
The strengthening of the Georgian language is also blatant in the 
educational sector. Whereas minority language rights in education were 
previously extensively provided for, as stipulated by Article 4 of the Law 
on Education276, the recent legislative changes in the educational sector 
emphasise and aim “at strengthening the position of the Georgian 
language” (Popjanevski 2006: 42). However, at the same time, provisions 
                                                          
276 Article 4 stipulated that ”the State, in accordance with recommendations from local 
administrative authorities shall take, for citizens whose mother tongue is not Georgian, 
measures to enable them to receive primary or secondary education in their own 
language” (Popjanevski 2006: 42). 
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guaranteeing minority rights in education are still upheld. Indeed, the 
2005 General Education Act, encompassing primary and secondary 
education, declares that “the language of instruction at institutions 
delivering general education is Georgian (with Abkhaz in Abkhazia), but 
also that citizens of Georgia, whose mother tongue is not Georgian, have 
the right to full general schooling in their mother tongue” (ECRI Report 
2006: 29). The General Education Act, furthermore, introduces reforms 
that aim to further strengthen the Georgian language, in particular, and 
civic integration, in general, by uniforming the curriculum. Hence, as part 
of the new General Education Act, it is stipulated that, “by 2010-2011, at 
the latest, schools giving instruction through the medium of a non-official 
language must teach Georgian language and literature, Georgian history 
and geography, and other social sciences through the medium of 
Georgian” (ECRI Report 2006: 30).  
 
The predominance of the Georgian language is also blatant in the 
provisions regulating higher education. The 2004 Higher Education Act 
stipulates that the language of instruction is Georgian and Abkhaz in 
Abkhazia. Possibilities for instruction in minority languages in higher 
education are sharply curtailed since the Law states that “instruction in 
other languages, except for individual study courses, is permitted 
provided that this is envisaged by international agreements or is agreed 
with the Ministry of Education and Sciences of Georgia” (Popjanevski 
2006: 43). The centralisation efforts as well as the strengthening of the 
Georgian language are also blatant in the higher education reforms, since, 
as from the school year 2005-2006, “a centralised system of entrance 
examinations for all of Georgia’s state-run universities was introduced” 
(ECRI Report 2006: 30). Part of the entry examinations are tests pertaining 
to both the Georgian language as well as to the Georgian literature. (ECRI 
Report 2006: 30) 
 
The legislative reforms, introduced by the 2005 General Education Act, 
are laudable in their efforts to strengthen the Georgian language and to 
unify the curriculum, in order to increase civic integration and thus 
decreasing the gap between minority communities and the majority. This 
could, consequently, lead to the strengthening of the competitiveness of 
ethnic minorities on the labour market, as well as to improving the 
possibilities of minorities to access higher education institutions in 
Georgia. However, the legislative reforms entail a number of challenges 
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which need to be met in order to guarantee more effective 
implementation. Indeed, in 2006, Georgia had 456 educational 
establishments which provided instruction in minority languages, mainly 
in Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijani. Although teaching of Georgian is 
compulsory in these schools, which means that “around three hours a 
week of the curriculum are devoted to it”, the number of hours dedicated 
to the teaching of Georgian is insufficient since the poor command of 
Georgian amongst minority communities prevails. (ECRI Report 2006: 29) 
Apart from too few hours of Georgian language training, there is the 
problem of the lack of qualified teachers of Georgian, especially in the 
isolated and heavily concentrated minority areas in the southern regions 
of Georgia. Moreover, due to the prevailing use of minority languages in 
the densely concentrated minority communities, “students are unable to 
practice Georgian outside of the school environment”, also heavily 
contributing to the poor command of the Georgian language. 
(Popjanevski 2006: 44) Furthermore, the problem of the poor quality of 
textbooks is another issue that hampers more effective teaching. Indeed, 
as underlined by the ECRI Report, in general, the quality of textbooks, 
“used at some levels in minority schools, are still inferior in content and 
quality to textbooks in Georgian” (ECRI Report 2006: 29). 
 
Even though the Georgian authorities have made serious efforts in 
attracting qualified teachers to especially the isolated regions, as 
welcomed by the ECRI Report, the result has so far not been successful. 
(ECRI Report 2006: 29-30) Indeed, “attempting to improve conditions for 
language training in the regions, the Georgian Ministry of Education 
recently offered 40 language teachers a high salary for Georgian language 
teaching in Kvemo-Kartli and Javakheti regions. However, due to the 
hardships connected with living in the regions, few teachers were willing 
to work in those remote areas” (Popjanevski 2006: 44). Thus, the lack of 
qualified language teachers, as well as the lack of quality textbooks, 
subsequently, entail that pupils of minority education still do not “attain 
sufficient command of Georgian by the end of their schooling”, and 
graduate from schools that are still inferior in quality, and thus viewed as 
second-rate. (ECRI Report 2006: 29) This, furthermore, greatly hampers 
minorities’ chances to integrate into the Georgian labour market, as well 
as greatly reduces their chances to access higher education. (ECRI Report 
2006: 29)  
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Hence, even though the ECRI Report welcomes the steps taken by the 
Ministry of Education and Sciences to improve the education system, in 
general, and minority education, in particular, more effective and 
concerted action needs to be taken by the Georgian authorities. Indeed, as 
strongly recommended by the ECRI, the Georgian authorities need to 
“press ahead with their reform of the teaching of Georgian to children 
belonging to ethnic minorities, so as to make sure that when they leave 
school they have a sufficient standard of Georgian to be able to integrate 
into higher education, the employment market and society, generally. 
This involves providing all the human and financial resources necessary 
to continue training teachers of Georgian as a second language and 
provide suitable textbooks” (ECRI Report 2006: 31). Indeed, in connection 
with the prevailingly poor command of the Georgian language, the ECRI 
recommends that the Georgian authorities “closely monitor the new 
higher education entrance examinations to make sure that they do not 
have the effect of preventing Georgian citizens, who do not speak the 
official language, from studying in Georgia or discouraging them from 
doing so” (ECRI Report 2006: 31). As a way of reconciling guarantees of 
minority language rights protection in education, with the emphasis on 
the Georgian language training, the ECRI, furthermore, notes that there is 
a need “that adequate room be left for teaching minority languages and 
cultures” (ECRI Report 2006: 31). This is also in line with worries 
expressed by some minority communities who have voiced fears that the 
learning of the State language would take over “to such an extent that 
their children will no longer be proficient in their mother tongue” (ECRI 
Report 2006: 30). In this regard, the ECRI points out that the “setting up of 
bilingual schools is a worthwhile idea” (ECRI Report 2006: 31). 
 
Even though the recent legislative reforms have inaugurated an 
educational system where the state language is promoted to the 
detriment of minority languages, members belonging to national 
minorities still have legal rights to “full general schooling in their mother 
tongue”, in primary and secondary education. (ECRI Report 2006: 29). 
However, the term, “full general schooling”, is relative inasmuch as, not 
only, is the teaching of the Georgian language obligatory, “the Georgian 
literature, Georgian history and geography, and other social sciences”, 
should also be given in the Georgian language, to be fully implemented 
by the school year 2010/2011. (ECRI Report 2006: 30) However, in 2006, 
pupils belonging to national minorities had the right to be educated 
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completely in their mother tongue. Thus, taken in our study and based on 
the index scale, Georgia is positioned on the level of 3.0.   
 
Fig. 13.3. Georgia and level of rule adoption in minority language rights in 
education upon gaining status as ENP-state 
 
2006 
   Tolerance                                                              x                       Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
  (0): No education of or in minority language; 
(1): Children belonging to minorities have the right to learn their 
mother tongue in school; 
(2): At least parts of the curriculum (e.g. history or religion) are taught 
in the minority language; 
(3): Minorities have the right to educate their children completely in 
the mother tongue, either in state schools with a complete syllabus 
taught in the minority language or in specific minority schools; 
(4): Minorities have their own universities. 
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14 
AZERBAIJAN AND MINORITY LANGUAGE 
RIGHTS PROTECTION 
Azerbaijani independence 
As opposed to Georgia and Armenia, which both had experienced 
periods of “statehood in the Middle Ages”, Azerbaijan had little previous 
statehood to fall back upon when it gained independence in 1991. Indeed, 
except for a short interlude of independence in between 1918277 and 1920, 
present-day Azerbaijan had primarily been ruled by the Ottoman and 
Iranian Empires, before being annexed to the Russian Empire in 1828.278 
Thus, the strong influences from the Ottoman and the Iranian empires 
had, early on, islamicised the population and the “conversion to Shi’a 
Islam occurred mainly in the sixteenth century, under the impact of 
Safavid Iran” (Lattimer 2003: 6).  
 
Another distinctive feature of Azerbaijan, as opposed to both Georgia and 
Armenia, was the richness of its natural resources. Already in the 19th 
century, the first findings of oil were discovered which brought both 
prosperity to the country, as well as further increased the ethnic diversity 
of Azerbaijan, by attracting “Armenians, Jews, Russians and other 
minorities to Baku, the capital” (Lattimer 2003: 6). After the invasion of 
the Red Army in 1920, supported and facilitated by the Baku Bolsheviks, 
Azerbaijan became one of the constituent republics of the Transcaucasian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic up until 1936, when Azerbaijan 
became an independent Soviet Socialist Republic. (Lattimer 2003: 7) Just 
as the neighbouring states of the South Caucasus had a privileged 
                                                          
277 The existence of the first Azeri state, proclaimed in 1918 as the Democratic Republic of 
Azerbaijan, was short-lived and only endured until 1920 when it became subjected to 
Soviet rule. Cf. (Lattimer 2003: 6). 
278 Even though the border between Iran and the Russian Empire was established in 1828 
when present-day Azerbaijan was annexed to Russia, the majority of Azeris in fact live in 
Iran. According to estimates they constitute “approximately one-fifth to one-quarter of the 
total population” of Iran and sometimes this part of Iran is controversially referred to by 
some Azeris as ‘southern Azerbaijan’. Cf. (MRGI 2006: 1) 
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position in the Soviet Union, so did Azerbaijan which also was granted 
special arrangements, “with economic subsidies and pricing 
arrangements, designed to ensure higher living standards” (Lattimer 
2003: 7). The special position, furthermore, entailed that the penetration of 
the Soviet system in Azerbaijan never reached the same level as in the 
other Slavic Republics. However, the relaxation of Soviet control also 
meant that “private entrepreneurial activities and black markets were 
never completely eradicated”, and still is a distinctive feature of society in 
present-day Azerbaijan. (Lattimer 2003: 7) When Azerbaijan proclaimed 
independence on the 30th of August 1991, the first phase of state-building 
was to take place in parallel with open war, fought against Armenia over 
the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which was to define the internal turmoil, 
characteristic of the first years of independence, as well as contribute to 
complicate “the relationship between the state and national minority 
groups” (Popjanevski 2006: 59). 
 
The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region flared up, as early as 
1988, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but escalated in conflict intensity 
when both states gained independencies in 1991. In fact, the Nagorno-
Karabakh region had been an issue of contention between the two Soviet 
Republics ever since the 1920s, when Stalin “sought rapprochement with 
Turkey and thus tended to support Azerbaijani claims to the 
predominantly Armenian-populated lands of Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Nakhichevan, the latter’s population being approximately half Muslim, 
half Armenian” (Lattimer 2003: 7). The loss of the Autonomous region to 
Azerbaijan constituted a heavy blow to Armenia and their “aspirations to 
bring together historical homelands, where Armenians still constituted a 
majority” (Lattimer 2003: 7). Thus, with the liberalisation of Soviet 
policies during the Gorbatchev period, the Armenian majority of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, supported by the Armenian army, unilaterally 
declared secession from Azerbaijan. The intensity of the conflict rose at 
the beginning of the 1990s, and whereas Azerbaijani forces, initially, were 
victorious, they would experience several defeats in 1993, “leading to not 
only to the taking of Nagorno-Karabakh but the occupation of seven 
regions of Azerbaijan, surrounding it by the Karabakh Armenian forces, 
backed by Armenia” (MRGI 2006: 1). After having experienced heavy 
casualties on the part of the Azeri army and the expulsion of ethnic Azeri 
from the Armenian-controlled area, the cease-fire of 1994 put an end to 
the violent conflict. However, the unresolved status of Nagorno-
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Karabakh, de facto independent, but de jure still a part of Azerbaijan, still 
poses the most serious threat to the territorial integrity and the internal 
stability of Azerbaijan, as well as to international stability. 
 
Domestically, the conflict was to have severe repercussions on the first 
years of the virgin state with a series of fragile governments, which “rose 
and fell according to developments in the Karabakh war” (MRGI 2006: 1). 
In 1993, however, political order and stability would be restored when 
Heydar Aliyev279 seized the presidential power and secured a regime 
based on an authoritarian rule, in which the all-empowering President 
would be subjected to a personality cult. The authoritarian rule would 
entail the establishment of a party-state280 à la Soviet rule, which meant 
that social mobility was conditional upon state-party membership, the 
electoral processes were non-democratic and any opposition was 
crushed, with violence if necessary. (MRGI 2006: 1). The Constitution, 
adopted on the 12th of November 1995, enshrined the Republic of 
Azerbaijan as a unitary, secular state, and only made provisions as for the 
autonomy status of Nakhichevan, but did not touch upon an eventual 
future autonomy status for Nagorno-Karabakh. (Art. 134, Art. 7, 
Constitution) In fact, even though Azerbaijan had, in 1992, already made 
legislative provisions for the protection and the promotion of national 
minority issues281, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the subsequent 
Azeri defeat, would have a deteriorating impact on the State’s 
relationship with minority groups.  
 
In fact, not only the Karabakh conflict but also other secessionist-prone 
minorities in both the north and the south meant that any minority rights 
claims were seen as a threat to the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani 
state. Hence, in 1993, the position of the Aliyev regime was to take “a 
unitary approach to nationhood”, thus, relegating issues of minority 
rights protection to the domain of rhetoric exclamations. (Popjanevski 
                                                          
279 In the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azeerbaijan, Aliyev had held the position of first 
secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party. Cf. (MRGI 2006: 1).  
280 The state party is the Yeni Azerbaycan Party (YAP) and without party membership, 
career opportunities are almost non-existent. For instance, employment in the public 
sector is conditional upon membership in the YAP. Cf. (MRGI 2006: 1).   
281 In 1992 Azerbaijan issued a presidential decree on the Protection of the Rights and 
Freedoms and on State support for the Promotion of the Languages and Cultures of National 
Minorities, Numerically small Peoples and Ethnic groups living in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Cf. 
(Popjanevski 2006: 59).   
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2006: 59) This, furthermore, meant that any separatist movements were 
effectively crushed, by “prosecuting and sentencing individuals, involved 
in separatist activities, to lengthy imprisonments” (Popjanevski 2006: 59). 
The restoration of domestic order, however non-democratically upheld, 
in parallel with the fertilisation of the personality cult of the President, as 
well as the “lucrative contracts for Caspian oil exploitation”, explain not 
only the longevity of the Heydar Aliyev regime, which endured for two 
Presidential terms (1993-2003), but also the enforcement of his succession. 
Indeed, the presidential election of 2003 secured the victory of Heydar’s 
son, Ilham, who would pursue the policy line of his father, by 
emphasising the promotion of “a civic, rather than ethnic, national 
identity” (Popjanevski 2006: 59). The problem of corruption, which 
permeates the whole Azerbaijani society, and the non-democratic 
regime282, are severe challenges to the Euro-Atlantic structures which 
Azerbaijan belongs to as a consequence of their pro-western foreign 
policy orientation. 
 
Internationally, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was already a challenge 
from its inception, in that the war broke out prior to the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, severely limiting any international action. In January 
1992283, however, the OSCE took on a mediating role and the subsequent 
creation of the Minsk Group, involving Russia, the USA and France, 
would successfully mediate a cease-fire on the 12th of May 1994. (Ramelot 
& Remacle 1995: 124) However, even though the cease-fire meant the end 
of bloodshed, a solution to the conflict is yet to be found. Since the 
positions of the two parties are frozen, and the Azerbaijani authorities 
have been reluctant to have direct talks with the political leadership of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, the Minsk Group still has a mediating role in trying 
to find a political solution to the conflict. However, in the mid-2000s, the 
rhetoric of the new Azerbaijani President towards Nagorno-Karabakh 
became more militant and, “coupled with a rise in military expenditure, 
contributing to expectations of a military ‘solution’ to the conflict” (MRGI 
2006: 2).  
 
                                                          
282 In fact, the authoritarian rule was further strengthened after a referendum in 2009 
which gave the government carte blanche to eliminate any barrier for the extension of the 
two consecutive presidential terms. Cf. (EU Report 2009: 3). 
283 In January 1992 both Azerbaijan and Armenia became members of the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Cf. (Ramelot & Remacle 1995: 114). 
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However, since the foreign policy goals of the Azerbaijani government is 
to deepen the Euro-Atlantic ties with both the EU and NATO, there is a 
chance that with an increasing integration into Western structures, the 
incentives of finding a political solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
will increase. Indeed, in the EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan of 2006, the main 
priority of the EU is to “contribute to a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict” (EU Report 2006: 9). Furthermore, the relations with 
the USA took a turning point284 in 2001, in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, when Azerbaijan sided with the USA in the fight against 
terrorism. This turn of events has increased both the US financial support 
to Azerbaijan, as well as having increased their integration into NATO. 
Furthermore, due to fact that the Azeri are “ethnographically and 
linguistically a Turkic people”, the country has very close ties to Turkey. 
(MRGI 2006: 1) 
The demographic dimension 
The Azeri are a Turkic people who adhere to Islam, with an orientation 
towards Shi’a rather than Sunni and the majority of the Azeri people live 
in the north-western parts of neighbouring Iran. Indeed, according to 
estimates, the Azeri population of Iran amounts to “approximately one-
fifth to one-quarter of the total population” and sometimes this part of 
Iran is controversially referred to by some Azeri as ‘southern Azerbaijan’. 
(MRGI 2006: 1) The positioning of Azerbaijani territory in the South 
Caucasus, stretching over 86.000 km2, has important geostrategic 
implications. Indeed, situated on the western coast of the Caspian Sea, 
Azerbaijan borders on Iran to the south, Armenia to the west and Georgia 
as well as Dagestan of the Russian Federation to the north. Furthermore, 
since the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic still constitutes a part of 
Azerbaijan, a small strip of the north-western part is bordering on 
Turkey.  
 
Prior to independence and particularly before the emergence of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan was a highly multi-ethnic state, 
accounting for sizeable minority groups. According to the 1979 census, 
the Azeri majority amounted to a mere 78.1% with the Russian and the 
                                                          
284 Prior to 2001, US financial support to Azerbaijan was severely “limited by Section 907a 
of the Freedom Support Act, which restricted assistance to states which blockades other 
states” (Popjanevski 2006: 62).  
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Armenian minorities accounting for 15.8% of the population. The third 
numerically largest minority group in 1979 was the Lezgin minority, 
amounting to 2.6% of a total population of just over 6 million. These three 
minority groups still account for the numerically largest minority groups 
in Azerbaijan. However, with independence and especially the Nagorno-
Karabakh war, their numbers have decreased significantly in parallel 
with the substantial increase in the majority group, where the ethnic 
Azeri had increased to 90.6%, according to the 1999 census, out of a 
population of almost 8 million. (Gerber 2007: 8) Indeed, the trend towards 
mono-ethnicity in parallel to a trend towards depopulation have 
characterised Azerbaijani society ever since independence. Furthermore, 
these two trends have been mutually reinforcing since “minorities are 
more prone to emigrate” than is the majority. (Lattimer 2003: 15) 
 
In fact, due to social and economic hardship, ensued by independence as 
well as the ethnic conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, it is estimated that 
approximately 2 million have primarily migrated to Russia from 
Azerbaijan. It is the decimation of the two historically and numerically 
largest minority communities that is the most blatant. Indeed, during a 
time span of 20 years, in between 1979 and 1999, the Russian minority 
was decimated from 7.9% (1979) to 1.8% (1999). Due to the ethnic conflict 
in Nagorno- Karabakh, an even bigger decrease has been noted in the 
Armenian community which amounted to almost half a million in 1979 
(7.9%), had decreased to 390.500 (5.6%) in 1989 to reach a mere 1.5% in 
1999. (Lattimer 2003: 15) The same trend is notable also amongst the 
Lezgin minority which decreased from 2.6% (in 1979) to 2.2% (1999), as 
well as in some smaller minority groups which fear that without state 
support their minority cultures and languages will peter out into 
complete assimilation. However, the decrease in the smaller minority 
communities’ numbers is not only a result of emigration but is also due to 
the fact that some chose to register as the titular nation rather than 
according to their ethnic belonging. The failure to register according to 
ethnicity is both explained by way of facilitating social mobility, as well 
as by way of preventing harassment from state officials. Indeed, with the 
war and the increasing Azeri nationalism, some minority communities, 
such as the Lezgin, Avar and the Talysh minorities, have been perceived 
as secessionist-prone and as threats to both the territorial integrity and to 
the political stability of the Azerbaijani state.  
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Table 14.1. Ethnic structure of Azerbaijan according to the 1999 census (data 
retrieved from MRGI 2006: 1; Gerber 2007: 8) 
 
Nationality 1999 number 1999 % 
Azeri 7.205.780 90.6 
Lezgi 178.000 2.2 
Russian 141.700 1.8 
Armenian 120.700285 1.5 
Talysh 76.800 1.0 
Avar 50.900 0.6 
Turk-Meskhetian 43.400 0.5 
Tatar 30.000 0.4 
Ukrainian 29.000 0.4 
Georgian 14.900 0.2 
Kurd 13.100 0.2 
Tat 10.900 0.1 
Jews286 8.900 0.1 
Others/non-declared 29.320 0.4 
Total 7.953.400 100 
 
 
As a result of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian minority287 
has a particularly vulnerable situation. Indeed, out of the 1.5% of 
Armenians, approximately 30,000 live on Azerbaijani-controlled territory 
where they are consistently harassed both from the media, from state 
officials as well as from the general public. Indeed, the discriminatory 
policies from the state against the Armenians, consistently being treated 
as pariah and as traitors to the state, have subsequently entailed that the 
majority of Armenians in Azerbaijan “often seek to hide their ethnic 
identity, for instance through changing their names” (ECRI Report 2006: 
                                                          
285 The size of the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan is a contentious issue and the figure 
should be taken with precaution. Cf. (MRGI 2006: 1). Furthermore, almost the entirety of 
this group inhabits Nagorno-Karabakh except for an estimated 3000 which are believed to 
live in the Azerbaijani controlled territory. Cf. (Lattimer 2003: 15).    
286 The Jews are divided into European (Ashkenazi), Mountainous and Georgian Jews. Cf. 
(Gerber 2007: 8).  
287 During the height of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh the Armenian minority was 
expelled from Azerbaijan “after pogroms in Baku and its suburb Sumqayit” (MRGI 2006: 
1).  
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28). Apart from the conflictive relationship between the State and the 
Armenian minority, the Karabakh conflict would also shed light on 
increasing tension between the ethnic Azeri and the Lezgi and Avar 
communities in the North Caucasus as well as the Talysh minority in the 
South.  
 
Bordering on Dagestan in the Russian Federation, the Lezgin minority 
amounts to 178,000 people who are territorially concentrated in the far 
north-eastern regions of Gussary288, Khachmaz, Quba as well as Sheki; 
Sheki being located a bit further to the north-west. In Baku, the capital, 
the Lezgi minority amounts to approximately 15%. (Lattimer 2003: 17) On 
the Dagestan side of the border, the Lezgi minority constitutes another 
150,000 people. Although the border between Dagestan and Azerbaijan 
has divided this minority ever since 1860, the border was not perceived as 
a real problem until 1991, when the border became international and the 
Lezgi found “themselves in the position of a truly divided people” 
(Lattimer 2003: 17). Thus, ever since 1991, the division has been perceived 
as a threat to the survival of the Lezgi culture and language with an 
increasing fear of becoming assimilated to the Azeri majority. Tensions 
between the mounting nationalism of the Azeri and the Lezgi started in 
1991, when a separatist movement of the Lezgi on the Dagestani side of 
the border, the “Sadval political movement, called for the creation of an 
independent Lezgistan” (Lattimer 2003: 17).289 The tensions between the 
Azeri state and the Lezgin minority on the Azerbaijani side of the border 
were, furthermore, exacerbated when, at the height of the Nagorno-
Karabakh war, the Lezgi refused to enroll in the Azerbaijani army which 
led to “violent clashes between Lezgins and Azeri in Derbent, Dagestan, 
and in the Gussary region of Azerbaijan” (Lattimer 2003: 17).  
 
Just as the Lezgin, the Avar minority, amounting to 50,900 people and 
constituting 0.6% of the population, is territorially concentrated on the 
border to Dagestan, mainly inhabiting the regions of Zakataly and 
Belokany. As is the case with the Lezgi, the Avar community is also 
divided by the Dagestani border, however, with the major part of the 
                                                          
288 The Gussary region is primarily inhabited by Lezgis where they constitute 91% of the 
share of the population. Cf. (Lattimer 2003: 17).  
289 The Dagestani authorities however never endorsed the claim of an independent 
Lezgistan and it was furthermore “officially rejected by Sadval in April 1996” (Lattimer 
2003: 17).  
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Avars living in Dagestan, “where they constitute the largest ethnic group, 
numbering 600,000” (Lattimer 2003: 17). The explosiveness of inter-ethnic 
relations in the north of Azerbaijan has been fuelled by the wars in 
adjacent Chechnya290, in parallel with a radicalisation of Islam, making 
the region highly violent-prone. Whereas the ethnic Azeris are 
predominantly Shi’a Muslims, both the Lezgin minority as well as the 
Avar minority are primarily Sunni Muslims. Indeed, the ethnic tensions 
and the violent clashes between the local police, predominantly ethnic 
Azeris, and the ethnic minorities in the North, increased in strength in 
2001291, and “increasingly, minorities in Azerbaijan are associated with a 
growing religious zeal” (Lattimer 2003: 16).292  
 
Although being of Shi’a Muslim faith, the Talysh minority inhabiting the 
south-eastern parts of Azerbaijan, mainly in the regions of Lenkoran and 
Massaly, bordering on Iran, became a problem to the internal security of 
Azerbaijan in 1993, when the Talysh minority proclaimed a “Talysh-
Mugan Republic in Lenkoran” (Lattimer 2003: 17). People belonging to 
the Talysh minority are an Iranian people who, for a long time during 
Soviet rule, were not recorded as a minority group. In fact, it was only in 
the 1989 census that the Talysh became officially recorded and in the 
census of 1999 their number was recorded as constituting 76,800, (1 %), of 
the total population of Azerbaijan. However, some Azeri experts estimate 
that their actual number, in fact, amounts to between 200,000 and 250,000 
although “the authorities are reluctant to admit this” (Lattimer 2003: 17). 
The closeness to the Iranian border, and the growing Iranian influence on 
the Talysh minority, becoming visible with the creation of “new mosques 
and madrassas, established with financial backing from Iran”, has become 
increasingly challenging to the Azeri state. (Lattimer 2003: 17)  
 
Thus, religion and the radicalisation of Islam have become an aggravating 
component in the relations between the State and the national minorities, 
in particularly the North but also in the South. With the active stance of 
                                                          
290 Since the Azeri authorities do not recognise the Chechens, there are no official records 
as to their numerical strength in northern Azerbaijan. However, estimates have it that 
approximately 20.000 Chechen refugees inhabit the area. Cf. (Lattimer 2003: 17).    
291 Violent clashes between the local police, predominantly ethnic Azeri, and ethnic 
minorities were reported in 2001. Cf. (Lattimer 2003: 17). 
292 In the Lezgin-populated Khachmaz region in Northern Azerbaijan, bordering on 
Dagestan and Chechnya, Lezgins are usually associated with radical Islamic movements. 
Cf. (Gerber 2007: 14).   
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the Azeri government in siding with the USA in the aftermath of 9/11 and 
the war on terrorism, minority claims from especially the Lezgin and the 
Avar minority communities have sometimes been effectively labelled as 
terrorist acts by the Azeri government. Thus, whereas minority protection 
was largely inhibited by the negative unfolding in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
war during the 1990s, minority protection was furthermore hampered by 
the Azeri government’s active stance in the war against terrorism during 
the 2000s.  
The sociolinguistic dimension 
The socio-linguistic situation in Azerbaijan is highly different to that of 
Georgia in that the language does not constitute the primary factor of 
segregation. Indeed, national minorities in Azerbaijan generally have a 
good command of the state language which means that the language 
issue does not constitute a barrier of integration in Azerbaijan. Thus, the 
language issue in Azerbaijan is neither as problematic nor as politically 
sensitive as it is in Georgia. However, the recent legislative reforms, 
aiming at strengthening the state language, are made on behalf of 
minority language rights protection which have entailed that 
“international monitoring bodies are concerned with the diminishing 
importance of minority languages and the lack of state support for their 
use” (Popjanevski 2006: 65).  
 
As is the case in Georgia, the recent Azerbaijani policies of promoting the 
state language are prevalent, both in the administrative sphere as well as 
in the educational domain. These policy reforms should primarily be seen 
as a reaction to the Russian language, which has been, and still is, 
frequently used as the language of communication in the administrative 
domain in Azerbaijan, but also to other minority languages in use in the 
regions. (Popjanevski 2006: 65) This development, in parallel with the 
trend towards mono-ethnicity, entail that there is a real concern, 
especially voiced from monitoring bodies, that without promotion of 
minority languages, especially the smaller minority languages might face 
extinction. However, the Azeri authorities that have been engaged in 
strengthening an Azeri civic national identity, based on an omnipotent 
state, have been quite immune to any criticism of this kind. Furthermore, 
language rights claims from minority communities have been sparse and 
this could obviously be understood in light of the oppressive policies, 
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pursued by the regime against any oppositional forces. At the same time, 
it should be noted that the linguistic issue does not present a paramount 
challenge to minorities, since they generally are proficient in the Azeri 
language. Also, it should be noted that instruction in the Azeri language 
in education could furthermore be seen to be in the interest of minorities, 
as a way to provide for better guarantees as to social mobility and career 
opportunities. 
 
Spoken by the majority of the population, the Azeri language is a Turkic 
language which, prior to 2001, used the Cyrillic script. However, and by 
way of bringing the Azeri language “into line with the Turkish alphabet”, 
in September 2001, the President ordered that the Azeri language should 
henceforth use the Latin script. (Lattimer 2003: 24) This decision, which 
has alarmed not only minority communities but also the ethnic Azeris, 
can presumably also be understood as an effort to strengthen the Azeri 
language by distancing it from, as well as reducing the status of, the 
Russian language, which still is largely used as the administrative 
language of communication in the country. In fact, the Russian language 
is the second most used language of communication, spoken also by 
“ethnic Azeris who bilingually use Russian and Azerbaijani” 
(Popjanevski 2006: 64). Apart from Russian, which holds a particular 
position due to the fact that it is understood by the majority of the 
Azerbaijani interlocutors, Azerbaijan hosts a variety of smaller linguistic 
minorities, like the Lezgi, Georgian and Talysh.  
 
The deteriorating status of minority languages is particularly blatant as 
regards the Russian language, which had such a predominant position in 
Azerbaijan prior to independence. Indeed, during Soviet rule, the strong 
position of the Russian language had relegated the Azerbaijani language 
to a second-rate status, which meant that not only was Russian used as 
the language of administration, but also that “the majority of the schools 
were in Russian” (Gerber 2007: 26). Thus, prior to 1991, even though there 
were schools with instruction in the Azerbaijani language, these were by 
far outnumbered by the Russian-speaking educational establishments. 
From 1991 to 2001, the main languages of instruction in the educational 
system were Azeri and Russian, respectively. However, since 2001, the 
educational reforms have led to the closing down of many Russian-
speaking schools and today instruction in Azerbaijani accounts for 
approximately 80-90% of the schools in the country. (Gerber 2007: 26)  
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Even though the Azeri language has predominantly become the language 
of instruction in the Azerbaijani school system, instruction of minority 
languages is offered in regions which are densely populated by minority 
communities. Thus, in the Lezgin-populated regions in the north, as well 
as in the Talysh-dominated regions in the south, minority pupils are 
offered “lessons of their mother tongue two hours per week, from the 
first to the fourth grade” (Gerber 2007: 53). Furthermore, as concerns 
especially the Lezgin minority, being the numerically largest minority 
language at present, the State has introduced measures for the promotion 
of the Lezgin language, by sponsoring “Lezgin-language newspapers and 
radio programmes” (Lattimer 2003: 17). Another example of the 
importance given to the Lezgin language is that one branch of the Baku 
Teacher Training College, located in Gussary, “prepares students to teach 
Lezgin in primary schools” (Lattimer 2003: 17).  
 
As attested by interviews, carried out among representatives from the 
Lezgi and Talysh minority communities, amongst others, instruction in 
the state language in school is unproblematic and, in fact, is welcomed by 
these minority communities since they feel that “their interests are best 
served by achieving a good command of the state language” (Gerber 
2007: 54). Proficiency in the state language is viewed as of paramount 
importance, since this is a prerequisite to access higher education 
institutions in Azerbaijan. Thus, without a good command of the state 
language, these minority communities would not be able to compete on 
equal terms with the ethnic Azeris. (Gerber 2007: 54).  
Legislation in minority language rights upon gaining 
status as ENP-state 
Azerbaijan ratified the Framework Convention on National Minorities 
(FCNM) on the 26th of June 2000 and in January 2001 Azerbaijan became a 
full member of the Council of Europe. Upon accession to the Council of 
Europe, the poor human rights record of Azerbaijan became blatantly 
clear in the “lengthy list of conditions, which the country was required to 
meet after its accession, including the adoption of a law on ethnic 
minorities” (Lattimer 2003: 25). Even though the country has made 
progress in the legislative domain, the path towards full compliance is 
cumbersome, especially in the domain of minority rights, which is 
particularly blatant in that the adoption of a law on ethnic minorities, 
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which the Azerbaijani government “committed itself to adopting within 
three years of its accession” (i.e. before 25 January 2004), has yet to be 
adopted. (ECRI Report 2006: 17)  
 
The cumbersome road to complying with the minority rights 
conditionality should be understood, both as a consequence of the still 
unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, but also due to the nature of 
the authoritarian regime, whose oppressive policies have left a very weak 
civil society.293 The stance of the Azerbaijani political leadership is 
problematic and involves a balancing act. On the one hand, it is in the 
national interest of the Azeri state, both economically as well as security-
wise, to pursue a pro-western foreign policy agenda, which consequently 
requires the Azeri state to adopt legislation favouring minority rights’ 
protection. On the other hand, minority rights protection is perceived to 
go counter to the strengthening of the internal stability of the country, 
where a strong Azeri national identity is deemed indispensable in 
preventing any future secessionist minority claims and, above all, in 
finding a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Thus, the fact that 
“Azerbaijan is attempting to promote a civic national identity is visible in 
many areas of the legal framework as regards minorities” (Popjanevski 
2006: 72). 
 
The poor implementation of existing legislation is consistently pointed 
out in the monitoring reports and, in fact, is not limited to the domain of 
minority rights legislation, but refers to a more general problem which is 
the weakness of the rule of law in the country. In fact, in order to render 
minority rights protection more effective in the country, “particular 
attention needs to be paid to the weak rule of law in Azerbaijan, in 
general, and de facto application of minority rights provisions, in 
particular” (Popjanevski 2006: 73). Furthermore, the Nagorno-Karabakh 
territory and the adjacent regions, which are not under the Azeri 
government’s effective control, are not part of the assessments, thus, are 
not included in the investigation pertaining to minority language rights 
                                                          
293 The oppressive policies pursued by the regime have produced a situation where 
minority communities generally absent from coming forward to claim their minority 
rights. In fact, the climate generated by the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has entailed that 
minority rights claims are generally equated with separatism and secession where 
minority representatives have been accused of being traitors and enemies of the state. Cf. 
(ECRI Report 2006: 18). 
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legislation. Just as in the case of Georgia, the assessments from the two 
monitoring bodies in the domain of minority language rights are scarce 
and therefore other sources from 2006 have been consulted.294  
Non-discrimination 
General guarantees against discrimination are provided for by the 
Azerbaijani legislation. The equality provisions are constitutionally 
protected in Article 25 which stipulates that “the State guarantees 
equality of rights and liberties of everyone, irrespective of race, 
nationality, religion, language, gender, origin, property status, 
occupation, beliefs, affiliation with political parties, trade unions or other 
public associations” (Art. 25, Constitution, 1995). The same article, 
furthermore, declares that limitation of these rights pertaining to the 
above-mentioned categories is prohibited. (Art. 25, Constitution) Non-
discrimination legislative provisions are also provided for in the spheres 
of civil law and criminal law. Non-discrimination in the area of 
employment is provided for in the Labour Code, adopted in 1999, where 
Article 16 prohibits “discrimination in offering employment and in 
defining rights and duties arising from employment on the grounds, inter 
alia, of nationality, race or religion” (ECRI Report 2006: 11). The Labour 
Code, furthermore, stipulates that “a person who has been subjected to 
discrimination has (…) the right to appeal to the court and demand 
restoration” (Popjanevski 2006: 70). The penalisation of discrimination is 
constitutionally enshrined in that the Constitution prohibits “agitation 
and propaganda aimed at arousing racial, national, religious or social 
difference and hostility”, as well as being provided for in the Criminal 
Code. (Popjanevski 2006: 70) Various articles in the Criminal Code 
prohibit discrimination “on the grounds of, inter alia, ethnic origin, 
language or religious belief” and, furthermore, ban “incitement to 
national, racial, religious hatred or the debasing of national dignity and 
discrimination” (ECRI Report 2006: 9).  
 
                                                          
294 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2007) Second report on Azerbaijan 
adopted on 15 December 2006, CRI (2007) 22, Strasbourg, 24 May 2007, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/countrybycountry_en.asp, 2012-03-09. 
Popjanevski, J. (2006) “Minorities and the State in the South Caucasus: Assessing the 
Protection of National Minorities in Georgia and Azerbaijan”, Silk Road Paper, September 
2006. Washington-Uppsala: Central-Asia Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program 
– Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Centre.  
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Although general guarantees exist in the domain of non-discrimination, 
the monitoring reports display concern as to the poor compliance with 
the laws. Whereas the absence of any criminal charges is taken as 
evidence from the Azerbaijani authorities that discrimination does not 
exist in Azerbaijani society, the monitoring reports interpret the lack of 
prosecutions and convictions differently. Indeed, discrimination against 
ethnic minorities is a recurrent problem as evidenced by several reports 
which attest of “cases of racist and inflammatory speech or the promotion 
of religious intolerance by some media, members of the general public 
and politicians, particularly against Armenians, Russian citizens from 
Russia and members of some religious minorities” (ECRI Report 2006: 6). 
Incitement to harassment, especially against Armenians living in 
Azerbaijan, is particularly worrisome and calls for specific action. Thus, 
the ECRI report recommends the Azerbaijani authorities “to ensure an 
adequate response to all instances of discrimination and hate-speech 
against Armenians and contribute actively to generating a climate 
favourable to a fair and peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict” (ECRI Report 2006: 6). To increase the effectiveness of protecting 
national minorities from discrimination and harassment, the 
recommendations of the ECRI are two-fold, namely, that the Azerbaijani 
authorities “ensure the proper implementation of the civil and 
administrative law provisions”, at the same time as they are 
recommended to “complement the existing provisions”, by adopting 
more comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation. (ECRI Report 2006: 
11-12) 
 
To ensure more effective implementation of existing legislation, there is a 
need to enhance the competencies among the judicial officials and 
increase the awareness of existing legislation in this domain. Thus, the 
ECRI report recommends that the “Azerbaijani authorities substantially 
increase their efforts to provide training to the police, prosecutors, judges, 
lawyers and trainees in the judicial system on the application of the 
legislation on racist offences” (ECRI Report 2006: 10) Awareness-raising 
and training of the judicial staff is also set as priorities in the EU-
Azerbaijan Action Plan in order to increase the effectiveness of human 
rights and minority rights protection. (EU Report 2006: 14) Another 
incitement to increase awareness and competencies, thereby increasing 
the effectiveness of the implementation, would be to “enhance the 
capacity of institutions dealing with the protection and promotion of 
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human rights, in particular the Office of the Ombudsman” (EU Report 
2006: 14). Although the ECRI Report welcomes the work carried out by 
the Human Rights Commissioner (Ombudsperson), the ECRI is however 
sceptical towards increasing the capacities of this institution, since “it 
does not seem to ECRI that there is a special emphasis in the office’s work 
on the fight against racism, religious intolerance, racial discrimination or 
other forms of discrimination” (ECRI Report 2006: 12). Thus, the ECRI 
recommends that the Azerbaijani authorities could either increase the 
responsibilities, as well as strengthen the capacities of the existing 
institution, or preferably “to set up in the near future an independent 
specialised body to combat racism and racial discrimination” (ECRI 
Report 2006: 13). 
 
The recurrent problem as regards non-discrimination legislation, in 
particular, is the weakness of the judicial system, in general, which 
inhibits the “strengthening (of) the stability and effectiveness of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law” (EU Report 
2006: 14). In consequence, this state of affairs, in parallel with the negative 
climate, especially as concerns the Armenians, greatly reduces the 
likelihood that cases of discrimination will be brought to justice. 
Paradoxically, the Azerbaijani authorities point to the lack of criminal 
charges as evidence of the high level of tolerance within society, which 
explains that “no complaint of racial discrimination (…) has been brought 
to their attention”, and therefore there is no need for more comprehensive 
anti-discrimination legislation to be adopted. (ECRI Report 2006: 11) 
Thus, the recommendations of the ECRI, that Azerbaijani authorities 
complement existing legislation, “by adopting comprehensive provisions 
prohibiting racial discrimination in a precise and exhaustive manner to 
ensure that all areas of life such as education, access to housing, to public 
services and to public places”, does not constitute a basis for discussion in 
Azerbaijan at present. (ECRI Report 2006: 11)  
 
The legal provisions pertaining to non-discrimination exist, where the 
equality provisions are constitutionally protected, and non-discrimination 
provisions are integrated both in the Labour Code, as well as in the 
Criminal Code. However, and as emphasised by the ECRI Report, to 
encounter the existing discrimination in the Azerbaijani society, which 
also permeates the judiciary system, it is important that existing 
legislation is complemented by more comprehensive anti-discrimination 
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provisions. On the basis of the index-scale, Azerbaijan is positioned on 
the level of 1.0. 
 
Fig. 14.1. Azerbaijan and level of rule adoption in non-discrimination upon 
gaining status as ENP-state 
 
2006 
   Tolerance                       x                                                               Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
(0): Absence of any non-discrimination norm; 
(1): General provisions such as an equality clause in the Constitution;   
(2): Non-discrimination laws are inserted in specific laws;  
(3): Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation which then means 
that there has been a complete transposition of the EU anti-
discrimination acquis; 
(4): Non-discrimination laws exceed the minimum requirements of 
the Directive.  
Minority language use in official contexts 
In 1995, the Azerbaijani language received the status of sole official 
language, as articulated by the Constitution. (Art. 21, Constitution, 1995) 
However, at the same time the Constitution enshrined the right for 
national minorities to freely use their mother tongue, as well as to have 
the right to receive education in “any language, as desired” (Art. 45, 
Constitution). However, in recent years and most likely as a reaction to 
the special position of the Russian language, which still largely is in use 
in administrative communications, the Azerbaijani authorities have, by 
way of reform, strengthened the use of the state language to the 
detriment of minority languages. (Popjanevski 2006: 65) Indeed, in 2002, 
the Azerbaijani Parliament adopted a new Law on State Language which 
stipulates that “all services, procedures in state agencies, NGOs, and 
trade unions must be in Azerbaijani or in a foreign language with a 
translation into Azerbaijani” (Popjanevski 2006: 65). The new Law, as its 
title indicates, is primarily concerned with provisions regulating the State 
language, and does not provide for any specific minority language rights, 
apart from the passage granting “the right of minority representatives to 
use other languages than Azerbaijani in parliamentary work” 
(Popjanevski 2006: 65). Provisions regulating minority language rights in 
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the judiciary are, however, provided for, both in the realm of civil law 
and criminal law. This means that parties in court proceedings are 
entitled to “select the procedural language, depending on the majority 
language of the locality” (Popjanevski 2006: 66). Furthermore, and 
according to the Criminal Procedural Code, “any person, suspected of, or 
charged with, a crime, has the right to make statements, address the 
court, and file complaints in his or her own language, and to receive 
translation free of charge” (Popjanevski 2006: 66). 
 
The trend towards strengthening the state language to the detriment of 
minority languages is also seen in the fact that, although Azerbaijan 
signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 
(ECRML) in December 2001, this legal instrument has not yet been 
ratified. The non-ratification has been explained, not by a lack of political 
will, but by a lack of financial resources “for financing all the measures 
that need to be taken in order to fully implement this instrument” (ECRI 
Report 2006: 7). The non-ratification is pointed out by the ECRI Report 
which “reiterates its recommendation that Azerbaijan ratify (…) the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages” (ECRI Report 
2006: 8). Minority language rights are, however, neither an area of 
priority in the EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan, nor call for any specific 
assessment in the ECRI Report. The reason for this is presumably related 
to the fact that minority representatives, generally, seem content with the 
laws regulating the use of the State language. Thus, the stance of the ECRI 
is lukewarm and only points out that the Azerbaijani authorities should 
“monitor the implementation of the legislation on languages in order to 
identify any problems that national minorities may face in this regard. 
Where necessary, the authorities should take steps, ensuring that this 
legislation and its implementation do not impact negatively on the 
development of national minorities’ languages” (ECRI Report 2006: 19). 
 
The assessments of the use of minority language rights in official contexts 
are, particularly, sparse in the monitoring reports. However, what is clear 
is that the legislative provisions, enabling minorities to use their language 
in official contexts, are almost non-existent and apart from the 
Constitution, which enshrines the right for national minorities to freely 
use their minority languages, this does not seem to apply to the official 
realm. Thus, on the basis of the index-scale, Azerbaijan is positioned on 
the level of 0.5. 
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Fig. 14.2. Azerbaijan and level of rule adoption in minority language use in 
official contexts upon gaining status as ENP-state 
 
2006 
   Tolerance              x                                                                        Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
      
(0): No recognition of minority languages; 
(1): The right to use the minority language in official contexts (before 
judicial and administrative authorities; i.e. the right to a translator);  
(2): The minority language can be used in Personal and Place Names 
(public signs); 
(3): The minority language can be used in official documents; 
(4): Minority language having status as official language. 
Minority language rights in education 
Just as the strengthening of the state language is pertinent in the domain 
of minority language use in official contexts, the same trend is blatant 
also in the laws regulating minority language use in education. Thus, 
with the recent educational reforms, where the strengthening of the State 
language is part of the efforts to standardise the curriculum, the legal 
status of minority languages has been weakened. Indeed, whereas the 
previous 1992 Law on Education provided for “rights for national 
minorities to receive education in their own language”, the newly 
reformed Law on Education seriously weakens this right, by increasing 
“the number of subjects taught in Azerbaijani as well as the use of the 
Latin alphabet” (Popjanevski 2006: 68). Thus, although minority language 
rights in education are constitutionally protected, in that it is stipulated 
that “Everyone has the right to be educated, carry out creative activity in 
any language, as desired” (Art. 45, Constitution 1995), the new Law on 
State Language does not provide any guarantees of this constitutionally 
protected right. (Popjanevski 2006: 68) 
 
The strengthening of the state language in education does not mean, 
however, that instruction in minority languages no longer exists in 
Azerbaijan. Although instruction in the Azerbaijani language in 
educational establishments accounts for 93.3%, there are minority-run 
educational establishments which provide instruction in minority 
languages. Apart from a great many schools which provide for 
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instruction in the Russian language, mainly in Baku, there are also some 
Jewish and Georgian schools. Indeed, in the western parts of Azerbaijan, 
there are still Georgian schools where “ethnic Georgians receive 
education in Georgian”, on the basis of the Georgian curriculum. 
(Popjanevski 2006: 68). Apart from these minority-run schools, in the 
remaining 400 Azerbaijani schools, minorities are offered the possibility 
to learn their minority languages as a separate subject. Indeed, in regions 
where minorities live compactly, “in general, two hours a week are 
devoted to teaching minority languages, from the first to the fourth 
grade” (ECRI Report 2006: 18). 
 
Minority language rights in education neither seem to be an issue of 
controversy amongst the minority communities themselves, nor from the 
monitoring bodies, whose assessments are, just as in the domain of 
minority language use in official contexts, sparse. Since the strengthening 
of the state language does not go counter to the principles of the FCNM, 
and is not considered “an illegitimate objective”, the legal status of 
minority rights in education does not call for great concern in the 
monitoring reports. (Popjanevski 2006: 68) It is, however, noted that the 
rapid transition from one curriculum to another might have negative 
consequences for persons belonging to certain minority groups, who 
“may be unable to compete with ethnic Azeris, or other minority groups 
who use Azerbaijani, in the education and labour fields” (Popjanevski 
2006: 69). At the same time, it is noted that the recent educational reforms 
seem to have had a positive impact on particularly the Chechen children, 
who, up until 2003, were prohibited access to local public schools. In this 
regard, the ECRI Report notes, with interest, “that the government started 
to allow Chechen children to register in public schools in 2003” (ECRI 
Report 2006: 26). 
 
Regarding the teaching of minority languages, the quality of minority 
language textbooks has called for some concern. Whereas the ECRI 
Report welcomes the initiatives of the Azerbaijani authorities to have 
improved the textbooks for the Lezgin and the Talysh minorities, the 
poor quality or the outright lack of minority language textbooks, as 
concerns other minority communities, is a recurrent problem. In fact, and 
as underlined by the ECRI report, “textbooks for learning other minority 
languages, such as Tats and Avar are still unsuitable” (ECRI Report 2006: 
18). Furthermore, as regards these particular minority groups, the lack of 
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teachers, qualified to teach these minority languages, raises concern. 
Although the Azerbaijani authorities have stated that the Ministry of 
Education is in the process of taking action in order to improve this 
situation, the ECRI report, nevertheless, recommends the authorities “to 
step up their efforts to improve the quality of teaching of minority 
languages and cultures in public schools” (ECRI Report 2006: 19). 
 
Although minority language rights in education are constitutionally 
protected, the recent educational reforms strongly limit the legal status of 
minority languages in education. Indeed, the standardisation of the 
Azerbaijani curriculum entails the strengthening of the State language to 
the detriment of minority languages. Hence, although minority schools 
still do exist de facto, these are not de jure provided for in the recent Law 
on Education. According to the Law on Education, Azerbaijan would be 
positioned at the far left end of the index scale. However, since Article 45, 
of the Constitution, does enshrine the rights for minorities to freely 
choose the language of instruction, Azerbaijan is positioned on the level 
of 0.5. 
 
Fig. 14.3. Azerbaijan and level of rule adoption in minority language rights in 
education upon gaining status as ENP-state 
 
2006 
   Tolerance             x                                                                        Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
  (0): No education of or in minority language; 
(1): Children belonging to minorities have the right to learn their 
mother tongue in school; 
(2): At least parts of the curriculum (e.g. history or religion) are taught 
in the minority language; 
(3): Minorities have the right to educate their children completely in 
the mother tongue, either in state schools with a complete syllabus 
taught in the minority language or in specific minority schools; 
(4): Minorities have their own universities. 
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15 
LEVEL OF RULE ADOPTION IN MINORITY 
LANGUAGE RIGHTS LEGISLATION UPON 
INITIAL STATUS 
Prior to presenting the results of how the three categories have fared as 
concerns rule adoption in minority language rights, initially, it is 
indispensable to reiterate a few considerations of importance for the 
analysis. In some states, minority language rights are graded, which, 
consequently, means that some minorities are provided with more 
legislative rights than others. In these cases, pertinent for instance in 
Macedonia, Kosovo as well as in Moldova, I have chosen to focus on the 
rights granted to those minorities where the deepest conflictive lines have 
produced the most ethnic tension and conflict. Thus, in Macedonia the 
focus of attention is the Albanian minority, in Kosovo the Serb minority 
and in Moldova the Russian minority, where the rights granted to these 
minorities have been singled out in terms of the measurement of rule 
adoption. Another issue of relevance, which has to be pointed out, is the 
quality of the monitoring reports. In some states the monitoring reports 
have been rather scarce, particularly pertinent as regards the ENP states, 
and in these cases additional sources have been consulted. Furthermore, 
although the monitoring reports focus equally much on legislation 
adopted, as well as on implementation, this study is only concerned with 
measuring the legislation adopted.  
Non-discrimination: Inter-category variation 
One would have expected that the states, when initially acquiring status 
as candidate state, potential candidate state and ENP-state, respectively, 
would have been positioned according to their temporal location to the 
prospective EU membership reward. Consequently, it was assumed that 
the category of candidate states (category 1), would have adopted more 
extensive legislation in the domain of minority language rights than the 
potential candidate states (category 2), which, in turn, were expected to 
have proceeded further than the ENP states (category 3). In the domain of 
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legislation pertaining to non-discrimination, the results show that even 
though category 1 does score higher than the other two categories, the 
same is not true for category 2, which actually scores lower than category 
3. Indeed, when we calculate the means of the first category we notice 
that the candidate states attain the level of 1.25. As shown in figure 15.1., 
the distance between categories 1 and 2 is the most pronounced, since the 
potential candidate states only attain the level of 0.83, not even 
amounting to having provided for general legal provisions in the domain 
of non-discrimination. Category 3 acquires an intermediate position, 
having attained the level of 1.0, providing for general legal guarantees 
against discrimination.  
 
What is possibly even more striking is that the variation between the 
three categories is minor, and all three categories conglomerate around 
position 1.0, which means that all three categories, more or less, have 
provided for general legal guarantees against discrimination. When we 
proceed to calculate the Eta square value, which amounts to 0.208, the 
modest relationship between the categories’ temporal location to the 
prospective EU membership reward and the level of rule adoption is 
confirmed, since the variation in the level of rule adoption in the area of 
non-discrimination is only explained by 20.8% of the categories’ temporal 
location to the prospective EU membership reward. 
 
Fig 15.1. Initial status: Non-discrimination and inter-category variations: Eta 
square value: 0.208; significance value: 0.558 
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(0): Absence of any non-discrimination norm; 
(1): General provisions such as an equality clause in the Constitution;   
(2): Non-discrimination laws are inserted in specific laws;  
(3): Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation which then means 
that there has been a complete transposition of the EU anti-
discrimination acquis; 
(4): Non-discrimination laws exceed the minimum requirements of 
the Directive.  
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Non-discrimination: Intra-category variation 
When we scrutinise the results, however, by focusing more closely on the 
individual states, one concludes that the intra-category variations are 
more important and, in fact, substantial, in some cases. Indeed, as shown 
in figure 15.2., Croatia scores higher (1.5) than Macedonia (1.0), even 
though one has to acknowledge that the variation is rather minor. 
However, when we proceed to category 2, the variation between the 
states is substantial, and in this category Kosovo stands out since, by 
having adopted the Anti-Discrimination Law in 2004, they have 
positioned themselves on the same level of rule adoption as Croatia (1.5). 
In comparison to both Bosnia and Serbia, which both provide for very 
weak non-discrimination legislation, and which score a mere 0.5, the 
variation is substantial between the states forming category 2. In the case 
of Serbia, the weak position is primarily related to the difficult legal 
situation the country finds itself in. Indeed, 2003 marks the year when the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia, including the 
Autonomous Regions of Voijvodina and Kosovo (de jure), and 
Montenegro, becomes void and a loose confederation, the Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro is established. Thus, in 2003 Serbia finds itself in a 
constitutional limbo which entails that the status of the legal system is 
weakened, which obviously has a detrimental effect upon the legislation 
pertaining to non-discrimination.  
 
The case of Bosnia in 2003 is less transitional and relates more to the 
problematic constitutional status that the Dayton Peace Agreement from 
1995 has imposed on the Bosnian constitutional design, in which the 
ethno-territorial autonomies, carved out during the war, have been 
preserved. This has subsequently entailed a complex legal federative 
system, where the levels of the Entities have been strengthened to the 
detriment of the State level, creating two phantom states within a weak 
whole. Thus, the lack of legal harmonisation between the State level and 
the Entities, on the one hand, and between the Entity of the Federation 
and the Cantonal levels, on the other, has created a problematic politico-
legal situation. Additionally, the overarching privileged status of the 
three constituent nations, Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, constitutionally 
enshrined, creates a situation where the legal protection of those not 
belonging to the constituent nations is heavily reduced. In fact, one of the 
negative consequences of the Dayton Peace Agreement has been the 
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construction of a legal situation where national minorities, or the 
“Others”, actually have become legally discriminated against. Although 
both Bosnia and Kosovo are internationally administered states, thus, 
constituting semi-protectorates, the legal status of their respective 
minorities differs substantially. In fact, whereas there is quite extensive 
non-discrimination legislation in Kosovo, these legal rights are heavily 
curtailed in Bosnia. However, from a conflict-resolution perspective, 
whereas the guaranteeing of the equality of the three constituent nations 
in Bosnia was paramount to ending the conflict, the Kosovo case was very 
different. Indeed, in the case of Kosovo, as manifested by UN resolution 
1244, the conflict resolution mechanisms centred on extensive rights for 
national minorities, in general, and for the Serb minority, in particular.  
 
As far as the ENP states are concerned, there is no variation whatsoever 
between these three states, which are the furthest away from the 
prospective EU membership reward. As shown in figure 15.2., they all 
have adopted general legal guarantees against discrimination and are 
positioned on the level of 1.0, according to the index scale. The three 
states of category 3 are, thus, positioned along with candidate state 
Macedonia, in between Serbia and Bosnia, to the left, and Croatia and 
Kosovo, to the right. 
 
Fig 15.2. Initial status: Non-discrimination and intra-category variations 
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(0): Absence of any non-discrimination norm; 
(1): General provisions such as an equality clause in the Constitution;   
(2): Non-discrimination laws are inserted in specific laws;  
(3): Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation which then means 
that there has been a complete transposition of the EU anti-
discrimination acquis; 
(4): Non-discrimination laws exceed the minimum requirements of 
the Directive.  
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Minority language use in official contexts: Inter-
category variation 
Whereas the variations between the three categories are minor, pertaining 
to the non-discrimination norm, the same is not true for the other two 
norms, the right to use minority languages in official contexts, and the 
right for minorities’ to get educated in the minority language. Indeed, as 
regards particularly minority language use in official contexts, the 
ranking is spread along the index scale according to the categories’ 
temporal location to the prospective EU membership reward. As shown 
in figure 15.3., there is fairly good variation between category 1 and 2, 
where the candidate states are positioned at the far right of the index 
scale (3.5). Category 2 has acquired an intermediate position (2.5), 
between category 1 and 3, where the ENP-states have been left on the 
margins, having adopted very moderate legislation in the domain of 
minority language rights use in official contexts (1.33). This is confirmed 
when we calculate the measures of association and conclude that the Eta 
square value amounts to 0.342. This consequently means that the 
variation in the level of rule adoption in this domain is explained by 
34.2% of the categories’ temporal location to the prospective EU 
membership reward. However, not only is there substantial inter-
category variation, the variations within the different categories are even 
more substantial.  
 
Figure 15.3. Initial status: Official use of minority languages and inter-category 
variations: Eta square value: 0.342; significance value: 0.351 
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(0): No recognition of minority languages; 
(1): The right to use the minority language in official contexts (before 
judicial and administrative authorities; i.e. the right to a translator);  
(2): The minority language can be used in Personal and Place Names 
(public signs); 
(3): The minority language can be used in official documents; 
(4): Minority language having status as official language. 
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Minority language use in official contexts: Intra-
category variation 
The variation is relatively minor within the first category, as compared 
with the other two categories. As shown in figure 15.4., in the first 
category, Macedonia has adopted the most extensive legislation in this 
domain and scores the maximum 4.0, and Croatia is close, having 
attained the level of 3.0. The very extensive rights in the case of 
Macedonia are primarily a result of the peace agreement, established by 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement, and are, thus, very much limited to the 
granting of very extensive minority language rights, including official 
language status, to the Albanian language, since this was seen as a 
prerequisite for the prevention of future ethnic conflict in Macedonia. In 
category 2, the dispersion between the three states is considerably greater 
since Bosnia stands out from both Serbia and particularly Kosovo. 
Indeed, whereas Kosovo scores the maximum 4.0, Serbia has attained the 
level of 3.0, consequently, leaving Bosnia far behind. Indeed, Bosnia only 
scores 0.5, providing for very limited rights in the sphere of minority 
language rights use in official contexts. Thus, whereas both Serbia and 
Kosovo are ranked on the same level as the candidate states, respectively, 
and where the official language status granted to the Serbian language in 
Kosovo is a direct consequence of UN Resolution 1244, and the 
establishment of the UNMIK governance, Bosnia scores the same low 
level of rule adoption as the two ENP states, Georgia and Azerbaijan. In 
the case of Bosnia, the focus on the equality of the languages of the three 
constituent nations has been the centre of attention, which consequently 
has relegated legislative provisions of minority language use to the 
background.   
 
Just as the intra-category variations are substantial as regards category 2, 
the same applies to category 3, in which both Georgia and Azerbaijan are 
ranked low (0.5), as opposed to Moldova which ranks substantially 
higher (3.0), being positioned on the same score as both Croatia and 
Serbia. The substantial variation within the ENP-category is interesting, 
since the Georgian and the Moldovan cases are quite similar as regards 
the sensitivity of the linguistic issue in both states. Indeed, both states 
struggle with weak state languages, and the necessity to strengthen the 
same are part of the state-building processes in both countries. This 
problem is, particularly, acute in the case of Georgia, where the 
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segregation of the numerically large minorities primarily is a result of 
national minorities’ poor command of the Georgian language. In Georgia, 
the low score can, thus, be seen as a result of the policy stance of the 
Georgian authorities, which has been to strengthen the state language to 
the detriment of the use of minority languages.  
 
The Moldovan case, although similar as regards the prerequisites of the 
weak state language, is, however, substantially different as regards the 
outcome of the legislative rights granted to minority language use, since 
Moldova scores high (3.0). Indeed, in the Moldovan case, the sensitivity 
of the Russian minority language, that has de facto official language status, 
is very much linked to the Transnistrian conflict. In regards to the 
conflict, the policy of the Moldovan authorities has been to stall any 
discussions on the linguistic issue for fear that the frozen conflict with the 
breakaway republic would flare up again if the Moldovan authorities 
would decide to promote the strengthening of the state language. Hence, 
as regards the extensive rights granted to the official use of minority 
languages, this largely concerns the status of the Russian minority 
language, even though the rights granted to the Gagauz language, 
however primarily limited to the Autonomous region of Gagauzia, are 
also extensive. Although Azerbaijan scores as low as Georgia, the 
promotion of the state language to the detriment of minority languages in 
Azerbaijan, is rather “unproblematic”, in the sense that the linguistic 
issue and the civic integration campaign is not as controversial in the 
authoritarian state as it is in the Georgian case. Indeed, the strengthening 
of the Azerbaijani state language does not entail the same language 
impediments as in Georgia since national minorities have a good 
command of the state language. In fact, minorities’ command of the 
Azerbaijani state language is, generally, good, and the monitoring reports 
on the whole don’t indicate that the strengthening of the state language 
causes concern among minority communities. However, it has to be 
underlined that any opposition to the state policies has been effectively 
crushed by the authoritarian regime, so even if these minority language 
rights claims exist, they are not voiced for fear of severe repression.  
 
 
 
 
299 
Figure 15.4. Initial status: Official use of minority languages and intra-category 
variations 
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(0): No recognition of minority languages; 
(1): The right to use the minority language in official contexts (before 
judicial and administrative authorities; i.e. the right to a translator);  
(2): The minority language can be used in Personal and Place Names 
(public signs); 
(3): The minority language can be used in official documents; 
(4): Minority language having status as official language. 
Minority language rights in education: Inter-category 
variation 
Legislative provisions, in the area of minority language rights in 
education, seem less controversial than in the domain of minority 
language use, and do not entail the same inter-category variation. Indeed, 
as shown in figure 15.5., all three categories have quite extensively 
provided for legislation in this field, with the candidate states having 
adopted the most extensive legislation (3.5). There is, however, some 
variation with regard to both the potential candidate states, as well as the 
ENP states, which both score 2.5. However, when we proceed to calculate 
the measures of association, to find out to what extent the temporal 
location of the prospective EU membership reward explains variations in 
the level of rule adoption, we can conclude that this relation is quite 
insignificant and only amounts to 10% (Eta square: 0.1).  However, even 
though the inter-category variation is almost insignificant, when one 
proceeds to scrutinise the results on a more individual level, by studying 
the intra-categorical variations, one notices huge discrepancies, primarily, 
in the two categories the furthest away from the prospective EU 
membership reward.   
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Figure 15.5. Initial status: Minority language rights in education and inter-
category variations: Eta square value: 0.10; significance value: 0.768 
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  (0): No education of or in minority language; 
(1): Children belonging to minorities have the right to learn their 
mother tongue in school; 
(2): At least parts of the curriculum (e.g. history or religion) are taught 
in the minority language; 
(3): Minorities have the right to educate their children completely in 
the mother tongue, either in state schools with a complete syllabus 
taught in the minority language or in specific minority schools; 
(4): Minorities have their own universities. 
Minority language rights in education: Intra-category 
variation 
On an individual state level basis, the variations within the three 
categories are substantial, and the distribution of states is, not 
surprisingly, quite similar to the situation of rule adoption pertaining to 
minority language rights in official contexts. As shown in figure 15.6., in 
the category of the candidate states, the variation is minor with Croatia 
scoring 3.0 and Macedonia 4.0. In the same vein as in the context of the 
official use of minority languages, in Macedonia the extensive rights 
granted to minority languages in education is, primarily, a result of the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement, just as the rights provided for are 
principally directed towards the Albanian minority. As concerns category 
2, however, the discrepancies between the potential candidate states are 
huge and, primarily, relates to the very low score of Bosnia, which is 
consistent in its policy towards minority language rights, thus, scoring a 
low 0.5. Serbia is also consistent and scores a high 3.0, with finally Kosovo 
having provided for the most extensive legislation, since the Kosovo 
Serbs have their own university (4.0).  
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As concerns category 3, the same huge discrepancies as in category 2 are 
noticeable. Moldova scores the maximum 4.0, Georgia is positioned on 
the level of 3.0, and Azerbaijan scores a low 0.5. The extensive rights, 
provided for in the Moldovan case, concerns the very extensive minority 
language rights granted to the Russian language, where Russian-
speaking universities are still provided for in Moldova. The educational 
rights of minorities in Georgia, in 2006, might seem astonishing in view of 
the restricted legislation in the area of official use of minority languages. 
However, it is clear that the legislative provisions in this area are, indeed, 
a relic from the Soviet era, and although these rights are legally provided 
for in 2006, the Georgian authorities have already made extensive plans, 
as laid out in the Law on Education, to reduce these rights in favour of 
compulsory instruction in the Georgian language in numerous subjects. 
However, in 2006, national minorities still had the legal right to receive 
education in full in the minority language. Just like Bosnia, Azerbaijan is 
consistently pursuing a rather hostile approach towards minority 
language rights in education, even if de facto minority education exists. 
 
Figure 15.6. Initial status: Minority language rights in education and intra-
category variations 
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taught in the minority language or in specific minority schools; 
(4): Minorities have their own universities. 
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Addition of all three norms upon initial status 
When adding up the three norms and the status of the level of rule 
adoption of the different categories, as well as the sum pertaining to the 
states individually, we find that category 1 has adopted the most 
extensive legislation (2.75), preceding category 2 that ranks second (1.94). 
Even though category 3 scores the lowest (1.61), the variation between 
category 2 and category 3 is minor. 
 
Fig. 15.7. Addition of all three norms: Inter-category variations 
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As expected, and as shown in figure 15.8., the variations especially within 
category 2 but also category 3 are substantial and the results show an 
important dispersion, where we notice that Kosovo, belonging to 
category 2, in fact, has adopted the most extensive legislation, when 
adding up the results from the three individual norms (3.17). Also 
interesting but not surprising is that Bosnia, also belonging to category 2, 
has fared the least well by being positioned to the far left of the index 
scale (0.5), closely followed by Azerbaijan (0.67). Macedonia (3.0) 
precedes Croatia (2.5), and what is even more surprising, so does 
Moldova (2.67) which belongs to category 3 and is the furthest away from 
the prospective EU membership reward. Georgia is positioned on an 
intermediate level (1.5) and is preceded by Serbia (2.17). Thus, when we 
have scrutinised the results from the sum of all three norms, we can 
conclude that even though there are inter-category variations, which are 
indeed displayed according to the categories’ temporal location of the 
prospective EU membership reward, these variations are minor, 
compared to the substantial variations that exist within the three 
categories. This confirms the strong heterogeneity of the states of 
especially category 2, but also of the states being the furthest away from 
the prospective EU membership reward, category 3. Whether these intra-
category variations will prevail under the impact of the speed of the 
prospective EU membership reward, in terms of the progress made, will 
be clarified in the coming chapter. However, if our hypothesis is 
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confirmed, not only will the inter-category variations become even more 
important under the impact of the speed of the prospective EU 
membership reward, but this would also entail that the heterogeneity 
within the different categories would become less manifest. 
 
Fig. 15.8. Addition of all three norms: Intra-category variations 
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16 
PROGRESS IN RULE ADOPTION IN 
RELATION TO THE SPEED OF THE 
PROSPECTIVE EU-MEMBERSHIP REWARD 
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is necessary to reiterate one of the 
central claims around which this investigation centres, which is that the 
prospective EU membership reward is considered to be an effective 
mechanism to induce non-member states, on track of EU accession, to 
comply with EU minority language rights conditionality. On the basis of 
this claim, it has subsequently been hypothesised that the closer recipient 
states are to the prospective EU membership benefits, the more likely 
they are to have progressed to a high level of rule adoption in the three 
categories of minority language rights under investigation. Thus, the 
temporal distance to the prospective EU membership reward is argued to 
be a strong incentive as to the progression in the level of rule adoption. 
Furthermore, as already stated, even though the monitoring bodies 
integrate assessments of the de facto situation in each state under 
investigation, it is only the de jure situation that forms the basis of the 
measurement of this investigation. The time span of the analysis is 
confined to 2004 – 2010. In the case of category 1, the progress reports, 
that form the basis of the analysis, are limited to the time frame 2005 – 
2010. The material pertaining to category 2 is limited to the time span 
2004 – 2010 and, finally, the progress reports of category 3 are confined to 
the period between 2005 and 2010.  
Non-discrimination: Inter-category variation  
The pattern of inter-category variation is highly different when we 
measure how the three categories have progressed, in terms of the level 
of rule adoption in the area of non-discrimination, during the time span 
of the investigation. However, on the basis of the analytical framework, it 
is only partially that our expectations are confirmed. Indeed, as shown in 
figure 16.1., whereas the distance between categories 1 and 3 has 
substantially increased, positioning category 1 way ahead of category 3, 
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the distance between categories 1 and 2 has been nullified, since they 
score the same level of rule adoption. In fact, category 1, forming the 
candidate states and for whom the adaptation pressure is argued to be 
the strongest since they are temporally the closest to EU membership, 
scores 2.0. This consequently means that this category has made fairly 
good progress compared to their initial level of rule adoption (1.25). The 
potential candidate states, forming category 2 and for whom the 
adaptation pressure is argued to be less constraining since these states are 
temporally more distant to the prospective EU membership, surprisingly, 
score an equally high 2.0, levelling with category 1. The progress made in 
this category is substantial, compared to their initial very low score which 
amounted to 0.83, which, in fact, invalidates our hypothesis, partly at 
least. Finally, category 3 which consists of the three ENP states and for 
whom the prospective EU membership reward is the most distant, has 
not progressed at all and remains positioned on the same low score as 
they did initially (1.0). 
 
The lack of progress in the third category is not surprising and only 
confirms our hypothesis since being temporally the furthest away from 
the prospective EU membership reward, there is, in fact, very little 
incentive to provide for a higher level of rule adoption. This, in turn, 
explains the substantial increase in variation which becomes clear when 
we proceed to calculate the Eta square which displays a significantly 
higher value than initially. Even though the Eta square value should be 
taken with precaution, since the number of cases only amounts to 8, it is 
nevertheless a clear indication of the direction of the association between 
the two variables. Indeed, whereas the relationship between the speed of 
the prospective EU membership reward and the level of rule adoption 
was quite weak initially (Eta square value: 0.208), it is clear that this 
correlation has substantially been strengthened when we analyse the 
progress made during the time span of investigation. In fact, at the end of 
2010, the variation in the level of rule adoption is explained by more than 
65% (Eta square value: 0.652) by the speed of the prospective EU 
membership reward. Although these results are in no way unexpected, 
and only confirm our postulated hypothesis, it is, at the same time, 
evident that the nullification of the distance between categories 1 and 2 
goes completely counter to what was hypothesised. This, in turn, makes 
us question, not only, the impact of the speed dimension as an effective 
mechanism of adaptation pressure, but also the relevance of the 
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categorisation of the states of the Western Balkans. Hence, in order both 
to explain the unexpected, as well as the expected results, an analysis of 
the intra-categorical specificities calls for a closer investigation.  
 
Fig 16.1. Progress as of 2010: Non-discrimination and inter-category variations: 
Eta square value: 0.652; significance value: 0.71 
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(0): Absence of any non-discrimination norm; 
(1): General provisions such as an equality clause in the Constitution;   
(2): Non-discrimination laws are inserted in specific laws;  
(3): Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation which then means 
that there has been a complete transposition of the EU anti-
discrimination acquis; 
(4): Non-discrimination laws exceed the minimum requirements of 
the Directive.  
Non-discrimination: Intra-category variation  
The individual results pertaining to the two categories of the Western 
Balkan states are indeed highly interesting. As shown in figure 16.2., one 
notices that Croatia has progressed to 2.5 (from an initial 1.5), having 
almost transposed the whole EU acquis in the area of non-discrimination. 
Macedonia, on the other hand, has progressed only slightly having 
adopted moderate legislation in this domain, having progressed to 1.5 
(from an initial 1.0). Even though the Croatian score of 2.5 is not 
exclusively limited to Croatia, since Kosovo (as one of the potential 
candidate states) has adopted the same extensive legislation, the Croatian 
case is exclusive since it is the sole case which has been assessed as 
having regressed from one year to another. Indeed, in the 2009 
monitoring report, the EU Commission concluded that Croatia had de jure 
transposed the whole EU non-discrimination acquis, since the 
Ombudsman’s Office finally had been “transformed into an independent 
Equality Body” (EU Report 2009: 47). Although the EU assessment of 
2009 entailed that Croatia had progressed to the level of 3.0, the following 
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year the EU Commission went back on its assessment, which, 
consequently, relegated Croatia back to its final score, 2.5, in 2010.  
 
The EU Commission does not mention whether this decision is a result of 
Croatia having gone back on their previous legislation, or whether, and, 
what is more likely, the EU Commission had actually overlooked the lack 
of specific legislation in their 2009 report. However, the reasons provided 
by the EU Commission were that even though “the relevant directives 
have been transposed (...), some provisions require further alignment 
with the acquis, with regard to the exceptions to the principle of non-
discrimination” (EU Report 2010: 43). Further explanation to the 
relegation of Croatia’s position was given by the EU Commission which 
stated that, even though “there is good alignment with the acquis and 
preparations are on course (...), some gaps remain in alignment of the 
legislation, notably on transposing labour law directives outside the 
scope of the Labour Act, and in the fields of anti-discrimination and 
gender equality” (EU Report 2010: 44). The assessment of the EU is 
interestingly more severe than the assessment of the Council of Europe, 
which reports, that same year, that the Discrimination Prevention Act 
“reflects the standards set in the European Council Directive on Racial 
Equality (2000/43/EC), and the European Council Directive on 
Employment Equality (2000/78/EC), and provides a clear legal basis for 
the protection against discrimination, including in the field of employment” 
(CoE Report 2010: 14, emphasis added). However, since the non-
discrimination norm is based on the EU directives, which, in turn, are 
part of the EU acquis, the EU assessment is argued to be of higher 
relevance and, thus, constitutes the basis of the measurement.  
 
The case of Croatia is also interesting in other regards since even though 
temporally the closest to the EU membership reward, Croatia was very 
slow, at least initially, to react to the recommendations of primarily the 
EU, but also the Council of Europe. Indeed, from 2005 up until 2007, the 
progress made in the area of non-discrimination is rather insignificant 
and even though the monitoring bodies, and especially the EU, 
consistently stress that Croatia needs to adopt comprehensive anti-
discrimination legislation, very little progress was noted. In fact, it was 
not until 2008 that Croatia finally adopted a “comprehensive law on anti-
discrimination”, which furthermore means good progress since “this law 
is aimed at full alignment with the EU acquis” (EU Report 2008: 12). What 
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is more, the moderate progress, provided for by Croatia in the first three 
years, should also be viewed in light of a very proactive and persistent 
EU Commission which, as early as 2005, is pressuring Croatia to advance 
in terms of adopting new legislation, stating that “a comprehensive 
national strategy for the elimination of discrimination has not been 
adopted according to schedule. Legislation, transposing the acquis in this 
field, will have to be introduced and implemented. Further efforts will be 
needed in order to ensure full conformity, including the establishment of 
the Equality Body, required by the acquis” (EU Report 2005: 78, emphasis 
added).  
 
The proactive stance of the EU Commission is also noted in the fact that 
to press for further legislation in this domain, the EU Commission 
attempted, already in 2006, to speed up the adoption of legislation by the 
Croatian authorities, when referring to the fact that Croatia, in 2006, still 
had not adopted the comprehensive anti-discrimination law, which is “an 
important partnership priority”, and that “this process should be 
accelerated” (EU Report 2006: 53). In 2007, there is some progress noted 
since the Croatian authorities had started work on a “National Plan to 
Combat Discrimination” (EU Report 2007: 44). Furthermore, in July 2008, 
Croatia adopted a “comprehensive law on anti-discrimination”, which 
meant good progress since “this law is aimed at full alignment with the 
EU acquis” (EU Report 2008: 12). However, as noted by the EU 
Commission, the legislation adopted was “still not in line with EU 
standards”, which could be seen in that the Ombudsman’s Office had 
“not yet been transformed into an independent Equality Body” (EU 
Report 2008: 47-48). This criterion had, however, been complied with by 
2009, when the EU Commission assessed that Croatia had de jure 
transposed the whole EU non-discrimination acquis, an assessment which 
however was revised in 2010.   
 
What is striking is that even though Macedonia is also a candidate state, 
and actually scores very low in comparison to Croatia, having adopted 
very moderate legislation in the domain of anti-discrimination (1.5), the 
EU Commission neither addresses any time-schedules, nor refers to any 
partnership priorities in the Macedonian case. In fact, the lack of a 
proactive stance from the EU is surprising, seeing as how Macedonia is 
temporally as close as Croatia is to the prospective EU membership 
reward. Indeed, the low level of anti-discrimination legislation in 
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Macedonia does not seem to be of great concern to the EU Commission, 
which overall limits its recommendations to point out that Macedonia has 
not done enough in this domain. However, in the 2007 Report, the EU 
Commission did stress that, “in the area of anti-discrimination policies, 
further efforts are required to fight against all forms of discrimination. A 
comprehensive law on anti-discrimination should allow for more 
effective mechanisms to identify, pursue, and penalise all forms of 
discrimination by state, and non-state bodies against individuals or 
groups” (EU Report 2007: 15). The same recommendation, or rather the 
same findings, from the EU is consistently repeated up until 2010. In 2008, 
for instance, the EU Commission pointed out that “in the area of anti-
discrimination policies, neither a framework law on anti-discrimination 
has yet been enacted, nor has this issue been clearly regulated in the 
existing legal provisions” (EU Report 2008: 19). This is repeated in 2009 
when the EU Commission stated that “little progress has been made in 
the area of anti-discrimination policy” (EU Report 2009: 19-20).  
 
Even though the Macedonian authorities, finally, seem to have 
acknowledged the EU “call” for a framework law on anti-discrimination, 
since they did adopt one in 2010, Macedonia is only assessed as having 
made “partial progress in the area of anti-discrimination policy”, since 
this law “has important gaps” (EU Report 2010: 19-20). The more relaxed 
stance of the EU Commission in the Macedonian case is difficult to 
comprehend, not only in light of the low level of anti-discrimination 
legislation, but also in light of an apparent reluctance from the 
Macedonian authorities to provide for more extensive legislation in this 
domain. This reluctance became evident in 2006, when the Advisory 
Committee, during an interview with Macedonian state officials, took 
note of the fact that some of the interviewees did not see the need for a 
“special anti-discrimination law” (CoE Report 2006: 11).  
 
Taken into account that the progress of Croatia is considerable, even 
though Croatia did not proceed as far as the level required for EU 
accession in this domain, and that of Macedonia is minor, we are 
confronted with a situation where actually the heterogeneity of category 1 
is more manifest than was initially the case. Thus, instead of observing a 
decrease in the intra-category variation, as we expected, the opposite has 
occurred. If rule adoption in the domain of non-discrimination were to be 
indicative of the entire conditionality-compliance process, one would be 
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inclined to suspect that the Macedonian EU accession might very well 
become a time-consuming endeavour. In fact, a possible scenario could be 
that some of the potential candidate states, most presumably Serbia, 
could acquire EU membership before Macedonia.  
 
Just as the results pertaining to category 1 are interesting, since they go 
counter to what was to be expected, so are the developments within 
category 2, since these states have indeed adopted the same level of 
extensive legislation as category 1. Thus, the progress made, compared to 
their initial status, is substantial, and especially the Serbian case stands 
out in this regard since they have progressed from the very low level of 
0.5, in 2003, to 2.0, in 2010. Bosnia, which attained the same low result as 
Serbia, upon potential candidate state accession, has proceeded to 1.5, 
and, finally, Kosovo, which had, by far, the most extensive legislation 
adopted in 2004, has progressed from 1.5 to 2.5, positioning itself on the 
same high level of rule adoption as Croatia. This, furthermore, has 
entailed that the strong intra-categorical variation, that was noted 
initially, has remained. Although the Serbian progress is remarkable, one 
has to take into account the difficult legal situation that Serbia found itself 
in, upon accession to potential candidate state, which obviously 
negatively impacted on the level of rule adoption in the area of non-
discrimination in 2003. At the same time, it can be noted that, since the 
legal transition of Serbia was prolonged in that also the Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro was dissolved, in 2006, when the Republic of Serbia was 
finally proclaimed, the legal progress in terms of non-discrimination 
legislation has, in fact, been remarkably quick. Indeed, whereas the 
progress reports between 2004 and 2006 indicated a rather worrisome 
legal situation, in the domain of non-discrimination, it is clear that this 
situation had been altered from 2007.  
 
In 2007, the EU Commission commended the new Constitution of the 
Republic of Serbia, adopted in November 2006, and stipulating the 
prohibition of “all forms of direct and indirect discrimination” (EU 
Report 2007: 14).  Even though the report of the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)295 also recognised the progress 
entailed by the new Constitution, at the same time the ECRI noted that “a 
                                                          
295 The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, established by the Council 
of Europe, is an independent human rights monitoring body which assesses issues 
pertaining to racism and intolerance in the member states of the Council of Europe.    
311 
number of measures remain to be taken” (ECRI Report 2007: 6). In fact, 
and as underlined by the ECRI, “there is no single law in Serbia 
prohibiting racial discrimination in areas such as education, employment 
or access to public places” (ECRI Report 2007: 12). Even though the EU 
Commission did refer to the lack of a comprehensive anti-discrimination 
law, as early as 2005, since they stated that “there has been no progress” 
in this domain, a more elaborated concern started to be voiced in 2008, 
coinciding with the unilateral proclamation of Kosovar independence. 
(EU Report 2005: 20)  
 
Although the proclamation of Kosovo independence contributed to fuel 
inter-ethnic tensions in Serbia, obviously this did not impact negatively 
on rule adoption since, in March 2009, Serbia adopted the “Law on 
Prohibition of Discrimination” (...), which marks a “step forward in the 
protection of human rights” (EU Report 2009: 17). The evaluation of the 
EU in terms of the Law is that it “is a welcome step towards the 
implementation of the European standards in this field. However, certain 
definitions, relating to discrimination, still need to be better formulated. 
A number of exceptions are wider than allowed for under European 
standards, and the rights of NGOs and associations to pursue 
discrimination before the courts still need to be clarified” (EU Report 
2009: 37). In 2010, the EU Commission concluded by stating that “overall, 
the legal framework on the respect for and protection of minorities in 
Serbia is in place” (EU Report 2010: 17). Thus, although the Law on the 
Prohibition of Discrimination has been criticised for certain shortcomings, 
and the National Minority Councils “are yet to become operational”, the 
progress made by Serbia is considerable, viewed the constitutional limbo 
that Serbia found itself in, not only once, but twice, during the period of 
investigation. (EU Report 2010: 17).   
 
Even though the EU reports neither refer, specifically, to any time-tables 
or schedules, nor pressurise Serbia by referring to the Partnership 
priorities, it is clear that the monitoring reports focus more attention on 
non-discrimination legislation in Serbia than was the case in Macedonia. 
Thus, the more proactive stance of the EU Commission in the Serbian 
case is surprising on two counts. Firstly, since Serbia is a potential 
candidate state, and, thus, temporally further away from the prospective 
EU membership reward than Macedonia, one would have expected that 
the attention from the EU Commission would have been less focused on 
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the level of rule adoption in Serbia than in Macedonia. This is not the 
case. Secondly, since the level of rule adoption in the domain of non-
discrimination is lower in Macedonia (1.5) than in Serbia (2.0), the relaxed 
stance of the EU Commission towards Macedonia is even more 
perplexing. 
 
The Bosnian case is very similar to the Macedonian one regarding the 
level of attention from the monitoring bodies, at least from the EU. 
Furthermore, in terms of the level of rule adoption in the domain of non-
discrimination, the Bosnian case is similar to the Serbian one in that both 
had a very low level of rule adoption, upon gaining status as potential 
candidate state. However, the Bosnian shortcomings, although legally 
anchored just like the Serbian ones initially, are of another order, less 
transitional, and more persistent, which, furthermore, explain the 
relatively moderate progress achieved by Bosnia in 2010 (1.5). Indeed, the 
problematic constitutional order, implemented on the basis of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement in 1995, persists, and even though both monitoring 
bodies do recognise that the constitutionally enshrined rights of the 
constituent nations have discriminatory effects upon the rights of national 
minorities, this constitutional solution is recognised as having been 
indispensable in order to end the Bosnian war in 1995. This situation, in 
turn, creates a dilemma for the monitoring bodies, which both adopt a 
prudent stance, which, in turn, possibly explain the lower level of 
attention directed towards non-discrimination legislation in Bosnia. 
However, the monitoring bodies do raise the issue of the problematic 
ethnically-based policies that override the equality provisions, and which, 
actually, should call for an amendment to the Constitution. Thus, in 2006, 
the EU Commission stated that “failure to adopt reforms to the 
constitution has perpetuated the exclusion of the national minorities from 
institutions, (which) has an adverse effect on the protection of minorities 
that do not belong to these “constituent peoples”. It also hampers Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’s evolution towards a State based on citizenship, rather 
than on ethnic representation” (EU Report 2006: 17). In 2008, this 
constitutional “cul-de-sac” was raised by the Council of Europe which 
stressed that “there is a need for moving from a system based on group 
rights towards a more balanced approach, that pays adequate attention to 
individual rights, in order to ensure long-term stability and social 
cohesion of the country” (CoE Report 2008: 5).  
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However, even though the EU Commission found that there had been no 
amendment to the Constitution, legislation in the area of non-
discrimination does exist. (EU Report 2007: 18). In fact, not only by 
referring to the State and Entity Constitutions, which all “guarantee equal 
treatment of all people”, the EU Commission also noted that even though 
Bosnia had not adopted a comprehensive anti-discrimination law, “anti-
discrimination legislation exists in several areas” (EU Report 2007: 18). 
The following year, although the EU Commission concluded by stating 
that although no comprehensive anti-discrimination law had been 
adopted, positive steps had been taken in that the introduction of 
Councils of National Minorities had been made on the State level. (EU 
Report 2008: 21).  
 
Indications of further progress was noted by the Advisory Committee, 
which pointed out that Bosnia “has fairly well-developed legislation for 
the protection of national minorities”, although there are shortcomings in 
implementing the law. (CoE Report 2008: 5) In 2009, finally, and “after 
long delays, a comprehensive State-level anti-discrimination law has been 
adopted” (CoE Report 2009: 19). Although the law “represents a positive 
step towards uniform protection across Bosnia and Herzegovina”, the 
Advisory Committee is concerned about deficiencies of the law, since it 
“exempts religious groups and provides only limited protection to 
several groups of vulnerable individuals” (CoE Report 2009: 19). 
Although the EU Commission also took note of the progress entailed by 
the Law, the Commission also underlined its shortcomings in that, 
although covering “a wide range of sectors (employment, social security, 
education, goods and services, housing) (...), several aspects of the law 
remain unclear, or not fully in line with the acquis, in particular as regards 
the grounds covered (age and disability are not covered), and the broad 
scope of exceptions to discrimination” (EU Report 2009: 41-42).  
 
Neither the deficiencies of the Constitution, nor those of the Law, had 
been corrected as of 2010. However, in terms of the inconsistencies of the 
Constitution, a court ruling had rendered a necessary amendment to the 
Constitution even more acute. In fact, “in December 2009, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued a legally-binding decision 
(Dejdic-Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina case) that found ethnicity-based 
ineligibility to stand for election ‘incompatible with the general principles 
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of the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms’” (EU Report 2010: 5). 
 
One could argue, on the basis that much of the executive and legislative 
powers have, in fact, been held by an international protectorate, although 
the “dependence on the international community in terms of legislative 
drafting is declining”, that the constitutional amendment would be easily 
imposed. (EU Report 2006: 7) However, the sensitivity of this task, 
considering that inter-ethnic animosity is still prevalent between the three 
constituent peoples, would entail very high stakes whose consequences 
are difficult to predict. Furthermore, and also constituting one of the 
Partnership priorities, is that in order for EU accession to become 
possible, Bosnia needs to become a self-sustaining state. (EU Report 2003: 
3). This also explains why the EU is adamant about the fact that a 
“constitutional reform cannot be imposed. It should be decided by 
consensus amongst the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (EU 
Report 2006: 6). 
 
The semi-protectorate status has also been a challenge in the case of 
Kosovo, where governance has been divided between the UNMIK 
administration and the Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government. Although Kosovo became independent in 2008, by 
unilaterally proclaiming independence, the majority of states of which 
five are EU member states296, have not yet recognised Kosovo’s 
independence. It is blatant that in the Kosovo case, however, the 
monitoring bodies, and especially the EU, are much more proactive and 
pay great attention both to the level of non-discrimination legislation, as 
well as the level of de facto discrimination. In fact, the sui generis status of 
Kosovo, and the tense relationship with Serbia, which has not yet 
recognised Kosovo independence although Serbian EU membership is 
conditional upon its recognition, has merited substantial scrutiny on the 
part of the monitoring bodies. This probably also explains why Kosovo, 
in 2004, and in the aftermath of the 2004 riots, had adopted an Anti-
discrimination law. However, it is obvious that not only the EU Reports 
but also the Council of Europe Reports centre much of their attention on 
the implementation of the extensive legal framework, which Kosovo had 
                                                          
296 Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain do not formally recognise the Republic of 
Kosovo. Among the states of our investigation Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia 
and Moldova have refused to recognise Kosovo independence.  
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adopted as of 2010 when they reached the same high level of rule 
adoption as Croatia, namely 2.5. Indeed, the focus on the de facto situation 
in Kosovo is blatant in the recurrent observations, which stress that 
“creating a society free from discrimination of any kind, and promoting 
the integration of disadvantaged groups is a key European Partnership 
priority” (EU Report 2009: 15-16).    
 
Indeed, the progress reports between 2005 and 2006 focus much of their 
attention on the implementation of the Anti-Discrimination Law, which is 
assessed as unsatisfactory since “Kosovo Serbs continue to be subject to 
incidents such as harassment and intimidation” (EU Report 2006: 15). 
However, positive effects of the “action plan for the implementation of 
the anti-discrimination law”, which the government adopted in October 
2005, can be noted since “there has been a decline in serious crimes with 
an ethnic motivation” (EU Report 2006: 14-15). In 2007, the EU 
Commission noted that “the legal framework with regard to anti-
discrimination incorporates important parts of the Community 
directives” (EU Report 2007: 19). In this regard, the report specifically 
highlighted that the “human rights units within the ministries, which are 
also charged with monitoring the implementation of the anti-
discrimination legislation”, had become operational. (EU Report 2007: 19) 
Although deficiencies as to the administrative capacities of these human 
rights units were noted, the EU, nevertheless, concluded that “overall, the 
legal framework is nearly comparable to European standards” (EU 
Report 2007: 19). In 2009, the legal anti-discrimination framework was 
further reinforced by the “adoption of the strategy and action plan on 
human rights 2009-2011” (EU Report 2009: 33). That same year, the 
Advisory Committee recognised that “the current legislative framework, 
generally, reflects the principles of the Framework Convention” (CoE 
Report 2009: 5). 
 
However, since de facto discrimination is prevalent in the Kosovo society, 
primarily directed against the Kosovo Serbs and the Roma, the 
importance of “creating a climate of reconciliation, inter-ethnic tolerance, 
and sustainable multi-ethnicity” is stressed in 2009, underlining that this 
is “a key European Partnership priority” (EU Report 2009: 19). Indeed, 
the Advisory Committee raised the issue of the gap between the de jure 
and the de facto situation, since the implementation of existing legislation 
still is poor. In fact, as noted by the Advisory Committee, “inter-ethnic 
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relations in Kosovo remain characterised by mutual distrust and 
divisions along ethnic lines, in particular between persons belonging to 
the Serbian and the Albanian communities” (CoE Report 2009: 7). 
Considering this worrying trend, the Advisory Committee, thus, “regrets 
the absence of a general strategy for reconciliation and inter-ethnic 
dialogue” (CoE Report 2009: 7).  
 
However worrying the situation of de facto discrimination in Kosovo, the 
Advisory Committee, nevertheless, noted that “there is a well-developed 
legal basis, providing for equality before the law and prohibition of 
discrimination. Besides the anti-discrimination provisions, contained in 
the 2004 Anti-discrimination Law, the 2008 Constitution guarantees 
equality of all and anti-discrimination, inter alia, on grounds of language, 
religion, national origin, race, colour and relation to any community” 
(CoE Report 2009: 14). However, and as underlined by the EU 
Commission in their 2010 Report, “the high level of formal protection, 
provided by law, has to be effectively implemented” (EU Report 2010: 
18).  
 
By the end of 2010, it is blatant that the heterogeneity of the states making 
up category 2 remains. The category of the potential candidate states is, 
not only diverse as concerns the level of the de jure situation, but also as 
concerns the de facto situation. Indeed, even though de jure, the level of 
anti-discrimination legislation in Kosovo is higher than in Serbia, it is 
obvious that the de facto situation in Kosovo is more worrying, as is clear 
in the reports of both monitoring bodies. This most probably explains 
why the EU Reports never mention whether Kosovo is close de jure of 
having transposed the EU non-discrimination acquis even though Kosovo, 
legally, has provided for the same level of rule adoption as Croatia. 
Indeed, there is never any reference to whether Kosovo has partially 
transposed the non-discrimination acquis, or whether Kosovo is on its 
way of complying with the EU directives. Hence, even though Serbia has 
not reached the same high level of rule adoption as Kosovo in 2010, 
considering that the de facto discrimination in Serbia has not called for the 
same concerns by the monitoring bodies as is the case in Kosovo, it is 
highly probable that Serbia, in the not too distant future, will have 
proceeded further than Kosovo, at least in the domain of non-
discrimination. Furthermore, the sui generis situation of Kosovo most 
probably also explains that even though the EU Commission is proactive, 
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it is a prudent proactive stance, where it seems too premature to speak of 
at least nearly full compliance with the non-discrimination acquis.  
 
As opposed to the categories of the Western Balkan states, the three ENP-
states, making up the third category, remain highly homogenous and 
there is absolutely no variation as concerns rule adoption compared with 
their initial status. Indeed, just as Moldova remains on the same low score 
as in 2005 (1.0), so do both Georgia and Azerbaijan. However, as opposed 
to the two Caucasus states, Moldova had “started work on 
comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation”, as noted by the EU 
Commission in 2007. (EU Report 2007: 4) Another indication of potential 
progress, which was welcomed by the Advisory Committee, was that 
work had started on a new “Human Rights Action Plan for 2009-2011 
(which) should, according to the information provided to the Advisory 
Committee, include a chapter on combating discrimination” (CoE Report 
2009: 11). However, as of 2010, neither the anti-discrimination legislation, 
nor the Action Plan, had been adopted and, as underlined by the EU 
Commission, “no significant progress was made with regard to minority 
rights and the fight against discrimination” (EU Report 2010: 6-7). Thus, it 
is too early to tell whether these steps are indicative of a more progressive 
stance from the Moldovan authorities, as regards non-discrimination 
legislation, or whether these steps are attributed to other non-
governmental actors. In fact, the ECRI reported that a coalition of NGOs, 
supported by the OSCE Mission in Moldova, in fact, were the initiators of 
establishing “a strategy for the promotion of non-discrimination policies 
in Moldova”, of which one of the “main objectives of this strategy is to 
promote the adoption of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation” 
(ECRI Report 2007: 13). Thus, even though the Moldovan authorities had 
“taken a number of steps to combat illegal behaviour on the part of law 
enforcement officials”, it is nevertheless questionable as to how effective 
these steps will be, since the authorities persist in claiming that “there is 
hardly any intolerance in the country”, which goes counter to reports that 
inform of racism and racial discrimination, directed towards “several 
minority groups” (ECRI Report 2007: 27).  
 
Just as the monitoring bodies are more prone to assess the de facto 
situation rather than the existing non-discrimination legislative 
provisions in Moldova, the same is true for Georgia. Where one can see 
inclinations of a more proactive stance from the Moldovan government, 
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however initiated by other non-governmental actors, the Georgian 
authorities seem to be more reluctant to provide for anti-discriminatory 
provisions based on ethnic belonging. In fact, the Georgian authorities 
have made it clear that “they have no plan to introduce positive measures 
to promote the equality of persons belonging to national minorities” (CoE 
Report 2009: 14). It is blatant that the Georgian authorities consider that 
any minority rights provisions would be counterproductive to the 
strategy of promoting civic integration, which has been the active policy 
of the Georgian authorities. The focus on civic integration, as opposed to 
specific minority rights provisions, can, for instance, be seen in the 
“National Concept for Tolerance and Civil Integration and of its Action 
Plan”, which was adopted by the Prime Minister on the 8th of May 2009. 
(EU Report 2010: 6). However commendable the National Integration 
Strategy, which aims to achieve full equality for all citizens, at the same 
time as creating “the necessary conditions for the preservation and 
development of ethnic minorities’ culture and identity”, it is, at the same 
time, underlined by the monitoring bodies that since there has been no 
“follow-up report on the state of the implementation of the action plan”, 
an assessment of its effectiveness is impossible. (ECRI Report 2011: 33; EU 
Report 2010: 6). Indeed, in 2010 the EU Commission took the opportunity 
to underline that “there has been no progress reported on the integration 
and the rights of ethnic, religious and sexual minorities in Georgia” (EU 
Report 2010: 6).  
 
In fact, in 2009, the Advisory Committee noted that however 
indispensable the civic integration campaign is in order to integrate the 
segregated national minorities into the mainstream of Georgian society, 
they recommended the Georgian authorities to “incorporate in existing 
legislation a prohibition of discrimination – particularly that based on 
ethnic origin – in other fields, including access to housing, social 
protection and public goods and services. The authorities should also 
review the existing laws and consider elaborating comprehensive anti-
discrimination legislation” (CoE Report 2009: 13). However, since such 
measures are firmly believed to go against the promotion of civic 
integration and, by extension, could even threaten the territorial integrity 
of the Georgian state, it is not surprising that the FCNM “has not been 
fully transposed into domestic legislation, and the European Charter for 
Regional and Minority Languages has still not been signed by Georgia” 
(EU Report 2010: 6). 
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The Azerbaijani situation is close to the Georgian one, in that civic 
integration is viewed as key to the survival of the Azerbaijani state, and, 
consequently, any promotion of minority rights is inherently looked upon 
as destabilising, and potentially threatening to lead to secessionist claims. 
Indeed, during one of the interviews carried out by the Advisory 
Committee, they were informed by the Azerbaijani officials that “the 
adoption of measures to promote equal opportunities for persons 
belonging to national minorities, including in the framework of a law on 
national minorities, is considered inappropriate, as such measures could 
be interpreted as a sign that there exists differences in society and could, 
therefore, go against the overall objective of integration in society” (CoE 
Report 2007: 10). Therefore, the calls from the monitoring bodies that the 
Azerbaijani authorities should “develop a more comprehensive and 
detailed anti-discrimination legislation, so as to complement existing acts 
and ensure that potential victims of discrimination in various spheres of 
life are adequately protected”, remain unanswered. (CoE Report 2007: 10)  
 
There are no indications, during the time span of investigation, that 
Azerbaijan is making progress in terms of adopting more extensive 
legislation in the domain of anti-discrimination. Indeed, both monitoring 
bodies are not only concerned about the lack of a more comprehensive 
anti-discrimination law, Azerbaijan had not progressed towards 
ratification of “Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights 
on the general prohibition of discrimination, and the European Charter 
for Regional or Minority Languages” (EU Report 2009: 5). Indeed, even 
though legislation on the freedom of Assembly had been amended, as of 
May 2008, in order to meet “most of the international standards”, the 
repressive nature of the Azerbaijani regime strongly limits these rights in 
practice. (EU Report 2008: 2) In fact, as reported by the EU Commission 
that same year, “freedom of media and expression, in particular, remain 
causes for serious concern” (EU Report 2008: 2). As underlined by the EU 
Commission in 2008, just as the poor implementation of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms constitute a challenge, “further work in the 
area of justice, freedom and security (...) will be key reform challenges in 
2009” (EU Report 2008: 2). Although the government had publicly 
committed itself, in 2009, “to decriminalise defamation and draft 
legislation to that end”, in 2010, no progress was reported, neither in the 
legislative domain, nor de facto. (EU Report 2009: 4; EU Report 2010: 5).  
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Fig 16.2. Progress as of 2010: Non-discrimination and intra-category variations 
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The lack of progress in rule adoption is, however, not in the least 
surprising in the case of Azerbaijan, nor in the other ENP states. Hence, 
being the furthest away from the prospective EU membership reward, 
they are not expected to have made substantial progress since the 
adaptation pressure is, indeed, low. The low level of attention from the 
monitoring bodies, and primarily the EU, is also indicative of the low 
level of incentive of this category, which has remained as homogenous as 
it was initially, since no intra-categorical changes have been noted. Thus, 
as opposed to categories 1 and 2, the low level of rule adoption of this 
category confirms the strong explanatory power of the speed dimension’s 
impact upon the level of rule adoption.  
Minority language use in official contexts: Inter-
category variation  
The general character of the Articles of the Framework Convention, 
regulating minority language use in official contexts, gives the 
monitoring bodies’ great flexibility of interpretation depending on the 
national contexts of the States under investigation. This, in turn, explains 
why the assessments sometimes generate very different concerns and 
recommendations. Here, it is apparent that the balance between collective 
rights and ethnic accommodation, on the one hand, and individual rights 
and civic integration, on the other, is rooted in the context of security 
related concerns, specific for each State. The contextualised security-
based approach of minority language rights also becomes clear in that 
rule adoption in this area is heavily determined by the different peace 
agreements, which specifically regulate minority language rights 
provisions of the Western Balkan states, and which have been 
instrumental both to establishing peace, but also in laying out the 
groundwork for the prospective EU membership. This, in turn, produces 
321 
a situation where the assessments made by the monitoring bodies, and 
especially the reports published by the Council of Europe, are primarily 
directed towards evaluating how well the existing legislative provisions 
have been implemented, thus, focusing much more on the de facto 
situation than whether the states have adopted more extensive 
legislation.  
 
As opposed to rule adoption in non-discrimination, there is absolutely no 
variation when we measure how the speed of the prospective EU 
membership reward has impacted on the progress made in the domain of 
rule adoption pertaining to the use of minority language rights in official 
contexts. Indeed, and as shown in figure 16.3., the pattern of inter-
category variation, which was established initially when the states gained 
their respective statuses, has remained intact, with category 1 ranked at 
3.5, category 2 positioned at 2.5 and category 3 finally remaining at 1.33. 
Even though the variation in the level of rule adoption, initially, was 
established at being explained by 34.2% of the impact of the speed 
dimension, the relevance of this result nevertheless has to be questioned. 
However, the issue at stake is not the questioning of the results per se, but 
rather the relevance of the measurement itself. It is obvious that the 
conflict resolution mechanisms, at stake in each of the states forming 
categories 1 and 2, at least initially, set the bar in terms of the 
extensiveness of the legislative provisions, and generally these were set 
extensively, except in the case of Bosnia.  
 
At the same time, it should be noted that on the basis of the assessments 
made, which primarily focus on the de facto situation, these assessments 
might very well constitute the basis for legislative changes in the future, 
even though these are likely to be time-consuming endeavours since they 
entail very high stakes. Indeed, the politicisation of linguistic issues is 
inherent in any state-building process and therefore, necessarily, part of 
any conflict resolution mechanism, which in turn produces a balancing 
act between civic integration and ethnic accommodation. At the same 
time, it is clear that, should the ENP states, forming category 3, have been 
closer to the prospective EU membership reward, it is probable that these 
states would have been more responsive to the recommendations of the 
monitoring bodies, at least as far as Georgia and Azerbaijan are 
concerned. Hence, even though no variations have been detected, neither 
in-between, nor within the three categories, it is nevertheless interesting 
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to investigate the individual states more closely since this should at least 
give an indication as to the likelihood of legislative change in the future.   
 
Figure 16.3. Progress as of 2010: Official use of minority languages and inter-
category variations: Eta square value: 0.342; significance value: 0.351 
 
 3 2 1 
   Tolerance                             x                      x                 x             Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
(0): No recognition of minority languages; 
(1): The right to use the minority language in official contexts (before 
judicial and administrative authorities; i.e. the right to a translator);  
(2): The minority language can be used in Personal and Place Names 
(public signs); 
(3): The minority language can be used in official documents; 
(4): Minority language having status as official language. 
Minority language use in official contexts: Intra-
category variation  
The individual results of the level of rule adoption in the domain of the 
use of minority language rights in official contexts are interesting, and 
highly diverse, as was the case initially. When studying the assessments 
of the two candidate states, and as shown in figure 16.4., it becomes clear 
that although Macedonia provides for the maximum level of rule 
adoption (4.0), the Macedonian case retains much more attention from the 
monitoring bodies than does Croatia, which has remained on the level of 
3.0. Indeed, as concerns the legislative provisions adopted by Croatia, the 
monitoring bodies have few issues to raise and especially the EU 
Commission contents itself by stating that “both Croatian citizens and 
foreign nationals who are party to criminal or civil proceedings have the 
right to have documents served on them in the language they understand 
and, during oral hearings, to have access to an interpreter paid for by the 
state budget” (EU Report 2005: 86). Furthermore, a good sign of the 
legislative status of minority language rights protection in Croatia, which 
was provided for in 2005, was that Croatia had signed and ratified “all 
the Council of Europe’s conventions it had committed itself to”, including 
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the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. (EU Report 
2005: 20)  
 
The more encompassing assessments of the Council of Europe’s Advisory 
Committee, however, do raise concerns, especially as regards 
implementation of existing legislation. Indeed, in the reports of the 
Advisory Committee, it becomes clear that, even though the legislative 
provisions are extensive in Croatia, shortcomings in their implementation 
are noted. Whereas effective implementation has been reported regarding 
the use of the Italian minority language in the Istria region, violation of 
existing legislation has been noted as concerns the use of the Serbian and 
the Hungarian minority languages. Furthermore, the Advisory 
Committee has questioned the threshold of one-third, that conditions 
application of the legislative provisions, by recommending the Croatian 
authorities to revise it, in order to permit the use of minority languages in 
locations where minorities constitute a substantial number, but not 
amounting to one-third. The wording, “substantial number”, however, is 
never specified, and since there are no numerical criteria set in Articles 10 
and 11 of the FCNM, such recommendations are uneasily met, which can 
also be seen in the fact that this recommendation is not responded to. 
Whereas the Croatian case, however, does not call for any serious 
changes, it is blatant that the Macedonian case is more challenging. The 
very extensive minority language rights in Macedonia have raised 
concerns by the monitoring bodies, which have noted an increasing 
divide between the Macedonian-speaking and the Albanian-speaking 
communities.  
 
To provide for extensive minority language rights, especially for the 
numerically large Albanian community, was a solution that was imposed 
by the international community with the establishment of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement. Thus, even though the Macedonian authorities 
previously had refused to give in to the Albanian claims of official 
language status, with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, 
they finally had to abide by these demands. According to the EU 
Commission the Agreement “remains a crucial guarantee of the rights of 
ethnic communities in the country” (EU Report 2007: 15). Hence, the lack 
of effective implementation of the Agreement gives cause for concern, 
since it is stressed that “sustained commitment to implementing the 
regulatory framework for the use of minority languages is lacking” (EU 
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Report 2007: 53). Deficiencies in implementation notwithstanding, the 
very extensive minority language rights, granted to the Albanian 
minority, have paradoxically created a situation where the Albanian 
minority has become increasingly segregated, and the lack of 
bilingualism has accentuated the ethnic division in the country. This 
concern was raised by the EU Commission when they noted that 
“integration of ethnic communities remains limited”, however, noting, at 
the same time, that “effective implementation of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement needs to be maintained, in a spirit of consensus” (EU Report 
2009: 22).  
 
Apart from concerns on the deficiencies of the implementation of the 
Agreement, and concerns on the lack of integration between the Albanian 
minority and the Macedonian majority, the monitoring bodies also point 
to shortcomings in the legislative provisions granted to smaller minority 
languages. Thus, on the basis of these concerns, the Advisory Committee 
considered that “by adopting a comprehensive language law, the country 
would dispose of a clear and coherent legal basis in this field, which 
would also bring solutions to the difficulties so far reported” (CoE Report 
2007: 23). Even though opinions within the Macedonian state officials 
differed as to the necessity of such a law, in 2008, a Law on the use of 
Languages was, however, adopted, which aimed at clarifying the criteria 
for the use of minority languages. However, whereas the Law on the use 
of Languages had created conditions for more effective implementation 
for the use of the Albanian language, visible, for instance, in that “some 
chairpersons of parliamentary committees began using Albanian”, little 
progress had been noted “regarding use of the languages of the smaller 
ethnic communities” (EU Report 2009: 20).  
 
The sensitivity of the status of minority languages, and the reluctance of 
the Macedonian authorities to regulate legislative provisions for smaller 
ethnic minorities, as well as to ensure proper implementation of both the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement, as well as the new Law is, however, 
blatant. Indeed, despite the legislative efforts made, it is apparent that 
serious shortcomings as to their implementation are still noted. In fact, 
the Advisory Committee reported, in 2010, that, “in practice, 
representatives of national minorities claim that the possibilities to use 
minority languages, other than Macedonian, in relations with the 
administrative authorities, remain limited, on account of the lack of 
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qualified interpreters and translators”, which, furthermore, has been 
reported as a recurrent problem in Macedonia. (CoE Report 2010: 21) 
However, at the same time, it should be noted that positive signs in the 
implementation of the use of minority languages for local place names 
have been detected during the course of 2010. Indeed, as noted, 
satisfactorily, by the Advisory Committee, “according to persons 
belonging to national minorities, the implementation of the legislative 
provisions has improved in recent years. Bilingual (Macedonian and 
Albanian language), and trilingual (Macedonian, Albanian and Turkish 
language) signs are in use in municipalities, where the number of persons 
belonging to a national minority is not lower than 20% of the local 
population” (CoE Report 2010: 22).  
 
Even though the Macedonian authorities are commended for having 
created a clearer and more coherent legal framework for the use of 
minority languages, however, limited to primarily the Albanian one, the 
increasing inter-ethnic divide has become an issue of concern. (CoE 
Report 2010: 5) Whether the lack of interethnic communication and the 
resulting interethnic tensions are a direct consequence of the very 
extensive minority language rights is, however, difficult to tell. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the creation of a linguistic gap has done 
nothing to facilitate interethnic communication and, especially in 
predominantly Albanian-populated areas, Albanians have become less 
and less fluent in the Macedonian language.  
 
As opposed to the candidate states, the dispersion of the potential 
candidate states in category 2 is important, with Bosnia remaining on the 
low score of 0.5, Kosovo still scoring the maximum level of 4.0, and 
finally Serbia remaining at the level of 3.0. As concerns Serbia, the reports 
from both the EU and the Council of Europe are rather scarce. 
Furthermore, most of the assessments concern the de facto situation, 
where great variations as to implementation have been noted. For this 
reason, the Advisory Committee recommended that existing legislation 
be revised, in order to “further clarify the existing legal regulations, 
governing the right to use personal names in minority languages and its 
official recognition, and remove any territorial limitations to this right” 
(CoE Report 2009: 6). Some minor progress in this area had been noted in 
2008, however, when the EU Commission pointed out that “new 
legislation extends the requirement for local administration to use official 
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seals in minority languages, where those languages are in use” (EU 
Report 2008: 19). However, these legislative changes were minor, and 
according to an update of the Council of Europe in 2011, there is still “a 
need to ensure a more consistent approach to the use of minority 
languages in the public sphere” (CoE Report 2011: 2). 
 
The de facto situation had called for concerns, especially in the regions of 
Vojvodina, Southern Serbia, and the Sandzak region in North-western 
Serbia. In Vojvodina, the Serbian authorities had dealt rather successfully 
with the situation, since “a number of measures concerning the official 
use of minority languages and scripts” had been taken. (EU Report 2006: 
14) The resolve from the authorities was underlined by a report, of the 
Ombudsman’s Office in Vojvodina, which had informed the ECRI, in 
2007, that “the right of national or ethnic minorities to use their mother 
tongue in the media, and public administration, is broadly respected” 
(ECRI Report 2007: 27). Concerning the situation of the Albanian minority 
in Southern Serbia, the EU Commission had reported, as early as 2004, 
that there had been “progress in the use of minority languages (...) with 
the official use of Albanian” (EU Report 2004: 15). Progress 
notwithstanding, when the EU Commission monitored the situation on 
the ground, in 2007, it was obvious that, whereas the de facto situation in 
Vojvodina had improved, and the situation in the Albanian-dominated 
areas of Southern Serbia had “remained stable, but tense, with sporadic 
incidents”, the situation in the Bosniak-dominated Sandzak region had 
worsened. (EU Report 2007: 15) However, the situation in Serbia, neither 
de jure nor de facto, calls for any alarming assessments from the 
monitoring bodies.  
 
As opposed to Serbia, the very modest legislative provisions in Bosnia 
remain a problem. Indeed, even though legislative provisions in this 
domain exist, the very high thresholds that condition them, in fact, 
invalidate their application. At the same time, and as underlined by the 
Advisory Committee, the Bosnian authorities have made some progress, 
since the legal provisions pertaining to the official use of minority 
languages have been incorporated in legislation on the Entity level. In 
this regard, the Advisory Committee “welcomes the fact that the Law on 
National Minorities of the Republika Srpska allows municipalities, where 
persons belonging to national minorities are traditionally resident, but do 
not constitute an absolute or relative majority of the population, the 
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possibility of taking steps to permit the use of minority languages in 
relations with the authorities, without applying a minimum threshold” 
(CoE Report 2008: 28, emphasis added). The Federation’s Law “includes a 
similar provision, stipulating that municipalities, where persons 
belonging to national minorities do not constitute the majority of the 
population, may take measures to permit the use of minority languages in 
relations with authorities” (CoE Report 2008: 28, emphasis added).  
 
These changes were introduced as a consequence of the amendment, 
made in 2005, to Article 12, of the State Law on National Minorities, 
which eliminates “the need for a national minority to constitute an 
“absolute or relative” majority of the population, in order to have the 
possibility of using its language in relations with the administrative 
authorities, even where persons belonging to these minorities do not 
constitute a majority of the population, a minimum threshold of one-third 
of the local population is still required” (CoE Report 2008: 28). The same 
threshold of one-third regulates the use of minority signs and symbols, 
since “for municipalities that decide, in accordance with Article 12 of the 
Law on National Minorities, to permit the display of topographical and 
other indications in minority languages, even where persons belonging to 
national minorities do not constitute a majority of the population, a 
minimum threshold of one-third of the population is still required” (CoE 
Report 2008: 29, emphasis added). 
 
The problematically high threshold, although lowered from an absolute 
or relative majority to one-third, is apparent as concerns the applicability 
of existing legislation. This is also confirmed by the monitoring report of 
the Council of Europe, which stressed that during one of its visits to 
Bosnia, it became apparent that “minority languages are not used in 
relations with the administrative authorities” (CoE Report 2008: 28). 
Subsequently, even though the threshold has been lowered, the main 
criticism of the Advisory Committee is that it is still too high, considering 
that the use of minority languages is inexistent in Bosnia. Hence, the 
Advisory Committee “considers that this requirement, in practice, 
impedes the use of minority languages, including in areas traditionally 
inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities” (CoE Report 2008: 
28). Even though the ECRI Report from 2010 does not assess the situation 
of the use of minority languages, per se, the poor visibility of national 
minorities, in general, and minority languages, in particular, are raised as 
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recurrent problems. Indeed, as the ECRI Report underlined, in 2010, one 
of the main concerns of national minority representatives is “the need for 
greater visibility of their languages and cultures – whether in school 
textbooks, public broadcasting, or public life more generally” (ECRI 
Report 2010: 40).  
 
The questioning of the level of thresholds is problematic, since the 
Articles of the FCNM don’t determine any levels, and, thus, leaves this 
decision to the discretion of the State authorities. What is more 
problematic in the context of the Bosnian legislation, however, is that, 
independently of the level of thresholds, although existing legislation has 
been delegated to the Entity level, consistently, it is stressed that these 
legislative provisions are up to the discretion of the municipalities. Thus, 
the legislative provisions, based on the lower threshold of one-third, 
don’t give any guarantees to the national minorities but it is left to the 
discretion of municipalities to decide whether they should allow, permit, 
or to take measures in favour of the use of minority languages, and to 
allow these rights on the basis of the lowered one third threshold. 
Therefore, the legislative provisions can be argued to be more 
recommendations than legislative guarantees, and, independently of the 
lowering of the threshold, they do not secure any rights of minorities to 
use their languages in official contexts, at least not on the basis of the one-
third threshold. This, consequently, reduces the discussion on the 
question of the threshold of one-third to irrelevance, since the legislative 
guarantees are still conditioned by the threshold of the absolute or 
relative majority.  
 
The Kosovo case is opposite to the Bosnian case but very similar to the 
Macedonian one, in that both have provided for very extensive legislation 
in the domain of minority language use. Just as the Albanian language 
has been recognised as having official language status in Macedonia, the 
Serbian language has official language status in Kosovo. Thus, the 
monitoring bodies are primarily concerned with assessing how well the 
extensive minority language rights have been implemented in practice. 
The lack of effective implementation was, for instance, pointed out in 
2006 when the EU Commission stated that “in many cases there has been 
insufficient allocation of resources to ensure compliance with language 
standards” (EU Report 2006: 15). However, and just as in the case of 
Macedonia and the focus on the Albanian language, it is apparent that in 
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Kosovo, existing minority language rights have been very much centred 
on the status of the Serbian language to the detriment of smaller linguistic 
minorities. Thus, in view of providing for a clear legal basis for the use of 
smaller minority languages, as well as creating a more coherent legal 
framework for more effective implementation of the use of the Serbian 
language, the monitoring bodies recommended the Kosovo authorities to 
adopt a comprehensive Language Law. This recommendation was 
complied with, in 2006, when Kosovo adopted the Law on the Use of 
Languages. (EU Report 2007: 20-21) The new Law gave rise to satisfactory 
statements by the Advisory Committee, which noted that the “Albanian 
and Serbian languages remain the two official languages in Kosovo. The 
Language Law has contributed to clarify the legal provisions as regards 
the smaller minority communities also which is the most important 
contribution” (CoE Report 2009: 35). Furthermore, in connection with the 
adoption of the Law, the Assembly of Mitrovica, simultaneously, 
“adopted the Turkish language for official use” (EU Report 2007: 20-21).  
 
It is, nevertheless, blatant, that there are still shortcomings, since it has 
been pointed out that “implementation of the 2006 Law on the Use of 
Official Languages, at central and local level, is hampered by the absence 
of municipal regulations and appropriate resources” (EU Report 2008: 
24). Whereas the lack of regulations had, partly, at least, been rectified in 
2010, as the EU Commission pointed out that “a large majority of 
municipalities have adopted the regulations according to the Law”, the 
lack of sufficient allocation of resources was still a major impediment 
towards more effective implementation. (EU Report 2010: 19) This, 
consequently, had resulted in a situation where “the decreasing 
knowledge of the second official language by civil servants and 
employees of public companies raises legitimate concerns” (EU Report 
2010: 19). Indeed, the lack of bilingualism in the Kosovo society is an 
alarming trend, which probably has more to do with the highly 
segregated school system and less with ineffective implementation of the 
existing legislative provisions. Hence, in order to overcome the lack of 
proficiency in the official languages in public institutions, “language 
courses among civil servants are not sufficient to enhance bilingualism 
within the administration” (EU Report 2009: 18). The lack of bilingualism 
in the Kosovo society raises concern from the monitoring bodies, since the 
aim of enhancing integration in the Kosovo society has instead seen an 
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increasing divide, which limits the “progress on integration of minority 
communities” (EU Report 2010: 21).  
 
The internal linguistic prerequisites are somehow different as concerns 
the three ENP states, as are the extent of their legislative provisions in the 
domain of minority language use. However, whereas Georgia and 
Azerbaijan have remained on the very low score of 0.5, Moldova 
continues to provide for the same extensive minority language rights as 
they did initially, and remains on the level of 3.0. However modest the 
rights regulating minority language use in Georgia are, the monitoring 
reports are much more focused on the necessity to enable national 
minorities’ to increase their level of proficiency in the state language. This 
is due to the fact that the segregation, of especially the numerically large 
national minorities in Georgia, is primarily related to the low proficiency 
in the Georgian language. This is why the Advisory Committee “calls on 
the authorities to step up their efforts to assist the persons concerned in 
acquiring an adequate level of command of the Georgian language” (CoE 
Report 2009: 15). Seeing as how the increased level of proficiency in the 
state language is a long-term project, the Advisory Committee, at the 
same time, is concerned, that the strengthening of the legislative 
provisions of the official language, “does not give rise to direct or indirect 
discrimination against persons belonging to national minorities, who 
have insufficient command of this language” (CoE Report 2009: 15).  
 
Hence, although minority languages, in practice, are still used in relations 
with the State authorities, in order to prevent that persons belonging to 
national minorities find themselves in a legal void, it is necessary to 
legislatively provide for the rights which, however flexibly, are currently 
provided for, in practice. Thus, the Advisory Committee “urges the 
authorities to ensure that persons belonging to national minorities are 
able effectively to benefit from their linguistic rights, as protected by 
Articles 10 and 11 of the Framework Convention” (CoE Report 2009: 32). 
However, since the perspective of the Georgian authorities is anchored in 
an understanding that minority language rights could only be 
counterproductive to the state-building process, and, by extension, to the 
survival of the Georgian state, the calls from the Advisory Committee are 
not responded to. However, potential progress might be in the cards, 
since “the authorities have indicated that the public debate on the 
ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 
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is underway, and that they envisage signing and ratifying it” (ECRI 
Report 2010: 11). Furthermore, even though the poor command of the 
state language still constitutes the main impediment to integration of 
national minorities into the mainstream of Georgian society, the ECRI 
interestingly had noted “efforts on the part of the Georgian authorities in 
favour of teaching Georgian, the official language of the State, to adults 
who are members of ethnic minorities” (ECRI Report 2010: 27).  
 
The strengthening of the Moldovan state language seems to be of even 
greater concern to the monitoring bodies, which, to a large extent, have 
left assessment of minority language rights provisions on the sidelines. At 
the same time, this is not surprising seeing as how Moldova does provide 
for extensive legislative provisions in the domain of minority language 
use. Furthermore, the weakness of the state language does not entail the 
same high stakes in the Moldovan case, since, even though the level of 
command of the Moldovan language is low, and at times, very low, 
amongst national minorities, they still have recourse to the Russian 
language, which still has de facto status as official language and is largely 
used in public administration.  
 
In the 2007 report, the recommendations of the ECRI were nevertheless 
two-fold: on the one hand, the authorities were encouraged to “provide 
more opportunities to learn Moldovan for those who want to” (ECRI 
Report 2007: 24). At the same time, however in very general terms, the 
Moldovan authorities were recommended to “take care to preserve and 
encourage minority cultures and languages. In regards to this connection, 
the ECRI reiterated its recommendation that the Moldovan authorities 
ratify, as speedily as possible, the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages” (ECRI Report 2007: 24). In 2009, the Advisory 
Committee expressed concern over the weakness of the state language 
and stated that “provision of teaching of the State language for persons 
belonging to national minorities, at school and in other contexts, 
continues to be insufficient, despite the various programmes 
implemented by different actors in recent years” (CoE Report 2009: 8). 
Thus, in order to enable substantial changes to be made in this area, the 
Advisory Committee recommended the Moldovan authorities to adopt a 
comprehensive strategy, in order to “increase substantially the 
availability and quality of teaching in this field, as many persons 
belonging to national minorities continue to have little or no command of 
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the State language” (CoE Report 2009: 8). However, these 
recommendations had come to nothing the following year, since it was 
stressed that the “provision of adequate teaching of the state language to 
persons belonging to national minorities continues to be insufficient” 
(CoE Report 2010: 2). Furthermore, the calls on the Moldovan authorities 
to “ratify, as speedily as possible”, the ECRML, had neither bore fruit. 
(CoE Report 2009: 24) 
 
Whereas the linguistic prerequisites, as well as the legislative provisions, 
are highly different in the case of Azerbaijan, as opposed to that of 
Moldova, the legislative provisions on minority language rights are as 
modest as in the Georgian case, remaining on the same low score of 0.5, 
as they did initially. The Azerbaijani case differs from the Georgian one, 
however, since national minorities in Azerbaijan generally do have a 
good command of the Azeri state language. Hence, the assessments 
made, which in this case also are limited to the reports of the Council of 
Europe, as well as the ECRI, are restricted to recommendations on more 
extensive legal provisions in the domain of minority language use in 
official contexts. In this regard, the Advisory Committee recommended 
the authorities “to consider supplementing the Law on State Language 
with specific legislation on the use of minority languages, with a view to 
ensuring that persons belonging to national minorities can effectively 
enjoy the rights contained in Article 10 of the Framework Convention” 
(CoE Report 2007: 22). The same recommendations were made in the 
domain of topographical indications, where the Advisory Committee 
urged “the authorities to take steps, including at the legislative level, to 
ensure that persons belonging to national minorities are allowed to 
display in a minority language signs, inscriptions, and other information 
of a private nature visible to the public” (CoE Report 2007: 23). These 
legal provisions were, furthermore, advised to be integrated within the 
framework of “a draft law on the protection of national minorities” (CoE 
Report 2007: 22). 
 
However, the reluctance of the Azerbaijani authorities to provide for 
these rights is apparent since this Law still has not been adopted, even 
though already upon accession to the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan 
“committed itself to adopting, within three years of accession (i.e. before 
25 January 2004), a law on minorities” (ECRI Report 2011: 15). At the 
same time, it should be noted that Azerbaijan does not seem temporally 
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far from ratifying the ECRML. As indicated by the ECRI Report of 2011, 
the Azerbaijani authorities “have stated that certain provisions of the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages are already, 
partially, implemented in practice; the instrument’s ratification is 
planned, but will necessitate the identification of additional human and 
financial resources” (ECRI Report 2011: 11).  
 
Figure 16.4. Progress as of 2010: Official use of minority languages and intra-
category variations 
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The approach of the monitoring bodies as concerns the three ENP- states 
is rather different than the stance taken in the cases of the Western Balkan 
states. Indeed, the focus of attention has very much shifted to the 
importance of strengthening weak state languages, which primarily is 
made to the detriment of promoting legislative guarantees for minority 
languages. At the same time, and as evidenced by the assessments of the 
monitoring bodies, the strengthening of the state language is sometimes, 
at least in the Georgian case, not easily made without at the same time 
providing for minority language rights. Thus, what is clear is that the 
balancing act between ethnic accommodation and civic integration is 
problematic, and, depending on security related concerns, calls for 
different solutions in the individual states. Indeed, even though the focus 
of the monitoring bodies is much more directed towards minority 
language rights in the case of the two categories of the Western Balkan 
states, it is evident that the recommendations made in these cases as well 
are based on the contextualised settings of each case which, furthermore, 
in certain cases entail recommendations on the strengthening of the 
official languages.  
 
The cases of Macedonia and Kosovo are the most pertinent where the 
extensiveness of the rights granted to the numerically largest minorities 
have created a situation of a linguistic gap, which is an alarming trend of 
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increasing ethnic division. Hence, although the monitoring bodies stress 
the importance of guaranteeing the effective implementation of these 
legislative rights, concomitantly, they press for further efforts from the 
state authorities to introduce measures of bilingualism. These efforts 
have, to date, proven rather futile and it is evident that the legislative 
guarantees provided for in the peace agreements, setting the terms for 
peace, at the same time as paving the way for integration into the 
European structures, are indeed difficult to negotiate away. The 
counterproductive effects of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia are 
also indicative of this trend, although with the exception that, in Bosnia, 
the legislative provisions for minority language use are very modest. 
 
Confirming what we initially suspected in the case of the Western Balkan 
states at least, it is evident that the level of legislation had already been 
established, prior to the temporal setting of this investigation, by the 
different peace agreements, which, in turn, explain the lack of change in 
the level of rule adoption in this area. Thus, even though the variation in 
the level of rule adoption initially was explained by 34.2% by the speed of 
the prospective EU membership reward, the relevance of the impact of 
the speed dimension on the level of rule adoption in this area has to be 
seriously questioned at least as far as categories 1 and 2 are concerned. 
Indeed, in the assessments of the Western Balkan states, possibly with the 
exception of Bosnia, the monitoring bodies are primarily concerned with 
assessing the de facto situation, which in turn sometimes leads to 
recommendations on legal revisions within the framework of existing 
legislation. Regardless of category, these recommendations are more or 
less responded to. Whereas both Kosovo and Macedonia are, indeed, 
responsive to the recommendations of the monitoring bodies, the non-
responsiveness of Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia is blatant. At the same time, 
it has to be underlined that the situation on the ground in Serbia and 
Croatia is much less worrying than are the situations in Macedonia and in 
Kosovo. The case of Bosnia is particular, since the Dayton Peace 
Agreement was nearly oblivious to minority language rights, which, in 
consequence, ties the hands of the monitoring bodies to seriously push 
for legislative change, at the same time as it facilitates for the Bosnian 
authorities to legitimately stay relatively passive to the prudent 
recommendations of the monitoring bodies. 
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When we turn to the states forming category 3, however, it is clear that 
we cannot entirely dismiss the impact of the speed dimension on the level 
of rule adoption. Indeed, the modest level of rule adoption and the lack of 
legislative change in the ENP-states, which are temporally the furthest 
away from prospective EU membership, are not surprising, and, in fact, 
in line with our stipulated hypothesis. Given the fact that the adaptation 
pressure is low, neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan has responded to the 
recommendations of the monitoring bodies. Thus, since the incentives to 
provide for more extensive legislation are negligible, the Georgian and 
Azerbaijani authorities have remained on the very modest level of rule 
adoption and are not likely to make legislative changes as long as the 
incentives to do so are almost insignificant. In this regard, it is important 
to point out that the EU Commission neither assesses the legislative 
provisions, nor the de facto situation of minorities’ possibilities to use their 
minority languages. Hence, it is likely that should Georgia and 
Azerbaijan have been nearer to the prospective EU membership, than is 
the case at present, it is probable that the EU Commission would have 
exerted some pressure and possibly then would have made the state 
authorities more responsive to the calls and concerns, not only of the EU 
Commission, but also of the Advisory Committee of the Council of 
Europe. The Moldovan case is different, since the state authorities 
initially provided for extensive legislation in the domain of the official 
use of minority languages. Furthermore, in the Moldovan case the 
monitoring bodies are almost exclusively directed towards the necessity 
to introduce more serious efforts to enhance minorities’ proficiency in the 
state language. 
 
Indeed, as concerns both Moldova and Georgia, the focus of attention is, 
in fact, more directed towards the necessity of strengthening minorities’ 
proficiency in the state language. Whereas the calls from the monitoring 
bodies are, in fact, responded to in the Georgian case, the same is not true 
for Moldova. Even though the Moldovan authorities would be anxious to 
meet the external demands, it is obvious that the heavily politicised 
linguistic issue in Moldova still impedes any change in this direction, 
which furthermore also explains why the Russian minority language still 
has such a predominant position. In Georgia, the external calls to 
strengthen the state efforts in view of increasing minorities’ level of 
proficiency, are, however, responded to. At the same time, since it is in 
the national interest of Georgia, as part of the civic integration 
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programme, to increase minorities’ level of command in the Georgian 
language, these measures would presumably have been made even 
without the external recommendations.  
Minority language rights in education: Inter-category 
variation  
The more contextualised security based approach is apparent also as 
concerns provisions of minority language rights in education, where a 
similar situation prevails as was the case pertaining to legislative 
provisions in the domain of the official use of minority languages. Thus, 
much of the legislation provided for in the states of the Western Balkans 
had already been regulated, as part of the various peace agreement 
packages, established prior to the time-span of measurement of this 
investigation. This, furthermore, entails that progress on the basis of our 
index-scale is highly unlikely, as evidenced by our results shown in 
figure 16.5., which indicate that no variation as concerns the states of 
categories 1 and 2 have been detected. Consequently, we conclude that 
there is no variation as concerns either the candidate states or the 
potential candidate states that have remained on the levels of 3.5 and 2.5, 
respectively. Thus, on the basis thereof, the assessments of the monitoring 
bodies are more prone to investigate how effective existing legislation is 
implemented in practice, even though these findings sometimes produce 
calls for legislative change. The static dimension, produced by the peace 
agreements, is also blatant as concerns Bosnia, which, here again, stands 
out since Bosnia has provided for very modest legislation. Thus, just like 
the peace agreements in the cases of the other states implicitly make 
legislative progress highly unlikely, the same goes for Bosnia. The static 
nature of this norm is, however, slightly altered when we turn to the 
results of the ENP-states, which do point to a certain change, however 
minor. 
 
Indeed, when we analyse the results on the basis of the assessments of the 
ENP-states, we can conclude that some variation has occurred, even 
though this development points to a regression in terms of minority 
language rights in education. Indeed, the modest variation is explained 
by the legislative change provided for by Georgia. The Georgian 
regression from the level of 3.0 to 2.0 entails, on the whole, that whereas 
initially the variation in the level of rule adoption was explained by an 
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insignificant 10% by the speed of prospective EU membership, this 
correlation has slightly increased as of 2010. As a result of the Georgian 
regression, category 3 falls behind category 2 and, thus, regresses from 2.5 
to 2.17. Thus, when we proceed to calculate the Eta square value, on the 
basis of the change made, we can conclude that the Eta square value has 
increased to 0.144, which, furthermore, entails that the variation in rule 
adoption in this domain is explained by 14.4% by the speed of the 
prospective EU membership reward. Whether this change should be 
viewed as a consequence of the impact of the speed dimension is more 
doubtful and necessitates further investigation. Indeed, an analysis of the 
assessments pertaining to each of the recipient states might give an 
indication as to both the temporal impact upon rule adoption, and, at the 
same time, an indication as to potential legislative change in the future.  
 
Figure 16.5. Progress as of 2010: Minority language rights in education and 
inter-category variations: Eta square value: 0.144; significance value: 0.679 
 
  3  2 1 
   Tolerance                                               x    x                 x             Promotion 
(0)             (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 
  (0): No education of or in minority language; 
(1): Children belonging to minorities have the right to learn their 
mother tongue in school; 
(2): At least parts of the curriculum (e.g. history or religion) are taught 
in the minority language; 
(3): Minorities have the right to educate their children completely in 
the mother tongue, either in state schools with a complete syllabus 
taught in the minority language or in specific minority schools; 
(4): Minorities have their own universities. 
Minority language rights in education: Intra-category 
variation  
The intra-category variation is even more diverse in the domain of 
minority language rights in education, than was the case in the domain of 
minority language use in official contexts. As shown in figure 16.6., 
Macedonia scores the maximum 4.0, followed closely by Croatia, which 
remains ranked at the level of 3.0. Just as in the context of the official use 
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of minority languages, the Macedonian case receives the most attention 
from the monitoring bodies and this is primarily understood in the 
context of the worrying trend of increasing segregation, primarily 
between the Albanian-speaking and the Macedonian-speaking 
communities. In the case of Croatia, neither the legislative situation, nor 
the de facto situation calls for any real concerns from the monitoring 
bodies. Indeed, in the 2010 assessment, the Advisory Committee stated 
that “a well-developed system of minority language education exists in 
Croatia, permitting students belonging to national minorities to receive 
instruction in, or of their languages” (CoE Report 2010: 2). This was 
further emphasised by the EU Commission, which stated that “the 
education provisions of the CLNM and other laws relevant to minorities 
are generally being implemented satisfactorily” (EU Report 2007: 13). 
This finding was confirmed in 2010, when the EU Commission, once 
again, stated that “the education provisions of the Constitutional Law, 
and other laws relevant to minorities, are generally continuing to be 
implemented satisfactorily” (EU Report 2010: 14).  
 
It is clear, however, that the de facto situation varies as to how effectively 
the legislative provisions are implemented. Indeed, in the Serb-
dominated area of Eastern Slavonia, the extensive legislative provisions, 
regulating especially the language rights of the Serb minority in 
education, are successfully being implemented, “in line with Croatia’s 
obligations under the Erdut Agreement” (EU Report 2006: 11). However, 
it has been noted that the Serb minority has met with more difficulty 
outside the area of Eastern Slavonia, since it has been reported that “there 
is often a lack of resources for Serbian sections of schools and translation 
of Croatian books into Serbian is slow” (EU Report 2006: 12). Even 
though the poor integration of the Roma minority in education has also 
been a recurrent problem in Croatian society, as is the case in the other 
states of the Western Balkans, the EU Commission noted, with 
satisfaction, that the adoption of the Croatian government’s action plan 
for Roma inclusion seems to have made an impact. Although the EU 
Commission advised the Croatian authorities to adopt more systematic 
policies as regards inclusion of Roma pupils into the education system, 
the Commission noted, satisfactorily, that “the number of Roma children 
completing primary education and pre-schooling has increased” (EU 
Report 2008: 15).  
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In comparison to Croatia, the Macedonian case is severely more 
challenging, and the main concern of the monitoring bodies is the highly 
segregated school system, between the Albanian-speaking and the 
Macedonian-speaking communities. (EU Report 2006: 15) Indeed, the 
very extensive minority language rights, granted to the Albanian 
minority in education, have generated an educational system based on 
two parallel tracks, one Albanian and the other Macedonian. This, in turn, 
has contributed to accentuate an increasing sharp dividing line between 
the Albanian-speaking and the Macedonian-speaking communities. Thus, 
concern, over the lack of interaction between the two numerically largest 
communities, was voiced by the EU Commission, in 2006, when they 
found that “there are still insufficient opportunities for interaction 
between the different communities, particularly in the sphere of 
education (...). There appears to be no comprehensive policy to bridge the 
gap between the different communities through the education system” 
(EU Report 2006: 15). The same concern was voiced by the Council of 
Europe the following year, when the Advisory Committee stressed the 
need for integration efforts, since “the education of children from the 
majority and minority (especially Albanian) communities is too often 
separated” (CoE Report 2007: 26). Furthermore, since the separation of 
the Albanian-speaking and the Macedonian-speaking pupils is not 
limited to the academic sphere, but has been “extended to extracurricular 
activities of children and youth from majority and minority communities, 
including in leisure, sport and cultural activities”, this is an alarming 
trend that needs to be dealt with more seriously. (CoE Report 2007: 26-27) 
 
Hence, even though the Advisory Committee has acknowledged that 
minority education might indeed require separate classes or schools, at 
the same time, they have underlined that “there are different ways to 
accommodate such needs, including bilingual education” (CoE Report 
2007: 26-27). However, whereas the lack of bilingualism is prevalent in 
the educational system, in especially the Albanian-dominated areas, some 
positive developments have been noted in ethnically-mixed regions. 
Indeed, in these regions, “greater attention has been paid, over the last 
few years, to the learning of Macedonian by persons belonging to the 
different ethnic communities, particularly the Albanians” (CoE Report 
2007: 32). Furthermore, the Advisory Committee has noted “encouraging 
signs of a growing interest in studying Albanian on the part of the 
Macedonians” (CoE Report 2007: 32).  
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However, even though the adverse situation of stark segregation in 
education in the Albanian-dominated areas prevails, and continues to be 
one of the main challenges, outbursts of ethnic strife were, in fact, 
reported in the ethnically-mixed schools. In their 2008 report, the EU 
Commission pointed out that “in several mixed secondary schools, there 
were severe incidents of violence between students from different ethnic 
communities” (EU Report 2008: 20). In order to prevent these ethnic 
clashes from emerging, the EU Commission reiterated the need for 
“mutual understanding and intercultural dialogue (...) between the 
different components of society, in particular in the field of education” 
(EU Report 2008: 20) In 2010, the Macedonian government had responded 
to the calls for closer integration and, on the basis of a dialogue with the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, adopted a Strategy on 
Integrated Education. One of the aims of this strategy was to promote 
“the learning of each others’ languages and increasing inter-ethnic 
interaction between pupils” (EU Report 2010: 20-21). As part of 
promoting the official language, the decision was taken to “introduce 
state language teaching as of the first year for pupils from non-majority 
communities” (EU Report 2010: 21). However, this decision instantly 
fuelled resentment among minority community representatives, which, 
subsequently, led to the annulment of the decision by the Constitutional 
Court, on the basis that “the Minister’s decision was not in line with the 
Law on primary education of 2008” (EU Report 2010: 21). In 2010, 
segregation remained an issue of paramount challenge, as evidenced by 
the ECRI Report which urged “the authorities to tackle the issue of ethnic 
segregation in the school system” (ECRI Report 2010: 9). Furthermore, 
although no outbursts of ethnic strife were reported in 2010, the ECRI 
Report noted that “relations between the majority population and the 
Albanian minority have not become less tense” (ECRI Report 2010: 8).  
 
Whereas the extensiveness of language rights for the Albanian minority 
in education is problematic, so is the lack of legislative provisions for the 
smaller linguistic minorities. The Advisory Committee underlined that 
“the opportunities for persons belonging to smaller communities to learn 
their languages or study in them are at present limited” (CoE Report 
2007: 33). Whether there will be any changes in this regard, when the 
“Agency for protecting the rights of minorities which represent less than 
20% of the population”, becomes operational, is difficult to tell. (EU 
Report 2010: 21) The situation of the Roma minority in education is 
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particularly worrisome. Not only is the Roma minority largely excluded 
from the Macedonian education system, those who attend school are 
more regularly than not improperly sent “to educational facilities for 
pupils with a mental disability” (ECRI Report 2010: 9). This is why the 
ECRI recommended the Macedonian authorities to “take specific 
measures to improve the situation of the Roma in the field of education” 
(ECRI Report 2010: 22).  
 
The heterogeneity of the potential candidate states is as important as was 
the case initially, and whereas Bosnia scores the same low level of 0.5, 
Kosovo remains on the very extensive level of 4.0, with Serbia left 
positioned on the intermediate level of 3.0. The assessments of the 
monitoring bodies are quite scarce as concerns both the de jure status, as 
well as the de facto situation, of minority language rights in education in 
Serbia. However, the monitoring bodies recognise that the de jure status is 
quite unproblematic since the legislative framework is in place. However, 
seeing as how there have been variations recorded as to the effectiveness 
of implementation, the monitoring bodies call on the Serbian authorities 
to introduce more specific regulations, which would clarify the existing 
legislative provisions. Whereas existing legislation seems to be applied 
without further ado as concerns the Albanian and Hungarian language 
rights in education in Southern Serbia and Vojvodina, respectively, 
deficiencies in implementation have been noted as concerns other 
minorities’ possibilities to be instructed in, or of, their minority 
languages, “in particular for the Vlachs living in North East Serbia” (CoE 
Report 2009: 6).  
 
Thus, as underlined by the Advisory Committee, “the Serbian authorities 
should consolidate the legislative framework regarding minority 
language teaching” by more specific regulations. (CoE Report 2009: 41). 
This recommendation was reiterated the following year with calls for 
“promotion of tolerance and better regulation of use of minority 
languages in education” (EU Report 2009: 18). However, by 2010, it is 
evident that the Serbian authorities had not been responsive to the 
recommendations of the monitoring bodies, since the EU Commission 
reiterated its recommendation that “education in minority languages 
remains to be improved and the relevant legal framework clarified” (EU 
Report 2010: 16). Furthermore, the lack of more specific legislation had 
been detrimental, not only to the Vlach minority, but had also affected 
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other minorities, like the “Bosniak, Bulgarian, Bunjevci”, as reported by 
the EU Commission in 2010. (EU Report 2010: 16) However, the minority 
that calls for the strongest reactions from the monitoring bodies in Serbia 
is the Roma minority, since “Roma children face a wide range of obstacles 
in their access to education” (EU Report 2006: 15). In the same vein as in 
Macedonia, pupils from the Roma minority “are often considered 
mentally disabled” and, thus, uncalled for, placed in special schools for 
pupils with mental disabilities. Even though the Serbian Ministry of 
Education made “Roma education one of the priorities of its Strategy for 
Education (2005-2010)”, which was commended by the monitoring 
bodies, discrimination against Roma pupils is still reported as a serious 
problem in Serbia. (ECRI Report 2007: 24)  
 
Minority education in Bosnia is, however, more alarming than in Serbia, 
since the legislative provisions are very modest, indeed. Furthermore, the 
problem of a highly segregated educational system, along ethnic lines, is 
more of a generalised problem. As opposed to Macedonia, ethnic 
segregation in Bosnia is primarily centred on the division between the 
three majority communities, the Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. Thus, even 
though the monitoring bodies are concerned about the very modest 
minority language rights provisions in Bosnia, which, in turn, has 
entailed that “national minorities accordingly continue to be “invisible” 
within the education system”, more attention is paid to the worrying 
segregation between the three constituent nations. (EU Report 2007: 39) 
Indeed, the highly segregated school system in Bosnia manifests itself in 
the educational system of “two schools under one roof – which separates 
pupils in schools along ethnic lines” (EU Report 2007: 39). Furthermore, 
even though the constituent nations do not have status as national 
minorities, the de facto situation has entailed that Croats and Bosniaks 
have found themselves in a minority position in the Republika Srpska, 
and, vice versa, that Serbs have been treated as a minority in the 
Federation. This, consequently, led the Advisory Committee to 
recommend the Bosnian authorities to consider whether a person, having 
de jure status as constituent nation, however being in a de facto minority 
situation, could be allowed to be treated as a national minority under the 
Framework Convention. This recommendation had not been responded 
to by 2010.   
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Minorities’ language rights in education are, however, very modest and 
the primary impediment is constituted by the very high thresholds that 
regulate application of the legislative provisions. Although the Advisory 
Committee pointed out, in their 2008 Report, that there seems to have 
been a relaxation as regards the level of the threshold, enabling the 
teaching of minority languages in education, these changes seem more 
cosmetic than anything else since they, in fact, in no way obligate the 
municipalities to implement these provisions in practice. This problem 
was highlighted in the 2008 Report, in which the Advisory Committee 
pointed out that, “the amendments made to the State Law on National 
Minorities in 2005 have not really relaxed the conditions to be met for 
teaching to be dispensed in minority languages. This is because the 
requirement that the minority should constitute an absolute or relative 
majority of the population of the municipality concerned, has been 
replaced by the criterion that, to be able to ask to be taught in their language, 
pupils belonging to a national minority must form one-third or one-fifth 
(in the case of optional classes) of the populations of the school 
concerned” (CoE Report 2008: 33, emphasis added). Thus, even though 
one is led to believe that there has been a relaxation of the threshold, 
these lower thresholds are only guarantors of possibilities for the national 
minorities, and not guarantors as to any obligation that would befall the 
State authorities. This, in turn, has led to a situation where “the cultural 
heritage, history and languages of national minorities are virtually absent 
from school syllabuses and textbooks” (CoE Report 2008: 7). Even though 
some progress had been made by 2010, in that some minority classes 
were reported to have been held, the ECRI Report commented that, 
however commendable the amendments made to the Law of 2005, “in 
practice the criteria remain difficult to fulfil and the number of classes in 
which minority languages are taught remains low” (ECRI Report 2010: 
40).  
 
Paradoxically, however, the low level of minority language rights 
provisions in education does not seem to concern the monitoring bodies a 
great deal, and few recommendations are actually made as to the need to 
make these more extensive. Indeed, the recommendations in this regard 
are limited to one of the Advisory Committee Reports which 
recommended, to little avail however, the state authorities to rapidly 
“make the history, culture and languages of the national minorities a 
component part of school syllabuses and to train teachers to inculcate 
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knowledge of these subjects” (CoE Report 2008: 31). Much more attention 
and concern is raised in relation to the ethnically-based school system, 
which is perceived as a far greater challenge to the national cohesion of 
the weak Bosnian state. In fact, as early as 2006, this issue was raised by 
the EU which found that “little progress has been made in preventing the 
separation of children in schools along ethnic lines. This is a serious issue 
that needs to be addressed” (EU Report 2006: 16). This issue is 
consistently stressed by both the EU and the Council of Europe, and 
although improvements had been recorded in some areas of the 
Federation in 2008, the EU Commission noted that this problem “remains 
a serious issue” (EU Report 2008: 42). The same year, the Advisory 
Committee urged the authorities of the Entities and the Cantons to “take 
far more determined measures to end segregation of pupils according to 
their national or ethnic origin” (CoE Report 2008: 31). In 2009, it was 
reported that the measures taken were far from satisfactory and that the 
segregated school system had “already created tension at the community 
level” (EU Report 2009: 43). However, in 2010, the EU Commission made 
note of some progress since the number of divided schools had seen a 
rapid decrease from 83 to 19. Whether this decrease actually means 
progress is too early to tell, since, in parallel to this development, “the 
number of mono-ethnic schools has grown, making longer term 
integration more difficult” (EU Report 2010: 18). 
 
The lack of integration, and the problem of a strictly divided education 
system, is also a challenge in Kosovo and resembles both the Bosnian case 
as well as the Macedonian one since, here too, “parallel and ethnic-based 
structures, using different curricula and textbooks, are a source of 
segregation” (EU Report 2008: 41). However, as opposed to Bosnia, in 
Kosovo, the division along ethnic lines is primarily cemented between the 
Kosovo Albanian majority and the Serb minority. In fact, the very 
extensive minority language rights, granted to the Serb minority in 
education, have consequently made way for parallel educational 
structures, similar to the Macedonian situation. Thus, the concerns of the 
monitoring bodies is both the lack of integration, between particularly the 
Serb minority and the Kosovo Albanian majority, but also the poor 
inclusion of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian minority communities in the 
Kosovo education system.  
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Efforts to bridge the divide between the Kosovo Serbs and the Kosovo 
Albanians have been consistent, as evidenced by the monitoring bodies’ 
assessments, which, for instance, reported in 2006 that the Ministry of 
Education “is making efforts to offer Albanian and Serbian language 
classes to all communities in order to integrate them into the Kosovo 
educational system” (EU Report 2006: 28). The following year, efforts 
were made to facilitate inclusion of minorities into the higher education 
system, by adopting a “Strategy for pre-university education with 
inclusive and progressive measures for minorities in Kosovo” (EU Report 
2007: 21). However, the persistency of the problem is evident, since, in 
2009, the parallel education system was addressed by the EU Commission 
as one of the main barriers to “reconciliation and multi-ethnicity”, which, 
furthermore, are main priorities in the European Partnership Priorities. 
(EU Report 2009: 17) Indeed, as stated by the Advisory Committee, 
“resolute and urgent action must be taken by the authorities to 
implement initiatives, promoting inter-ethnic contacts, at schools, and 
among children in general” (CoE Report 2009: 9). One measure, seen as 
primordial by the Advisory Committee, is to increase the opportunities 
for pupils of minority communities to learn the official languages. At the 
same time, it is important to provide “opportunities for pupils belonging 
to the majority community to learn minority languages” (CoE Report 
2009: 41). It is apparent though that not enough had been done in this 
area by 2010, since the EU Commission found that “learning Albanian or 
Serbian language is not compulsory for the Serbian and Albanian 
communities, respectively. Trainings are urgently needed to ensure the 
use of new language curricula, which is key to develop interactions 
between communities” (EU Report 2010: 19).  
 
More concerted efforts as to integration of smaller linguistic communities 
are also raised, and especially worrying is the lack of integration of the 
Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities in the Kosovo education 
system. In order to systematically address this issue, the Ministry of 
Education adopted a Strategy for the education of the Roma, Ashkali and 
Egyptians, in July 2007. (EU Report 2007: 21) However, progress for more 
effective inclusion of these vulnerable minority communities has been 
slow, and, already in 2007, the EU Commission pointed out that these 
groups “continue to face very difficult living conditions and 
discrimination, especially in the areas of education, social protection, 
health care, housing and employment” (EU Report 2007: 22-23). Although 
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there had been noted some progress in 2010, the EU Commission still 
stressed that “their situation remains a very serious concern” (EU Report 
2010: 20).   
 
When we turn to the states forming category 3, we notice that at least 
Georgia and Moldova are confronted with the same problem of weak 
state languages and problems of national cohesion, at the same time as 
minority language rights in education have been extensive in the 
Georgian case (3.0), and very extensive in the Moldovan case (4.0). The 
Azerbaijani case stands out with very weak legislative provisions for 
minorities in education (0.5), at the same time as the status of the state 
language does not call for any concerns. The Georgian case is interesting, 
since it is the only case that has accounted for legislative change in this 
domain. Indeed, although the internal linguistic prerequisites in Georgia 
are similar to the Moldovan one, Georgia is the only State that has 
actually succeeded in increasing the legislative status of the state 
language in education. In fact, with the adoption of the 2005 General 
Education Act, limiting minorities’ language rights in education from 
2010, not only does the revised curriculum make learning of the Georgian 
language compulsory, other subjects instructed in Georgian are also 
made obligatory. This, subsequently, entails that the legislative rights of 
minorities in education have been reduced from 3.0 to the level of 2.0, 
since only parts of the curriculum can, henceforth, be taught in the 
minority language.  
 
As a consequence, the assessments from the monitoring bodies are very 
much focused on the necessity to improve the teaching of the state 
language to national minorities, since “inadequate command of the 
Georgian language is one of several factors accounting for their 
marginalisation” (CoE Report 2009: 3). At the same time, and due to the 
fact that the strengthening of the state language in education has been 
made to the detriment of minority language rights, the monitoring bodies 
are concerned that “the implementation of the reform to education does 
not have discriminatory effects for persons belonging to national 
minorities” (CoE Report 2009: 50). In fact, the expansion of subjects, 
taught in Georgian, requires substantial measures to increase national 
minorities’ level of proficiency in the Georgian language, without which 
access to both higher education and employment would be severely 
limited. In fact, under the prevailing circumstances, which entail that the 
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university entry requirement “comprises a test in (the) Georgian language 
and literature, (this) forms a considerable obstacle for students who have 
studied in the education system in a minority language” (CoE Report 
2009: 50). The negative consequences of the new requirements have 
already been noted, seeing that there has been a significant drop in 
admittance of students of national minorities to higher education. (CoE 
Report 2009: 36) Thus, the recommendations from the monitoring bodies 
are primarily focused on the necessity of taking measures to increase the 
level of proficiency in the Georgian language, even though it is stated that 
this should not be “pursued to the detriment of the linguistic rights of 
persons belonging to national minorities, the effective enforcement of 
which requires more resolute measures, both in the legislative framework 
and in its implementation” (CoE Report 2009: 3). 
 
In 2007, the EU Commission pointed to the fact that the State initiatives, 
regarding increasing the learning of the State language, were insufficient. 
(EU Report 2007: 18) Although some progress had been noted, it was 
clear, in 2009, that the State authorities’ “efforts are far from adequate and 
do not constitute an appropriate response to existing needs” (CoE Report 
2009: 3). However, several measures had been implemented with the 
adoption of the Georgian language curriculum in 2009, of which one aim 
is to “improve the teaching of Georgian in pre-school education centres, 
which will be established in the Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli 
regions” (ECRI Report 2010: 16). In order to raise the quality of the 
teaching, measures will be taken both as concerns more adapted 
textbooks, distributed free-of-charge, as well as increased skills of the 
teachers. However, as concerns the more specialised teachers, the ECRI 
noted that “further efforts are needed to ensure that these teachers know 
the local minority language, as this is considered by specialists to be one 
of the conditions for improving the quality of teaching Georgian as a 
second language” (ECRI Report 2010: 16). Furthermore, to reduce the 
inequality of access to higher education, the State authorities had 
introduced a series of measures which already seem to have borne fruit, 
since “the number of minority students passing the centralised exams is 
increasing again” (ECRI Report 2010: 17). Indeed, the introduction of both 
a quota system, permitting pupils from Armenian-speaking and 
Azerbaijani-speaking schools to receive a university grant, as well as a 
system of preparatory language courses for minority pupils had been 
successfully implemented by 2010.  
348 
The focus on the strengthening of the state language is evident also in the 
Moldovan case. Even though the monitoring reports do mention the 
necessity to ensure that minority language rights in education are 
implemented in practice, especially for the non-Russian minority 
languages, it is obvious that this area is not their primary concern. 
Indeed, the necessity to strengthen the low, and sometimes very low, 
level of minorities’ command in the Moldovan language, is, consistently, 
stressed throughout the monitoring reports, since proficiency in the state 
language is vital in order to guarantee that when pupils of national 
minorities “leave school they will have equal opportunities in access to 
higher education and employment” (ECRI Report 2007: 31). Even though 
it is important that national minorities’ acquire a good command of the 
state language, concern is raised as to the inadequacies of State incentives 
in this regard. As underlined by the ECRI, “the present situation remains 
unsatisfactory as far as teaching the state language for children belonging 
to national minorities is concerned” (ECRI Report 2007: 30).   
 
Worrying signals of the lack of efforts from the state authorities, which 
even seem to have been relaxed, were detected by the ECRI report which 
stressed that the prevailing situation is “far from improving in this field, 
which is regrettable as the state language is an important tool for the 
integration of the whole society” (ECRI Report 2007: 30-31). Furthermore, 
the educational efforts, so far carried out, have been flawed due to the 
poor quality of teaching, as well as the poor quality of textbooks, which 
consequently entail that minority pupils “do not attain sufficient 
command of Moldovan by the end of their schooling” (ECRI Report 2007: 
30-31). Although some improvements had been noted, it is apparent that 
the measures taken were not encompassing enough, since the Council of 
Europe report stressed, in 2010, that the State authorities need “to make 
every effort to improve, substantially, the availability and quality of 
teaching of the state language” (CoE Report 2010: 3). Concomitantly, 
however, it should be noted that the authorities were also recommended 
to find an “educational approach that reconciles the desire to promote 
teaching of the state language with the need to protect minority 
languages” (ECRI Report 2007: 30). This recommendation was reiterated 
in 2010. (CoE Report 2010: 3) A serious impediment, however, towards 
realising both an increased level of proficiency in the state language, in 
parallel with ensuring minority language rights in education, is the 
privileged position of the Russian minority language, which still has de 
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facto status as official language, and is still largely used as the main lingua 
franca.  
 
Just as in Georgia, the strengthening of the state language has been part 
of the civic integration programme in Azerbaijan. However, the stakes for 
the national minorities of Azerbaijan are much less aggravating than for 
those in Georgia, since minorities’ command of the Azeri state language 
is, generally, very good. Thus, the more “unproblematic” situation of 
minorities in education in Azerbaijan is also apparent in the monitoring 
reports, whose assessments are very limited, indeed. The little attention 
is, however, surprising, since the legislative provisions in the area of 
minority language rights in education are almost non-existent (0.5). In 
fact, even though the Advisory Committee had previously urged the 
Azerbaijani authorities “to provide adequate legal guarantees for persons 
belonging to national minorities, to receive education in their minority 
language”, the urgency of the matter seems to be reduced, since de facto 
minority education exists. (CoE Report 2007: 25) Even though not 
legislatively provided for, the Advisory Committee “welcomes the fact 
that schools with the entire curriculum in Russian or Georgian continue 
to be available, besides schooling in Azerbaijani” (CoE Report 2007: 6). 
Furthermore, and once again de facto, it is possible to study other minority 
languages as part of primary education, in regions “where persons 
belonging to national minorities live in substantial numbers” (CoE Report 
2007: 6).  
 
Even though the de facto situation is assessed as quite satisfactory, the 
Advisory Committee nevertheless recommends the Azerbaijani 
authorities “to consider ways of extending possibilities to learn minority 
languages in the educational system” (CoE Report 2007: 26). Furthermore, 
and notwithstanding the quite extensive possibilities that exist, in 
practice, for minorities’ to get instructed in, or of, their minority 
languages, the Advisory Committee “invites the authorities to ensure that 
any future legislation adequately guarantees the right”, which already is 
provided for in practice. (CoE Report 2007: 26) However, in 2010, no 
legislative provisions had been adopted and, de facto, the Azerbaijani 
authorities continued to “provide the general school curriculum in three 
languages (Azerbaijani, Russian and Georgian), as well as teaching at 
primary school level of several minority languages” (ECRI Report 2011: 
7). 
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Figure 16.6. Progress as of 2010: Minority language rights in education and 
intra-category variations 
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To sum up, it is evident that even though some change has been 
recorded, compared to the initial level of rule adoption, variation is 
minor, and resembles the situation pertaining to the domain of official 
use of minority languages. However, whereas the “explanatory power” 
of the speed dimension accounted for 34.2% of the variation in the level of 
rule adoption in the domain of the official use of minority languages, the 
impact of the speed dimension is almost insignificant as concerns 
minority language rights in education. Although the legislative change, 
made by Georgia, has meant that the Eta square value has increased from 
0.10 to 0.144, which, subsequently, entails that the variation in the level of 
rule adoption would be explained by 14.4% by the speed dimension, the 
increase is minor. Furthermore, and in the same vein as within the 
domain of the official use of minority languages, the relevance of the 
impact of the speed dimension on the level of rule adoption in this area 
has to be seriously questioned. Since the basis of the legal framework 
primarily was established by the different peace agreements, prior to the 
investigation, the likelihood for legislative change is minor, at least in the 
categories pertaining to the States of the Western Balkans.  
 
Even though change has been recorded in one of the ENP-states, 
temporally the furthest away from the prospective EU membership 
reward, the change has meant a regression in terms of minority language 
rights in education. What is more, whether this legislative regression is a 
direct consequence of the recommendations of the monitoring bodies, or, 
whether it is a logical consequence of national strategic considerations of 
Georgia, is a matter of speculation. However, what is clear is that 
irrespective of category, recommendations on the promotion of the state 
language in minority education and increased efforts of bilingualism, are, 
consistently, stressed by the monitoring bodies, although these should 
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not be implemented to the detriment of minorities’ language rights in 
education.   
 
The argument that questions the relevance of measuring the speed 
dimension’s impact on the level of rule adoption in this area is that, 
irrespective of category, the majority of the recipient states already 
initially provided for extensive rights (Croatia, Serbia and Georgia), and 
very extensive rights (Macedonia, Kosovo and Moldova). Apart from 
Croatia and Serbia, the counterproductive effects of these extensive rights 
have contributed to create parallel education systems, enhancing the 
linguistic gap between the linguistic communities, which, in turn, has led 
to increased ethnic segregation. Thus, apart from stressing more effective 
implementation of minorities’ language rights in education, the 
recommendations of the monitoring bodies are, however, consistently, 
more directed towards urging state authorities to increase efforts of 
bilingualism, with the aim of strengthening the national cohesion of the 
recipient states. The calls for integrative efforts are particularly blatant in 
the cases of Macedonia, Kosovo, Georgia and also Moldova. In the 
Kosovo case, efforts aiming at “reconciliation and multi-ethnicity” are a 
priority, explicitly defined in the European partnership priorities. (EU 
Kosovo Report 2009: 17) Whereas the recommendations of the monitoring 
bodies have largely been responded to by the authorities of Macedonia, 
Kosovo, and by Georgia to some extent, the non-responsiveness of the 
Moldovan authorities is evident. In the Moldovan case, the reluctance 
should, primarily, be seen in light of the highly politicised linguistic issue, 
which makes any change in this area highly unlikely at present. In the 
same vein, it has to be recognised that, although responsive, the 
“integrative” measures, introduced by the authorities of both Kosovo and 
Macedonia, have, in fact, been inconclusive. Indeed, the most striking 
example is the decision to introduce learning of the Macedonian language 
from primary school; a decision that was violently reacted to by the 
minority communities and, which, subsequently, led to its annulment. 
 
Viewed the sensitivity of the linguistic issue in education, since the 
strengthening of the state language in education necessarily means the 
weakening of minority language rights, it is a balancing act. In fact, not 
only the monitoring bodies, but also the state authorities in the recipient 
states, have to navigate between ethnic accommodation and civic 
integration. Furthermore, since the rights granted by the peace 
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agreements are hard to negotiate away, it is not surprising that Georgia, 
in fact, was the only state that successfully managed to strengthen the 
state language to the detriment of minorities’ rights in education. 
However, the consistent calls from the monitoring bodies for introducing 
bilingual measures, with the aim of strengthening the national cohesion 
of the majority of the recipient states, indicate that the Georgian example 
could be followed by others. Consequently, this might entail that instead 
of predicting a progression in terms of the level of minority language 
rights in education, as we had expected, in the future we might instead 
see a regression. Whether this process will be embarked upon or not, is 
not the issue of investigation here. However, what is clear is that the 
relevance of measuring the progress in minority language rights in 
education, and what impact the speed dimension, consequently, has on 
this area of investigation, can seriously be questioned. 
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17 
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNT AND WHERE DO 
WE GO FROM HERE? 
This investigation started out as an interrogation as to the widespread 
understanding of the effectiveness of EU political conditionality. In 
research on EU conditionality, the strategy of reinforcement by reward 
has proven particularly successful in explaining norm compliance. Thus, 
on the basis of the External Incentives Model of Governance, whose 
central claim is that the EU membership reward is an effective incentive 
to induce non-member states, on track of EU accession, to comply with 
EU conditionality, the research at hand set out to test the validity of the 
model. The scope of research was limited to EU minority language rights 
conditionality, where the norms of non-discrimination, the use of 
minority languages in official contexts, as well as minority language 
rights in education were investigated. While the explanatory power of the 
speed dimension, as one source of variation, has never been properly 
analysed, since it has been overshadowed by the size dimension, this 
investigation set out to do just that. Thus, based on the rationalist 
perspective, the speed of the prospective EU membership reward was 
understood to constitute both a constraint and an opportunity, 
constituting the main driving force of adaptation pressure, in the 
conditionality-compliance process. Since norm compliance was 
operationalised as the level of rule adoption, variation in the level of rule 
adoption in minority language rights conditionality was argued to be 
heavily impacted by the temporal distance to the prospective EU 
membership.  
 
Fig 17.1. Speed of reward hypothesis and level of rule adoption 
 
Temporal distance        level of adaptation      level of rule  
to EU membership pressure  adoption   
reward     
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Following from this, it was, subsequently, hypothesised that the nearer 
the recipient states are to the prospective EU membership reward, the 
higher the adaptation pressure, and the more likely the level of rule 
adoption would be high. Vice versa, the further away the recipient states 
are from the prospective EU membership reward, the lower the 
adaptation pressure, and the more likely the level of rule adoption would 
be low. On the basis of our empirical base, we, accordingly, expected the 
level of rule adoption to have progressed to be the highest in Croatia and 
Macedonia (category 1: candidate states), to have acquired an 
intermediate level in Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia (category 2: potential 
candidate states), and to be the lowest in Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Moldova (category 3: ENP states). 
 
Fig. 17.2. Speed of reward hypothesis and categorisation of the empirical base 
 
Close to EU mem-  high level of adaptation  progressed to a 
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(category 1)    adoption 
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tance to  EU mem- adaptation pressure intermediate level  
bership reward    of rule adoption 
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Distant to EU mem-  low level of adaptation   progressed to a 
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When having measured the level of rule adoption, on the basis of the 
progress made in the respective categories during the time frame of the 
analysis, the results of the investigation, however, only partially 
confirmed our postulated hypothesis. The results pertaining to the non-
discrimination norm showed that the speed of the prospective EU 
membership reward did constitute an effective mechanism of adaptation 
pressure, but only partly. On the one hand, we observed that whereas the 
relationship between the speed of the prospective EU membership 
reward and the level of rule adoption was quite weak initially (eta square 
value: 0.208), it had been substantially strengthened when we had 
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measured the progress made by 2010. In fact, in 2010, the variation in the 
level of rule adoption between the three categories was explained by 
more than 65% by the speed of the prospective EU membership reward 
(eta square value: 0.652). On the other hand, however, it became evident 
that the strengthened association, between the temporal distance and the 
level of rule adoption, was, primarily, explained by the increased 
variation in the level of rule adoption between the ENP-states (category 
3), which had remained on the same low level of rule adoption as 
initially, and both categories of the Western Balkan states. Since the 
candidate states (category 1), and the potential candidate states (category 
2), had progressed to the same high level of rule adoption, this had 
entailed a levelling out of the expected differences in rule adoption 
between the two categories. Obviously, this result was highly 
unexpected, since the candidate states are temporally closer to the EU 
membership reward than the potential candidate states, thus, rendering 
that the hypothesis was partially invalidated.  
 
The results pertaining to the norms of minority language use and 
minority language rights in education were highly different from those of 
the non-discrimination norm. Whereas we had confirmation on the 
strengthened relationship between speed and rule adoption in non-
discrimination, almost no progress was noted in the level of rule adoption 
pertaining to the other two norms. In fact, in regards to rule adoption in 
the area of the use of minority languages in official contexts, no progress 
had been recorded by 2010. Thus, even though initially the variation in 
the level of rule adoption had been established at being explained by 
more than 34% by the speed dimension (eta square value: 0.342), a result 
which in itself is not insignificant, by 2010, the same pattern of inter-
category variation remained. The results observed in the domain of 
minority language rights in education, further confirmed the non-
dynamic relationship between the speed dimension and rule adoption 
pertaining to these two norms. Indeed, although we did observe a slight 
change in the pattern of inter-category variation (from an eta square value 
of 0.10 to 0.144), the change was insignificant. Initially, the association 
between the two variables was negligible, since only 10% of the variation 
in the level of rule adoption could be derived from the temporal distance.  
 
It became evident that the weak association between the temporal 
distance and the level of rule adoption, especially pertinent in the case of 
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minority language rights in education, was primarily due to the peace 
agreements of the Western Balkan states, which, prior to this 
investigation, had set the bar in terms of the extensiveness of the 
legislative provisions. This largely explains the non-dynamic association 
between the temporal dimension and the level of rule adoption in these 
contextualised security-based norms. At the same time, the results 
strongly question the relevance of the measurement, which is anchored in 
a categorisation that appears ad hoc, at best. The problem of the 
categorisation is even more manifest as concerns the results in the non-
discrimination norm, where the uncertainties, surrounding the temporal 
location of SAp-conditionality, in fact, have eradicated the demarcation 
between the categories.       
The principle of differentiation in relation to 
uncertainties surrounding the temporal location  
On the basis of the same structures as the pre-accession conditionality of 
1993, SAp-conditionality was launched, in 2000, as a mechanism to 
integrate the former warring states of the Western Balkans into the 
structures of the EU. However, as opposed to the conditionality of the 
large Eastern European enlargements of 2004 and 2007, three distinct 
features, specific of SAp-conditionality, were introduced. Firstly, Sap-
conditionality was not directly linked to enlargement, since no explicit 
promise of EU membership was made.297 Second, the principle of 
differentiation was retained as a lesson drawn from the previous Eastern 
enlargement, which, consequently, introduced the categorisation, on the 
basis of the recipient states’ presumptive possibilities of compliance, into 
candidate states and potential candidate states. Lastly, SAp-conditionality 
was based on the principle of contextualisation in that it was country-
specific. These three specificities are argued to have limited the impact of 
the temporal dimension on rule adoption, particularly blatant in the area 
of non-discrimination.    
                                                          
297 In fact, the only “promise” of future EU membership seems to be the statement of the 
Thessaloniki Agenda which was reiterated in 2005 and which stipulated that regardless of 
category “the future of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union”. Cf. European 
Council (2005) “Conclusions of the Presidency”, DOC 10255/1/05 REV 1, Brussels, 15 July 
2005, p. 12, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/85349.pdf, 2010-
10-10. 
 
357 
Since the finalités géographiques of SAp-conditionality were left 
undetermined, the temporal location of the potential EU membership 
reward was left undefined. In the area of non-discrimination, the 
uncertainties surrounding the temporal location seem to have been 
instrumental as to the reduction of the temporal dimension’s impact on 
the adaptation pressure, and therefore on the legal behaviour of the 
recipient states of the Western Balkans. Indeed, the lack of temporal 
devices, especially timetables, with fixed dates and sequences associated 
with each category, strongly indicates that the recipient states perceive 
that they are competing on the same temporal footing. This, in turn, 
abolishes any temporal frontiers, thus invalidating any variation in the 
level of adaptation pressure, and, consequently, in the level of rule 
adoption. Therefore, in the cases where there is uncertainty, not only as to 
how speedily the prospective EU membership reward will benefit the 
recipient states, but also as to the duration of the whole conditionality-
compliance process, the effectiveness of the speed dimension is seriously 
reduced in favour of other considerations. These considerations seem to 
have more to do with the level of motivation, i.e. political will and 
capacities, of the individual states. Interestingly, we noted that the 
uncertainty, surrounding the time-frame between compliance and 
reward, effectively produced very different legal behaviours in the 
recipient states. Whereas the temporal uncertainty seemed to have 
created what Goetz has called “trans-temporal policy problems” in 
Macedonia and Bosnia, constraining these states into a low level of rule 
adoption, the opposite legal behaviour was noted in the cases of Croatia, 
Serbia and Kosovo. (Goetz 2009: 208)  
 
The low level of rule adoption in the Macedonian case is particularly 
interesting, since it is a candidate state, and thereby being temporally the 
closest to the EU membership reward, at the same as it enjoys most of the 
financial assistance of the SAp-conditionality. Financial assistance 
notwithstanding, in the Macedonian case the uncertainties surrounding 
the temporal location seem to have constrained the Macedonian 
government into a situation of legal relaxation. The low level of rule 
adoption in the Bosnian case is, however, more comprehensible, since it 
seems to be more related to the dysfunctional effects of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement than to the Bosnian level of motivation. At the same time, 
though, it is highly likely that the prerogatives granted to the three 
constituent nations, enshrined in the peace treaty, might very well have 
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constituted a legal pretext for the Bosnian government to abstain from 
adopting more extensive legislation in the area of non-discrimination. As 
opposed to Bosnia, and particularly Macedonia, the legal behaviours of 
Croatia, Kosovo and Serbia indicate that they have taken advantage of the 
opportunities of the uncertainties surrounding the temporal location, 
since they all have progressed to a high level of rule adoption. Thus, 
whereas the legal behaviour of Macedonia runs counter to Avery’s 
argument, which is that the uncertainty surrounding the temporal 
location would predispose applicant states “to try harder to meet the EU 
requirements”, the legal behaviours of Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo are 
completely in line. (Avery 2009: 262)  
 
Whereas the lack of temporal devices, and especially set time-tables 
specific for each category, most probably constitutes an impediment 
towards more effective rule adoption, in general, and for the states 
having been the least prone to adopt extensive legislation (Macedonia 
and Bosnia), in particular, one is tempted to question the strategy of the 
EU pertaining to the categorisation. Bearing in mind, however, that our 
domain of investigation only constitutes one small area of the 
conditionality package, the categorisation nevertheless raises questions. 
On the basis of the level of rule adoption, in the domain of non-
discrimination at least, a more measured categorisation would have been 
to place Croatia, Kosovo and Serbia in the category of the candidate 
states, whereas it would have been more relevant to place Macedonia, 
along with Bosnia, in the category of the potential candidate states. At the 
same time, however, it is highly probable that the categorisation is not 
only determined by the level of the extensiveness of legislation adopted, 
but also is explained by the de facto situation of discrimination, as well as 
challenges pertaining to the legal order of the recipient states.  
 
In this regard, it is obvious that the situation in Kosovo is problematic 
and most probably explains why Kosovo is placed in the category of the 
potential candidate states. Even though de jure, the level of anti-
discrimination legislation is higher in Kosovo than in Serbia, it is evident 
that the de facto situation in Kosovo is more alarming than in Serbia, as 
indicated by the reports of the monitoring bodies. Furthermore, the sui 
generis situation of Kosovo, which still can be characterised as a semi-
independent state and, in fact, still is monitored on the basis of UN 
Resolution 1244, is another sensitive issue. Not only is it sensitive from 
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the perspective particularly of those EU member states that have not 
recognised the independence of Kosovo, it is also challenging from the 
perspective of the recipient states, and particularly Serbia, whose non-
recognition not only complicates the future accession of Kosovo but also 
prolongs Serbia’s own road to the prospective EU membership. This also 
explains the EU stance, which is proactive at the same time as it is 
restrained, which can be seen in the fact that although Kosovo scores the 
same high level of rule adoption as Croatia, the EU Commission never 
speaks of near compliance in the Kosovo case. It is clear that Serbia is less 
controversial, since neither Serbia’s legal situation, nor its de facto 
discrimination, causes any real concern from the EU. Not surprisingly 
then, Serbia had, in fact, been upgraded to the status of candidate state by 
March 2012. Notwithstanding Serbia’s level of rule adoption in the area of 
non-discrimination, since our investigation is limited to 2010, it is 
however highly probable that the progress to candidate status was also 
due to progress in other areas of the conditionality process.298  
 
The categorisation of Macedonia as candidate state is harder to explain, 
since there is neither a proactive stance from the Macedonian authorities, 
nor from the EU. One might speculate though, that the decision to accept 
Macedonia as a candidate state in 2005 might have had more to do with 
politico-strategic considerations, than any considerations based on the 
progress made in the level of rule adoption in the domain of non-
discrimination. To this effect, status as candidate state might have been 
seen as an important incentive to the Macedonian authorities, in order to 
ensure the effective implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, 
which is consistently stressed in the EU reports as being crucial to the 
political stability of Macedonia. Thus, the categorisation of the Western 
Balkan states, which, at first sight, seemed to have been made in an ad hoc 
fashion, at closer inspection, it would seem that strategic considerations 
were at the core of the categorisation. This would, consequently, mean 
that although the level of the de jure situation had a bearing on the 
categorisation, the impact of the de facto situation, measured on the basis 
of security-related concerns, seems to have been equally important.   
 
                                                          
298 The fact that Serbia had finally agreed to extradite the remaining war criminals to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was most probably 
crucial to the decision to upgrade Serbia from potential candidate state to candidate state.  
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The categorisation, in relation to the lack of temporal devices, might seem 
to be an ineffective mechanism when preparing the Western Balkan states 
for eventual EU membership. However, it is highly likely that this is a 
well thought-out strategy, since it enables the EU to stay non-committal 
towards these recipient states, at the same time as keeping them on a 
leash of membership expectations, regardless of the category they belong 
to. The EU strategy is comprehensible since it leaves the EU with the 
utmost flexibility of action. The non-committal strategy seems to be based 
both on a sense of enlargement fatigue in parallel to a lack of consensus 
from the member states on the end-goal of the SAp-conditionality-
compliance process. It has to be acknowledged that the strategy has 
proven to be effective since the results show that, even in the absence of 
membership guarantees, the recipient states, in general, were decidedly 
prepared to comply with the EU conditions, at least in the domain of non-
discrimination. In light of these considerations, the non-committal 
strategy and the lack of an explicit promise as to when, and, 
consequently, how speedily the ultimate reward might benefit the 
recipient states, is comprehensible, however, precarious, in a long-term 
perspective. Precarious, in the sense that the lack of a temporal location of 
the prospective EU membership reward, as well as the blurring of the 
temporal distance, can create a sense of fatigue, at least on the part of 
some of the recipient states, whose motivations to comply might stagnate, 
as already noted in the cases of Macedonia and Bosnia.  
 
The strategy is precarious also from the perspective of the political 
instability which still characterise Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo, in 
particular, whose societies are still permeated with inter-ethnic tensions. 
Consequently, a sense of temporal infinity, in regards to the ultimate EU 
membership benefit, might aggravate the inter-ethnic tensions, which 
paradoxically were the main reasons for the launching of the SAp-
conditionality. Furthermore, the complexity of the very nature of the 
contextualised security-based norms, based not only on the various peace 
treaties but also on the articles of the Framework Convention, give rise to 
uncertainties, which, in turn, create problems as to the implementation of 
the very regulations that have been set as conditions.   
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Security-based conditionalities: Problems and 
perspectives  
Both moral reasons as well as self-interested calculations are certain to lie 
behind the EU decision in the late 1990s to tie the states of the Western 
Balkans closer to the European structures. Indeed, it is evident that the 
incapacity of the EU to help resolve the violent conflicts in the Western 
Balkans left imprints on the EU, at the same time as there was a necessity 
to secure the external stability of the EU, once the violent conflicts had 
been terminated. Thus, in the aftermath of the Kosovo war, it is clear that 
the EU perceived that they had an obligation to act in order to prevent the 
re-emergence of violent ethnic conflicts on the doorstep of the EU. Since 
the pre-accession conditionality of the CEEs had been perceived as a 
success, SAp-conditionality was developed, primarily, as a conflict 
resolution mechanism, an EU variant of the Responsibility to protect 
norm, however with specific conditional criteria attached to it. Even 
though the Copenhagen criteria are part of the conditionality package, 
the contextualised security-based conditions, largely regulated by the 
various peace treaties, are an important part of SAp-conditionality.  
 
Furthermore, since the prevention of inter-ethnic tensions underpins 
much of the SAp-conditionality, assessments of the de jure situation were 
also complemented by assessments of the de facto situation, which was 
blatant also in the area of the non-discrimination norm. However, as 
opposed to the universal justice-based norm, which accounts for a high 
level of legal precision, the complexity of the more contextualised 
security-based norms is two-fold, which makes compliance difficult, not 
in terms of de jure rule adoption, but in terms of meeting the 
recommendations of the monitoring bodies, which are more focused on 
the de facto situation. First, the content of the norms is stipulated in a very 
general fashion, allowing for different interpretations, not only from the 
recipient States’ authorities, but also from the monitoring bodies, 
depending upon the security contexts of the recipient states. Second, and 
added to the legal imprecision of the norms, even though the regulatory 
frameworks of the peace treaties had initially set the bar as to the level of 
the extensiveness of legislation in each of the states of the Western 
Balkans, concomitantly, the assessments are made on the basis of the 
articles of the FCNM. Whereas the basis of the peace treaties had almost 
exclusively been centred on guaranteeing that minorities would be 
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provided with extensive language rights299, the articles of the FCNM, and 
the recommendations of the monitoring bodies, are, equally, focused on 
the fact that these minority language rights provisions should not be 
made to the detriment of the strengthening of the State languages.  
 
The inconsistencies, between the legal frameworks and the 
recommendations of the monitoring bodies, are, particularly, pertinent 
both in the cases where extensive minority language rights are provided 
for (Macedonia and Kosovo), and also in the case where these language 
rights are very modest (Bosnia). In Kosovo and Macedonia, the 
construction of political stability was considered to require far-reaching 
minority language rights, particularly for the Serb and the Albanian 
minorities, respectively. Thus, one component of UN resolution 1244 was 
to provide for very extensive language rights for the Serb minority. In 
Macedonia language rights for the Albanian minority was the pivot of the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement that set the regulations which provided for 
the same extensive language rights as in Kosovo.  
 
At the same time, and on the basis of concerns over increasing 
segregation between the major communities in the two states, and based 
on the articles of the FCNM, the recommendations of the monitoring 
bodies also point to the importance of the introduction of bilingualism, as 
a means of overcoming the division between the former warring parties. 
With the aim of bridging the gap between the linguistic communities in 
both states, the strengthening of the official languages has been 
recommended, since this has been seen as vital for the promotion of the 
national cohesion of the respective states. However, the challenges that 
these recommendations entail, are enormous, because guarantees of 
extensive minority language rights have been seen as instrumental to 
resolve the inter-ethnic violence, as enshrined in the peace treaties. The 
introduction of the Albanian language as obligatory in the Kosovo-
Serbian curriculum has not been an easy task, and neither has the reverse, 
i.e. to make the learning of Serbian compulsory to Albanian pupils. Even 
though some efforts of bilingualism were noted in the Macedonian case, 
the results have, so far, been quite fruitless. Increasing the complexity of 
the conditions set is the ambiguous stance of the monitoring bodies. 
                                                          
299 Except for the Dayton Peace Agreement which was almost exclusively centred on 
guaranteeing equal rights of the constituent nations which was made at the detriment of 
protecting minorities’ language rights.  
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Recognition is given to the importance of implementing the regulations of 
the peace treaties, since these are seen as vital to the political stability of 
these states.  
 
On the other hand, the regulations of the peace treaties, although not 
expressed directly by the monitoring bodies, seem to constitute part of 
the problem in terms of promoting reconciliation and multi-ethnicity, 
which are seen as the key to the viability of the political stability. The 
Bosnian case is very different, although equally challenging. Indeed, 
although the modest minority language rights have been recognised as a 
problem by the monitoring bodies, the challenges of the highly 
segregated Bosnian state are primarily found in the stark division 
between the three constituent nations. Indeed, the prerogatives granted to 
the three constituent nations, enshrined by the Dayton Peace Agreement, 
constitute both the foundation of the ethnic-based policies, as well as their 
preservation, which, in consequence, has led to very modest minority 
language rights provisions. 
 
The ambiguous stance of the monitoring bodies, as concerns the dilemma 
between ethnic accommodation and civic integration, is prevalent in the 
ENP-states as well, especially in the cases of Moldova and Georgia, where 
the weakness of the state languages is manifest, at the same time as 
minority language rights are very extensive in the Moldovan case, and 
decreasingly weak in Georgia. However, the ambiguous stance of the 
monitoring bodies does not have the same bearing on difficulties of 
compliance, since these states are temporally much more distant to the 
prospective EU membership reward. Since the incentives are less 
important, the adaptation pressure is considerably lower. Furthermore, 
even though the linguistic issue is highly politicised, particularly, in 
Georgia and Moldova, the ENP minority language rights conditionality is 
less complex, since it is limited to the legal framework of the FCNM, 
however vague the stipulated articles are. In addition, the ENP-
conditionality is less challenging to the EU. In fact, even though the path-
dependency of the ENP-conditionality has been argued to be strong, its 
end-goal is certainly less anchored in enlargement than the SAp-
conditionality. At the same time, it is true that even for the ENP-states, 
the Commission did leave the gate of membership expectations open, 
when declaring that this new relationship “would not in the medium-term 
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include a perspective of membership” (Kochenov 2008: 15, emphasis 
added).    
 
It is clear that even in the absence of an explicit promise of EU 
membership, as well as a lack of temporal devices, especially SAp-
conditionality has proven quite effective, at least as far as Croatia and 
Serbia goes. However, in those states which are the most ethnically 
segregated, it is blatant that SAp-conditionality, at least without an 
explicit temporal location, has largely failed. Not surprisingly, this 
situation is prevalent also in the ENP-states where the influence of the EU 
has been almost non-existent, at least in the areas of investigation. The 
risks of compliance fatigue in these weak states are challenging, and 
would call for greater incentives from the EU. These greater incentives 
would not necessarily have to entail the determination of the end-goals of 
either SAp-conditionality or ENP-conditionality, nor how speedily these 
could be reached. However, since the road to prospective EU 
membership most probably will be both cumbersome and time-
consuming for the weakest states, it would probably be wise to develop a 
system of gradual incentives, where the financial and political assistance 
would be tied to a system of gradual compliance. At the same time as a 
gradual conditionality-compliance approach seems urgent, in order to 
facilitate the road to the end-goal, in parallel, it seems highly risky to 
avoid a more explicit determination of the end-goal of full compliance. 
Risky in the sense that in cases where the recipient states have fully 
complied with the conditions set and the presumptive reward, i.e. EU 
membership, will not be awarded, this could create situations of 
heightened tensions in the near neighbourhood that the EU would be ill-
equipped to respond to. Furthermore, this plausible situation would in 
fact discredit the very essence of the conditionality policy, which, up until 
now, has been quite effective, at least in terms of making states adopt 
legislation to meet the EU requirements.  
 
The explicit determination of the end-goal of the security-based 
conditionalities, and particularly SAp-conditionality, is, however, highly 
unlikely, and is not only due to an enlargement fatigue and a lack of 
consensus pertaining to enlargement per se between the 27 EU member 
states. In fact, the lack of an end-goal to the current enlargement process 
points to a more generalised problem, which is anchored at the very 
nexus of the EU project itself. Indeed, since there has never been 
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consensus on the end-goal of the EU project, consequently, both, the 
enlargement process as well as the integration process, have been allowed 
to move in an ad hoc and unpredictable fashion. However, concerning 
especially the majority of the recipient states of SAp-conditionality, the 
stakes are much higher than during previous enlargement rounds, both 
to the recipient states themselves, but also to the EU. Although EU 
membership has not been explicitly promised, the EU has obligated itself 
to tie the future of these states into the European Union, without however 
giving the recipient states any serious incentives to be able to deliver on 
the unofficial promise. This has proven particularly problematic for the 
most ethnically segregated states. In fact, not only is the lack of temporal 
devices, in parallel to insufficient economic incentives, a problem, the lack 
of providing for clear political guidelines, as to the balance between 
ethnic accommodation and civic integration, is, equally, challenging, and 
does neither facilitate compliance nor ethnic reconciliation.  
 
The lack of consensus as to the end-goal of both SAp-conditionality and 
ENP-conditionality is likely to remain, and to constitute an enduring 
compliance problem for those states that are the most in need of support. 
Indeed, given that the EU, at present, is at a turning point where the euro-
crisis, at least temporarily, has put the integration process on hold, this is 
likely to have negative implications also for the enlargement process. 
However, just as the stagnation of the integration process is detrimental 
to handling the euro-crisis, a stagnation of the enlargement process is 
likely to produce tensions in the weakest states, whose consequences are 
difficult to predict, not only for the recipient states themselves, but also 
for the EU.  
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